William C. Snyder Discusses Huawei as a Security Threat With The Verge

Is Huawei a Security Threat? Seven Experts Weigh In

(The Verge | March 17, 2019) The United States government is cracking down hard on Huawei. Lawmakers and intelligence officials have claimed the telecommunications giant could be exploited by the Chinese government for espionage, presenting a potentially grave national security risk, especially as the US builds out its next-generation 5G network. To meet that threat, officials say, they’ve blocked government use of the company’s equipment, while the Justice Department has also accused Huawei’s chief financial officer of violating sanctions against Iran, and the company itself of stealing trade secrets.

Huawei’s status as a threat is hardly unique. Not only are other Chinese companies such as ZTE and China Mobile embedded in the supply chain, but so are those of other countries.

Huawei’s response has been simple: it’s not a security threat. Most importantly, the company’s leaders have said the US has not produced evidence that it works inappropriately with the Chinese government or that it would in the future. Moreover, they say, there are ways to mitigate risk — ones that have worked successfully in other countries. Huawei’s chairman has even gone so far as to call the US government hypocritical, criticizing China while the National Security Agency spies around the globe. The company has also denied any criminal wrongdoing …

WILLIAM SNYDER, PROFESSOR OF LAW, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Huawei is a threat to US national security, but that misses the bigger point. Vulnerabilities in the supply chain of network hardware and software is, has been, and will continue to be a threat to the national security of the United States and many other countries, including China. It remains very difficult to audit that a chip with millions of embedded transistors or software with millions of lines of code does only what consumers know and consent to it doing. Even if Huawei is not committing the sort of crimes for which a US grand jury indicted it, any company that supplies such a large percentage of the market for components of telecommunications networks and has such ties to the People’s Liberation Army is a threat. Huawei’s need to operate under Chinese laws about cooperation with Chinese military and intelligence agencies is of concern.

Huawei’s status as a threat is hardly unique. Not only are other Chinese companies such as ZTE and China Mobile embedded in the supply chain, but so are those of other countries. Huawei itself buys components from major US firms, including Qualcomm. Those companies are subject to US laws concerning cooperation with US intelligence agencies. Given the essentially free market economy of the United States, rarely, if ever, will a US company be as closely tied to the government as Chinese companies are. Still, if you are a security policymaker of a nation like India — with several times the population of the US — wouldn’t you worry about how many major militaries have back doors into your networks?

As long as conflict occurs at the nation-state level while critical cyber networks are designed and manufactured internationally, we all must be very careful. This is a systemic problem. Currently, Huawei’s size and ties to the PLA make it the focus of concern. In the future, another supply chain threat will take center stage.

Read the full article.

 

A Brief Look at European Security & Defense: Franco-German Steps to Renew the EU?

By Kamil Szubart

On March 4, 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron published an opinion piece titled “For European Renewal” in the biggest newspapers across Europe. The article is, according to the French president, a roadmap for reviving an idea of the European integration that is threatened by the growth of nationalism and populist movements across Europe, the forthcoming “Brexit,” and the crisis of the European Union as a political project most of all.

A short passage of Macron’s article focuses on the future of European security and defense ahead of the UK’s exit from the EU. Brexit has been a hot topic, which European leaders have touched upon for two and a half years. In his piece, Macron explains that the EU, in the past two years, has reached substantial progress about European security and defense matters. He also encourages Europe to continue these successful efforts by setting “a clear course”, namely “a treaty on defense and security” that “should define our fundamental obligations in association with NATO and our European allies: increased defense spending, a truly operational defense clause, and the European Security Council with the United Kingdom on board to prepare our collective decisions”.

The Aachen Treaty as the First Footstep

Macron’s remarks are not something new. These ideas saw progress a couple of weeks ago (Jan. 22, 2019) when the French president and his German counterpart Chancellor Angela Merkel signed the Franco-German Treaty on Cooperation and Integration in a western German city of Aachen, commonly known as the Aachen Treaty. The declaration alludes to the Élysée Treaty signed by both countries 56 years ago (Jan. 22, 1963). The treaty’s preamble emphasizes the need to continue intensive bilateral cooperation between both countries as well as on forum of international organizations such as the EU and the United Nations. Much attention in the document has been devoted to the issue of security and defense, including Chapter II on “Peace, Security, and Development.” The Aachen Treaty confirms an absolute need for close cooperation between Berlin and Paris in the area of security and defense policies, internal affairs (e.g., combating terrorism and organized crime), and further integration of arms industries of both countries.

Germany and France declared mutual military assistance in case of aggression, resulting from Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and article 42.7 of the EU Treaty. Berlin and Paris also committed themselves to work toward the cohesion and the credibility of European defense and the development of defense programs, as well as the reconstruction of cooperation within the framework of the German-French Defense and Security Council and—if possible—the presentation of a joint position at the EU and the UN.

Ambitions Versus Harsh Reality

Both Macron’s article and the Aachen Treaty embody a couple of somewhat strategic or operational limitations. Let us look closer at some of them.

First of all, the Aachen Treaty likely will not lead to the creation of a new paradigm in the field of European security and defense based on cooperation between France and Germany. Thus, there is no serious threat to NATO and its strategic planning process (NDPP) nor to initiatives developed under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Secondly, the document is only a political declaration that refers to those already being developed jointly through Berlin and Paris programs currently on various levels. It should be noted that both countries differ in the assessment of many of these projects. One of the best examples is Germany’s and France’s approaches to crisis management operations in the EU’s southern neighborhood, specifically North Africa. France permits itself to conduct combat operations against extremist groups in the Sahel region, while the Germans focus on advisory and training activities towards local security forces and providing humanitarian aid. For years, Germany and France have participated in two missions under the auspices of the UN (MINUSMA) and the EU’s training mission (EUTM Mali) in the Sahel region. The French Armed Forces, next to MINUSMA, also carry out a counterterrorism operation called Opération Barkhane.

Thirdly, The Aachen Treaty references the need to establish the “common strategic culture” of both countries despite Germany and France representing different strategic cultures regarding the use of military power and overseas deployments. Therefore, this demand should be interpreted only in terms of a political declaration.

For instance, the process of deploying the Armed Forces in France is much quicker than in Germany. This depends on the positions of the armed forces and political command and control over them in the constitutional systems of France and Germany. But differences between Paris and Berlin also occur at the operational level. France can deploy abroad in approximately 20,000 troops; Germany up to 5,000. Moreover, the German Bundeswehr faces a significant deficit in strategic airlift capabilities, depending on the assistance provided by the US or commercial transportation enterprises. On the other hand, France has at its disposal a well-developed chain of military bases worldwide, in South America, the Middle East, and Africa. France also remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power.

Fourthly, the Aachen Treaty calls for establishing common standards and rules for arms exports. However, it will be likely problematic to develop and set up a common position on arms goods. Despite the cooperation on the EU arms industry market, German and French arms companies compete for each other on non-European markets, above all in the Middle East and in southeastern Asia.

Fifthly, Despite the appeal in the Aachen Treaty to the need to continue efforts to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the EU, its operationalization will not be possible in the short term. In the first place, there is a difference in its definition by both partners. For France, the EU strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense are mainly actions for strategic emancipation from the US, and its military presence in Europe, which is negatively received by some EU countries, especially NATO’s eastern flank. For the Germans, however, EU strategic autonomy is first and foremost an option for the EU in respect to its southern neighborhood. According to Germany, the EU’s southern neighborhood remains outside the primary interest of NATO and the US, while France treats that region as its sphere of influence.

Moreover, Berlin remains strongly skeptical about plans to give the EU the central role as a security provider for the EU countries in the face of threats posed by Russia. Despite disputes between Germany and the Trump Administration on burden-sharing, the US and NATO remain vital pillars of Germany’s security policy and guarantors of peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. In Germany’s view, security and defense policy activities taken by the EU will strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

Sixthly, Berlin and Paris realize what London’s security and defense capabilities mean for their security, especially counterterrorism. France has payed particular attention to its European Intervention Initiative (EII/EI2) launched in June 2018 and composed currently of 10 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK). Paris needs both Berlin’s and London’s buy-in for the development of EII/EI2. In the case of Germany, France expects political support; in the case of the British, their military capabilities.

The Aachen Treaty’s declarations on strengthening cooperation between Germany and France concerning counterterrorism and combating organized crime should be considered appropriate. Although there are EU mechanisms in this realm—including the Schengen Information System or Europol—there is still less effectiveness than there should be. For instance, EU member countries still selectively provide intelligence data for their everyday use. Cooperation in this field should not, however, have an exclusive character, limiting itself to German-French cooperation. It should be extended to other EU member countries.

INSCT Research and Practice Associate Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at INSCT, via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He works as an analyst for the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznan, Poland, where he is responsible for German foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic threats in German-native-speaking countries and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and the UN. Currently, he is working on a doctoral dissertation examining US-German relations in the field of international security since 9/11.

 

Robert B. Murrett Talks Korea War Games with Stars & Stripes

US, S. Korea officially call off annual military exercises amid nuclear talks with N. Korea

(Stars & Stripes | March 2, 2019) The United States and South Korea canceled key war games in favor of low-profile drills, the allies said Sunday, in a major concession to North Korea days after its nuclear summit with President Donald Trump collapsed without agreement.

“It’s very serious because I think our capability with respect to the Korean Peninsula is in the process of atrophying at all the levels.”

The springtime exercises known as Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, along with their autumn counterpart Ulchi Freedom Guardian, have long been the lynchpin of the alliance between Seoul and Washington.

The drills, which include computer simulations and live-fire bombing runs, also have been a touchstone for tensions as the North considers them a rehearsal for an invasion.

The decision to cancel Key Resolve and Foal Eagle had been widely expected after Trump reiterated his own antipathy for the drills, which he has called “very expensive” and “provocative” …

… Last year, the Pentagon said it saved about $14 million with the cancellation of Ulchi Freedom Guardian, which was comparable in size and scope to Foal Eagle and Key Resolve.

Retired Navy Vice Adm. Robert Murrett said small-scale training is insufficient to prepare commanders and troops from both countries to overcome language and other difficulties to fight together if needed.

“That’s a little bit of a Band-Aid, but it doesn’t substitute the larger scale engagement we need to have,” said Murrett, now a Syracuse University professor.

“It’s very serious because I think our capability with respect to the Korean Peninsula is in the process of atrophying at all the levels,” he added.

Read the full article.

Brown Shirts, White Sheets, Red Hats: Beware Politicized Colors

By David M. Crane 

(Re-published from The Hill | March 3, 2019) Symbolism is critical to the political process, perhaps essential. At the ballot box, voters take these symbols in with them to identify a candidate who aligns that symbol with their political beliefs.

Politicians who have motives other than good governance can hide behind the shield of these freedoms.

Catchphrases, articles of clothing, and color are all part of our political paradigm. It allows supporters of a candidate to identify with others of like mind. Collective identity builds a base upon which a candidate wins an election and to govern.

There is nothing sinister about any of this in a larger sense. However, it can be sinister, divisive, and calculating, with an ultimate goal of control and governance by fear and hate.

It is this sinister calculus that citizens should be wary of, particularly citizens of liberal democracies where freedom of speech and expression are hallmarks to that democracy.

Politicians who have motives other than good governance can hide behind the shield of these freedoms, emerging to use their symbols to assist them in taking political control for more sinister reasons.

Modern history is replete with symbols, particularly clothing and colors, where politicians legitimately gain power, pivot, and seize ultimate control. Adolf Hitler and his henchmen were masters of using symbols and colors to create a national socialist agenda. The “Brownshirts,” party enthusiasts who believed in a greater Aryan nation, come quickly to mind.

In America, symbolism and colors also play an important part in our political and social discourse. Red and blue seem to be popular colors, also white. Suffragists wore a yellow sash, and the color white has symbolized the emancipation of women unifying for a proper cause. However, the white robe of the Ku Klux Klan captures how symbols and color can be used to promote division, hate, and fear for the sordid purpose of promoting a white America.

Over the past two years, another colored article of clothing has entered the political arena: a red hat. The “MAGA hat,” for President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan, has come to identify not just the president’s political agenda but those who have bought into his philosophy …

Read the full article.

Now retired from teaching at Syracuse University College of Law, David M. Crane is an INSCT Research & Practice Associate.

James E. Baker Gives Keynote at Cyber Command Legal Conference

INSCT Director the Hon. James E. Baker gave the keynote address on the first day of the 2019 US Cyber Command Interagency Legal Conference, held at Andrews Air Force Base, MD. Titled “Achieving and Maintaining Cyberspace Superiority,” the conference takes place over March 4-7, 2019.

The 2019 conference focuses on the 2018 Command Vision for the US Cyber Command, and it provides the opportunity to discuss the domestic and international law implications of confronting long-term strategic competition in cyberspace. The first two days of the conference are unclassified, before the conference splits to allow discussion of classified information and strategy.

Among the topics of discussion during the unclassified portion are “Enhancing Domestic Resiliency Through Public/Private Partnerships,” “The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act,” and “Defending Forward: International Law and Norms Development.” Baker is joined at the conference by COL Gary Corn, Staff Judge Advocate, US Cyber Command; Paul Rosenzweig, Red Branch Consulting, LLC; Robert Chesney, University of Texas School of Law; and Laura Dickenson, Research Professor of Law, George Washington Law School.

Foreign Policy Discusses Southern Border Troop Deployment with William C. Banks

Pentagon Chief Weighs Broader Approach to Border Security

(Foreign Policy | Feb. 25, 2019) The US military is sending an additional 1,000 troops to the border with Mexico, bringing the number of US military personnel there—both active-duty and National Guard—to about 6,000, a senior defense official told reporters at the Pentagon on Feb. 22.

That’s a significant chunk of military resources going toward a mission that can only legally be performed by domestic law enforcement such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers: border security. Under the Posse Comitatus Act, the US military is prohibited from taking any direct role in law enforcement—including search, seizure, apprehension, or arrest.

So what, then, are those 6,000 troops actually doing there? So far, the US military has functioned primarily in a supporting role—installing concertina wire, transporting law enforcement officers by air, providing medical services to migrants, hardening points of entry, and helping with surveillance. In addition to stringing another 140 miles of concertina wire, the troops will be supporting the CBP officers between the points of entry, as well as installing ground-based detection systems, the senior defense official said.

The goal is “freeing up agents and putting them in a law enforcement role instead of administrative duties,” according to the official.

Despite their restricted role, it now seems like the troops on the border are there for the long term. As the Trump administration trumpets the so-called national security crisis of border security—and seeks to divert billions of dollars in military funding to building his long-promised border wall—the Pentagon is reassessing the role of the US military in securing the border …

… But William Banks, an emeritus professor at Syracuse University’s College of Law and Maxwell School, believes there is no “clear, positive legal authority” for active-duty US troops to be at the US-Mexico border. The surveillance and detection role could pose a particular problem, he added.

The laws allowing US military forces to conduct surveillance in support of CBP officers dates back to the “war on drugs” in the 1980s and were specifically designed for counter-drug activities, Banks explained.

That means that any surveillance the US military is conducting that is not directly related to drug trafficking—for example, monitoring the border for illegal crossings—could be challenged in a court of law …

Pentagon Chief Weighs Broader Approach to Border Security

Space Force is a Bureaucratic Mess in Search of a Problem

By Sean O’Keefe

(Re-published from The Hill | Feb. 22, 2019) Earlier this week, Space Policy Directive – 4 was announced to start the process to create a new uniformed service of the armed forces to be designated as the U.S. Space Force. This will surely focus a lot of debate on space but doesn’t address the problem it’s designed to correct.

Beneath the Air Force secretary will be a new military four star general as chief of staff for Space Force, who will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After considerable debate in Washington, the directive emerged as an organizational compromise to create Space Force as a subcomponent of the Department of the Air Force akin to the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy. The effect of this bureaucratic victory avoids establishing a new civilian leadership chain to the secretary of Defense. The secretary of the Air Force is a direct report to DOD supported by the offices of an under secretary, assistant secretaries and general counsel, like the Army and Navy Departments. Enactment of the Space Force directive would also add another civilian under secretary for Space.

But there’s more — potentially much more. Beneath the Air Force secretary will be a new military four star general as chief of staff for Space Force, who will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all the associated military support structure that will mirror the Department of Defense structure today for each military service — the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, the National Guard Bureau and now Space Force.

The modest upside is that the civilian chain of the command doesn’t get too much more complicated than it already is other than accommodating a new under secretary. But 95 percent of the indirect cost is wrapped up in all the functional process units to be built around the typical overhead structures to administer budgets, programs, personnel, contracts, logistics and the very complex acquisition support for this new military service.

The Marine Corps is comparatively lean and much smaller than the Army, Navy or Air Force. But each of these functional organizations dedicated to Marine Corps matters are within the Department of the Navy which has a parallel collection of units that support Navy matters. The secretary of the Navy presides over this dual set of stove pipe organizations, the same way the secretary of the Air Force will have two different military services reporting to “organize, train and equip” the armed services. This is the standard responsibility of all of the military departments today …

Read the full article.

INSCT Faculty Member and Maxwell School Professor Sean O’Keefe served as secretary of the Navy and NASA administrator in the George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush administrations.

The Kaleidoscopic Conflict That Is Syria

By David M. Crane

(Re-published from The Hill | Feb. 24, 2019) “It is not clear whether our culture can ever develop sufficient knowledge, rigor, imagination and humility to grasp the phenomenon of [ISIS]. But for now, we should admit that we are not only horrified but baffled.” — Anonymous, the New York Review of Books, Aug. 13, 2015.

These dirty little wars have become “kaleidoscopic” in nature, and the winding-down conflict in Syria is a prime example of how bizarre conflict has become.

In the information age, the concept of warfare and conflict are changing and shifting. Industrial-age warfare lingers, but fades as a possibility. Twentieth-century wars most likely are not the future of conflict. The new high ground is cyberspace. The battles of the 21st century largely will be fought on the World Wide Web.

Yet human conflict will continue. It is in our nature. Military historian John Keegan stated simply that the history of war is the history of mankind, and the history of mankind is war. We never will “buy the world a home and furnish it with love,” as the creators of the 1971 Coca-Cola commercial imagined. As comedian and social critic George Carlin said: “Life is tough, then you die.”

Conflict has evolved from the agricultural age, when armies stood in a field, toe to toe, beating and striking one another until one army yielded and left the field. In the industrial age, conflict became more deadly, the weapons systems more anonymous and destructive. Civilian populations were at risk and destroyed wholesale. In the information age, conflict became more precise, though civilians still pay the ultimate price.

Throughout the 20th century, mankind tried to control the horror of war through law and, towards the end of that bloody century, to hold accountable heads of state who caused conflict, particularly when they targeted their own citizens. The age of accountability, which started at Nuremberg and rose to prominence over the past 25 years, also has begun to lose its effectiveness in securing international peace and security. The dirty little wars in this age will be fought in dark corners of the world, where the parties will not follow the laws of armed conflict.

Nearly two decades into this century, conflict has almost reverted to the agricultural age — bloody, toe to toe, lawless.

Modern armies are not trained for this type of warfare. These dirty little wars have become “kaleidoscopic” in nature, and the winding-down conflict in Syria is a prime example of how bizarre conflict has become. At one point in Syria, the United States was fighting one side, working with that same side to defeat a common enemy (ISIS), and providing military support to many of the various groups found in that conflict. We were shooting in every direction, being shot at by the very weapons we were supplying to the parties to the conflict. How crazy is that!

To add to the confusion, the military situation completely changed on a daily — and surely a weekly — basis. Where one thing changed, everything changed; hence, the description that warfare had become kaleidoscopic.

None of the doctrinal norms in planning for future conflicts applies. We cannot anticipate what the next dirty little war will look like, which causes strain to the deliberate planning process within the Department of Defense. Syria stressed our systems. Very little that our various services were capable of bringing to the battlefield applied or were effective. On any given day at the height of the Syrian conflict, no one could predict what would happen next. Commanders and their planners were not just shooting in every direction, we also did not know what our objectives were or what the end-state would be. It remains so even today …

Read the full article.

 
 

Now retired from teaching at Syracuse University College of Law, David M. Crane is an INSCT Research & Practice Associate.

William C. Banks Scholarship Included in Groundbreaking Disaster Risk Management Handbook

Disaster Risk HandbookProfessor Emeritus William C. Banks is among the authors included in a groundbreaking handbook for the emerging fields of disaster risk management and disaster risk reduction (DRR) law. The Cambridge Handbook of Disaster Risk Reduction and International Law (Cambridge, 2019) is edited by Katja L. H. Samuel, Marie Aronsson-Storrier, and Kirsten Nakjavani Bookmiller. Banks’ chapter—”Improving Disaster Risk Mitigation: Towards a ‘Multi-Hazard’ Approach to Terrorism”—is co-authored with Samuel and Daphné Richemond-Barak, of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel.

Yet the law sector itself remains relatively under-developed, including a paucity of supporting ‘DRR law’ scholarship and minimal cross-sectoral engagement.

The new handbook introduces concepts of DRR, especially DRR law; highlights the critical need for broader cross-sectoral engagement on DRR issues; looks at the multi-sectoral approaches of the Sendai Framework, especially between law, science, and technology; contributes to the development of DRR related law, policy, and practice; and informs law and policy makers of the growing importance of DRR law through comparative analysis of multiple regimes.

Write the co-editors in their introduction, “The number, intensity, and impact of diverse forms of ‘natural’ and ‘human-made’ disasters are increasing. In response, the international community has shifted its primary focus away from disaster response to prevention and improved preparedness.

“The current globally agreed upon roadmap is the ambitious Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, central to which is the better understanding of disaster risk management and mitigation. Sendai also urges innovative implementation, especially multi-sectoral and multi-hazard coherence.

“Yet the law sector itself remains relatively under-developed, including a paucity of supporting ‘DRR law’ scholarship and minimal cross-sectoral engagement. Commonly, this is attributable to limited understanding by other sectors about law’s dynamic potential as a tool of disaster risk mitigation, despite the availability of many risk-related norms across a broad spectrum of legal regimes.”

FBI’s Human Rights Investigators Are Critical to Prosecuting “Atrocity Crimes”

By David M. Crane, Stephen Rapp, Clint Williamson, and Beth Van Schaack

(Re-published from The Hill | Feb. 22, 2019) For over seven decades, the United States has stood as the cornerstone of a rules-based global system that arose from the ashes of World War II, organizing and leading a united group of nations as they held major violators to account at international tribunals convened in Nuremberg and Tokyo.

This world order is under threat as strongmen abound and governments step back from the advances made.

The Nuremberg Principles — which take as their starting point the promise that “any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment” — were woven into the fabric of our system of international peace and security. Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these global pronouncements protect the rights of every human being, demand accountability for grave international crimes, and undergird our entire structure of atrocity accountability.

On the domestic level, the United States has incorporated a number of international crimes into the federal penal code, ensuring that prosecutors have the legal authority they need to address crimes within the jurisdictional reach of our courts.

This world order is under threat as strongmen abound and governments step back from the advances made. Here in the United States, we have seen troubling indications of a diminishing commitment to the protection of human rights and support for atrocity accountability. In one recent development, the FBI reportedly intends to disband its International Human Rights Investigation Unit (IHRU).

At present, the IHRU plays an essential law enforcement role in bringing perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice in the United States by investigating suspected perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, torture, recruitment of child soldiers, and female genital mutilation, among other offenses. This includes crimes committed abroad when the perpetrator is within reach, and crimes committed by or against U.S. citizens.

The IHRU continues the U.S. law enforcement commitment that began with successful efforts to track down Nazi war criminals living in the United States and to remove them to venues where they could face justice. Its stated mission is “to mitigate the most significant threats posed by international human rights violators through effective intelligence collection and targeted enforcement action” through coordination with other domestic agencies, as well as its counterparts in foreign countries and INTERPOL.

The IHRU is an essential partner in a co-located task force with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit. Together, this team presents cases to Department of Justice attorneys for prosecution. This inter-agency team has been successful in bringing perpetrators of atrocities in Guatemala, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to justice in U.S. courts. Most recently, its work resulted in convictions of two Liberian warlords in federal court in Philadelphia …

Read the full article.

Now retired from teaching at Syracuse University College of Law, David M. Crane is an INSCT Research & Practice Associate.