Corri Zoli Presents Terrorism, Security Papers at ISA 2019

Corri Zoli, Director of Research at the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, presented two papers and was a panel discussant at the 2019 International Studies Association Annual Convention in Toronto, Canada, on March 27 and 28, 2019.

At the Wednesday session of “Revisioning International Studies: Innovation and Progress,” Zoli presented on the “Challenges for Contemporary Special Operations Forces” panel. Her paper—”Terrorist Critical Infrastructures, Organizational Capacity and Security Risk”—joined others on topics such as computer-mediated threat assessment, weak states, ethic conflict, and terrorists’ use of emerging technologies.

On Thursday, Zoli joined the “Shaping the National Security State” panel and read “Leviathan Revisited: Assessing National Security Institutions for Abuse of Power and Overreach.” Other papers on this panel addressed civil‐military relations, the defense industry, and Cold War Military Balance.

Later in the same day, Zoli was the Discussant on the panel “New Directions in Qualitative International Studies” chaired by Eric Stollenwerk of Freie Universität Berlin. This wide-ranging discussion looked at modern qualitative international studies through the lenses of multi-method research, philosophy, autoethnography, and public diplomacy.

 

The World at Night: 21st Century Global Security Challenges, with ADM Eric Olson (Ret.)

DATE: April 15, 2019
TIME: Noon
LOCATION: 350 Dineen Hall, Syracuse University College of Law

Eric OlsonADM Eric Olson (Ret.) is a former Commander of US Special Operations Command and Four-Star Admiral Navy SEAL. He is now President of ETO Group, consulting on national security; an Adjunct Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs; a Director of Iridium Communications; and a Director of the Special Operations Warrior Foundation.

William C. Banks Joins CSRR as Distinguished Senior Fellow

Rutgers Center for Security, Race, and Rights (CSRR) has announced that William C. Banks has joined CSRR team as a Distinguished Senior Fellow.

Banks is a Syracuse University College of Law Board of Advisors Distinguished Professor and Emeritus Professor at the College of Law and a Maxwell School Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs. During 2015-2016, Banks was Interim Dean of the College of Law. He is the Founding Director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism.

“I am especially pleased to join the Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR) as a Distinguished Senior Fellow,” says Banks. “Centers such as CSRR are an essential counterweight to the tendencies of governments that see security and terrorism problems through a religious and racial lens. While respect for basic human and civil rights should be at the undeniable core of law and policy in governments worldwide, glaring and persistent abuses abound. CSRR is an important voice for drawing attention to rights shortfalls and showing the way toward more just laws and policies.”

Corri Zoli Interviewed by CNY Central About the New Zealand Mosque Shootings

(CNY Central | March 15, 2019) “We bring in a new perspective on an awful topic a woman we turn to often in times like this. Corri Zoli is an assistant professor at the Maxwell school at Syracuse University … why the recordings? why record what you’ve done?”

“I think this is a kind of classic terrorist tactic that we’ve been seeing since you know 2010 at the least where ISIS and al-Qaeda. I remember in the Toulouse attacks in France, for instance, where they recorded the attacks against a Jewish school with a GoPro video” …

William C. Snyder Discusses Huawei as a Security Threat With The Verge

Is Huawei a Security Threat? Seven Experts Weigh In

(The Verge | March 17, 2019) The United States government is cracking down hard on Huawei. Lawmakers and intelligence officials have claimed the telecommunications giant could be exploited by the Chinese government for espionage, presenting a potentially grave national security risk, especially as the US builds out its next-generation 5G network. To meet that threat, officials say, they’ve blocked government use of the company’s equipment, while the Justice Department has also accused Huawei’s chief financial officer of violating sanctions against Iran, and the company itself of stealing trade secrets.

Huawei’s status as a threat is hardly unique. Not only are other Chinese companies such as ZTE and China Mobile embedded in the supply chain, but so are those of other countries.

Huawei’s response has been simple: it’s not a security threat. Most importantly, the company’s leaders have said the US has not produced evidence that it works inappropriately with the Chinese government or that it would in the future. Moreover, they say, there are ways to mitigate risk — ones that have worked successfully in other countries. Huawei’s chairman has even gone so far as to call the US government hypocritical, criticizing China while the National Security Agency spies around the globe. The company has also denied any criminal wrongdoing …

WILLIAM SNYDER, PROFESSOR OF LAW, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Huawei is a threat to US national security, but that misses the bigger point. Vulnerabilities in the supply chain of network hardware and software is, has been, and will continue to be a threat to the national security of the United States and many other countries, including China. It remains very difficult to audit that a chip with millions of embedded transistors or software with millions of lines of code does only what consumers know and consent to it doing. Even if Huawei is not committing the sort of crimes for which a US grand jury indicted it, any company that supplies such a large percentage of the market for components of telecommunications networks and has such ties to the People’s Liberation Army is a threat. Huawei’s need to operate under Chinese laws about cooperation with Chinese military and intelligence agencies is of concern.

Huawei’s status as a threat is hardly unique. Not only are other Chinese companies such as ZTE and China Mobile embedded in the supply chain, but so are those of other countries. Huawei itself buys components from major US firms, including Qualcomm. Those companies are subject to US laws concerning cooperation with US intelligence agencies. Given the essentially free market economy of the United States, rarely, if ever, will a US company be as closely tied to the government as Chinese companies are. Still, if you are a security policymaker of a nation like India — with several times the population of the US — wouldn’t you worry about how many major militaries have back doors into your networks?

As long as conflict occurs at the nation-state level while critical cyber networks are designed and manufactured internationally, we all must be very careful. This is a systemic problem. Currently, Huawei’s size and ties to the PLA make it the focus of concern. In the future, another supply chain threat will take center stage.

Read the full article.

 

A Brief Look at European Security & Defense: Franco-German Steps to Renew the EU?

By Kamil Szubart

On March 4, 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron published an opinion piece titled “For European Renewal” in the biggest newspapers across Europe. The article is, according to the French president, a roadmap for reviving an idea of the European integration that is threatened by the growth of nationalism and populist movements across Europe, the forthcoming “Brexit,” and the crisis of the European Union as a political project most of all.

A short passage of Macron’s article focuses on the future of European security and defense ahead of the UK’s exit from the EU. Brexit has been a hot topic, which European leaders have touched upon for two and a half years. In his piece, Macron explains that the EU, in the past two years, has reached substantial progress about European security and defense matters. He also encourages Europe to continue these successful efforts by setting “a clear course”, namely “a treaty on defense and security” that “should define our fundamental obligations in association with NATO and our European allies: increased defense spending, a truly operational defense clause, and the European Security Council with the United Kingdom on board to prepare our collective decisions”.

The Aachen Treaty as the First Footstep

Macron’s remarks are not something new. These ideas saw progress a couple of weeks ago (Jan. 22, 2019) when the French president and his German counterpart Chancellor Angela Merkel signed the Franco-German Treaty on Cooperation and Integration in a western German city of Aachen, commonly known as the Aachen Treaty. The declaration alludes to the Élysée Treaty signed by both countries 56 years ago (Jan. 22, 1963). The treaty’s preamble emphasizes the need to continue intensive bilateral cooperation between both countries as well as on forum of international organizations such as the EU and the United Nations. Much attention in the document has been devoted to the issue of security and defense, including Chapter II on “Peace, Security, and Development.” The Aachen Treaty confirms an absolute need for close cooperation between Berlin and Paris in the area of security and defense policies, internal affairs (e.g., combating terrorism and organized crime), and further integration of arms industries of both countries.

Germany and France declared mutual military assistance in case of aggression, resulting from Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and article 42.7 of the EU Treaty. Berlin and Paris also committed themselves to work toward the cohesion and the credibility of European defense and the development of defense programs, as well as the reconstruction of cooperation within the framework of the German-French Defense and Security Council and—if possible—the presentation of a joint position at the EU and the UN.

Ambitions Versus Harsh Reality

Both Macron’s article and the Aachen Treaty embody a couple of somewhat strategic or operational limitations. Let us look closer at some of them.

First of all, the Aachen Treaty likely will not lead to the creation of a new paradigm in the field of European security and defense based on cooperation between France and Germany. Thus, there is no serious threat to NATO and its strategic planning process (NDPP) nor to initiatives developed under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Secondly, the document is only a political declaration that refers to those already being developed jointly through Berlin and Paris programs currently on various levels. It should be noted that both countries differ in the assessment of many of these projects. One of the best examples is Germany’s and France’s approaches to crisis management operations in the EU’s southern neighborhood, specifically North Africa. France permits itself to conduct combat operations against extremist groups in the Sahel region, while the Germans focus on advisory and training activities towards local security forces and providing humanitarian aid. For years, Germany and France have participated in two missions under the auspices of the UN (MINUSMA) and the EU’s training mission (EUTM Mali) in the Sahel region. The French Armed Forces, next to MINUSMA, also carry out a counterterrorism operation called Opération Barkhane.

Thirdly, The Aachen Treaty references the need to establish the “common strategic culture” of both countries despite Germany and France representing different strategic cultures regarding the use of military power and overseas deployments. Therefore, this demand should be interpreted only in terms of a political declaration.

For instance, the process of deploying the Armed Forces in France is much quicker than in Germany. This depends on the positions of the armed forces and political command and control over them in the constitutional systems of France and Germany. But differences between Paris and Berlin also occur at the operational level. France can deploy abroad in approximately 20,000 troops; Germany up to 5,000. Moreover, the German Bundeswehr faces a significant deficit in strategic airlift capabilities, depending on the assistance provided by the US or commercial transportation enterprises. On the other hand, France has at its disposal a well-developed chain of military bases worldwide, in South America, the Middle East, and Africa. France also remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power.

Fourthly, the Aachen Treaty calls for establishing common standards and rules for arms exports. However, it will be likely problematic to develop and set up a common position on arms goods. Despite the cooperation on the EU arms industry market, German and French arms companies compete for each other on non-European markets, above all in the Middle East and in southeastern Asia.

Fifthly, Despite the appeal in the Aachen Treaty to the need to continue efforts to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the EU, its operationalization will not be possible in the short term. In the first place, there is a difference in its definition by both partners. For France, the EU strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense are mainly actions for strategic emancipation from the US, and its military presence in Europe, which is negatively received by some EU countries, especially NATO’s eastern flank. For the Germans, however, EU strategic autonomy is first and foremost an option for the EU in respect to its southern neighborhood. According to Germany, the EU’s southern neighborhood remains outside the primary interest of NATO and the US, while France treats that region as its sphere of influence.

Moreover, Berlin remains strongly skeptical about plans to give the EU the central role as a security provider for the EU countries in the face of threats posed by Russia. Despite disputes between Germany and the Trump Administration on burden-sharing, the US and NATO remain vital pillars of Germany’s security policy and guarantors of peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. In Germany’s view, security and defense policy activities taken by the EU will strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

Sixthly, Berlin and Paris realize what London’s security and defense capabilities mean for their security, especially counterterrorism. France has payed particular attention to its European Intervention Initiative (EII/EI2) launched in June 2018 and composed currently of 10 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK). Paris needs both Berlin’s and London’s buy-in for the development of EII/EI2. In the case of Germany, France expects political support; in the case of the British, their military capabilities.

The Aachen Treaty’s declarations on strengthening cooperation between Germany and France concerning counterterrorism and combating organized crime should be considered appropriate. Although there are EU mechanisms in this realm—including the Schengen Information System or Europol—there is still less effectiveness than there should be. For instance, EU member countries still selectively provide intelligence data for their everyday use. Cooperation in this field should not, however, have an exclusive character, limiting itself to German-French cooperation. It should be extended to other EU member countries.

INSCT Research and Practice Associate Kamil Szubart was a 2017 visiting fellow at INSCT, via the Kosciuszko Foundation. He works as an analyst for the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznan, Poland, where he is responsible for German foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Islamic threats in German-native-speaking countries and topics related to NATO, CSDP, OSCE, and the UN. Currently, he is working on a doctoral dissertation examining US-German relations in the field of international security since 9/11.

 

Robert B. Murrett Talks Korea War Games with Stars & Stripes

US, S. Korea officially call off annual military exercises amid nuclear talks with N. Korea

(Stars & Stripes | March 2, 2019) The United States and South Korea canceled key war games in favor of low-profile drills, the allies said Sunday, in a major concession to North Korea days after its nuclear summit with President Donald Trump collapsed without agreement.

“It’s very serious because I think our capability with respect to the Korean Peninsula is in the process of atrophying at all the levels.”

The springtime exercises known as Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, along with their autumn counterpart Ulchi Freedom Guardian, have long been the lynchpin of the alliance between Seoul and Washington.

The drills, which include computer simulations and live-fire bombing runs, also have been a touchstone for tensions as the North considers them a rehearsal for an invasion.

The decision to cancel Key Resolve and Foal Eagle had been widely expected after Trump reiterated his own antipathy for the drills, which he has called “very expensive” and “provocative” …

… Last year, the Pentagon said it saved about $14 million with the cancellation of Ulchi Freedom Guardian, which was comparable in size and scope to Foal Eagle and Key Resolve.

Retired Navy Vice Adm. Robert Murrett said small-scale training is insufficient to prepare commanders and troops from both countries to overcome language and other difficulties to fight together if needed.

“That’s a little bit of a Band-Aid, but it doesn’t substitute the larger scale engagement we need to have,” said Murrett, now a Syracuse University professor.

“It’s very serious because I think our capability with respect to the Korean Peninsula is in the process of atrophying at all the levels,” he added.

Read the full article.

Brown Shirts, White Sheets, Red Hats: Beware Politicized Colors

By David M. Crane 

(Re-published from The Hill | March 3, 2019) Symbolism is critical to the political process, perhaps essential. At the ballot box, voters take these symbols in with them to identify a candidate who aligns that symbol with their political beliefs.

Politicians who have motives other than good governance can hide behind the shield of these freedoms.

Catchphrases, articles of clothing, and color are all part of our political paradigm. It allows supporters of a candidate to identify with others of like mind. Collective identity builds a base upon which a candidate wins an election and to govern.

There is nothing sinister about any of this in a larger sense. However, it can be sinister, divisive, and calculating, with an ultimate goal of control and governance by fear and hate.

It is this sinister calculus that citizens should be wary of, particularly citizens of liberal democracies where freedom of speech and expression are hallmarks to that democracy.

Politicians who have motives other than good governance can hide behind the shield of these freedoms, emerging to use their symbols to assist them in taking political control for more sinister reasons.

Modern history is replete with symbols, particularly clothing and colors, where politicians legitimately gain power, pivot, and seize ultimate control. Adolf Hitler and his henchmen were masters of using symbols and colors to create a national socialist agenda. The “Brownshirts,” party enthusiasts who believed in a greater Aryan nation, come quickly to mind.

In America, symbolism and colors also play an important part in our political and social discourse. Red and blue seem to be popular colors, also white. Suffragists wore a yellow sash, and the color white has symbolized the emancipation of women unifying for a proper cause. However, the white robe of the Ku Klux Klan captures how symbols and color can be used to promote division, hate, and fear for the sordid purpose of promoting a white America.

Over the past two years, another colored article of clothing has entered the political arena: a red hat. The “MAGA hat,” for President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan, has come to identify not just the president’s political agenda but those who have bought into his philosophy …

Read the full article.

Now retired from teaching at Syracuse University College of Law, David M. Crane is an INSCT Research & Practice Associate.

James E. Baker Gives Keynote at Cyber Command Legal Conference

INSCT Director the Hon. James E. Baker gave the keynote address on the first day of the 2019 US Cyber Command Interagency Legal Conference, held at Andrews Air Force Base, MD. Titled “Achieving and Maintaining Cyberspace Superiority,” the conference takes place over March 4-7, 2019.

The 2019 conference focuses on the 2018 Command Vision for the US Cyber Command, and it provides the opportunity to discuss the domestic and international law implications of confronting long-term strategic competition in cyberspace. The first two days of the conference are unclassified, before the conference splits to allow discussion of classified information and strategy.

Among the topics of discussion during the unclassified portion are “Enhancing Domestic Resiliency Through Public/Private Partnerships,” “The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act,” and “Defending Forward: International Law and Norms Development.” Baker is joined at the conference by COL Gary Corn, Staff Judge Advocate, US Cyber Command; Paul Rosenzweig, Red Branch Consulting, LLC; Robert Chesney, University of Texas School of Law; and Laura Dickenson, Research Professor of Law, George Washington Law School.