Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism Director of Research Corri Zoli spoke to Syracuse-area channels 3/5 on March 9, 2018, about the overtures between the United States and North Korea on the subject of nuclear weapons. Zoli called them “interesting developments” that we should approach with a “healthy dose of skepticism” given North Korea’s broken promises in the past …
An interview with Robert O. Work, 31st US Deputy Secretary of Defense
By Octavian Manea (MAIR ’13)
(Re-published from Small Wars Journal | January 2018) Usually when we are talking about the Cold War, the first thing that we think in terms of a strategic framework is containment. But what has been the role the offset strategies played in the broader Cold War competition? In 1997, William Perry made an interesting observation that I think is worth reflecting on: “these strategies, containment, deterrence and offset strategy were the components of a broad holding strategy during the Cold War. I call it a holding strategy because it did not change the geopolitical conditions which led to the Cold War, but it did deter another World War and it did stem Soviet expansion in the world until the internal contradictions in the Soviet system finally caused the Soviet Union to collapse. The holding strategy worked.”
As Bill Perry suggests, technological offset strategies played an important role during the Cold War. The thinking about offset strategies can actually be traced to World War II. When the United States entered the war, planners concluded that the US would need over 200 infantry divisions and about 280 air combat groups to ultimately defeat the Axis powers. However, US leadership knew that if they built so many infantry divisions, the manpower they would need to work the arsenal of democracy wouldn’t be there. They therefore made a conscious decision to hold the number of infantry divisions to no more than 90 while keeping the 280 air combat groups. The thinking was that a “heavy fisted air arm” would help make up for the lack of infantry parity with the Axis powers.
The “90-division gamble” turned out to be a winner, but it was a close-run thing. In 1944, during the Battle of the Bulge, the US Army literally ran out of infantry, forcing leaders to rush untrained troops to the front. Despite this, the idea that technology could help offset an enemy’s strength took hold in American strategic thinking. As a result, throughout the Cold War, the US never tried to match the Soviet Union tank for tank, plane for plane, or soldier for soldier. It instead sought ways to “offset” the potential adversary’s advantages through technological superiority and technologically-enabled organizational constructs and operational concepts.
President Eisenhower was well aware of the 90-division gamble. When he became president, he asked how many infantry divisions it would take to deter a Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe. Coincidentally, he was told about 90 divisions. Eisenhower knew that having a “peacetime” standing army of that size was neither politically nor fiscally sustainable. To counter Soviet conventional superiority, he therefore opted for what is now thought of as the First Offset Strategy (1OS), which armed a much smaller US ground force with battlefield atomic weapons, and an explicit threat to use them on invading Warsaw Pact forces.
The 1OS strategy worked. We know this because the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies adopted a new campaign design to forestall NATO’s use of nuclear weapons early in a campaign. They planned to conduct conventional attacks in powerful successive echelons to achieve a penetration of the NATO front lines. Once a breach was achieved, an Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) would drive deep into NATO’s rear. The Soviets believed that once an OMG was operating behind NATO’s front lines, NATO leadership would be dissuaded or incapable of resorting to nuclear weapons. We’ll never know if NATO would have ever approved atomic attacks in response to a Warsaw Pact invasion. But we do know the 1OS provided a credible deterrent and had a major impact on Soviet thinking.
Fast-forward twenty years. While we were in Vietnam, the Soviet Union spent a huge amount of money in conventional equipment and technology. By the mid-1970s, there was a pervasive sense that the Soviet Union had achieved conventional superiority. This occurred around the same time the Soviets achieved strategic nuclear parity. Under these circumstances, underwriting NATO conventional deterrence with the threat of battlefield nuclear weapons simply wasn’t credible anymore. In this new context, the US sought to reassert conventional dominance in order to improve strategic stability.
The plan to reassert conventional dominance had many parts, including a move to an All-Volunteer Force, an emphasis on the operational level of war, a thorough force-wide modernization—think of the Army’s “Big Five”—and a renaissance in realistic, force-on-force training. All of these initiatives were, in turn, backed by Bill Perry’s Second Offset Strategy, which sought to arm new operational level battle networks with guided munitions and sub-munitions.
Battle networks were nothing new. The first modern battle network was the British home air defense network assembled at the start of World War II. Like all battle networks that followed, it had four interconnected grids. It had a sensor grid with radars, aircraft spotters and in the later stages of the campaign, electronic intelligence capabilities, all designed to sense the battlespace. It had an enormous command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) grid consisting of hardened underground command posts connected by radio and telephone that worked to make sense of what the enemy was doing, facilitate command decisions, and transmit orders to friendly forces. It had an effects grid consisting of Spitfire and Hurricane fighter squadrons, antiaircraft weapons, barrage balloons and electronic warfare capabilities designed to achieve the specific combat outcomes directed by the C3I grid. And it had a sustainment and regeneration grid that allowed the British to continue fighting and restore combat losses.
This battle network allowed the outnumbered British Air Forces to keep the larger German Luftwaffe from knocking Britain out of the war. Radar was the key sensor grid advance, which helped take surprise out of the Luftwaffe attacks. It informed the C3I grid when the bomber streams were coming and where they were headed. The C3I grid was able to exploit this information to mass the RAF’s relatively short-ranged fighters against German attacks, where they fought at line of sight ranges using unguided machine gun and cannon fire. The sustainment and regeneration grid kept producing fighters, and pilots who were shot down over their home territory had a much better chance of getting back into the fight. All this—along with heavy doses of bravery and skill—allowed the British to make up for their losses, continue the fight, and win the Battle of Britain.
The 2OS battle network had all the same characteristics of the British home air defense network, but it focused on the land battle. It relied on new airborne sensors that could see well beyond the NATO front lines to identify massing ground forces with the same ease air radar could identify massing air forces. By so doing, the sensor grid could discern the Warsaw Pact’s first, second and third echelon forces as they were forming up, and track them along their lines of approach. New C3I nodes and processes would quickly convert incoming sensor data to targeting information and transmit it directly to ground-based missile and air attack units armed with guided anti-armor munitions and submunitions. These guided weapons promised to be as accurate at their maximum effective ranges as they were at line-of-sight ranges. All this should allow the American battle network to “look deep and shoot deep,” and mount devastating attacks and advancing Soviet forces long before they reached NATO front lines. This new operational battle network would be demonstrated in an advanced concept technology demonstration called Assault Breaker, announced in 1976 when William Perry assigned DARPA to assemble its grids and test them using production prototype sensors and effectors.
Assault Breaker, and the 2OS it portended, really caught the Soviets’ attention. In 1979 the Soviets conducted a big war game in which they explored what might happen if NATO actually deployed the operational capability to hit successive attacking echelons with long-range guided munitions. The game suggested that if the battle network performed as the Americans expected, NATO would be able to break up a Warsaw Pact attack before a breakthrough could occur, and keep OMGs from getting into NATO’s rear without resorting to nuclear weapons.
When we successfully demonstrated the Assault Breaker concept in 1982-1983, the Soviets concluded the game results were accurate. Shortly thereafter, in 1984, Marshall Ogarkov, the head of the Soviet General Staff, declared that conventional guided munitions, precisely targeted through theater battle networks, could achieve battlefield effects roughly equal to those of tactical nuclear weapons. These new conventional “reconnaissance strike complexes” thus represented what Soviet military theorists called a “military-technical revolution.” Their appearance completely upended the Soviet’s campaign design, and convinced the General Staff that a conventional invasion would not likely succeed. In other words, the 2OS convinced the Soviets of NATO conventional superiority, and helped in no small way to end the Cold War without a shot being fired.
If you look back in time in 1984, it is interesting to note that the Soviets actually understood the implication of the 2OS long before most American strategists did. It wasn’t until Desert Storm that American strategists understood that the 2OS had caused a fundamental shift in conventional warfare.
So it was that the First and Second Offset Strategies contributed the broader US “holding strategy” during the Cold War. The 1OS and 2OS were both designed to reduce the chance we would fight a conventional conflict before the Soviet system collapsed.
One of the key points that James Lacey makes in a recent book, after surveying a set of strategic rivalries/great power competitions from the classical world to the Cold War, is that “power shifts (real or perceived) double the chance of war. In this regard, shifts toward parity are most likely to start wars.” To what extent is this structural variable identifiable in the operational environment that during the Cold War produced offset strategies twice? In other words what is the structural reality that triggers and makes the search for an offset strategy an imperative?
The United States adopted the 1OS when it enjoyed nuclear superiority. It was a key part of the “New Look” and “New, New Look” Strategies adopted by the Eisenhower Administration, which relied upon the threat of massive retaliation at the strategic level and early use of tactical nuclear weapons during conventional confrontations. Once the Soviet Union achieved strategic and tactical nuclear parity, however, the threat of tactical nuclear weapons was no longer credible. US strategists believed this made the likelihood of conventional war in Europe greater, which spurred the 2OS.
Similar thinking animates the Third Offset Strategy. Both Russia and China were alarmed by the ease in which the US defeated Iraq in the First Gulf War, and both made it their business to seek rough parity in battle network-guided munitions warfare. Both have now achieved that goal, if only in their “near abroads,” where they have assembled very powerful “anti-access, area-denial” (A2/AD) networks designed to deter, disrupt and defeat US power projection operations near their home territories. If they choose to do so, these same A2/AD networks provide an umbrella under which they can project power to coerce their neighbors or threaten US allies. As Lacey suggests, this shift towards conventional parity makes the likelihood of military confrontation between state powers higher.
With this in mind, the 3OS seeks to reestablish US conventional overmatch, thereby strengthening both conventional deterrence and strategic stability. With regard to the latter, as a status quo power, the 3OS fits within a framework of comprehensive strategic stability, which consists of three supporting legs: strategic deterrence, conventional deterrence, and the day-to-day competition below the threshold of armed conflict. All work together to provide comprehensive strategic stability. Our concept of strategic deterrence rests upon the assumption of strategic parity and “mutually assured destruction.” In contrast we do not consider conventional parity to be a good thing. We much prefer having clear conventional overmatch, which is generally thought to be the best way to deter would be aggressors from resorting to conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold. To James Lacey’s point, then, the 3OS is a response to a new condition of parity in battle network-guided munitions warfare, which undermines both conventional deterrence and comprehensive strategic stability.
As for whether the 3OS is “a holding strategy,” the contemporary challenges posed by Russia and Chinas are two different kettles of fish than the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. Russia is a resurgent great power, possessing a large nuclear arsenal and formidable conventional forces. But it no longer seeks to forcibly expand either its dominion or communism, and it demographics and economy both look really bad over the long term. On the Chinese side, their economy could surpass that of the US, and they are intent on becoming a global military peer. So I guess I would say the 3OS might be thought of as a holding strategy for the Russians, and a hedging strategy for the Chinese.
I tend to look at both powers less as adversaries and more as competitors, as geopolitical rivals. They see themselves and act like great powers, and they want to be treated as such—more as equals with the US rather than as weaker minor powers. Consequently, I would say we are engaged in a very intense strategic rivalry with both, although because the Russians have used “active measures” against US democratic processes and are actively working to undermine and fracture NATO, they can certainly be viewed in more adversarial terms.
Let’s describe the broader strategic context in which the 3OS is developing. What is the operational problem 3OS is trying to address?
Offsets inevitably cause adversaries and competitors to react. The Soviets clearly reacted to the 1OS, seeking both strategic parity and conventional dominance. Once they achieved their goals, the US was forced to purse the 2OS, which in turn spurred a Chinese and Russian reaction to perceived US conventional dominance.
Russian and Chinese adopted 2OS thinking and technologies to erect A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) networks to confront our own battle networks. They do so to deter, forestall and disrupt any US power projection operation near their own territory. But, as we discussed earlier, the networks also provide both with an umbrella under which they could coerce neighboring states or threaten US allies.
The appearance of conventional A2/AD battle networks capable of directing guided munitions salvos as deep and as dense as our own threatens our ability to project power. This is a serious operational problem, and a direct challenge to a global superpower that relies on its ability to project power into distant theaters to underwrite both its alliances and conventional deterrence. If Lacey is correct that conventional parity often incentivizes aggressive and coercive behavior on the part of rising powers, this condition raises the likelihood of military confrontation. The whole idea of the 3OS is to restore our conventional overmatch, so deterrence is strengthened, and the chance of confrontation lowered …
Octavian Manea was a Fulbright Junior Scholar at Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs (Syracuse University) where he received an MA in International Relations (2013) and a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies from INSCT.
Mueller Steps Towards Red Line with New Subpoenas
(Bloomberg Law | March 16, 2018) William Banks, a professor at Syracuse University Law School, discusses a New York Times report that details new Subpoenas issued by special counsel Robert Mueller, including ones involving the Trump Organization, which the President has said he would see as a red line in the investigation. Plus, Jennifer Rie, a senior litigation analyst for Bloomberg Intelligence, discusses new regulator concerns over Bayer’s planned $66 billion takeover of Monsanto after the Department of Justice voiced new antitrust concerns over the deal. They speak with Bloomberg’s June Grasso.
China Is Developing Ships to Cover the Globe Without Captains
(Forbes | March 14, 2018) China ranks as the world’s third largest marine shipping country with a chance to become the world’s most dominant one by 2030. Even as commodity shipments have slipped with the slowdown in Chinese economic growth, container traffic from China to Europe and the U.S. west coast were picking up in 2016, market research firm IHS itime & Trade says.
But someday you might not see any captains. Instead, remote-controlled ghost ships would send containers around the world and even work for the Chinese navy , according to news reports and the views of analysts.
That’s because China is rigorously grooming an autonomous fleet, something like giant drones of the sea. This year it started building a huge “test field” for autonomous ships off the South China Sea coast of Guangdong province, according to this World Maritime News report. The 771.6-square-kilometer Wanshan Marine Test Field, hailed as a first of its kind in Asia, was set up to become the world’s largest field anywhere over the next three to five years, the report says …
… Autonomous ships can save money otherwise spent to hire captains and support people, a report by the Technical University of Denmark says. In any country, it’s industry that usually pushes for this technology, says Robert Murrett, a public administration and international affairs professor at Syracuse University in the United States …
… Autonomous ship technology can quickly move from one use to another, including into a country’s navy, Murrett says. The U.S. Navy in 2016 christened its autonomous ship the Sea Hunter as part of an anti-submarine program. China isn’t saying it would pass its autonomous technology from the marine test site to the People’s Liberation Army’s naval unit, but maritime and aerospace discoveries in the country often cross the civilian-military line.
The test field sits in the vast South China Sea, site of a maritime sovereignty dispute involving Beijing and four Southeast Asian governments. China had irked other claimants by landfilling disputed islets for military use before tempering that expansion last year. Now other countries may worry about China’s technological leads over the waterway prized for fish and fossil fuels …
… All “high-tech” countries are trying to use autonomous shipping, Murrett says. “I wouldn’t want to single out China, because there are other countries,” he said. “They have a lot of competition” …
From March 1-3, 2018, a team of College of Law and Maxwell School national security students—coached by Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) Director William C. Banks and Maxwell School Professor Sean O’Keefe—took part in the 2018 National Security Crisis Law Simulation at Georgetown Law. This year, the students competed not only with other national security law students from the US—including from Cornell, Fordham, New York University, and the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School—but also students from six Canadian universities, the Australian National University, and the UK.
The INSCT team consisted of third-year J.D./M.P.A. students Conor Sullivan and Ryan White; second-year J.D./M.P.A. student Kristina Cervi; third-year M.A.I.R/M.S.P.R candidate Stephen Brickey; and third-year J.D. student Elizabeth Snyder. The students played law and policy roles within the US Department of State (DOS), specifically Secretary of State (Brickey); Legal Advisor (Snyder); Under Secretary for Political Affairs (Sullivan); Coordinator of the Office for Counterterrorism (White); and a DOS staff member (Cervi).
As with previous simulations, organizers wrote a cascade of interconnected and fast-evolving national and international crisis scenarios that called on student teams in the national security, homeland security, defense, intelligence, foreign service, and financial service sectors to work alone and together.
The teams were called upon to save the world from a North Korean ransomware attack on Jersey, UK; a sudden, 2008-style financial crisis in New York City; a threat against British politicians from a resurgent Irish Republican Army; a Cold War-style military stand-off and related cyberattacks in the Arctic; the return home to Canada and Australia of foreign terrorist fighters; and more besides.
“This was the third national security invitational, and Syracuse has participated in each of them,” says Banks. “I think that it’s fair to say that our students performed superbly, more than holding their own against the best from other schools. Their role was in the middle of several intense crises, and they had to gather law and facts, make decisions quickly, persuade others of their positions, and communicate them succinctly and clearly.”
At the end of the event, the teams were reviewed by a distinguished panel of judges, including former Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. “The feedback was laudatory and very valuable for the students,” Banks observes. “I could not be more proud of the Syracuse group. They demonstrated once again the value of our interdisciplinary model and of the joint Maxwell School/College of Law INSCT program.”
A team of Law and Maxwell School national security students—coached by INSCT Director William C. Banks and Professor Sean O’Keefe—took part in the 2018 National Security Crisis Simulation at Georgetown Law the weekend of March 1-3, 2018. As with previous crisis simulations, the students were given government roles to assume during complex and fast-moving crises that call on each team to develop legal and policy responses and work with other teams/agencies, under the tutelage of national security experts.
The Syracuse University team included third-year J.D./M.P.A. students Conor Sullivan and Ryan White; second-year J.D./M.P.A. student Kristina Cervi; third-year M.A.I.R/M.S.P.R candidate Stephen Brickey; and third-year J.D. student Elizabeth Snyder.
Photos by Kristina Cervi.
By Ryan White
(Re-published from Crossroads: Cybersecurity Law & Policy | Feb. 28, 2018) A few weeks ago, an article from Nextgov, a website dedicated to “how technology and innovation are transforming the way government agencies serve citizens and perform vital functions,” described recent efforts by DHS to address cyber security risks as they relate to supply chains. The article quotes Jeanette Manfra, the head of DHS’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, who explained that “[t]he program’s major goals are to identify the greatest supply chain cyber threats, figure out if there are technical ways to mitigate those threats and, if not, figure out other solutions.” But other than barring companies with weak supply chain security from government contracts, no other solutions were mentioned. Below I look at what a cyber security supply chain policy might encompass.
One of the more prominent supply chain incidents in recent memory involved Hewlett Packard Enterprise, who, in an effort to expand its business, offered a Russian defense agency an inside look at a program called ArcSight.[i] The problem, however, was that ArcSight is a program that is heavily relied on by the Pentagon.[ii] The program is a “cybersecurity nerve center” that sends alerts when it detects a potential attack on a network.[iii] The program is also used frequently by private sector companies.[iv] By providing the program code to Russia, HP not only created a vulnerability for the United States but exposed that vulnerability to the most notorious cyber threat to the U.S. in recent years.
Another example of the cyber supply chain problem occurred several years ago with the United States Air Force. The Air Force had contracted with a vendor in an Asian country to produce hardware for one of the Air Force’s systems.[v] When the hardware arrived in the U.S. and was reviewed by the Air Force, however, they found that the chips contained an extra transistor. While the chip performed its intended function, the Air Force could not decipher what else the piece would do with the extra transistor. As a result, that batch of hardware was disposed of and never installed.
These two examples highlight the breadth and depth of the challenges regarding supply chains and cyber security. Supply chain security implicates hardware and software, public sector and private, and in these two instances, Asia and Russia. The Air Force was fortunate enough to find the altered specifications in its hardware, and reports so far suggest no harm has come from Russia’s ArcSight review.
Every point in every supply chain presents a weakness for that product’s cybersecurity. Every individual human that comes into contact with every component piece of hardware or software is a potential threat. The threats to the supply chain include:[vi]
- Installation of hardware or software containing malicious logic
- Installation of counterfeit hardware or software
- Failure or disruption in the production or distribution of critical products
- Reliance on a malicious or unqualified service provider for the performance of technical services
- Installation of hardware or software that contains unintentional vulnerabilities
All of these create potential weaknesses that can be exploited at a later point in time. Vulnerabilities could be exploited to steal sensitive information. Anything that program does could send a copy of that data to a third party. A vulnerability created by a nefarious actor somewhere in the supply chain could be a switch that lies dormant until activated when it would disable the system. Depending on what system that might be, there could be devastating consequences.
Two major concepts underlie the cyber supply chain security issues in the United States: (1) the United States technology sector is dependent on hardware components manufactured all over the world; and (2) the United States government is heavily dependent on commercial off-the-shelf cyber programs.
The United States, both its government and its private citizens, has become increasingly dependent on an intricate global economy. This is particularly true when it comes to technology, as the cost of manufacturing in the U.S. has led to increases in outsourcing. For example, the production of one iPhone involves component parts made in the U.S., South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Germany that are all ultimately assembled in China.[vii] The diagram below shows a similar analysis for a standard laptop, whose component parts may come from as many as twenty different countries …
[i] “Special Report: HP Enterprise let Russia scrutinize cyberdefense system used by Pentagon,” Reuters (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-russia-hpe-specialreport/special-report-hp-enterprise-let-russia-scrutinize-cyberdefense-system-used-by-pentagon-idUSKCN1C716M.
[v] The facts of the Air Force narrative are from a series of conversations with Professor William C. Snyder, who had substantial knowledge of that situation’s details.
[vii] Cyber Supply Chain Security: A Crucial Step Toward U.S. Security, Prosperity, and Freedom in Cyberspace, Heritage Report, (Mar. 6, 2014) http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/cyber-supply-chain-security-crucial-step-toward-us-security-prosperity-and-freedom.
Ryan White is a third year law student at Syracuse University College of Law and is also pursuing a Master of Public Administration degree from Syracuse’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.
Democrats Release Nunes Memo Rebuttal
(Bloomberg Radio | Feb. 26, 2018) William Banks, a professor at Syracuse University Law School, discusses the release of a memo written by Democratic members of the House Intelligence Committee. The heavily redacted document was published in response to a memo written by the committee’s chairman, Devin Nunes. He speaks with Bloomberg’s June Grasso on Bloomberg Radio’s “Politics, Policy, Power and Law.”
INSCT Director William C. Banks was a co-discussant on the panel “Complexity and the Law of Armed Conflict” at the 2018 Duke University Center on Law, Ethics and National Security (LENS) Conference on Feb. 22-23, 2018. Banks was joined on the panel by Rita Siemion, International Legal Counsel, Human Rights First; Brig. Gen. Ken Watkin, former Judge Advocate General, Canadian Forces; and Professor Jeremy Rabkin of George Mason Law.
INSCT alumna Erin Wirtanen (JD/MPA ’98), Chief Counsel for the Center for Cyber Intelligence, CIA, was moderator of the “Complexity and Cybersecurity” panel. Amb. Nathan A. Sales, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, and a former INSCT Faculty Member, spoke at the conference dinner at the end of the first day.
The conference—entitled Complexity and Accountability: The Future of the ICC—was sponsored by LENS, the Center for International and Comparative Law, and the International Human Rights Clinic. Other speakers included Maj. Gen. Charlie Dunlap, USAF (Ret.), LENS Executive Director; Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation; John Cronan, US Acting Assistant Attorney General and former Chief of the Southern District of New York’s Terrorism Unit, US Department of Justice; Monika Bickert, Head of Global Policy, Facebook; and Professor Laurie Blank of Emory Law School.
Gerald B. Cramer ’52, H’10, devoted friend, advocate, and generous benefactor of Syracuse University, died Feb. 13, 2018. Cramer, whose extraordinary philanthropy seeded opportunity for countless students and advanced faculty excellence, had served on the Board of Trustees since 1995 and was a Life Trustee at the time of his passing.
Born in 1930, Cramer was a 1952 graduate of Syracuse University’s Whitman School of Management and remained deeply involved with his alma mater throughout his life. His dedication and impact were recognized with numerous University distinctions during that time, including a George Arents Pioneer Medal—the University’s highest alumni distinction—and an honorary doctor of laws degree.
After earning a degree in accounting from the Syracuse University Whitman School of Management and attending the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business, Cramer launched a successful career as an investment manager that would span 50 years. He was a managing director of GOM Capital and a co-founder and chair emeritus of the investment advisory firm Cramer, Rosenthal & McGlynn, where he held overall responsibility for the firm’s investment policy. He also was associated with the investment brokerage houses of Oppenheimer & Co., where he was a senior partner, and Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith. He also served as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy during the Korean War.
“Gerry exemplified the power of one person to make a positive difference in the lives of others,” says Chancellor Kent Syverud. “He funded dozens of scholarships and provided leadership support for innovative programs that were important to him. He had a big heart and an even bigger vision that will continue to shape Syracuse University’s legacy and impact for generations to come.”
Cramer’s love for Syracuse University touched every segment of the campus community. But his philanthropy had an especially transformative impact on students and faculty of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He served on the school’s Advisory Board for more than 15 years and vigorously supported initiatives designed to foster global scholarship and engagement. He funded faculty positions in global affairs, economics and aging studies; provided leadership support for the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism; and supported numerous scholarships and programs in international relations, including a student exchange program between Maxwell and the Interdisciplinary Center at Herzliya, Israel …