INSCT’s Security Sector Governance project addresses difficult, often ambitious efforts embodied in a variety of multi- and unilateral activities, with labels such as Security Cooperation (SC); Security Assistance (SA); Security Sector Reform (SSR); Security Force Assistance (SFA); and Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR).
Part 1: Contracting in Complex Operations
In the long-term, ensuring goal alignment with a focus on win-win outcomes that accounts for performance and cost effectiveness is beneficial for both the buyers and sellers of these services.
Part 2: The Prospects of Institutional Transfer
SSR is critical in the sense that, if done successfully, it creates the space and momentum for human security, institution building, and development in other sectors.
|“The Prospects of Institutional Transfer: A Within-Case Study of NATO Advisor Influence Across the Afghan Security Ministries and National Security Forces, 2009-2012” by Nicholas Armstrong (INSCT Research Fellow/Ph.D. Thesis 2014)|
|This dissertation is an in-depth case study of NATO advisors and their perceived influence in Afghanistan (2009-2012). It explores the two-part question, how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local capacity, values, and security governance norms? I argue that security sector reform (SSR) programs in fragile states lack an explicit theory of change that specifies how reform occurs. From this view, I theorize internationally led SSR as “guided institutional transfer,” grounded in rationalist and social constructivist explanations of convergence, diffusion, and socialization processes. Responding to calls for greater depth and emphasis on interactions and institutional change in SSR research, I examine NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan as an extreme case of SSR in which external-internal interactions were the highest. A stratified, purposive sample of 68 military and civilian elites (24 ministerial advisors, 27 embedded field advisors and commanders, and 17 experts and external observers) participated in a confidential, semi-structured interview.|