




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**Building Police Capacity in
Indonesia & the Philippines:**
An Analysis of Military and Civilian Models

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Executive Summary

Establishing a trained and effective civilian police force is critical to the long-term stability of a developing nation and to US national security interests. Developing countries need a more effective and legitimate police force as the frontline for safe and secure communities. For the United States, investing in the training of police forces, and concurrent reforms to the larger law enforcement system, is a way to strengthen institutions and countries so that they are ready and able to confront threats of terrorism, insurgency, and international crime on their own.

This report provides an analysis of military and civilian policing models, develops a gap analysis in current police assistance programs in Indonesia and the Philippines, and draws from police reform efforts in both countries to recommend a list of best practices.

The civilian police model is better suited to the long-term needs of Indonesia and the Philippines; however, the military model is currently employed in both countries in regions where civilian police have proven inadequate to the task. The key determinants to deploying a military or civilian policing model are the level of security needs in a country or region, as well as the capabilities and resources of existing police forces. Areas experiencing active conflict or with an ineffective or otherwise compromised police force can mobilize military units to ensure human security and sufficient stability so government can properly function. Conversely, stable regions require a fully operational civilian police force that is trained and focused on protecting the rule of law, human rights, and the citizens of the community.

Gaps in service delivery exist despite the best efforts of any actor - as such, the default position is that gaps should be expected, sought out, and addressed as quickly as possible. The following gap analysis addresses positive and negative experiences in service delivery to the Philippine National Police and Indonesian National Police by US agencies as well as other actors.

The best practices guide draws from existing police capacity building and security sector reform models, supplementing them with lessons learned in Indonesia and the Philippines. The guide focuses on concepts of host nation leadership, police ethics, organizational culture, the purpose and the implementation of training, and comprehensive law enforcement system reform.

Recommendations for US Police Capacity Building Efforts

The recommendations of this report outline best practices focused on civilian police reform under the informal rubrics of institutional, procedural and cultural themes. Several of the topics identified here may fit under multiple themes. Readers would be well informed to review and understand these overlaps, and develop comprehensive and long-term approaches to address them.

Institutional Best Practices

- **Host nation leadership is key to successful reform.** The host nation knows the needs, capabilities, and resources of its police best. Buy-in at all levels of government starts by creating a vision for reform and leading its implementation. USG is a partner in reform by providing guidance, technical assistance, and additional resources.
- **Comprehensive reform of the law enforcement system promotes effective police reform.** Building police capacity is not enough. Effective law enforcement resides in the

effective and legitimate working of police, courts and prisons. Without concurrent reforms across the law enforcement system, the impact of police reforms will be limited.

- **Information sharing and feedback mechanisms between key institutions are vital to interagency coordination.** Interagency communication is essential to proper service delivery, and will help to avoid overlap and promote an efficient use of resources.

Procedural Best Practices

- **Establish a consultative process with the host nation and local organizations to design and deliver assistance.** Any consultative process should attempt to balance the priorities of the donor government with the needs of the local government.
- **Changing the organizational and ethical culture of the police, is the most critical component of a reform strategy.** This is an expansive notion of culture change, and ranges from police ethics to the culture of maintenance.
- **Long-term relationships allow for consistent mentoring, better understanding, and greater trust.** Embedded mentors and trainers are better able to learn and understand the unspoken realities that govern daily behaviors and create the context of the local police subcultures. Moreover, the most successful long-term relationships are from cop-to-cop.
- **International policing and human rights standards serve as the baseline for police reform.** International standards are the most legitimate default when two separate nations work together on police reform. Those standards should not be taken wholesale, but adapted by the host nation to make them relevant to its own culture, history, and policy.
- **Maximize existing host nation resources first.** Using academic and training institutions within the host nation can help optimize resources and aid joint reform efforts. Such an approach works to strengthen the systems that support the law enforcement system, such as equipment suppliers, maintenance crews, and even watchdog NGOs.
- **Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) procedures tackle poor public perception while institutionalizing reform.** Involving NGOs and citizens, as well as government, promotes an effective system of checks and balances.
- **Investing in a public relations strategy also drives institutionalization of reform.** Communicating reform efforts will help legitimize police efforts in the public eye, and is another way to demonstrate to police themselves that change is underway.
- **If the US military is involved in foreign police training, the use of military police or special operations forces is most effective.** Military police are a midway point, combining law enforcement capabilities with a perspective of military law. Special forces operate with a reduced footprint and are better trained, more experienced, and more culturally adept than soldiers in conventional units.

Cultural Best Practices

- **Special attention needs to be paid to training and policies that underscore the challenges and opportunities due to gender, culture, ethnic, and religious diversity.** Equal access to and application of the law are challenging in large and diverse countries. Nevertheless, police will thrive if they are seen as fair and impartial arbiters of law.
- **Shifting the mindset from reactive to proactive policing puts police on the streets to engage the community and makes them a positive, legitimate presence.** Where the traditional military mindset is to wait for events to occur, civilian police must serve an active and visible role in community cooperation and security.

- **Anti-corruption measures are critical to legitimizing police as a trustworthy institution.** Accountability and ethics starts with recruits and ends at the most senior level. Enforcing a uniform code of ethics is necessary to institutionalize change.

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Research Methodology

This report was written as the culmination of a 4-week capstone project for the Public Administration Program at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, through a collaboration between the University's Institute of National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), the US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the US Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).

The report focuses primarily on police capacity-building programs provided by ICITAP to the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). It also includes research by other United States Government (USG) agencies as well as similar programs run by other governments and international organizations.

The objectives of the project were to compare military and civilian police models; analyze training and capacity building efforts in Indonesia and the Philippines; identify gaps, overlaps and redundancies in current USG service delivery; and develop a best practices analysis to complement future research in the field.

The first week of the project focused on the collection of background literature on police capacity building and security sector reform from the USG, foreign governments, think-tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academic research centers. In the second week, interviews were conducted with experts in the foreign police assistance and professionals actively managing police assistance programs in both countries. These individuals were primarily from ICITAP and PKSOI but also included members from the US Special Forces (SF) and the Department of Homeland Security. In the third week, the scope of the project was refined and the majority of the report was written, under the guidance of the project sponsors and faculty advisors. In the fourth week, the findings were presented to ICITAP and PKSOI officials in Washington, D.C.

List of Acronyms

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
DILG	Department of Interior and Local Government (Philippines)
DoD	US Department of Defense
DoJ	US Department of Justice
DoS	US Department of State
HN	Host Nation
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
INAF	Indonesian National Armed Forces
INP	Indonesian National Police
INSCT	Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITP	Integrated Transformation Program
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MPS	Model Police Station
NGO	Non-Government Organization
PKSOI	US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
PNP	Philippine National Police
PPSC	Philippine Public Safety College
SF	Special Forces
SPLED	Southern Philippines Law Enforcement Development
TAG	Transparent Accountable Governance
UN	United Nations
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

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Introduction

This document is intended for practitioners and other audiences already versed in the history and recent dynamics of police capacity building, the democratization and professionalization of law enforcement systems in developing countries, and security sector reform in general. It is informed by the experiences of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), the lead USG agency tasked to provide police assistance and capacity building worldwide.

The first section is a comparative analysis of the military and civilian policing models, differentiating them according to the context of their typical deployment, their unique strengths, and their individual weaknesses. Keller finds that different military and civilian police deployments exist across a spectrum of stability contexts.¹ In general, the most stable regions demand a fully operational civilian police organization as a part of a larger institutional system that protects the rule of law, human rights, and civil society. At the other end of the spectrum, the less stable regions are marked by active conflict that demands a military police organization with greater force capabilities to ensure basic human security and stability for the local community and government.

Gaps in service delivery exist despite the best efforts of any actor - as such, the default position is that gaps should be expected, sought out, and addressed as quickly as possible. The following gap analysis addresses positive and negative experiences in service delivery to the Philippine National Police and Indonesian National Police by US agencies as well as other actors.

Best practices are a dynamic body of knowledge. In police democratization and capacity building efforts, such practices must be adapted and evaluated in every new country and context where they are implemented.² The following best practices are in addition to previous best practice guides and are grounded in the experiences of police reform efforts in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Both the gaps and best practices have been grouped into the informal themes: institutional, procedural, cultural. The **Institutional** theme addresses issues at the government

¹ Keller, Dennis E. "US Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the US Capacity Gap."

² Bayley, David H. "Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It."

level, with interagency coordination, and the larger law enforcement system. **Procedural** addresses issues in the implementation of reform or capacity building programs at the organizational level. **Cultural** addresses issues rooted in cultural or social norms. These categories are not meant to be exclusive. Readers would be well informed to review and understand these overlaps, and develop comprehensive and long-term approaches to address them.

Comparative Analysis of Military & Civilian Policing Models

Military and civilian-led police forces bring distinct strengths and weaknesses to stability operations. Each model can be applied to specific scenarios in countries around the world, but it is important to understand the appropriate context for which they are best suited. The two models also have contrasting training roles and styles.

Military Police Model

The strengths of the military model are characterized by the military's ability to pursue and achieve high-scale operations when the security and stability of an environment is severe -- primarily areas of combat or conflict. As military training promotes a highly technical and tactical skill set, this model is better able to swiftly minimize threats and subdue areas of unrest. The military model is most effective when there is instability or active conflict within a host nation. The deployment of a military police force is often a short-term solution for a variety of issues. The military is often an extension of the national government with no ties to local communities. Without a long-term relationship, there are fewer constraints in the use of force and less accountability to local authorities. This type of force is frequently used when the civilian police need security from uprisings or other unstable situations. This type of strategic implementation is better suited to creating episodic stability, especially if local police forces are considered part of the insecurity issue.

Military officials often lack knowledge of the areas where they operate in a police capacity and are less accountable to the residents living there. With little accountability, any violations or corrupt practices will fall on deaf ears. Another key weakness of this model is that policing tasks fall outside of the mission of the military. The military is traditionally an instrument of war and brute force therefore soldiers are not properly trained to perform the tasks of civilian police. Assigning military officials to these operations not only increases the burden and stretches them thin, but it also limits the capacity for them to effectively operate elsewhere. Additionally, taking on missions outside the traditional military scope often leads to soldiers becoming disenchanted, which can pose a significant risk to the success of stability and policing efforts.

Civilian Police Model

Civilian police forces are characterized by strengths that contrast those of the military model. Because they are traditionally younger institutions, civilian police are less experienced and often lack established operating procedures. This makes the deployment of a civilian police force is most appropriate when the environment is stable and long-term sustainability is pursued. In developing countries, this police force is commonly used in urban areas with a community-based focus of policing. Their community-oriented capabilities and focus lead to civilian police officers having a greater local knowledge that fosters close relationships. These relationships result in a more receptive attitude and encourage greater participation from the people they serve, which is essential to long-term sustainability. Civilian police forces also tend to have strict guidelines in the use of force that makes them more accountable and focused on the promotion of human rights. Finally, a key strength of the civilian model is its ability to perform investigative duties as part of an overall justice system. Compared to the military, the civilian force is a precise instrument better suited to collect and process evidence to charge and convict criminals.

The weaknesses of the civilian model can be traced back through history. Many countries have a military legacy that spans decades, even centuries. The military often played important roles in the liberation of a host nation, and military leaders frequently became prominent figures in the political arena. These militaries have dictated the policing of many countries for years and have limited any involvement or even the existence of civilian forces. As a result, there is a major lack of civilian-based policing skills and many of these civilian forces do not have the proper funding to effectively carry out their duties. This creates major problems, as forces often do not have the capacity to address large security challenges and contributes to poor salaries that force many policemen to live in poverty or adopt corrupt practices to make ends meet. This situation occurs in many countries, including Indonesia, and is repeatedly a source of public distrust of police forces. Concurrently, complementary law enforcement institutions such as the judiciary are weak or unstable, seriously undermining any efforts made by police.

TABLE 1: Military vs. Civilian Policing Models

Police Force	Military Police	Civilian Police
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Instability/active conflict ● Deployed when police need security ● Short term ● When police is still part of the military ● When police has military legacy ● When police is part of the problem ● When military is seen as more legitimate than cops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Stable environment/long term ● Urbanized area (especially in developing countries) ● Community focused ● Younger and still involving institution
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ability to pursuit high-scale operations ● Appropriate in active conflict areas or in severe security/stability situations ● High technical/tactical skill set ● Less constraint in use of force ● impartial or external to community (considered apolitical because not accountable to local government) ● Often more legitimate (national) government agent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Participatory ● Investigative capabilities ● Stricter guidelines in the use of force ● Human rights orientation ● Accountable to community ● Local knowledge ● Citizens more receptive to civilian cops
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● “Bull in the china shop” effect ● Less accountable to the community ● May lack local knowledge ● lost capacity to operate or project force elsewhere ● Policing not traditional military mission – Lack of buy-in from military (not in the case of the Philippines) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Military legacy - lack of civilian policing skills, ethics, culture ● Funding ● Poor public image ● Lack of complimentary LE institutions ● Lack of capacity to deal with large security challenges ● Not legitimate institution or profession ● Poor salaries - living in poverty as cops

Police Training Models

An outside military force used to train police personnel is a cost-effective option, mainly because the length of training is typically short-term in nature. Using an outside force also brings risk as citizens may view the training efforts by an outside military force as foreign interference or imposition of ideas not native to their culture. This frequently occurs when conventional military forces are present in large numbers within a host nation. A shift toward Special Forces as tactical trainers is becoming more commonplace, as their military footprint is much smaller and expertise is unparalleled. However, there is a greater emphasis on force tactics, prioritizing security functions over basic law enforcement functions. This focus limits the long-term sustainability of law enforcement agencies.

The training style for the civilian model is distinctively different and more focused on long-term commitment. As a result, most training ventures are expensive and require consistent appropriations over a longer period of time in order to achieve sustainability. Because of this long-term strategy, contractors are frequently used to conduct much of the training as a way to minimize costs. A drawback of embedding contractors in civilian training programs is that it creates less accountability and flexibility. The focus of civilian police training is traditionally academic, emphasizing community engagement skills that are necessary for developing a positive image and lasting relationships with the citizenry.

TABLE 2: Military vs. Civilian as Police Trainers

Police Force	Military Police	Civilian Police
As police trainers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● If foreign military, perception of outside interference ● Emphasis on aggressive force tactics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Security functions over law enforcement functions ● Conventional units vs. special forces as trainers ● Less expensive than contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Contractors: less accountable, less flexible. military or civilian mindset ● Recruitment and skillsets similar to military ● Training on community engagement ● Expensive; long term appropriations ● Academic orientation - monitoring and evaluation

Background: Indonesian National Police

The Indonesian National Police was first incorporated into the Indonesian National Armed Forces (INAF) in 1960 and did not return to being a fully civilian police force until 2000. The civilian transition started in 1998 with the resignation of President Suharto after 31 years of rule. In 1999, the People's Consultative Assembly – Indonesia's Congress – passed resolutions separating the INP from the rest of the armed forces. In 2000, INP were removed from the Department of Defense and placed under the authority of the President. The 2002 Indonesian Police Act set the definitive mandate for the INP, and was followed by 2004 Armed Forces Act, which in turn redefined the INAF mandate.³

The Indonesian government invited the USG to assist the reformation of the INP in 2000. Following the initial needs assessment, the USG tasked ICITAP to spearhead comprehensive US police assistance in Indonesia. In 2006, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) became an active partner in anti-corruption programs for the INP. Starting in 2008, ICITAP has worked with INP to operationalize a maritime security initiative with Malaysia and ICITAP Philippines.⁴

Background: Philippine National Police

The reorganization and reforms of the modern Philippine National Police began in 1981, with the lifting of Proclamation No. 1081 and the end of a decade of martial law. Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Philippines and the author of 1081, only relinquished power after he fled the country on 1986. The PNP was first formalized by Republic Act 6975 of 1991, in which the police remained a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) but served under the authority of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The separation of the PNP with the AFP was only fully enacted on 1998, when the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act officially established the PNP as a civilian national force.⁵

In its drive for institutional reform and modernization, the PNP formally requested USG assistance in 2006. ICITAP conducted the initial needs assessment, and has since focused its efforts to support to three major programs of the PNP: the Model Police Station (MPS) program,

³ "Indonesia: Unfinished Business: Police Accountability in Indonesia." *Amnesty International*, 24 June 2009.

⁴ "USDOJ: CRM: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)."
<<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/>>

⁵ "Philippine National Police." <<http://www.pnp.gov.ph>>

) the Southern Philippines Law Enforcement Development (SPLED) program, and the tri-national maritime security initiative.⁶

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⁶ "Richard Miller." Telephone interview. 27 May 2011.

Gap Analysis in Service Delivery

Introduction

This analysis attempts to identify relevant gaps and other challenges to successful service delivery in Indonesia and the Philippines. The context behind these lessons is that the desire for and design of police reform in Indonesia and the Philippines is driven by the host nations, and that they work in partnership with local, non-state, and international actors to provide the additional expertise, guidance, critical resources, and legitimacy necessary for success. However, despite the most committed attempts to adapt best practices and international standards to local contexts, gaps will always occur. As such, they should be expected and deliberately sought out.

Police reform requires a long-term commitment to organizational and cultural change on behalf of the police, the community that they serve, and the rule of law that they enforce. Constant monitoring and evaluation of progress is critical. It is in this act of monitoring that gaps are exposed, and which ultimately enable leaders of the reform effort to make the critical decisions to apply resources, reflect on progress, and make adjustments.

Institutional Gaps

1. Police reform demands long-term political support at all levels of government.

“Foreign assistance programs must be built on foreign ‘demand’ rather than donor ‘supply’,” and therefore local buy-in remains one of the most critical factors for long-term police reform.⁷ This has proven very complex in both Indonesia and the Philippines. Although both have strong central governments and national police forces accountable to a centralized leadership, there is in fact a distribution of power to local communities which are typically rural, under-resourced, and ideologically or culturally unique. In other words, real power to source budgets and enforce policy also exists at the local level.⁸ US agencies are still challenged to secure consistent buy-in from leaders at the local level, which is necessary to provide critical resources and share the long-term vision for reform.

⁷ Bayley, David H., pg. 35.

⁸ "Gerald Heuett." Telephone interview. 25 May 2011. & "Richard Miller." Telephone interview. 27 May 2011.

2. Police reform needs better coordination with judicial and correctional reforms.

To achieve lasting reform and effective rule of law, the entire law enforcement system must be transformed simultaneously – yet, due to political expediency, community demands, and the realistic capacity of the actors involved, reforms are neither equal nor simultaneous.

The USG is the leading actor in comprehensive rule of law reform operations in Indonesia and the Philippines. With a small US footprint, and advisors in a consultative role, an all-encompassing approach demands a long-term presence on the ground.

3. For the USG to deliver a unified platform for police capacity building, its various stakeholder agencies need a single or shared definition of what the platform entails.

Definitions are to development programs what congressional mandates are to government agencies - the letter of the law. It is an enormous challenge for the different agencies involved in US development operations to coalesce under a single definition, but lacking that mutuality sows discord and diminishes the viability of the operation itself.

4. The lack of shared planning and implementation in the absence of a unified chain of command jeopardizes the success of US-led law enforcement reform efforts.

The Department of State (DoS) has “overall responsibility for coordinating US rule of law policy and programs,” but it is an assumed responsibility and not one awarded by congressional mandate.⁹ DoS shares that responsibility with USAID, DoD, MCC, and a variety of other organizations, and all rely on DoJ as the lead implementer of law enforcement capacity building programs on the ground. These groups must still actively seek ways to work together and limit the natural discord of competing agencies, overlapping mandates, and minimal resources.

5. Programs that fail to keep open lines of communication will lose out on opportunities for greater synergy and effectiveness.

ICITAP has so far been successful at keeping both formal and informal lines of communication open with peer agencies in Indonesia and the Philippines. Nevertheless, the USG

⁹ Keller, Dennis E. "US Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the US Capacity Gap." & US Institute for Peace," April 2011.

should endeavor to maintain those connections or else risk relapsing, as in the case of the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM). The IOM's community-based policing pilot program in Indonesia has suffered from the lack of strong lines of communication and coordination with the host nation and other police assistance efforts.¹⁰ In 2009, its internal evaluation noted that poor communication led to an inability to retain trainers, operationalize trained capacities, and institutionalize learning. This ultimately placed the success of the project in serious jeopardy.

Procedural Gaps

1. Bad budgets make bad cops.

Richard Miller of ICITAP Philippines and Gerald Heuett of ICITAP Indonesia both identified police funding and budgetary capabilities as the largest challenge to effective police capacity building and reform.¹¹ Budgeting is a tool that prioritizes limited resources and implements policy, and without budgetary commitment by the government, long-term efforts at capacity building and the sustainability of police reform are meaningless.

The Indonesian National Police (INP) only receives 50% of their budget from the government and make up for the shortfall by participating in both legal and illicit businesses and through unfettered and commonly acknowledged corruption.¹² The Philippine National Police (PNP) have always been at the mercy of local government officials, rather than the central government, for financial support of their operations. 92% of PNP funds allocated go to salaries and benefits, and the remaining 8% is used to conduct all other policing activities.¹³ This poses innumerable challenges to operations, procurement, maintenance and logistics, which are central to police effectiveness, and is the greatest liability to police reform.

¹⁰ Holmes, Peter. "Strengthening the Indonesian National Police through Institution Building – Phase II, Part 2."

¹¹ Gerald Heuett & Richard Miller, Personal Interviews.

¹² Gerald Heuett, Personal Interview.

¹³ Richard Miller, Personal Interview.

Corollary: Effectiveness and public perception are both linked to the police's ability to generate and manage an adequate budget – a relationship that is not well understood.

Governments, especially those in developing countries, live with very finite resources that are rarely adequate for their needs. Whereas the government may see a police force as under-financed, under-trained, under-equipped, the public perception is simpler: the police are ineffective and corrupt. Police are the most visible manifestation of the local and central government; in their role as street-level bureaucrats, their actions and the community's perception of them speak louder than words.

Corollary: Poor salaries make bad cops.

Both the Indonesian and the Philippine government have already begun to devise programs to raise salaries and benefits, develop stronger recruiting and retention processes, and improve advancement. The biggest short term win may be better salaries for recruits and young police officers, which should instill a greater sense of duty and purpose while also lowering corruptibility. Young police officers also tend to be more idealistic about the profession, and better salaries should help retain both the officer and their moral compass, which can be critical in long-term reform efforts.¹⁴

In his interview, Robert Barlow cited an example from the Pakistani Motor Police as the potential for salary change to make more effective police. "The Pakistani Motor Police were once considered the most corrupt and least respected police organizations in Pakistan. They raised the salaries, gave them new uniforms and training, weeded out the corrupt ones and held them to some accountability and now they are considered one of the most effective police forces in Pakistan. This mainly started with the raising of salaries."¹⁵

2. There are no substitutes for internal and external feedback mechanisms, and yet most programs have poor monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, if at all.

A culture of learning is critical to organizational transformation. Changing the culture of an organization, rather than merely its technical capacities, is a constant process and requires the

¹⁴ Arthur Roderick & Richard Miller, Personal Interviews

¹⁵ "Robert Barlow." Telephone interview. 26 May 2011.

ongoing ability to monitor change as it happens, to reward progress, and mitigate tendencies to revert back to previous practices.

When democratizing a police force, the challenge is to design an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism that places an emphasis on changes to organizational culture, policing philosophy, and ethics rather than counting technical abilities, new equipment, and figures of criminal activity.

The USG may be able to use the initial needs assessment of the Indonesian and Filipino police forces (conducted following an invitation for police training assistance), to set the benchmarks by which to monitor their efforts. These assessments may describe quantitative deficiencies (personnel, materiel) rather than the qualitative ones (organizational culture, police ethics) that today are understood as the most critical components of reform.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the opportunity exists to develop these evaluations if and when that measurement is understood as an operational priority.

No police capacity building program instituted in the Philippines and Indonesia claims to have the level of evaluation capabilities that they desire. Lacking hard statistics, police development programs must rely on the traditional backstop of qualitative assessments - in other words, collecting good stories.¹⁷ This is common practice wherever strong evaluation capabilities are in need. Even then, a coherent effort must be made to collect these stories and study them for lessons learned or potential use in public relations efforts.

Additional efforts to measure the needs and priorities of host nation police institutions will supplement the productivity and overall effectiveness of any reforms. Continued assessment should be developed by the host nations themselves, with lateral assessment coming from training partners and donors as necessary.

3. Proper design and use of incentives generate stronger buy-in to reforms and allow host nations to build capacity beyond what limited resources would suggest.

Well-designed incentives will allow host nations to meet trainers halfway using available resources, and will encapsulate reforms to organizational culture, policing philosophy, and ethics. ICITAP has yet proven adept at designing appropriate “carrots” in their Indonesian and

¹⁶ Gerald Heuett, Richard Miller & Arthur Roderick, Personal Interviews

¹⁷ Dunford, Christopher. “Promise and Peril of Microfinance Impact Evaluations,” 23 May 2011.

Philippine programs. In one memorable instance, ICITAP built and equipped a regional police headquarters once the police successfully graduated half their force from a new training program and secured the personnel and budget resources to staff and maintain it.¹⁸ Other police assistance groups have proven much less successful at designing incentives.¹⁹

4. An imbalance in training and capabilities will render the police ineffective.

Investigation and forensic skills, human rights and police ethics, community relations, and organizational management are all needed for a well-rounded and effective police. For example, with an ideal ratio of 10% management, 40% investigation, 50% operations and other functions, only 10% of the INP were trained in proper investigation protocol.²⁰ As a result, the police force in question was rendered ineffective in the primary task of solving crimes.

Police training is also ineffective when the training orientation contradicts the host nation legal system, specifically when the training follows the “evidentiary” system used in the US but contradicts the “accusatory” system used in the host nation.²¹ Contradictions between the US and host nation policing and legal concepts are troubling and may create friction about what actually constitutes effective policing.²² In such a case, the principle of a US consultative approach and defaulting to existing laws and practices of the host nation may actually be counterproductive to reform. Nevertheless, it is ultimately under the discretion of the host nation how to resolve such contradictions and potentially seek guidance from advisors such as ICITAP.

Cultural Gaps

1. Gender and Equality in Police Reform

Gender roles and stereotypes have contributed to women’s “different and continued insecurity” across histories and cultures, and yet few resources provide substantive recommendations for including gender as an issue in security sector reform.²³

¹⁸ Richard Miller, Personal Interview.

¹⁹ Holmes, Peter. “Strengthening the Indonesian National Police through Institution Building – Phase II, Part 2.”

²⁰ Gerald Heuett, Personal Interview.

²¹ LTC Edward Jolley, Personal E-mail. 6 June 2011

²² Ibid.

²³ Salahub, Jennifer E., and Krista Nerland. “Just Add Gender? Challenges to Meaningful Integration of Gender in SSR Policy and Practice.”

Neither women nor gender concerns in general are widely integrated in either Indonesian or Philippine society. Participatory processes and citizen-oriented reform are considered the best way to optimize institutional development. However, even in active reform efforts for equality, gender is often taken for granted.²⁴ This schism reflects a broader disconnect between policies of democratization and social equality, and programming for police capacity building and reform.

Today, the security institutions in the Philippines and Indonesia remain male-dominated; hence, inclusion of gender-based initiatives, like recruiting and advancement quotas, and other tactics of integration can create meaningful institutional changes to the status quo.²⁵ Foreseeable advantages can be seen in the realization of mainstreaming of gender. For example, women in uniform can be utilized in their full potential as a good channel of communication between law enforcement and the community.²⁶ In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 8551 mandated larger opportunities for women in the PNP. The amendment also established a requirement for a women and children's desk in every police station to address cases of domestic violence and sexual assault.²⁷ A challenge for foreign assistance may be to ensure that these positions have the authority and resources to fulfill this role, so that these efforts are not merely symbolic gestures.

A gender-oriented agenda can be the centerpiece of civilian-oriented reforms, emphasizing the human security regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or class. "Security sector decision makers are less likely to listen to the civil society actors than to their peers in the security sector," which places the burden of gender mainstreaming squarely on the shoulders of police trainers and mentors embedded in foreign police organizations.²⁸

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ De Guzman, Melcho C., and James Frank. "Policewomen and Their Problems: the Philippine Context."

²⁶ Yadi, Partiwe E. "The Role of Women in Policing and Policewomen's Contribution to Achieve a Level of Security in Indonesia at Present and in the Future."

²⁷ Pilar, Nestor N., Rebullida, Lopez, et. al. "Civilianization and Community-Oriented Policing in the Philippines." p. 151

²⁸ Salahub, Jennifer E., and Krista Nerland. "Just Add Gender? Challenges to Meaningful Integration of Gender in SSR Policy and Practice."

Best Practices for USG Police Assistance

Best practices are a dynamic body of knowledge. In police reform and capacity building efforts, such practices must be adapted and evaluated in every new country and context where they are implemented. This best practices guide draws from existing police capacity building and security sector reform models, supplementing them with lessons learned in Indonesia and the Philippines. These practices focus on concepts of host nation leadership, police ethics, organizational culture, the purpose and implementation of training, and comprehensive law enforcement system reform.

Institutional Best Practices

1. Host Nation Leadership

The host nation must take on a leadership role for international police assistance to be successful in the short-term and institutionalized in the long-term.²⁹ In this case, leadership signifies that the host nation is actively engaged in the design and implementation of reform and invests its own resources to the effort. By making itself the face of reform, the host government can actively persuade its citizens that necessary and effective changes are being made. Creating this perception among the citizens will not only stimulate changes in the system itself, but promote citizen engagement as well.

2. Comprehensive Reform

Building police capacity is not enough. Effective law enforcement resides in the effective and legitimate working of police, courts and prisons, without which the impact of police reforms will be limited. "You've got to look upon it as a system...it's all the tenets of security which are judicial, prosecutorial, and police."³⁰ As mentioned by LTC Ed Jolley, this systematic approach must also focus on building the capacity of correctional facilities, judicial systems, and a robust legal system in order for police training and stability to be effective.³¹

²⁹ Theme derived from the following interviews: Robert Barlow, Karen Finkenbinder, Gerald Heuett and LTC Edward Jolley.

³⁰ "LTC Edward Jolley." Telephone interview. 25 May 2011.

³¹ Ibid.

3. Maintaining Communication With Key Stakeholders

Unless programs are vetted by the local community, they will likely face an uphill battle in successful implementation due to lack of cooperation and/or increased resentment and mistrust.³² Proper information sharing and feedback mechanisms between the police and key stakeholders are vital to ensure that programs are targeting the problems most relevant and concerning to the community. While military forces can take on more external threats that may not be felt as strongly by the local community, the civilian police can focus their efforts around the needs and priorities of their respective localities. This work at the grassroots level can serve as the first step in preventing the growth of anti-government groups.

One of the major challenges in the Philippines and Indonesia is the extreme diversity of cultures and religions found within their borders. Discontent with the government has arisen frequently among minority groups that feel marginalized from the rest of society³³. Consequently, it is crucial to avoid isolating specific groups from community partnerships. Since the priorities of these groups will often conflict both amongst themselves and with the national government, it is important that any reform dialogue include members from these different parties.³⁴

The participation of different community leaders is vital to the successful implementation of policing reform considering there is little confidence in the PNP on the part of the public. A study by the Asia Foundation found that a plurality of respondents were more comfortable reporting crimes to higher authorities in government or resorting to violence, than going to the police.³⁵ Building trust between communities and their respective police forces will require better communication strategies between the two. One method of addressing this need is ICITAP's suggestion to create the position of Community Liaison Officer within each police station in the Philippines.³⁶ This Officer should be responsible for engaging community members to build and promote trust. As previously mentioned, community buy-in is an important component of security and stability operations. While many police forces have tarnished reputations,

³² Keller, Dennis E. pg. 25

³³ Rood, Steven. "Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society.", pg 7

³⁴ Ibid., pg. 10.

³⁵ Dayag-Laylo, Carijane C. "Exploring Conflict Management in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao." The Asia Foundation. February 2004, pg 7.

³⁶ Richard Miller, Personal Interview.

supplementing host nation reform efforts with designated liaison positions contributes to a better public image of the police.

Procedural Best Practices

1. USG agencies should establish a consultative process for decisions regarding the targeting of police trainings and resources.

Whereas assistance will be guided by specific objectives of the USG, the host government will have the greatest sense of ownership or buy-in when it is the lead actor in the decision-making process. Host nation leadership opens the window to input local priorities, know-how and understanding into the design and implementation of capacity-building programs. Consultation is most successful when it includes host governments at the national, regional, and local levels.

Donors often aim to encourage and use local input when planning programs, but in the field, these same efforts oftentimes fall short.³⁷ This is especially true when the host nation lacks the capacity or institutional framework to participate as donors have imagined. Nevertheless, participation by local leaders in the decision-making process is an important first step in building these needed capacities. The consultative relationship shifts the impetus of reform to where it truly belongs, with the host governments.

2. Encouraging Institutional Change/Cultural Change

Many of the challenges facing police reform are inherent in the organization and culture of police forces. Changing the organizational and ethical culture of the police is the most critical component of a reform strategy. Key reform efforts focus on shifting the organizational culture with a goal of promoting a responsible and ethical police force.

Past US-led efforts have created tensions with host nations, who viewed any change as an imposition of Western ideology. Shifting culture is a delicate process, “and is best done in the context of local societal values rather than by attempting to impose US or other foreign cultural values on a native local police force.”³⁸

³⁷ Scheye, Eric. United States Institute of Peace Special Report 257, pg. 5

³⁸ Keller, Dennis E., pg. 41.

The success of community policing depends not only on organizational changes within the police system, but also a philosophical shift that shapes the beliefs, values, and behavior of policing. This change in the mindset of police officers has been hampered both in the Philippines and Indonesia by the legacy of a militarized police force. As Richard Miller explains, as the leadership of the PNP begins to include those individuals without a military background, it is likely that receptiveness to community policing models will increase.³⁹

3. Long-Term vs. Episodic Relationship

Mentors and trainers – whether military or civilian – are an integral part in the process of training competent police. As the host nation demonstrates to its people that it is leading the reform efforts, the United States must carefully place mentors in key positions that will strategically guide officials throughout the long-term training process. Because of limited US resources, the federal government will undoubtedly be forced to contract out positions related to long-term mentorship and training programs. In doing so, it is imperative that the Department of Justice and other agencies embed senior government officials who direct contracted employees within the host nations.⁴⁰ This best practice illustrates the combination of experienced and accountable officials with an efficient deployment of limited resources.

A challenge lies in the task of attempting to shape the host nation's organizational subculture and ethos; it is critical to establish long-term capacity that Philippine and Indonesian police can replicate successfully throughout their forces. Changing the police's organizational culture is not mutually exclusive from cultural nuances that emanate from society. The actions of each policeman define the boundaries of acceptable thought and behavior, especially when police encounter a unique situation that lacks a standard legal or operating procedure. When a climate exists that condones or even encourages abusive and corrupt behavior, the only way to reform police behavior is to modify the police ethos to a more respectable, professional manner.

Changing organizational culture is difficult but not impossible, and is best done with ongoing mentoring from trainers who understand that foreign values should not be imposed on local police elements. Modifying the police's culture requires outstanding trainers who possess

³⁹ Richard Miller, Personal Interview.

⁴⁰ LTC Edward Jolley, Personal Interview.

an intimate knowledge of both the local police subculture and the local societal culture in which they operate.⁴¹

Embedded trainers have the best opportunity to shape organizational culture and help reform police systems. The key is long-term, constant relationships instead of episodic partners in which continuity becomes hindered. Advisers must live with and learn about the local police force in order to understand the unspoken rules and forces that govern their daily behavior and create the context of their local organizational subculture.

In police training models, embedded trainers are a crucial part of the process as they are able to observe police interaction with the local society, and determine whether police behavior conforms to local societal values or clashes with them. As a result, trainers are able to identify how best to influence the organizational culture of the local police and encourage greater responsiveness. The routine interaction with police trainers is commonly a significant change compared to an environment of illicit activities, as many police are reduced to serving under untrained and corrupt leaders who possess little understanding of the role of police in a democratic society.⁴²

Advisers are also able to identify police leaders who are so corrupt and abusive that they fall outside the societal and organizational cultural norms. Training should focus on “change from within” the organization, but trainers are still capable to report and encourage the removal of such leaders both through the US and Philippine or Indonesian channels. The partnership should include more than just uniformed police. Other agencies, such as those at the national or ministerial level responsible for logistics, pay and benefits, etc., are just as equally important for trainers to be partnered and have an extended relationship with their counterparts.

While helping to reform basic uniformed policemen is important, it is vital to hold senior leaders accountable as well. Whenever possible, training models should include advisers who are embedded with police units for a significant period of time.⁴³ As a result, they are able to gain the needed cultural knowledge, while most importantly, instilling the necessary values and characteristics of a legitimate police force.

⁴¹ Keller, Dennis E. pg. 41.

⁴² Glanz, James and David Rohde. “Panel Faults US-Trained Afghan Police – New York Times.” NY Times. 4 Dec. 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/asia/04police.html>.

⁴³ “Karen Finkenbinder.” Telephone interview. 25 May 2011.

4. Adoption of International Use of Force and Human Rights Standards

One of the most important areas in building legitimate police capacity is proper training of techniques, procedures and community involvement. In evolving from a quasi-military organization to a more community focused policing model, it is important to tailor the training programs so that they focus on areas such as civil and human rights, cultural awareness and proactive citizen engagement to gain the trust and respect of the local population. By building this trust and showing that the police respect and are looking out for citizens, the community will see the police as partners rather than corrupt antagonists.

Since ICITAP has been operating in Indonesia, one of the biggest wins has been the adoption of Use of Force standards that meet or exceed international standards.⁴⁴ By rewriting and enforcing a strict Use of Force policy, the INP is on the right path to building a trusted community partner that people will be willing to work with. These actions will go a long way in reforming the image of police in these countries and will allow for the creation of stronger bonds between the police and people they serve.

5. Maximize existing host nation resources first

Using academic and training institutions within the host nation can help optimize resources and aid joint reform efforts. Such an approach works to strengthen the systems that support the law enforcement system, such as equipment suppliers, maintenance crews, and even watchdog NGOs.

The Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC) provides training and continuing education programs that are designed to provide the basic knowledge and behavioral expectations of police officers. Included in its programs are courses in (as of 2001), “a. integration of police operations and administration with local governance; b. strengthening the police community relations and c. shifting the philosophy of penology to more of rehabilitation.”⁴⁵ Reform efforts should include the review of these curricula, and any revisions should incorporate the latest information gathered from community needs analyses.

⁴⁴ Gerald Heuett, Personal Interview.

⁴⁵ Pilar, Nestor N., Rebullida, Lopex, et. al. “Civilianization and Community-Oriented Policing in the Philippines,” pg. 150.

6. Establishing Monitoring and Evaluation Practices

With both the Philippines and Indonesia undergoing police reform efforts to counter the negative public perception of the police, extensive and effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms will be necessary in the design and improvement of current policing models. The main factors hindering the progress of these reform efforts include a lack of transparency and accountability.

Strategies for improving transparency and accountability include pre-and post-program surveys, focus groups, town meetings and reliable reporting systems where community members can voice their complaints and concerns. The Transparent Accountable Governance (TAG) program of the Asia Foundation has focused on improving local governance as a remedy for conflicts in the Philippines, especially in the Mindanao region.⁴⁶ In municipalities, the program focuses on improving service delivery, financial management, and professionalization standards. The Social Weather Station conducts surveys on good local governance to measure public perception.⁴⁷ These results are used in the design of reform efforts and also serve as benchmarks for goal-setting. The PNP can adopt these same strategies to conduct needs assessment analyses, specifically to identify the key complaints and fears from community members.

7. Public Relations Strategy

In order to garner support among the community, the police should also invest in a public relations strategy that will highlight improvements and express their commitment to reform.⁴⁸ The campaign should stress the importance of the community's role in the success of the programs. Stressing inclusion can help create local buy-in and enhance the credibility of new programs. However, any PR campaign needs to be careful to not overemphasize the success of the program before actual results are observed and measured within the community. As Trajanowicz explains, most community relations programs in this region have failed because they focused on an educational effort to convince people that the police were the "good guys," rather than actually addressing the issues of crime, disorder, and fear of crime.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ "Local Governance in the Philippines." The Asia Foundation, April 2010, pg. 2.

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Robert Barlow, Personal Interview.

⁴⁹ Pilar, Nestor N. et. al pg. 160

8. The Military Footprint

In police training models, foreign militaries are often used to mentor local forces. For decades, units within the US military have been utilized to fill the gap throughout the police-training spectrum. As a whole, the employment of military personnel to train and advise civilian police is a flawed idea, but leaving local populations with no police or subject to incompetent, corrupt, and abusive police is a far-worse idea.⁵⁰ Military personnel, even military police (MP) personnel, are not prepared to train and advise civilian police in such tasks as arrest procedures, criminal investigations, working within local legal frameworks and court systems, crime prevention, and effective relations with local communities. There is also significant concern that civilian police agencies trained by military personnel could become overly militarized.⁵¹ Military intervention with police tends to skew training towards the higher-end stability policing tasks such as riot control, convoy security, motorized patrolling, and weapons training. As a result, the inappropriate focus subsequently makes the transition to community-based policing more difficult for local police. In both the Philippines and Indonesia, the transition is absolutely essential for the long-term security of local communities.

In nearly every police model, the use of the military is part of the overall process. Although law enforcement professionals are the ideal trainer to be embedded with police forces and organizational leadership, military members often fill the gap. Civilian trainers are not in abundance and capacity is often created by hiring contractors or other short-term personnel. In addition, the security situation on the ground may be untenable for a completely civilian model. The conundrum in all models is the appropriate footprint of military forces, and most importantly, determining what types of forces should be used.

As discussed earlier, an abundance of military personnel ultimately increase the risk of militarization of police forces. But a higher percentage of military trainers also increase the necessary amount of logistics and combat support personnel. Depending on the security situation, a larger gathering of military forces could present potential targets for terrorist or insurgent forces, especially those attempting to undermine the local police and their training mission.

⁵⁰ Keller, Dennis E., pg. 5

⁵¹ Ludwig III, Walter C. "Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of US Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency – Human Security Report Project." *Comparative Strategy*, pg 289.

The use of special forces (SF) is a more pertinent course of action than the use of conventional units. Above all, SF soldiers are often proficient in language training, cultural understanding, and are more experienced than soldiers commonly found in conventional units. No matter the type of trainer, it is extremely important for embedded advisers to operate without an overt presence. Otherwise, the image of foreign military trainers can reduce the legitimacy of police forces, or give the perception of an occupying force. As SF units are deployed in smaller numbers, they are often able to conduct certain police training tasks without a high level of visibility.

A country's current level of security often dictates what forces can be used in police training models. In situations where police training is conducted in a security sector that is still dangerous, the ratio of military forces may need to be higher. No matter the situation, there are a couple key observations about military advisers in police training models.

As a general trend, SF units produce a larger impact, on average, compared to conventional units. Simply put, more can be accomplished with fewer personnel. However, a fragile security situation may dictate more military numbers during police training missions, most notably the recent surge of 2/22 Infantry, 10th Mountain Division to help train Afghan police recruits. While Afghanistan is much different than the Philippines and Indonesia, it is important to note that conventional units have entered the military training model. But, no matter what type of force is used, the best practice is to minimize military advisers over long periods of time. Military trainers may have to be used if no other options exist or other resources are scarce, but experienced law enforcement professionals are the appropriate tool to spur the necessary changes in personal conduct and institutional reform within police organizations.

Cultural Best Practices

1. Gender, Equity, and Cultural Responsiveness

Special attention needs to be paid to training and policy reform that underscore the challenges and opportunities due to gender, culture, ethnic, and religious diversity. Equal access to and application of the law are challenging in large and diverse countries. Nevertheless, police will thrive if they are seen as fair and impartial arbiters of law.

Gender is a powerful and well-documented lens for how police reforms can address other issues of diversity and equality. Gender mainstreaming is the process of actively assessing the implications of legislation, policies or programs for women and men. It is important to note that it is “not a process of taking power away from men and giving it to women and other under-represented groups, but rather a process of improving efficiency and effectiveness of the reformed organizations.”⁵²

Men are on the frontline of gender change. The INP and PNP are majority male organizations, and “without the buy-in and support of the majority in a police organisation, no initiative will be successful or sustainable in producing change.”⁵³ As policing requires community consent, reforms also depend on how men and women from the community accept and respond to new notions of how the police treat gender and equality as security issues.

The PNP, for example, has long recruited women into their ranks to handle sensitive issues that involve violence against women and children, crimes of a sexual nature and other gender related sensitive issues. In this, the PNP has been successful in creating roles for women police officers and establishing processes for gender related crimes. However, these reforms remain ineffective if such roles lack the necessary authority and resources to effectively enforce them or if no crimes against women are actually reported.⁵⁴

Including women does not automatically result in a more non-discriminatory police organization.⁵⁵ Women officers may act more aggressive than their male counterparts would in order to fit into the existing masculine culture of the police, in effect aligning themselves with “the dominant culture to protect themselves in the workplace.”⁵⁶ Consider also that gender bias in police culture stems from broader societal restrictions on how women and girls are educated and expected to succeed in the workplace.⁵⁷ Recruitment and advancement quotas and gender-based policies are critical components to larger police reforms, but they are insufficient to bring about gender equality in policing without changes to the internal police culture and value system.⁵⁸

⁵² Denham, Tara and Kristin Valasek. “Gender and SSR Toolkit,” pg. 3.

⁵³ Ibid., pg. 6.

⁵⁴ “Strengthening of Task Forces on Women and Children Pushed.” PeaceWomen, 28 Mar. 2011.

⁵⁵ Denham, Tara and Kristin Valasek, pg. 6.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Burt, Geoff. “Proceedings of At the Margins of SSR: Gender and Informal Justice, Ottawa. 2011.”

⁵⁸ Ibid., pg. 4; de Guzman

Across the board, equality-oriented reforms require careful attention in design and implementation, as well as comprehensive buy-in from the police themselves and the communities they serve.

2. Proactive vs. Reactive Policing

A very important cultural shift that builds legitimacy in the eyes of the community is proactive policing rather than reactive policing. In both the Philippines and Indonesia, the police remain in a reactive stance most of the time due to the history of being part of the military and the lack of training and resources to provide proactive police support. According to Heuett, the administrative ratio of the Indonesian national police force is almost 80%, which means that 80% of the police are in the stations doing administrative work or waiting to react to something rather than being out in the community patrolling the streets and engaging the community.⁵⁹

By changing the reactive culture and giving the police consistency in resources, they could engage the citizens they serve in a more proactive manner, showing them that they are there to protect and serve rather than react to only negative events. Training the police in active stakeholder engagement would set the groundwork for a more active role in the community that would result in lower crime rates and more cooperation from the citizens they serve.

3. Anti-Corruption Training

In Indonesia and the Philippines, police forces exist in a culture permissive to corruption, and their organizations have so far lacked the ability or political will to eliminate corruption as a daily reality.⁶⁰

Upon being elected, Indonesian President Yudhoyono vowed to root out corruption at the highest levels of the Indonesian government and has had mixed results. There have been arrests and convictions of high-level officials involved in corruption, but there have also been accusations of corruption in the organization that is tasked with investigating and prosecuting these people as well.⁶¹ Eliminating corruption from Indonesian society is a work in progress and is very important to the prospects for democracy in the country overall.

⁵⁹ Gerald Heuett, Personal Interview.

⁶⁰ "Indonesia's Police: Cop Killers." *The Economist*, 4 Nov. 2010.

⁶¹ "Corruption in Indonesia: Slow to Shame." *The Economist*, 26 May 2011.

These anti-corruption measures are also important to legitimize the police as a trustworthy institution. Traditionally as much as two thirds of the police budget in Indonesia has come from off-the-books sources, mainly through gifts from wealthy individuals seeking influence and bribes at the street level by officers looking to supplement their incomes or provide resources for the police to do their jobs. These acts are still prevalent in Indonesia, but have gotten better, with an estimated 50% of the budget now coming from illegitimate sources.⁶² It is important to fund the police at a sustainable and consistent level so that this graft and solicitation can be eliminated at the local level; as long as police are extorting from the people they are supposed to serve, there will never be trust and legitimacy. This must start at the basic entry into the training process and continue throughout professional development. For the culture of corruption to end, leadership should be an integral role in reform, such as President Yudhoyono's continued crusade against illicit activities.

In the Philippines, the PNP has implemented reforms that prevent the misuse of power and other corrupt activities that undermine the integrity and morality of the institution. Part of this reform is transparency in the budgetary allocations of the PNP, as long as it does not violate national security. Under the leadership of President Benigno Aquino III, one of the administration's primary objectives is to eradicate corruption in all government agencies, specifically those institutions that are working in the public service, such as the PNP.⁶³

⁶² Robert Barlow, Personal Interview.

⁶³ Dalizon, Alfred. "DND, PNP Welcome Intel Funds Audit." 13 May 2011. <http://www.journal.com.ph/index.php/news/top-stories/5101-dnd-ntp-welcome-intel-funds-audit>

Conclusion

“Talking to police commanders over the years, they have said ‘ICITAP is like a virus, your ideas have gotten into our culture, and because they are so strong, they are changing the culture.’”⁶⁴

- Robert Barlow, ICITAP

Establishing a trained and effective civilian police force remains critical to the long-term stability of Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as US national security interests in the region and elsewhere. In the last decade, the Indonesian National Police and the Philippine National Police each emerged from their respective armed forces as independent, civilian-oriented institutions tasked with law enforcement and some measure of internal security. ICITAP has been the lead US agency providing police assistance efforts to both countries for that time.

Both INP and PNP are young institutions and are evolving in terms of their resources and capabilities. They depend on external aid and assistance to upgrade some, but not all, of those capabilities. In the next decade, these police forces will face a sea change in leadership, as senior officers with military backgrounds will start to retire and the first generation of junior officers, who have only known civilian police forces, will begin to take charge.

ICITAP must prepare for that leadership today. The idea that ICITAP has had a “viral effect” is a powerful metaphor for how police reform in both nations has been achieved. This report highlights key concepts that are also best practices for future efforts:

- Allow host nation to generate ideas and set pace of reform.
- Maintain long-term commitment but remain in consultative role.
- Keep a small footprint.
- Focus on organizational and culture change, as well as budget reform.
- Develop quantitative metrics and assessments to clarify effectiveness of reforms.

Metaphors aside, ICITAP would be wise to remember that “neither the police organization nor the people they serve...are passive receivers of reform” in viral or any other form.⁶⁵ Foreign police capacity building and reform is a slow, participatory process that demands

⁶⁴ Robert Barlow, Personal Interview

⁶⁵ Denham, Tara and Kristin Valasek. “Gender and SSR Toolkit,” pg. 7

a long-term vision and commitment to change. To ensure its continued success, ICITAP should expect more of the same.

Questions for the Future

As a subset of security sector reform, foreign police capacity building and reform can benefit enormously from additional analysis and research across the field. Going forward, the authors suggest a few key themes that emerged in the writing of this report.

- What are the appropriate roles for US federal employees and contractors in foreign police capacity building?
- Who are the other actors providing police assistance in the Philippines and Indonesia? How do their experiences compare to ICITAP's? What lessons can be drawn from them?
- What is the USG's ultimate goal in foreign police reform: to make the best with the police that a nation has, or to make by changing systems entirely?

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