COUNTERINSURGENCY, THE WAR ON TERROR, AND THE LAWS OF WAR

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Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military strategists, historians, soldiers, and policymakers have made counterinsurgency’s principles and paradoxes second nature, and they now expect that counterinsurgency operations will be the likely wars of the future. Yet despite counterinsurgency’s ubiquity in military and policy circles, legal scholars have almost completely ignored it. This Article evaluates the laws of war in light of modern counterinsurgency strategy. It shows that the laws of war are premised on a kill-capture strategic foundation that does not apply in counterinsurgency, which follows a win-the-population strategy. The result is that the laws of war are disconnected from military realities in multiple areas – from the use of non-lethal weapons to occupation law. It also argues that the war on terror legal debate has been myopic and misplaced. The shift from a kill-capture to win-the-population strategy not only expands the set of topics legal scholars interested in contemporary conflict must address but also requires incorporating the strategic foundations of counterinsurgency when considering familiar topics in the war on terror legal debates.

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INTRODUCTION

Counterinsurgency is the warfare of the age. Past eras have had their own forms of warfare and their own theories of war. In the 18th century armies lined up on expansive battlefields in rigid formation. In the 20th century, the age of total war, entire populations mobilized and contributed to the war effort – and at the same time were made vulnerable to devastating attack. Today, it has become common, even trite, to announce that the nature of warfare is changing. Insurgents do not look like the soldiers and warriors of the past. They are not amassed in great armies; they do not confront their enemy on the battlefield; they may not even be affiliated with a state. To be sure, insurgency is not a new form of warfare. America has been fighting wars against insurgents for well over a century. But never before has insurgency been so central to national and international security. Today military strategists believe that contemporary national security threats are best described as a global insurgency, and they expect that counterinsurgency operations will be the likely wars of the future.

Yet despite counterinsurgency’s ubiquity in military and policy circles, legal scholars have almost completely ignored it. The only exceptions are in the peripheral fields of constitution-making and tort compensation. This is a serious mistake. The laws of war were created with an assumption that conventional war’s strategy – kill or capture the enemy – was the route to victory. The war on terror, despite tactical innovations such as the absence of uniforms and a networked enemy structure, retains the same strategy: to win, simply kill or capture all the terrorists. Counterinsurgency emphatically rejects the kill-capture strategy. Instead, counterinsurgents follow a win-the-population strategy that is directed at building a stable and legitimate political order. Winning the population involves securing the population, providing essential

1 See MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY: FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE (Peter Paret ed., 1986).
3 See infra TAN xx – xx.
6 John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages (forthcoming).
7 The terms laws of war, laws of armed conflict, and international humanitarian law (IHL) are now often used synonymously, though they have different emphases. Historically, “war” implied conflict between states. “Armed conflict” expands the scope to lesser hostilities. IHL emphasizes a particular purpose of law. See David Wippman, Introduction 1, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? (eds. David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista, 2005).
8 I proceed using the counterinsurgency strategy that the U.S. Military has recently adopted, U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (2007) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL], in addition to works by contemporary strategists whose thought can be taken as doctrine because they either wrote the Field Manual or worked as counterinsurgency strategists in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some disagree with the strategy and prefer kill-capture operations. See Edward N. Luttwak, Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice, HARPER’S MAG., Feb 2007, at 33. But the mainstream view – and more importantly, the official military doctrine – embraces the Field Manual’s approach.
services, building political and legal institutions, and fostering economic
development. Killing and capturing the insurgents is not the primary goal, and
it may often be counterproductive, causing destruction that creates backlash
among the population and fuels their support for the insurgency. Counterinsurgency’s strategy is thus starkly different from the strategy that
undergirds the laws of war and the debates on legal issues in the war on terror.

This Article evaluates the laws of war in light of modern
counterinsurgency strategy. It takes seriously the win-the-population strategy as
the primary driver of military operations, rather than the kill-capture strategy
that defines conventional warfare and the war on terror. In doing so, the Article
has two aims. The first is to examine the relationship between
counterinsurgency and the laws of war. In particular, it demonstrates a
significant disconnect between counterinsurgency and the laws of war and roots
that disconnect in the strategic differences between counterinsurgency and
conventional warfare. In short, the laws of war are premised on a strategic
foundation that no longer applies, rendering many of its rules problematic for
the age of counterinsurgency. Second, it argues that the debate on legal issues
related to the war on terror has been myopic and misplaced. Legal scholars
have missed a tectonic shift in military circles: military strategists have rejected
the war on terror approach and now interpret global threats as an insurgency
that requires a win-the-population strategy for success. This shift in framing not
only expands the set of topics legal scholars interested in contemporary conflict
must address but also requires incorporating the strategic foundations of
counterinsurgency when considering familiar topics in the war on terror legal
debates.

The results of this investigation are significant. First, the considerable
attention paid to war on terror legal issues, such as detention and interrogation,
is somewhat misplaced. These issues are important, but as important are
occupation law and targeting under the principle of distinction, which get
comparatively little attention. Moreover, the laws of war are poorly tailored to
the realities of counterinsurgency. In some cases, such as the use of non-lethal
weapons, the laws of war are unduly constraining to the point of preventing
strategically helpful actions that align with humanitarian goals. In other cases,
such as civilian compensation, the laws of war could perhaps place greater
humanitarian constraints on military forces. Finally, the standard story of
compliance with the laws of war – reciprocity between parties – completely
fails in counterinsurgency because the prerequisites are absent. Yet
counterinsurgency strategy may itself suggest an alternative: Strategic self-
interest, a principle of exemplarism, may enable a self-enforcing foundation for
compliance with the laws of war, even for legal provisions that are commonly
justified as humanitarian.

Highlighting the disconnect between the laws of war and military
necessity may seem instrumental rather than humanitarian. But every age has
its own laws of war, based on the warfare dominant at the time. The positivists
of the 19th century saw war as an extension of national policy and therefore
conceived the laws of war in contractual terms. In the wake of the total wars of the 20th century, international lawyers envisioned war as human tragedy, and in the process reshaped the laws of war to protect civilians and innocent populations. In the face of today’s challenges – in this age of counterinsurgency – the laws of war must continue to keep up with the realities of war or else find itself increasingly irrelevant and potentially ignored.

To show the disconnect between the laws of war, the war on terror, and counterinsurgency, this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly reviews the foundations of conventional warfare, the kill-capture strategy. It then traces the history of the modern laws of war from the Lieber code in the 19th century to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to demonstrate that the laws of war are built on the assumption that warfare involves a kill-capture strategy. It demonstrates that the central principles and most important provisions of the laws of war – military necessity, discrimination, reciprocity, and inviolability – are all based on the kill-capture strategy.

Part II argues that the war on terror assumes, like the laws of war, that national security policy requires a kill-capture strategy. Although many have noted the tactical innovations of terrorists and have responded with different legal interpretations, it demonstrates that all three of the main camps in the war on terror legal debates nonetheless assume a kill-capture strategy. Part II then shows that the war on terror framework has been rejected in military circles for strategic and operational purposes, and that insurgency and counterinsurgency have taken center stage instead.

Part III outlines counterinsurgency’s strategy for victory: winning over the population. It discusses how this strategy manifests itself, including securing the population, building the rule of law, establishing economic capacity, and supporting political institutions. It also shows that counterinsurgents reject some of the principal tenets of conventional warfare, such as the centrality of military means.

Part IV shows the disconnect between the laws of war and counterinsurgency. It first addresses some specific areas within the laws of war: the principle of distinction, occupation law, detention policy, non-lethal weapons, and compensatory norms. The areas of law discussed by no means exhaust the laws of war; rather they provide examples of the significant legal consequences that follow from the strategic shift from kill-capture to win-the-population. In each case, the Article describes the current law, the disconnect between the law and counterinsurgency’s theory of victory, and potential revision that would better fit the realities of counterinsurgency. Part IV then considers the nature of compliance with the laws of war – the principle of reciprocity – and shows that the prerequisites for reciprocity do not apply in counterinsurgency, requiring a new way of thinking about compliance. It suggests that strategic self-interest, a principle of exemplarism, might provide that mechanism.

The disconnect between the laws of war and counterinsurgency strategy raises important practical and conceptual questions: Should the laws of war be
revised and if so how? What is the relationship between law and strategy? It is far beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive proposal for revising the laws of war or to provide a theory of the relationship between law and strategy, but Part V identifies some of the more important factors for future scholarship in this area.

I. CONVENTIONAL WAR, THE KILL-CAPTURE STRATEGY, AND THE LAWS OF WAR

The laws of war have not been developed in the abstract, absent connection to the realities of warfare and strategy. For over a century, the laws of war have assumed that the central strategy for victory in war is destroying the opponent and therefore that warriors seek to kill and capture their enemies. After outlining conventional warfare’s strategy as the kill-capture model, this Part shows how the kill-capture approach has inspired the framework of the laws of war from its modern origins in the Lieber Code through the Geneva Conventions. Kill-capture is manifested in the central principles of the laws of war: military necessity, discrimination, reciprocity, and inviolability.

Conventional war’s influence on the laws of war is necessary for understanding the divergence between the laws of war and counterinsurgency.

A. Conventional War and the Kill-Capture Strategy

The central focus of conventional warfare is the destruction of the enemy. This framework can be termed the “kill-capture” approach to victory because in a specific battle, destruction of the enemy is defined by killing or capturing the enemy’s forces until the enemy is vanquished or gives up. Not surprisingly, this approach was common to the military strategists of the era immediately preceding the codification of the laws of war. Frederick the Great argued that the objective of war was the “entire destruction of your enemies,” and the Swiss theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini, who contribution to military strategy was linking territorial conquest and victory, argued that “[t]he destruction of the enemy’s field armies was the new military aim.”

The most famous modern strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, also envisioned a strategy for victory based on a kill-capture approach. For Clausewitz, the “overriding principle of war” was the “[d]estruction of the enemy forces,” which can be accomplished by “death, injury, or any other

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9 Strategy can exist at many levels, from technical details and operations to political goals. See EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, STRATEGY (2002). I use strategy to indicate an overall approach, encompassing particular operations.
10 Indeed, even when the enemy gives up, it does so from fear of destruction. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 227 (eds. Michael Howard & Peter Paret, 1984).
11 Frederick the Great, Article XXII: Of Combats and Battles, in Military Instructions, the King of Prussia’s Military Instructions to His Generals, available at: www.sonshi.com/frederickthegreat1-22.html.
13 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 10, at 90; see also id. at 577 (“[T]he grand objective of all military action is to overthrow the enemy – which means destroying his armed forces.”).
means.” Clausewitz coined the term “center of gravity” to define the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” The center of gravity in war was the source of strength for the opponent, and it was the central objective against which force should be directed. For Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus, and Frederick the Great, Clausewitz argued, the center of gravity was the army, and therefore central feature of warfare was battle against the army. That the battle would be defined by killing and capturing was obvious, for the character of battles, he said, was “slaughter.”

Beyond the centrality of battle, Clausewitz also provided the groundwork for the total war theories of the 20th century in which kill-capture expanded beyond soldiers to the broader population. Clausewitz argued that war involved the interplay of three actors: the people, the military, and the government. The strength of each side would be determined by the will and power of this trinity. In the early 20th century, strategists realized that a state’s economic and military power were linked. That fact, coupled with development of devastating technologies and air power, refocused military strategy from the enemy’s military to its population and government. Total war required mobilization of the entire society and its resources. Giulio Douhet, an Italian military strategist, perhaps put it best, total war required “smashing the material and moral resources of a people...until the final collapse of all social organization.”

B. The Laws of War and the Kill-Capture Strategy

The conventional war model focused its attention on the destruction of the enemy — on killing and capturing enemy forces, and in the age of total war, on destroying the population’s will to support the national war machine. This approach to warfare inspired the laws of war. Significantly, the centrality of

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14 Id. at 227.
15 Id. at 595 – 96.
16 The military’s definition of center of gravity is "source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” Dept. of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 2008.
17 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 10, at 596.
18 Id. at 258.
19 Id. at 159; see also id. at 260
20 Id. at 89.
21 WILLIAM C. MARTEL, VICTORY IN WAR 52 (2007).
22 The German strategist Erich Ludendorff described total war as involving the entire territory, requiring the population to mobilize the economic power of the state, supporting their morale, preparing before the war, and having a single leader. See id. at 53.
23 Id. at 71.
24 Some international law scholars have noted the kill-capture nature of warfare. Professor Megret argues that the laws of war are necessarily based on “war,” which is a social construction “beyond which humanitarian lawyers feel they cannot go.” Frederic Megret, Non-Lethal Weapons and the Possibility of Radical New Horizons for the Laws of War at 9, 18-19 (on file with author). See also Mark Weisburd, AL QAEDA AND THE LAW OF WAR, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1163, 1171 (2007) (noting that “belligerent states attempt to prevent their adversaries from causing future harm by destroying their military forces; obviously, killing or capturing the members of an adversary’s forces will destroy those forces. If one could not kill members of the opposing
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the kill-capture approach to warfighting has resulted in the laws of war taking two inextricably linked trajectories: the laws of war have limited violence in light of humanitarian necessity, and at the same time, they have enabled violence.\textsuperscript{25} In essence, the laws of war are a blueprint for the architecture of legitimate warfare,\textsuperscript{26} whose design assumes a kill-capture military strategy.

The modern laws of war can be traced back to the Lieber Code, promulgated by Abraham Lincoln as Army General Orders No. 100 in 1863.\textsuperscript{27} Lieber’s contribution was the doctrine of military necessity as a limitation on violence,\textsuperscript{28} though necessity enabled violence as much as it curtailed it. Under the Code, military necessity comprised “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”\textsuperscript{29} Military necessity did not allow cruelty,\textsuperscript{30} but it permitted expansive kill-capture operations, including all direct destruction of life and limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable …. it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of particular danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy…\textsuperscript{31} Military necessity even permitted starvation.\textsuperscript{32} Lieber himself thought harsh and violent tactics would lead to shorter wars.\textsuperscript{33}

Another significant early codification likewise recognized the kill-capture nature of warfare. In the early 1860s, Czar Alexander II called an

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\textsuperscript{25} This is the conventional approach; international humanitarian law is a “compromise between humanitarian and military necessity.” See, e.g., Marco Sassoli, Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of Military Objectives for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflict, in WIPPMAN & EVANGELISTA, supra note 7, at 183 – 84. However, the foundational importance of kill-capture applies even if other approaches are followed. Eric Posner has argued that the laws of war seek to limit costly military technologies, thus freeing resources for production and consumption. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297 (2003). Given the primacy of military technology to Posner’s theory, his approach also grounds the laws of war in the kill-capture strategy.

\textsuperscript{26} See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 4 - 5 (2004).


\textsuperscript{28} Carnahan, supra note 27, at 213.

\textsuperscript{29} General Orders No. 100, supra note 27, at Art. 14.

\textsuperscript{30} Id. at Art. 16.

\textsuperscript{31} Id. at Art. 15.

\textsuperscript{32} Id. at Art. 17.

\textsuperscript{33} Meron, supra note 27, at 271.
international meeting in St. Petersburg to address the recent invention of exploding bullets. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration\(^34\) prohibited use of these projectiles, but is notable for its description of the relationship between strategy and the law. The Declaration stated its goal as “fix[ing] the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity.”\(^35\) It then went further: “the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men.”\(^36\) The St. Petersburg Declaration thus acknowledged that killing is necessary in war even as it established the principle of unnecessary suffering. The Declaration thus both empowered and restrained killing and capturing.

In 1899 and 1907, the international community codified laws of war during two conferences at The Hague.\(^37\) A review of even a few provisions demonstrates the importance of the kill-capture approach. Article 1 of the Regulations appended to Hague Convention IV of 1907, for example, establishes one of the central principles in the laws of war,\(^38\) the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians.\(^39\) As one commentator has noted, “[t]o allow attacks on persons other than combatants would violate the principle of necessity, because victory can be achieved by overcoming only the combatants of a country.”\(^40\) The principle therefore establishes that battle against combatants is central feature of warfare and justifies killing and capturing the enemy.

Other provisions in the fourth Hague Convention’s regulations follow. Under Article 20, prisoners of war must be repatriated to their home countries, the consequence of which is that captured enemy forces can be held by a belligerent for the duration of hostilities.\(^41\) Regulations announce that the means of warfare are not unlimited;\(^42\) that poison, actions that result in unnecessary suffering, and assaults on unarmed and surrendered persons are forbidden;\(^43\) and that armies shall not attack undefended towns, under the assumption that they can be occupied without bloodshed.\(^44\) The common thread throughout these regulations is that warfare necessitates killing and capturing, and that the laws of war can humanize that process, preventing extreme suffering. Hague

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\(^{34}\) Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/decpeter.asp.

\(^{35}\) St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 34.

\(^{36}\) Id.


\(^{38}\) Id. at 10; see also L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 47, 113, 192 (2nd ed. 2000).

\(^{39}\) Under Article 1, the “laws, rights, and duties of war” apply to armies, militia, and volunteer corps that are commanded by a person responsible to subordinates, that show a distinctive emblem, that carry arms openly, and that follow the laws and customs of war. Convention No. IV on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague IV].

\(^{40}\) Sassoli, supra note 25, at 202.

\(^{41}\) Hague IV, at Art. 20.

\(^{42}\) Id. at Art. 22.

\(^{43}\) Id. at Art. 23.

\(^{44}\) Id. at Art. 25.
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law also features the principles of symmetry and reciprocity. Symmetry makes a rule self-enforcing because neither party gets a relative gain from the regulated practice. A related feature is reciprocity – if a belligerent violates the rule, the other side can retaliate in kind. Fundamentally, the hope of symmetry and reciprocity is that neither side will have an advantage in the battle by using more destructive means.

After the slaughter of World War II, nations saw war less as a matter of national interest and more as “human tragedy” and gathered to protect the victims of war. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 each protect people from the destructive violence that a kill-capture strategy requires: they protect wounded and sick in the field, wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians. Yet even as the Geneva Conventions protect, they also enable violence. As the ICRC commentary puts it, “it is only the solider who is himself seeking to kill who may be killed.” The Geneva Conventions, inspired by humanitarian aims, thus also illustrate the core assumption that war’s central feature and strategy is killing and capturing the enemy.

What this brief history of the laws of war shows is that the central principles underlying the laws of war – military necessity, distinction, reciprocity, and inviolability – and the most important provisions of the conventions and declarations themselves assume that war is defined by a kill-capture strategy. As a result, the laws of war have sought both to enable and to constrain violence in light of humanitarian goals.

II. WAR ON TERROR OR COUNTERINSURGENCY?

Since September 11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, lawyers and scholars have worked to determine how the laws of war apply in the war on terror. Terrorism has allowed legal scholars to see significant divergences between contemporary conflict and the conventional mode of war: terrorists do not wear uniforms, they do not fight in pitched battles on defined battlefields, and they operate globally. Despite this substantial step forward, legal scholars have not

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45 For example, Declaration No. 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, banning the use of projectiles to spread asphyxiating gases, states that the Declaration is “only binding to the contracting Powers.” Such rules were derived from the contractual approach to the laws of war that emerged in the 17th century. See Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations 147 – 51 (2005). See also Eric Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 423, 427 – 30 (2005).
46 See Posner, supra note 45, at 428.
47 Id. at 429.
48 NEFF, supra note 45, at 340; see also Roberts & Guelff, supra note 37, at 195 (“The central concern of all four 1949 Geneva Conventions is thus the protection of victims of war”).
49 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter GC I].
51 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter GC III].
52 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter GC IV].
53 ICRC Commentary to GC I at 136.
gone far enough. Debates on the laws of war in war on terror consider these tactical shifts seriously, but they still work within the kill-capture strategy.

What the legal debates on the war on terror have missed is a shift in military strategy – one with significant implications for law. As early as 2003, military strategists started shifting away from the war on terror framework, instead characterizing contemporary security challenges as counterinsurgency. The shift is more than semantic. The war on terror framework assumes the primacy of a kill-capture strategy for victory. The counterinsurgency framework instead insists on a win-the-population strategy for victory. The win-the-population strategy for victory changes the center of gravity of military operations from the enemy’s military prowess to the civilian population, and expands the field of operations from kill-capture operations to security, political, legal, economic, and social operations. Recognizing this shift is necessary for thinking through the laws of war in the modern era.

A. Tactical Innovation and the War on Terror

To understand the nature of modern conflict, many have described the disconnect between the war on terror and conventional war. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks’s work provides a representative example. 54 Brooks outlines the breakdown of boundaries that the laws of war rely upon: The categories of international and internal armed conflict does not precisely apply to global terrorist networks, which are neither states that can be party to international conflict nor solely internal actors in one country. 55 The paradigms of crime and conflict are challenged by acts defined as crimes under law but having the scope of violence common to war. 56 Geographical limitations to a single battlefield are rendered meaningless by global actions. 57 The temporal boundary of war and peace is undermined, because “by its nature, the war on terrorism is unlikely ever to end.” 58 The distinction between civilians and combatants is blurred by the obsolescence of pitched battles and the roles of supporters and sympathizers. 59 As a result, the line between national security and domestic affairs is obscured, as greater intrusion into the lives of individuals is necessary to identify terrorists. 60 Notably, the war on terror’s innovations share a common feature: they are developments in the tactics and operations of the opponents. 61

55 Brooks, supra note 54, at 714; but see Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 39 – 41 (2003) (arguing that non-international armed conflicts extend not just to internal conflicts but to transnational conflicts “on a fortiori” grounds of creating a comprehensive system).
57 Id. at 720 – 25.
58 Id. at 726 (emphasis omitted)
59 Id. at 729 – 36.
60 Id. at 736 – 43.
61 One challenge Brooks does not discuss – the absence of reciprocity from terrorist groups – does not have this feature. For a discussion of reciprocity in the war on terror, see Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the
These changes have sparked extensive debate as to what extent the laws of war apply in the war on terror, and commentators can be divided into three groups. The first group believes that the laws of war do not apply in the war on terror. For simplicity, call this the Bush Administration approach. In a 2002 memo, President Bush linked the nature of the war to the legal regime structuring warfare: “[o]ur Nation recognizes that this new paradigm – ushered in not by us but by terrorists – requires new thinking in the law of war.”

For the Administration, the law of war was less relevant than this declaration perhaps suggested. John Yoo believed the nation was at war with Al Qaeda but he was imprecise as to whether it was an international armed conflict described in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions or a non-international armed conflict, described in Common Article 3. The Bybee Memo declared that the war on terror fit neither category because international armed conflicts were limited to states, and non-international armed conflicts had to occur within one state. Thus, only customary international law applied. The new paradigm of a global war on terror, in Alberto Gonzales’s view, “renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations…and renders quaint some of its provisions.”

As William Taft, another legal advisor, announced, “nothing in the law of war requires a country to charge enemy combatants with crimes, provide access to counsel in the absence of such charges, or allow them to challenge their detention in court.”

The Bush Administration approach clearly expresses the kill-capture strategy. In their vision, the war on terror will continue until terrorists around the globe are captured or killed, thus ending the threat. As President Bush declared, “[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

Government must therefore “maximize its own ability to mobilize lethal force against terrorists.” That the laws of war, do not explicitly cover the global nature of terrorism is, on this reading, fortunate, because it enables the kill-capture strategy to go forward unhindered.

The second group in the debate argues that the laws of war and criminal law are each adequate to handle contemporary global terrorism. Call this the legal doctrine approach. Gabor Rona, for instance, notes that “[h]umanitarian law is basically fine,” and that “[t]here is little evidence that domestic and
international laws and institutions of crime and punishment are not up to the task when terrorism and the War on Terror do not rise to the level of armed conflict.”

Thus, if each package of laws is coherent and effective, then the only question is determining which laws to apply. One set of analysts suggest that terrorism must be treated as a crime because terrorists are not a state and thus cannot be belligerents under the laws of war. A second set of scholars understand the laws of war as applying in the war on terror; they argue that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups could be understood as triggering either a non-international armed conflict as described in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, or if they are working with a state, an international armed conflict under Common Article 2. For this group, the laws of war as currently written are applicable, and there is nothing quaint or obsolete about Geneva. A third set of commentators have acknowledged placing terrorism is a challenge, but have seen no need to revise the substantive laws; rather, they hope to clarify the threshold determination of which law applies. At least some adherents to the legal doctrine approach have adopted this position partially due to fear of conceding ground to the Bush Administration approach. Recognizing any gaps or holes in the framework of relevant laws would enable exploitation, and ultimately legal violations. Others are concerned that a hybrid form of law, merging elements of the laws of war and criminal law, would be unprincipled and thus undermine human rights.

Like the Bush Administration approach, the legal doctrine approach sees the kill-capture strategy as central to the war on terror. The difference is fear that the terrorists’ tactical innovations will provide governments with the opportunity to undermine the laws of war’s constraints. Adherents to this approach follow directly in the tradition of the laws of war – acknowledging the kill capture nature of warfare and seeking to restrain war’s horrors. Professor Luban expresses the more fearful side of this group. He worries that “the real aim of the war [on terror] is, quite simply, to kill or capture all of the

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70 Luban, supra note 68, at 12.
72 Jinks, supra note 55; see also Anthony Dworkin, *Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place of Human Rights in the War on Terror*, in WIPPMA N & EVANGELISTA, supra note 7, at 55.
73 Jinks, supra note 61, at 177 – 78.
74 Kenneth Roth, *The Law of War in the War on Terror*, FOR. AFF. (Jun/Feb 2004).
75 Rona, supra note 69, at 58; see Wippman, supra note 7, at 8; Brooks, supra note 54, at 681; Roth, supra note 74.
76 Luban, supra note 68, at 12.
terrorists—to keep on killing and killing, capturing and capturing, until they are all gone.”

For Luban, the concern is that “even if al Qaeda is destroyed or decapitated, other groups, with other leaders, will arise in its place. It follows, then, that the War on Terrorism will be a war that can only be abandoned, never concluded. The War has no natural resting point, no moment of victory or finality. It requires a mission of killing and capturing, in territories all over the globe, that will go on in perpetuity.”

In a state of perpetual war, particularly one with the unconventional features of the war on terror, the threat to civil liberties and human rights is considerable.

The third group of scholars acknowledges that the war on terror challenges the laws of war, but instead of finding them inapplicable, the scholars seek to adapt the laws of war to better fit contemporary conflict. For shorthand, call this group the legal innovators. These scholars recognize that the laws of war were designed for a different kind of warfare—the conventional war model of massive armies waging war on distinct battlefields. Applying the laws of war to the war on terror and assuming a perfect fit is “anachronistic” because of developments “never even imagined by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions.” Some in this group go even further, historicizing the laws of war as responding to their particular context. After all, they note, the laws of war have been revised every twenty-five to thirty years since their first codification in the 1860s. On that timeline, since the last major revision—the Additional Protocols of 1977—another thirty years has passed and perhaps a revision is due.

The leading scholars in this camp have focused on the failure of the crime and war paradigms. For the legal innovators, the goal is to develop a hybrid model of law, between war and crime, that is better tailored to terrorist’s tactics. Judge Richard Posner’s approach is paradigmatic. Judge Posner believes that the threat of terrorism is different from traditional internal and external threats—criminals and foreign states. Because terrorists neither fit the crime or war models, pragmatic judges and legislators must balance civil liberties and national security and evaluate the effect a particular safety measure

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77 Id. at 13.
78 Id. at 13.
79 Brooks, supra note 54, at 706.
80 Id. at 745; see also Pierre-Richard Prosper, in Roberts, supra note 54, at 223 (“The war on terror is a new type of war not envisioned when the Geneva Conventions were negotiated and signed.”); Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants,” 75 G.W. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2007) (noting that the international / non-international armed conflict distinction does not fit the transnational nature of global terrorism).
81 Wippman, supra note 7, at 6; see also Weisburd, supra note 24, at 1080, 1085.
82 See, e.g., Wippman, supra note 7, at 4; Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307 (2003); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law: Choices of War, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’y 457 (2002). Feldman concludes that “terrorist attacks on the United States, planned from without, cannot definitively be categorized as either war or crime. They are crime from the perspective of provenance, war from the perspective of intentionality, probably crime from the perspective of identity, and very possibly war from the perspective of scale.” Id. at 470.
has on the values of security and liberty. Although the conflict is not a conventional war, there is a strong enough security interest to modify criminal law, because the enemy leverages the scope and destructive capacities of total war.

Professor Bruce Ackerman has also rejected war and crime as appropriate models, preferring instead “emergency” to describe terrorism’s threat. Terrorism is a “product of the free market in a world of high technology,” and even with peace and democracy in around the world, fringe groups would still have the capability to undertake acts of terrorism. The war model is inaccurate because terrorism is not an existential threat and because war allows presidents to use rhetoric to “batter down judicial resistance to their extreme efforts to strip suspects of their most fundamental rights.” The crime model is inaccurate because terrorism, unlike normal criminal operations, challenges the “effective sovereignty” of the state. It does so only momentarily, as terrorists are not trying, on Ackerman’s theory, to occupy or govern the state, only to destabilize it. Professor Ackerman prescribes an Emergency Constitution – a statute that would provide for declaration of an emergency after a terrorist attack and would provide heightened security measures to protect against a second-strike. This statute would expire if not reauthorized frequently by escalating supermajorities.

Many others have sought to find the appropriate balance between civil liberties and national security. Brooks uses human rights law as inspiration for providing a baseline law to apply in the context of terrorism. Monica Hakami suggests an administrative approach. Allison Danner looks to tribunals. Benjamin Wittes wants the proceduralism of Congressional and Presidential agreement to establish a balanced regime. Others advocate for a category of extra-state hostilities. And Noah Feldman notes that the absence of a clear hybrid model actually results in a flexible, ad hoc, model that incorporates components of each approach.

Although the legal innovators recognize that terrorism differs from both crime and conventional war, they simply assume that the kill-capture strategy is the primary, or even only, way to increase security and defeat terrorism. Take

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84 Id. at 32.
85 Id. at 72, 147 – 48.
87 Id. at 14.
88 Id. at 89, 171.
89 Id. at 38.
90 Id. at 42.
91 Id. at 171 – 72.
92 See Brooks, supra note 54.
95 BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR (2008).
97 Feldman, supra note 82, at 477.
Judge Posner. He assumes an unimpeded military could find, kill, and capture the terrorists, preventing terrorism and providing security. But he also acknowledges a conflicting value in constitutional rights and liberties. Law’s role is to protect rights when the cost of protection outweighs the marginal security gains of a particular safety proposal. Professor Ackerman reaches a similar conclusion through different reasoning. Ackerman believes terrorists have no broad ideological or political agenda, so kill-capture is the only way to stop them. Yet kill-capture and liberty-protecting laws are in conflict. Instead of a balancing test, as Judge Posner suggests, Professor Ackerman advocates for a category of emergency that has a fixed set of provisions that balance security and liberty and would operate for a short period of time. The basic assumption in both cases is that the kill-capture strategy is the central feature of the war on terror and that law gets in its way.

In addition to assuming that the war on terror is defined by a kill-capture strategy, the balancing approaches seem unsatisfying as a comprehensive way to think about law in the age of terrorism. The balancing approach merely tacks greater procedures onto the kill-capture approach. Moreover, when the legal innovators attempt to use a principled approach, the outcomes are often vague or one-sided. Human rights advocates, for example, admit their approach is incompetent to address difficult cases of military necessity. Finally, the balancing approaches also seem narrow in scope. They have a tendency to focus on domestic law when the problem is global. They also focus inordinately on detention, interrogation, and similar issues. From a review of the literature on the war on terror, one would think that these are the primary, perhaps even only, places where law interacts with twenty-first century conflict.

If we are to devise a legal regime for contemporary conflict, it must be based on the right understanding of the strategic challenge. Although the war on terror model has enabled legal scholars to see the tactical shifts in modern conflict, attempts to address contemporary conflict have thus far assumed that the central strategy for victory is a kill-capture strategy. But, as the next section will show, the kill-capture strategy approach is not the predominant military strategy for addressing contemporary security challenges.

B. From the War on Terror to Counterinsurgency

What the legal debates on the war on terror have missed is the fact that between 2002 and 2008, military strategists have reconceived the contemporary national security framework from a war on terror to counterinsurgency. The shift is significant because counterinsurgency rejects the kill-capture strategy for victory, instead embracing a win-the-population strategy for victory. The importance of the shift to a counterinsurgency strategy has been noted with

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98 Brooks, supra note 54, id. at 751.
sustained attention from popular commentators, with the most attention paid to the publication of The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual in 2007. This focus on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, has not made a significant impact in the legal literature.

There are stark differences between the terrorism and insurgency frameworks. The terrorism framework sees terrorists as unrepresentative and abnormal outliers in society. Insurgency is the manifestation of deeper, widespread issues in society. Terrorism isolates terrorists from negotiation or constructive engagement. Insurgency is premised on winning hearts and minds. Terrorists’ methods and objectives are condemned. Insurgents’ methods are condemned but their objectives might be reasonable if pursued through political means. terrorists are seen as psychologically defective – seeking violence for its own sake. Insurgents see violence as part of a broader political-military strategy. Terrorism is seen as either a law enforcement or military problem, root out a few bad apples. Insurgency is a social problem, requiring mobilization of all elements of government power. Counterterrorism is tactical, focusing on catching particular terrorists. Counterinsurgency is strategic, seeking to undermine the insurgent’s strategy and envisioning capture as secondary. In essence, terrorism is subordinate to insurgency. Terrorism is a particular tactic. Insurgency is the rejection of a political order.

The shift from the war on terror framework to the counterinsurgency framework proceeded roughly in three phases, as military strategists shifted focus from tactical innovations to the strategic goal of political order. During the first few years after September 11, national strategy envisioned the security challenge as the war on terror and focused on killing and capturing terrorists. In his address to Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush announced that the September 11 attacks were an “act of war” and declared that the “war on terror begins with al Qaeda,” but will not end until “every terrorist group of

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101 The only significant articles on the topic are Note, supra note 5, and Witt, supra note 6.
102 Professor Sloane has argued that terrorism is different in kind from traditional insurgency but for different reasons, namely, terrorists reject noncombatant immunity and are structured in networks instead of hierarchies. Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 443, 450 (2007). Military strategists more precisely see terrorism as largely fitting within the concept of insurgency – as a tactic used by insurgents.
104 Professor Bobbitt makes this point, but curiously prefers to refer to “terrorists” and “states of terror.” What defines terrorists, he says, is that they attack civilians and that they are opposed to the constitutional order of the era. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 27 (2008). Precision suggests distinguishing between these elements and referring to insurgents as those who oppose the constitutional order by violent means – whether as terrorists, guerrillas, or counterstates. This distinction also suggests terrorism can exist apart from insurgency. Where insurgency and terror overlap, political claims of insurgents can often be channeled into political mechanisms. The residual cases of pure terrorism will be few and can be addressed through conventional means.
global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”

Between 2004 and 2006, there was significant flux in how to describe the global conflict. David J. Kilcullen, one of the world’s leading counterinsurgency strategists, wrote in a far-ranging article in 2004 that the “present conflict is actually a campaign to counter a globalized Islamist insurgency,” and offered counterinsurgency as a superior alternative to counterterrorism. Kilcullen sharply distinguished between insurgency and terrorism: insurgency is “a popular movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence and subversion, while terrorism is one of its key tactics.”

Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, seemed to agree in 2005, writing in the New York Times that “military action is only one piece of the war on terrorism” and that while terrorists must be “hunted, captured or killed,” “all of the tools of statecraft” would be necessary for victory.

At the time, President Bush rejected the defense establishment’s wavering and reiterated that the “war on terror” continued. But by 2007 and 2008, a momentous shift had taken place. In 2007, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual was published and became official Army and Marine Corps doctrine for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Britain, the government decided to stop using the phrase “war on terror.” Army Lt. General William Boykin, serving as undersecretary of defense for intelligence and warfighting support commented: “If we look at is as terrorism, we have a tendency to think that the solution is to kill or capture all the terrorists. That’s a never-ending process.” “We’ll never be successful, we’ll never get there, if we think that’s the primary solution,” he said. “But if we approach it from the perspective of an insurgency, we use the seven elements of national power” -- diplomacy, military, economy, finance, law enforcement, information and intelligence.

Other officials agreed. Secretary of State Rice stated that “[l]eadning security experts are increasingly thinking about the war on terrorism as a kind of global insurgency,” and Secretary of Defense Gates argued that “[w]hat is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, world-wide irregular campaign.

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105 Bush, supra note 67.
106 Id.
107 Kilcullen, supra note 103, at 1; see also ROBERT M. CASSIDY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR (2006).
108 Kilcullen, supra note 103, at 15.
110 Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes it Clear: Phrase is 'War on Terror,' NY TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005.
111 See, e.g., JAMES CORUM, FIGHTING THE WAR ON TERROR: A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY (2007).
112 Philip Johnston, Ministers Ditch the phrase 'War on Terror,' DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 19, 2008.
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—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and moderation. … [O]ver the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory.”115

Perhaps most authoritatively, the National Defense Strategy of 2008 does not use the phrase “war on terror” once.116 Instead, the National Defense Strategy names the conflict the Long War,117 and transforms the strategic imperative from kill-capture to broader, “full-spectrum” counterinsurgency operations. Instead of hunting, killing, and capturing terrorists, the conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.118

The strategy, in essence, is not limited to kill-capture or even primarily kill-capture, as the war on terror framework implied. Rather, “essential ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications.”119

Counterinsurgency operations are not a new development of the 21st century, but they have never before seemed so central to the future of warfare. The national security establishment today believes counterinsurgency wars will be the likely wars of the future.120 Secretary of Defense Gates has argued that enemies have realized they cannot challenge the military supremacy of the United States and therefore have turned to asymmetric insurgency. “Asymmetric warfare,” he notes, “will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.”121 Secretary of State Rice agrees and projects that America will remain in this conflict “for many years.”122 And the US Counterinsurgency Guide for Policymakers states forthrightly that “[i]nsurgency will be a large and growing element of the security challenges

117 Id. at 8.
118 Id. at 8.
119 Id. at 17.
120 I take the phrase “the likely war” from VINCENT DESPORTES, LA GUERRE PROBABLE (2007).
122 Rice, supra note 114.
faced by the United States in the 21st century.”123 To be sure, it is unlikely that
the United States will invade another country, engage in regime change, and
conduct a full-scale counterinsurgency operation. But as Secretary Gates has
stated, insurgency is still the future of conflict. The American role may be
indirect – “building the capacity of partner governments and their security
forces” – but counterinsurgency operations will nonetheless take place.124

If the military is correct that the likely wars of the future will be
insurgencies, local and global, then applying the wrong strategy would be
disastrous. For international and national security lawyers, relying on an
outmoded notion of strategy for constructing a legal regime might lead to
substantial disconnects between military operations and law that are either
underconstraining or overconstraining, potentially ignored, or if revised, are
based on faulty premises. Rethinking the legal regime thus requires
understanding the strategy with depth and precision.

III. COUNTERINSURGENCY’S STRATEGY FOR VICTORY

The significance of the shift from the war on terror to counterinsurgency lies in
a shift in strategy: from kill-capture to win-the-population as the strategy for
victory. Counterinsurgency’s win-the-population approach differs in two ways.
First, although counterinsurgency has a place for killing and capturing enemies,
kill-capture is not the primary focus. Because insurgents gain strength from the
acquiescence of the population, the focus of counterinsurgency is building the
population’s goodwill toward and cooperation with the government. Second,
counterinsurgency is not limited to military operations. It includes political,
legal, economic, and social reconstruction in order to develop a stable, orderly
society, in which the population itself prevents the emergence or success of the
insurgency.

Insurgency is defined as a “protracted struggle conducted methodically,
step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives, leading finally
to the overthrow of the existing order.”125 In the modern era, insurgency often
“follows state failure, and is not directed at taking over a functioning body
politic, but at dismembering or scavenging its carcass, or contesting an
‘ungoverned space.’”126 The central issue in an insurgency is political power
because “each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority
as legitimate.”127

123 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide 1 (2009), available at:
124 Gates, supra note 115.
125 DAVID GALULA, COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE 4 (1964) (emphasis omitted). See also FIELD MANUAL,
supra note 8, at 1-2, 2 (“an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political
authority while increasing insurgent control.”).
127 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, 1-2 at 2.
Insurgencies are social systems that grow organically in local society but can link globally with other insurgencies. Success in an insurgency depends on the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the population. To win support or submission, insurgents employ disorder to undermine the counterinsurgent’s power and legitimacy, and they mobilize support locally and globally. Among other things, insurgents advocate ideologies, pay individuals to conduct operations, employ disorder, violence, and intimidation, and exploit local grievances such as communal or sectarian conflicts. Insurgents may have fewer resources than counterinsurgents, but success in the early stages of insurgency only requires “sowing chaos and disorder anywhere; the government fails unless it maintains a degree of order everywhere.” If successful in disrupting the counterinsurgent’s ability to govern, some insurgents, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, may develop a “counterstate” that provides security and essential services. The creation of a counterstate solidifies the insurgent’s support amongst the population because the government is impotent and the insurgents can meet the population’s needs.

A counterinsurgent’s task differs considerably from a conventional warrior’s because the enemy is embedded in the local community, focused on developing popular support or submission, and committed to disrupting a legitimate, stable political order. Counterinsurgency can be defined as the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” Success in counterinsurgency operations “depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule.” Because insurgents derive their support from the local population, only when the local population turns against the insurgency and actively embraces a burgeoning order can the insurgency be defeated.

Even at this level of abstraction from operational details, it is immediately obvious that counterinsurgency is not centered on a kill-capture strategy. As the Counterinsurgency Field Manual states, “killing

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128 Kilcullen, supra note 103, at 22 – 23.
129 GALULA, supra note 125, at 7 – 8.
130 Id. at 11.
131 Kilcullen, supra note 126, at 9.
132 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, 1-75 at 25.
133 Kilcullen, supra note 126, at 7.
134 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, 1-28, at 10.
135 Kilcullen, supra note 103, at 37. The word “grievance” is not used exclusively in this Article to connote, as it does in political science, a grievance created by ethnic or religious difference or lack of political rights. See James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 76, 79 (2003). Neither counterinsurgents nor these political scientists focus solely on these grievances, though they recognize that such grievances can be produced by wars and can challenge peaceful resolution. Id. at 88.
136 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 5, 1-9 at 4.
137 Id. at 1-33, 12.
139 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, 1-2 at 2.
140 Id. at 1-4 at 2.
insurgents…by itself cannot defeat an insurgency. The first problem is that it is impossible to kill every insurgent. Insurgents are embedded into the population, indistinguishable from civilians. And as importantly, an insurgency is made up not only of those who engage in combat, but also of active and passive supporters. Seeking to kill or capture all insurgent supporters would require targeting much of the nation. Moreover, conducting kill-capture operations against insurgents – whether participants or supporters – may be counterproductive, resulting in negative feedback loops. “[I]t risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.” Instead, counterinsurgents focus on separating the insurgency from its resources and popular support.

Counterinsurgency thus follows a win-the-population strategy. The people, not the enemy, are the center of gravity in counterinsurgency. They are the source of strength for both the insurgents and counterinsurgents. The central causes of the conflict – for example, local grievances, poor governance, insecurity – are sociopolitical. Addressing the root causes removes the population’s reasons for actively or passively supporting the insurgency, and will result in a withering insurgency. As a result, “all energies should be directed at gaining and maintaining control over the population and winning its support.” In other words, “[c]ounterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at.”

Counterinsurgency operations can be easily categorized: securing the population; ensuring essential services; establishing governance structures; developing the economy and infrastructure; and communicating with the population. Securing the population involves ensuring civil security and training host nation security forces. Ensuring civil security involves combat operations against insurgent fighters “who cannot be co-opted into operating inside the rule of law.” Operations are often small-scale and designed to avoid injuring innocent people both for humanitarian reasons and to win the population’s support for the counterinsurgency. Training host nation security forces gives the population a stake in counterinsurgency and develops their capacity for providing security. Ensuring essential services guarantees that the

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141 Id. at 1-14 at 5.
142 Id. at 1-128 at 41.
143 Id. at 3-84 – 3-88 at 104.
144 Id. at 1-128 at 41
145 Id.
146 Id.
149 Id. at 46.
151 See FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, figure 5-1 at 155
152 See id. at figure 5-2 at 156; 5-35 – 5-41 at 165 – 169.
153 Id. at 5-38 at 167
154 Id. at 5-38 – 5-39 at 167 - 68
population has the basic necessities of life: water, electricity, schools, transportation, medical care, and sanitation (trash and sewage). The importance of essential services is not to be underestimated. One influential review of Sadr City showed a direct correlation between insurgent activity and poor provision of power and sanitation. Infrastructure projects employ people, providing basic services, and place a wedge between insurgents and passive supporters.

The “most important” activity is establishing governance structures because effective governance will address social problems better than externally provided services. Developing governance includes local, regional, and national departments and agencies, creating a justice system with law enforcement, courts, and prisons, and working to secure fundamental human rights. Ensuring fair and transparent political processes enables self-government and provides a non-violent path for political expression. Guaranteeing a fair system of justice grants legitimacy to the state’s more coercive actions. In some cases, these systems may not exist or function and counterinsurgents will need to “establish legal procedures and systems to deal with captured insurgents and common criminals.” Economic and infrastructure development is also necessary to counterinsurgency because an effective economy gives the population a stake in society. Poor economic conditions provide an opportunity for insurgent’s false promises to gain active and passive supporters.

Finally, information operations is central to counterinsurgency and effects each of the prior operations. Every action is part of the information environment, particularly given the speed with which information travels on the internet and through television. Successful information operations requires dialogue between soldiers and the population, a forum for dialogue with the opposition, and avenues for the population to voice their opinions. Transparency is also central to establishing trust and legitimacy; thus, counterinsurgents must publicize treatment of detainees, allow for host nation leaders and media to tour detention facilities and even speak and eat with

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155 See id. at figure 5-4 at 170.
157 Chiarelli & Michaelis, supra note 156, at 10 – 12.
158 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, 5-45 at 171.
159 See id. at 5-54 – 5-55 at 170 – 71; D-38 at 360 – 361.
160 Id. at D-39 at 360 – 61.
161 Id. at 5-48 at 172. Economic aid has been found to decrease violence in counterinsurgency. See Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq 37, NBER Working Paper 14606 (Dec. 2008), available at: www.nber.org/papers/w14606.
162 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, 5-19 at 160; 5-28 at 164.
163 Id. at table 5-1 at 162.
Effective information operations can neutralize insurgent propaganda and goes a long way to winning the population’s support. As much as counterinsurgency stresses non-military operations, it is vital to understand that killing and capturing still takes place. Counterinsurgency is war. The need to protect the population from violent insurgents requires not only a robust defense of the civilian population but also the careful and aggressive hunting of insurgents. The goal is to distinguish between reconcilables and irreconcilables. The reconcilables can be won over; the irreconcilables must be killed or captured. The importance of the shift to a win-the-population strategy is not that it eviscerates the need to kill or capture, but rather that it substantially shifts the focus of military operations, the mindset and strategy of the military, and the default position the military begins with. Destruction and killing is not undertaken lightly and when it does take place, the military is as concerned with its effects on the population as on the targets themselves.

Thus far, the discussion of counterinsurgency strategy has been domestically focused. What is needed is a strategy for countering global insurgency. After all, the insurgency is not limited merely to Iraq or Afghanistan. The insurgents seek to transform the entire world by creating a Caliphate throughout the Muslim world and then to expand the realm of Islam to all of human society. One possible strategy is a global counterinsurgency strategy – a collective security approach that uses an international actor such as the UN Security Council as the global counterinsurgent. The problem is that successful counterinsurgency requires considerable interagency cooperation – between political, military, police, administrative, economic, cultural, and other actors. No international organization has that power nor is the emergence of such an actor likely. A national power, a global counterinsurgent nation, would solve this problem, but would face a substantial legitimacy problem – and legitimacy is crucial to winning over the population in counterinsurgency operations.

In response to these challenges, David Kilcullen has derived a strategy for countering global insurgency from the nature of the global insurgency itself. Global insurgency is not hierarchical nor even networked, but organic and complex. Global insurgency is the set of transnational systems (such as propaganda, logistics, recruitment, financing) and geographically-defined insurgent systems that interact and collectively amount to the global counterstate that opposes the global order. The power of the global

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164 Id.
165 Id. at 5-19 at 160.
167 Kilcullen, supra note 103, at 15.
168 Id. at 20.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 23-25.
171 Id. at 27.
counterinsurgency strategy is radically unconventional. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual has captured some of the counterintuitive elements of counterinsurgency as paradoxes. Five are worth noting. “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.” Traditional warfare encourages protection of one’s forces and allows self-defense actions by military forces. In counterinsurgency, a protected military will lose contact with the people and have little understanding of their needs and conditions. Counterinsurgents must instead be embedded in the society – even if they assume greater risks. “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.” In conventional war, total annihilation would guarantee victory because the enemy force was the center of gravity. Technology and economics thus worked together to develop ever more destructive weapons. In counterinsurgency, greater force means collateral damage and mistakes, which might result in the population losing faith in the counterinsurgent and supporting instead the insurgency. “Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.” Conventional war allowed for reprisals,
retaliation, even preemptive self-defense. But insurgents seek to provoke the counterinsurgent into overreacting and to exploit those errors in propaganda. The counterinsurgent thus may often determine that an otherwise permissible action may cause more harm than good. “Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.”\(^{183}\) Counterinsurgency is not limited to or even primarily dominated by military means. “[T]he decisive battle is for the people’s minds” which means that “dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets.”\(^{184}\) Finally, “the host nation doing it tolerably is normally better than us doing it well.”\(^{185}\) Conventional strategy focuses on one’s own military. Counterinsurgency suggests that building capacity in others is better than acting for oneself. Thus, whenever the host nation forces can be embedded or included, they should be; and when they can undertake operations themselves, they should.

These paradoxes demonstrate how different counterinsurgency is from conventional war. Counterinsurgency is defined by a win-the-population strategy for victory, not a kill-capture strategy for victory. It shifts the goals of war from destroying the enemy to protecting the population and building an orderly, functioning society. It expands the scope of operations for purely military operations to a broad set of operations including security, essential services, governance, economy, and information. And it holds that while security is essential, sustainable victory is dependent more on the other elements than on military prowess.

IV. THE LAWS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

As this Article has shown, the laws of war are based on the assumption that warfare is driven by a kill-capture strategy for victory, a strategy in which each side tries to destroy the other. Despite the tactical innovations of terrorism, the war on terror framework likewise follows this strategy for victory. However, developments in military strategy in the period from 2002 to 2008 demonstrate that the war on terror framework has been displaced by the counterinsurgency framework. Importantly, counterinsurgency’s strategy for victory is not kill-capture but win-the-population.

The shift to counterinsurgency requires reassessing the laws of war in light of the win-the-population strategy. This Part undertakes that task, first considering the legal implications of the win-the-population strategy for the principle of distinction, occupation law, detention policy, the use of non-lethal weapons, and civilian compensation and then reassessing compliance with the laws of war under the principle of reciprocity. To be sure, not all the principles or doctrines in the laws of war need to be rethought, and the goal of this section is neither to evaluate comprehensively every principle or doctrine nor to argue

\(^{183}\) Id. at 1-153 at 49.
\(^{184}\) Id.
\(^{185}\) Id. at 1-154 at 49 -- 50.
that the laws of war need to be rewritten or replaced. Rather, the goal is to assess how well some rules fit with counterinsurgency.

Some of the results may be unconventional and perhaps even controversial. The laws of war appear disconnected from counterinsurgency in three ways. In some cases, the laws of war have not gone far enough in enabling humanitarian operations. The internalization of the combatant’s privilege, for example, has left civilians injured as a result of collateral damage with no legal recourse or remedy, when in fact, civilian compensation would both provide humanitarian relief and strengthen the counterinsurgents’ posture with the public. In other cases, the laws of war render illegal necessary and beneficial operations: occupation law’s prevention of political and social reform is indispensible to counterinsurgency, though of questionable legality at best. The use of non-lethal weapons, often illegal, would undoubtedly save lives and assist counterinsurgency. At times, the laws of war appear to be largely superfluous, as strategic self-interest pushes counterinsurgents to operate in accordance with humanity as much as possible. The principle of distinction thus looks very different when counterinsurgents are determining targets to attack. In addition to these disconnects, taking counterinsurgency seriously changes the some of the conventional approaches to the “war on terror” policies. Counterinsurgency recommends that not all questions be resolved at the global level. The disaggregation strategy, for example, challenges the global detention regime. Moreover, counterinsurgency suggests that the “war on terror” has focused myopically on detention and related areas, to the detriment of other fields, such as occupation law and the use of non-lethal weapons.

A. Rethinking Doctrine

1. The Principle of Distinction. Perhaps the most important principle in international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction holds that armies must distinguish between combatants and civilians, military objects and civilian objects, and must not attack civilians and civilian objects. Undergirding the principle is an assumption that war is driven by a kill-capture strategy and an understanding that idealized warfare is fought in pitched battles by armies of professional soldiers. Modern counterinsurgency fits these basic assumptions poorly. Even more than conventional conflict, insurgencies are social systems, fueled and sustained by non-combat personnel and operations. The win-the-population strategy requires securing the population from insurgents who do not distinguish themselves and involves disrupting the insurgency’s lines of support. But embracing the blurring line between civilians and combatants and the concomitant discretion to armies to determine their targets need not eviscerate humanitarian ends. In fact, a broader interpretation of distinction giving more discretion to counterinsurgents would still offer considerable protections through a robust principle of proportionality, a principle that in counterinsurgency unifies humanity and strategic self-interest.
The principle of distinction holds that “parties to the conflict must at all
times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be
directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.”186
Distinction’s importance cannot be underestimated. It has been called the
“cardinal rule of humanitarian law,”187 the “single most important principle for
the protection of the victims of armed conflict,”188 and it is said that
“[h]umanitarian law contains no stronger doctrine.”189 Despite its foundational
status within humanitarian law, distinction actually grew out of a shift in
military strategy. As Vattel commented,

[I]n former times, and especially in small States, as soon as war was
declared every man became a soldier; the entire people took up arms
and carried on the war. Soon a choice was made, and armies were
formed of picked men…At the present day, the custom of having
regular armies prevails almost everywhere.190

The shift to professional armies provided the necessary elements for distinction
– a clear line of demarcation between those who fight and those who do not.
Notably, the principle of distinction provides protections and restrictions on
both combatants and civilians: the latter are protected from conflict but cannot
engage in conflict; the former are protected from civilians attacking them but
cannot attack civilians.191

The principle manifests itself throughout the laws of war. Additional
Protocol I declares that parties to a conflict “shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.”192 To expand on the definition, the laws of war
describe what fits in each category. The Hague Conventions applied the laws of
war to armies, militias, and volunteer corps as long as they had responsible
command, wore a distinctive emblem, carried arms openly, and conducted
operations in accordance with the laws of war.193 The Geneva Conventions
followed suit, providing the same criteria for distinguishing combatants and

186 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 3 – 8 (2005); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently
never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”).
187 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 186, at 257.
190 EMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, Book III, Ch II, s. 9 – 10; see also GREEN, supra note 38, at
103.
191 Cf. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 43 (2004) (describing the possible justifications for granting POW status as
including protection of civilians and soldiers).
192 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, at Art. 48 [hereinafter API].
193 Hague IV, at Art. 1.
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civilians, though in slightly different terms. Additional Protocol I loosened these requirements slightly, given the conditions of decolonization and guerrilla warfare, requiring only that combatants carry arms openly during engagements and preparations for launching an attack. Civilians are defined as anyone who is not a combatant.

The “war on terror” has not changed the debate over the principle of distinction. Both prior to September 11 and since, the debate has turned on the fact that it is often difficult to tell whether a person is a civilian or combatant and whether an object is civil or military. Is the civilian that takes up arms each day only to return home each night a civilian or combatant? Is a television station spreading enemy propaganda a military object? The laws of war address these challenges through two provisions. First, civilians are protected “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Second, military objectives are those objects whose “destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” Elsewhere, the Additional Protocols require consideration of the “concrete and direct military advantage expected.” Each provision has two prongs – the military character of the operations and a direct relationship between the operations and the actor or object – and each is subject to considerable debate.

The military/hostilities prong turns on what counts as “military” or “hostilities.” One approach includes preparations for attacks and returning from attack, even though those are not, strictly speaking, military activities or

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195 API, Art. 44(3). This weaker approach does not change the general state practice of using uniforms to establish distinction. See Art. 44(7).
196 See API, Art. 50, The provision states that all persons not part of GC III, Art. 4(A)(1) (armed forces), (2) meeting the four criteria listed, (3) unrecognized government armed forces, and (6) levee en mass, are civilians.
197 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 54, at 729 – 36 (arguing that the war on terror blurs line between civilian and combatant).
200 API Art. 51(3) (emphasis added); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter APII], at Art. 13(3). The “unless and for such time” language reveals the tension between a status and conduct based form of distinction. Under this provision, conduct matters; thus the revolving door combatant, fighting by day and a civilian by night, is protected at night because her conduct is civilian. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on API, at para. 1944 (“[o]nce he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to the protection.”), available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750065%20/OpenDocument; Int’l Comm. Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on APII, at para. 4789 (“as he no longer presents any danger for the adversary, he may not be attacked”). The discomfort with this approach comes from the idea that ongoing involvement, like conscription, gives a status of combatant that should not disappear when a person drops his weapon. See Schmitt, supra note 198, at 535 – 36.
201 API Art. 52(2) (emphasis added).
202 API Art. 51(5) (defining as indiscriminate attacks whose humanitarian consequences are disproportionate to the military advantage gained).
hostilities. A more extreme form of this argument even considers civilian support for the war effort as a military activity. On this reading, “military” or “hostilities” includes anything that seeks “to adversely affect the enemy’s pursuance of its military objective or goal.” Another approach, however, interprets the provision as requiring the use of force or “military activity” directed against the enemy. Some narrow interpretations even exclude objects that are obviously military in nature. As Marco Sassoli has noted, “[t]aken literally, the separate requirement that the attack must offer a definite military advantage means that even an attack on an objective of a military nature would not be lawful if its main purpose is to affect the morale of the civilian population and not to reduce the military strength of the enemy.”

More familiar to legal analysis is the debate on what constitutes “direct” participation or “concrete and direct” military advantage. One line of thought, expressed in the ICRC Commentaries, reads the directness requirement strictly, seeking a “direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes place.” Direct causal relationships exist when acts are “intended to cause actual harm to personnel and equipment of the armed forces.” The resultant view finds “a clear distinction between direct participation in hostilities and participation in the war effort.” The other line of thought is less restrictive, permitting as targets objects that “effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability.” This “American” approach follows Clausewitz’s insight that war involves the total capacity of society -- munitions factories are thus as important a source of military strength as the army itself. Under this approach, status as a member of the warfighting apparatus is enough, making direct participants even out of those “who have

203 See ICRC Commentary to API at para. 1943 (hostilities includes “not only the time that the civilian actually makes use of a weapon, but also, for example, the time that he is carrying it, as well as situations in which he undertakes hostile acts without using a weapon.”); see also Daphne Richemond, Transnational Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Force, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1001, 1022 (2007).
207 ICRC, supra note 205, at 23. “Military activity” does little to clarify the meaning of hostilities.
208 Sassoli, supra note 25, at 186.
209 ICRC Commentary to API at para. 1679; ICRC Commentary to AP II at para. 4787 (direct participation in hostilities “implies that there is a sufficient causal relationship between the act of participation and its immediate consequences.”).
210 ICRC Commentary to AP I at para. 1942.
211 Id. at para. 1945.
214 See Walzer, supra note 204, at 146.
laid down their arms.” Although some have acknowledged the similarity to proximate cause in tort theory, “a unanimous interpretation of this legal concept does not exist.”

Understanding counterinsurgency strategy helps clarify what is problematic about these contending interpretations. Focusing narrowly on “hostilities” or “military advantage” is problematic in counterinsurgency. Insurgencies are social systems, deriving their strength from social dynamics in the population. Targeting only narrowly-defined military objectives and or hostile insurgent forces will not result in victory. As Professor Oberschall has noted,

In unconventional warfare, many people in non-combat roles are part of the clandestine infrastructure of the insurgency: they shelter and supply the combatants with food, funds and other resources; provide intelligence, lookouts, messengers, weapons cashes and transport, and safe places, including religious buildings, hospitals, and schools. Some activists are women, children, older people, clergy. Without such a supportive covert organization, insurgency is not possible. In the context of this war amongst the population, counterinsurgency operations require preventing insurgents from spreading propaganda and developing support within the population. In order to win over the population, the counterinsurgent must separate the insurgents from the population. It may be better, then, to refer to insurgency rather than military advantage or hostilities.

A brief illustration will be helpful. In April 1999, NATO forces bombed Radio Television Serbia (RTS) killing sixteen and injuring another sixteen. The strike was questioned and criticized as not contributing to the military effort, and was later reviewed by the ICTY and European Court of Human Rights. Although the ICTY found that RTS was being used for military communications and was therefore an acceptable military target, it stated that stopping propaganda to undermine the government’s support or demoralize the population was not sufficient to make RTS a military target. In the context of conventional war and a restrictive understanding of military targets, this approach perhaps seems natural. But in counterinsurgency, informational operations and the ability to communicate effectively with the

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211 ICRC, supra note 206, at 29
212 ICRC, Report on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 11 (Sept. 2003), available at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205/$File/Direct%20participation%20in%20hostilities-Sept%202003.pdf; see Maxwell, supra note 212, at 5. Common Article Three is slightly different, protecting “persons taking no active part in the hostilities.” The ICTR claims that “active” and “direct” mean the same thing, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 216, but others disagree. See Maxwell, supra note 212, at 5; ICRC, supra note 205, at 29.
213 Anthony Oberschall, How Democracies Fight Insurgencies and Terrorists 11 (on file with author).
219 Final Report, supra note 199, at 1277.
220 Id.
222 Id.
population are central to the success or failure of the insurgency. A television or radio station is a much greater force multiplier for an insurgency than a few additional recruited combatants. Confronting these “non-military” sources of power is therefore a key task of counterinsurgency.

In addition, in counterinsurgencies, it would be unwise to follow the directness prong for participation. The directness prong focuses on how far removed a civilian’s actions are from kill-capture military operations. This approach overvalues military operations. A civilian engaged in spreading propaganda may be highly effective in contributing to the defeat of the counterinsurgents, even though his actions are not intended to cause harm to physical forces. Requiring a narrowly tailored relationship between conventional military action and civilian participation thus prevents targeting many insurgency operations. The insurgents’ television or radio station is a perfect example. Second, if the military operations prong is to be interpreted broadly to incorporate insurgent support systems, such as propaganda and other lines of support, then the directness approach becomes almost irrelevant. Almost any action could be seen as directly related to the expansive reading of military advantage, because military advantage would be coextensive with counterinsurgency’s broad scope.

From the perspective of counterinsurgency, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which focuses on persons taking an “active part in hostilities,” provides a less problematic approach. Counterinsurgency distinguishes between active and passive support.\(^{223}\) Active support consists of individuals or groups joining the insurgency, logistical and financial support, providers of intelligence, hosts of safe havens, medical assistance, transportation, and other operations on behalf of insurgents.\(^{224}\) Passive support, while benefiting insurgents, is not material support. Passive supporters “allow insurgents to operate and do not provide information to counterinsurgents.”\(^{225}\) Passive support is acquiescence or tolerance.\(^{226}\) This distinction is much more tractable from the perspective of counterinsurgency. Instead of focusing on the distance an action has from military consequences, the active/passive distinction focuses on a difference in kind between actions. It separates those who are not actively supporting the insurgency – and therefore need to be protected under the win-the-population strategy – from those who may need to be confronted by traditional military means. Distinction is not jettisoned; passive supporters are fully protected. But active supporters could be targeted.

To put a fine point on it, a counterinsurgency approach would establish taking an active part in the insurgency as the appropriate explication of the principle of distinction. This approach, however, is subject to the criticism that it reduces, even undermines, the humanitarian ends of the laws of war. Focusing on active involvement in insurgency operations would mean that

\(^{223}\) See FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, at 3-84 – 3-88, at 104 – 05.
\(^{224}\) Id. at 3-87 at 104
\(^{225}\) Id. at 3-88 at 104 - 05
\(^{226}\) Id. at 3-88 at 105.
bankers, propagandists, even farmers and cooks, could be targeted for kill-capture operations, regardless of whether they ever held a weapon. Such a policy could justify eradicating entire populations under the guise of counterinsurgency.

The objection, taken in the context of counterinsurgency strategy and other principles of international law, it is not as troublesome as it may first seem. First, counterinsurgency operations are not primarily focused on kill-capture operations, so even if the butcher and baker are potentially targets, it may not be in the strategic self-interest of the counterinsurgent to target them. Kill-capture operations can cause backlash and fuel the insurgency, rather than stamp it out. Particularly with the rise of instant communication and publicity, any kill-capture operation could easily be found to be unreasonable by domestic and international opinion.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, this reinterpretation of distinction is less an evisceration of distinction and more a strengthening of discretion, as exercised through the principle of proportionality. The relationship between distinction and proportionality is simple. Distinction asks whether the targeted object can be attacked or whether it cannot be attacked under the laws of war. Civilians, for example, cannot be attacked. If the object can be attacked, proportionality asks whether the collateral or incidental damage from attacking the target is disproportionate to the gain from the attack. If the damage is disproportionately high, then the attack must not take place – or else it will be deemed an indiscriminate attack in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Proportionality therefore involves the exercise of discretion by the attacking force. Shifting the focus of distinction in counterinsurgency operations does not require targeting all active supporters of the insurgency, and it may in fact prohibit targeting them if the attack would be disproportional to the gain.

Significantly, the conventional balancing test for proportionality also does not align with counterinsurgency -- counterinsurgency suggests greater protection against excessive kill-capture operations. Under the conventional proportionality analysis, the military weighs two heterogeneous factors: the military benefits and the humanitarian costs. In conventional warfare, in which kill-capture is the strategy for victory, the military and humanitarian goals are in direct opposition. Killing enemies will always contribute to victory under the conventional approach. Not attacking to spare civilians was therefore a constraint against self-interest, enforceable through reciprocity. In counterinsurgency, this balancing act is different. The counterinsurgent must win over the population, and thus any attack will have an effect on the chance

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228 API, Art. 51(5).
229 To be sure, the principle of distinction, due to the difficulty of applying it in practice, also requires discretion. See Maxwell, supra note 212, at 5; see also 2 HENKAERTS, supra note 186, at 122, para. 851; W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW, Dec. 1989, at 4.
230 See API, Art. 51(5); see also Schmitt, supra note 227, at 151.
of victory. The military side of the proportionality balancing test is thus handicapped by the fact that any attack may cause backlash, spark protests or propaganda, and fuel the insurgency further. As a result, the military benefits are necessarily less certain and weaker than in the conventional model. Another way of putting it is that counterinsurgency would reconceive proportionality not as military advantage versus humanitarian interests but rather as a cost-benefit analysis, in which humanitarian interests and strategic interests operate on both sides of the scale. Military action appears both as a cost and a benefit, not just as a benefit: Killing legitimate targets might be costly in terms of winning over the population if it could result in substantial backlash. Counterinsurgency’s proportionality test therefore places a thumb on the scale against military action. As a result, proportionality in counterinsurgency is likely to be far more humanitarian in its orientation than was proportionality in conventional warfare.

2. Civilian Compensation. One of the central tenets of the laws of war, undergirded by the kill-capture strategy, is that soldiers are privileged combatants, afforded the right to attack, injure, and even kill the enemy without legal redress. The laws of war, however, have gone further, recognizing more as a matter of pragmatics than principle, that some civilians may in fact be harmed, despite the protections afforded them by the principle of distinction. The pursuit of military objectives, necessary to destroying the enemy and winning the war, might result in harm to civilians. Recognizing this tragic reality, the laws of war provide that the collateral damage to civilians must not be disproportionate to the military advantage. The result is that privilege extends not only to killing the enemy but also to killing and injuring civilians as long as it is a matter of collateral damage. Civilians harmed under collateral damage therefore have no legal recourse – they have no right to compensation or other remedies for their losses. The war on terror approach does not revise this situation. Concerned primarily with killing and capturing terrorists, that approach sees collateral damage as tragic but necessary along the road to eliminating the terrorist threat and attaining victory. Civilians must simply realize they are, in the long run, being protected from terrorists.

With the application of the proportionality principle in targeting, the attacking army has no further responsibilities to civilians. Perhaps the best example of this limited responsibility is its manifestation in the Foreign Claims Act (FCA). The FCA grants authority to create claims commissions to settle claims against the United States for damage or loss of property of a foreign country or person or the injury or death of a foreign person caused by the U.S.

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231 API Art. 45; GC III Art. 99; see also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L-I/II.116, Doc 5 rev.1 corr. (22 October 2002) at para 68 (noting that “the combatant’s privilege...is in essence a license to kill or wound enemy combatants and destroy other military objectives”).

232 See supra TAN 186 – 230.

233 Green, supra note 38, at 181–82; Schmitt, supra note 227, at 150-52.

military. However, the FCA includes a “combat exclusion,” which excludes any claim that arises “from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly from an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat.” In essence, the FCA internalizes the law of war norm of the combatant’s privilege, allowing compensation for tort and other injuries caused by the U.S. military as long as those injuries occurred outside combat operations. A looser approach to compensating civilians who are injured is institutionalized through the payment of solatia – “nominal payments made immediately to a victim or the victim’s family to express sympathy when local custom exists for such payments.”

Even though solatia provides compensation, it sends strong signals that these are not claims of responsibility or compensation for a particular loss. Moreover, it is limited to countries that have a custom of solatia, which, according to the Army Regulations, consists of Micronesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand. In essence, compensation through both the Foreign Claims Act and solatia incorporate the central corollary of the laws of war’s principles of privilege, distinction, proportionality – that militaries have no responsibility to compensate civilians who are harmed, injured, or killed as a result of legitimate military operations.

In contrast to the kill-capture approach common to both conventional war and the war on terror approach, counterinsurgency’s win-the-population strategy suggests that compensating civilians who are harmed, injured, or killed even during legitimate military operations would be a smart tactic. Condolence payments have the benefit of expressing sympathy to victims and their families, providing humanitarian relief and aid to those who may no longer have the ability to earn a livelihood, and fostering goodwill among the population. Because counterinsurgents must convince the population that they are working in the population’s interest, compensation through condolence payments can help the population distinguish the legitimate, credible counterinsurgent. As a result, condolence payments have been called a “non-lethal weapons system” and have been heralded by commentators as an effective way to win the population in counterinsurgency operations.

Indeed, the practice of compensation since the Vietnam War confirms the strategic value of compensation. The Operational Law Handbook notes that the combat exclusion “interferes with the principle goal of low intensity

236 10 U.S.C. §2374 (b).
237 Army Reg. 27-20, Claims, at 108.
238 For example, solatia is paid through personal and operational appropriations rather than claims. See id. at 55; id. at 108.
239 Id. at 55; see also U.S. Dept. of Air Force, Instr., 51-501, Tort Claims, para. 4.20 (Aug. 9, 2002).
240 A condolence payment could be defined as “any monetary compensation made by the U.S. military directly to victims, or their survivors, who suffer physical injury, death, or property damage as a result of U.S. military or coalition operations.” See Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), Condolence Payments 1.
241 Id. at 1.
242 Id. at 4.
243 John Nagl, Introduction, in FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, at xvii.
conflict / foreign internal defense: obtaining and maintaining the support of the local population.” 244 And in every conflict from Vietnam to Somalia, the Army has tried to get around the restrictive nature of the FCA’s combat exclusion in order to pay condolences. 245 In Vietnam, the military got the government of South Vietnam to agree to pay claims; in Grenada, military personnel administered claims procedures but used State Department funds through USAID; in Panama, the U.S. provided funds to pay claims through a broader program of economic support for the government. 246 Indeed, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been no exception – together, the military has provided $29 million in condolence payments. 247

Although condolence payments are an effective weapon in counterinsurgency’s win-the-population strategy, recent practice in Iraq and Afghanistan and the laws of war themselves are severely disconnected from the win-the-population strategy. In Iraq and Afghanistan, condolence and solatia payments were prohibited early in the conflict and were coupled with restrictive interpretations of the FCA. The Air Force procedures for the Iraq war stated, “[a]ll [FCA] claims arising within the . . . boundaries of Iraq during the period of the war, are automatically classified as combat activity claims, and therefore are prohibited.” 248 With FCA claims absent, soldiers relied on condolence and solatia. Yet it was not until March 2004 that any condolence payments were made in Iraq and until November 2005 that they were made in Afghanistan. 249 And solatia payments, amounting to a total of $1.9 million by 2007, were only made in Iraq from June 2003 to January 2005 and in Afghanistan since October 2005. 250 In addition, funding for condolence payments was limited. Condolences are paid out of a commander’s emergency response program (CERP) funds, funds that are also a commander’s main source for reconstruction and humanitarian relief projects. 251 Indeed, condolence payments amounted to only 8% of the expenditures from CERP funds in Iraq in 2005 and 5% in 2006. 252 In Afghanistan, they amounted to 1% in 2006. 253 In some cases, the funding available for condolences would be used up, leaving commanders limited or no resources from which to pay claims. 254 The strategic importance of condolence payments suggest that the restrictive interpretation of the FCA,

244 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 152 (2007).
245 Id.; see also Witt, supra note 6, at 10 – 11.
246 HANDBOOK, supra note 244, at 152 – 53.
248 Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), 1 Legal Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq 179 (2004).
249 GAO Report, supra note 247, at 2 n.3.
250 Id.
251 See CIVIC, supra note 240, at 6; id. at 7, noting that CERP’s goal is focusing “on labor intensive and urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects. Projects should be implemented rapidly to reinforce a positive perception upon the Iraqi economy and by providing employment opportunities to the Iraqi people.”
253 Id.
254 CIVIC, supra note 240, at 6 n.8.
the limited use of condolence payments early in the wars, and the limited funding available for condolence payments were all mistakes.

Even when implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan, the practice of condolence payments has not been as effective a “non-lethal weapon system” as those hopeful about its use might desire.255 Because the condolence process is discretionary and decentralized to the level of particular commanders, the procedures and application have been inconsistent and largely ad hoc.256 Payments for similar injuries are inconsistent over time and places,257 claims are denied for no particular reason,258 and in many cases when an FCA claim is denied the claimant is not referred to the condolence system.259 The maximum payment for loss of life is $2500, which prevents claims officers from adequately compensating in the most egregious cases or compensating when someone has lost a breadwinner or livelihood and may be responsible for taking care of an entire family.260 Finally, because of the ad hoc nature of the program, particular units have established arbitrary interpretative rules, such as not paying condolences if another unit caused the harm, a particular problem given the migration of people due to violence and the high unit turnover, and placing a three month statute of limitations on payments.261 Standardized rules are not unworkable, as the FCA allows for units to pay claims from damage caused by other units and places a 2 year statute of limitations on claims.262

In addition to revising statutory and military practice with respect to condolences, the win-the-population strategy also suggests that the structure and principles of international law are in conflict with a robust condolence program. The laws of war, assuming the kill-capture strategy of victory, grant privilege to killing civilians as a matter of collateral damage during legitimate military operations. A win-the-population strategy would at the very least reject this privilege, leaving the question of remedy open. Some might go further, arguing a remedy is required. Under this approach, the counterinsurgent must try not to injure civilians and also compensate those who are injured by military operations. To some extent, this idea is emerging in limited domains. The international community has suggested compensation for victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity,263 and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention requires parties to a conflict that violate the Conventions to pay

255 See CLAMO, supra note 248, at 175; Witt, supra note 6, at 13; Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), Civilian Claims Act Frequently Asked Questions 2 [hereinafter CIVIC, CCA].
256 See Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), Adding Insult in Injury 1 – 2; Witt, supra note 6, at 13.
257 CIVIC, CCA, supra note 255, at 2; see also Witt supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that a table of standardized damage payments would be helpful to address this problem).
258 Witt, supra note 6, at 13.
259 CIVIC, supra note 256, at 1 – 2.
260 CIVIC, supra note 240, at 6.
261 Id. at 5.
262 Id.
compensation. But these provisions go nowhere near so far as what one commentator has called a “responsibility to pay.” Such a responsibility, in alignment with strategy in counterinsurgency, directly conflicts with the conventional kill-capture approach, which privileges killing civilians as a matter of collateral damage.

3. Occupation Law. In contrast to debates on targeting, detention, interrogation, and torture, the law of occupation has been comparatively ignored in public debate. To some extent, this is a function of the war on terror framework, whose strategy of kill-capture is not obviously related to occupation and territorial administration. Killing and capturing small bands of terrorists around the globe does not require overthrowing dozens of regimes and building their governments. In contrast, insurgency is driven by grievances in social systems and counterinsurgency’s win-the-population strategy requires security, basic services, and political, economic, and legal reforms to address and minimize those grievances. With this framework, occupation seems more relevant, if not central. Occupiers might seek to address insurgencies at their root — social and political structures — and in that process may need to reform state institutions. The law of occupation governs these actions and has long expressed a tension between a conservationist principle — in which the occupier maintains the ousted sovereign’s institutions — and a reformist principle — in which the occupier can change institutions for security, humanity, or in its most recent form, self-determination. Seeing contemporary conflict as insurgency and counterinsurgency rather than a war on terror places occupation law as one of the most important areas of the laws of war, and rejects the conservationist approach to occupation law.

Although occupation law has been applied infrequently between the occupations of Germany and Japan and the occupation of Iraq in 2003, it technically applies to a broad set of cases. Under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” In fact, the scope of Article 42 is so broad that occupation can occur during the conflict, if a territory is under foreign control for even a few hours.

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264. API, Art. 91.
265. Jonathan Tracy, Responsibility to Pay: Compensating Civilian Casualties of War, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 19 (Fall 2007).
266. See Eyal Benvenisti, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 182 (1993) (noting that governments have sought to avoid the distinction of occupant, except for Israel with respect to territories occupied during the 1967 war). For a helpful typology of occupations, see Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 1984 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1985).
The fundamental, pervasive characteristic of occupation law is a tension between conservation and reform. The conservationist principle arose out of the nature of conventional warfare. The Franco-Prussian War, considered the inspiration for occupation law, provides an example. After the war, Prussia occupied French territory until the peace treaty, under which some of the land was ceded to Prussia. As a model, the Franco-Prussian War had some significant features of conventional warfare: war was fought to achieve limited national goals, rather than regime change or expansive conquest, and it was fought between professional armies with no interest in involving ordinary civilians. The goal was to maintain the status quo prior to the war, until the peace treaty was signed and the temporarily-ousted sovereign could retake control.

Occupation law, on this model, is not focused on territorial administration or long-term peacemaking. It does not provide the occupant with “general legislative competence” and it is “not intended to provide a general framework for reconstruction and law reform.” Any “extensive forcible changes are unlikely to be lawful.” The occupant cannot change internal borders or create new constitutional or government structures because changes in political institutions could have consequences beyond the occupation and therefore undermine the ousted sovereign’s authority. Indeed, the ICRC Commentary to Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, notes that occupier changes during World War II are illegal under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations – even with the cooperation of portions of the population. The occupier is merely a “de facto administrator.”

The Hague Regulations are the clearest example of the conservationist principle. Article 43 states, “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the

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270 BENVENISTI, supra note 266, at 27.
272 See Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 Geo. J. INT’L L. 195, 199 (2005) (“Occupiers are assumed to remain only for the limited period between the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of a final peace treaty. That treaty determines the fate of the occupied territory, most likely returning it to the ousted de jure sovereign.”)
274 See id. at 119 – 20.
276 See STAHL, supra note 275, at 120; Thomas D. Grant, Iraq: How to reconcile conflicting obligations of occupation and reform, ASIL Insights at 3 (June 2003); Fox, supra note 272, at 199.
279 ICRC Commentary to GC IV at 273; 2 IHLRI, supra note 278, at 2.
country.” Even though it allows some reformation of the laws, setting the
default rule as respecting the laws in force expresses the conservationist
principle underlying occupation law. The Hague Regulations also express
this conservationist vision elsewhere. For example, if the occupier collects
taxes, it must do so “in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence
in force.”

The conflicting principle in the law of occupation is that of reform, the
occupier’s power and authority to change the status quo in the territory. The
impetus for reform can be grouped into three categories: security, humanity,
and self-determination. The security imperative was built into the Hague
Regulations and has remained part of occupation law since. Article 43 allows
the occupier to change the “laws in force in the country” in order to ensure
“public order and safety.” Article 49, notes that any levy of money “shall only
be for the needs of the army or the administration of the territory in
question.” The Fourth Geneva Convention also expresses this principle,
allowing the occupant to take “necessary” measures of “control and security in
regard to protected persons,” to transfer or evacuate persons for security
reasons, and to force the population to work if needed for the occupier’s
army.

At the same time, the Fourth Geneva Convention added a humanitarian
justification for reforming the laws in force. With that shift, Geneva law
transformed the occupier from a disinterested administrator to an administrator
with many duties. Article 47 makes the shift, asserting that persons must not
be deprived of “the benefits of the present Convention by any change
introduced, as the result of the occupation.” The ICRC Commentary
demonstrates the tension this change wrought. One the one hand, Hague Article
43 prohibits “changes in constitutional forms or in the form of government, the
establishment of new military or political organizations, the dissolution of the
State, or the formation of new political entities,” even if the occupier tries to get
the cooperation or assent of part of the population. On the other hand, some
changes to political institutions “might conceivably be necessary.”

Geneva’s expansive rights enable this reformist project. Some require
little reform: occupation law prevents forcing the population to divulge
information about the enemy’s army or defenses or to serve in the occupier’s

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280 Hague IV, Art. 43.
281 BENVENISTI, supra note 266, at 13 – 14.
282 Hague IV, Art. 48.
283 Id. at Art. 49.
284 GC IV, Art. 27.
285 Id. at Art. 49.
286 Id. at Art. 51.
287 Benvenisti, supra note 271, at 28-31; see also STAHN, supra note 273, at 117 – 18.
288 GC IV, Art. 47.
289 ICRC Commentary to GC IV at 273–74. See also GC IV, Art. 64 (“The Occupying Power may, however,
subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying
Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention….“)
290 Hague IV, Art. 44.
armed forces, it prohibits requiring allegiance to the occupier, and it forbids pillage. Others may require considerable reform: Protecting “family honour and rights, the lives of persons,” private property, and religious beliefs may require shifting a state’s balance of church and state or reforming a planned economy. The occupier must also ensure food and medical supplies, maintain public health, hygiene, and hospital functioning, and permit religious practice and ministry. It is quite possible that “protecting” these rights would require more than disinterested stewardship or administration, but rather the overthrow and reformation of the country’s laws.

United Nation Security Counsel Resolution 1483 introduced self-determination as another justification for reform. Under the conservationist approach, an occupier was unable to promote representative government or facilitate a process of self-determination, as it would directly contradict Hague Article 43, even with Geneva’s humanitarian reform principle. But since the Geneva Conventions, many contemporary instruments in international law have enhanced the right to self-determination. By incorporating self-determination, one commentator has argued, Resolution 1483 “invented a new model of multilateral occupation.”

Resolution 1483 recognizes the United States and United Kingdom as occupying powers, and grants authority that is in tension with the conservationist approach. Paragraph 4 calls upon coalition authority to “to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including … the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.” Paragraph 8 expands on this requirement, authorizing the Special Representative for Iraq to coordinate with the coalition authority to “restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance,” to facilitate “economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development,” and to promote “legal and judicial reform.” At the same time as the Resolution authorizes radical transformation, it calls upon the authority to “comply fully with their

291 GC IV, Art. 51.
292 Hague IV, Art. 45.
293 Id. at Art. 47; GC IV, Art. 33.
294 Hague IV, at Art. 46; GC IV, Art. 27.
295 GC IV, Art. 55.
296 Id. at Art. 56.
297 Id. at Art. 58.
299 STAHR, supra note 273, at 143.
301 See STAHR, supra note 273, at 144.
302 Res. 1483, supra note 300, at Para 4 (emphasis added).
303 Id. at Para 8c (emphasis added).
304 Id. at Para 8e (emphasis added).
305 Id. at Para 8i.
obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”

Yet the reforms allowed under Resolution 1483 would violate either of these regimes. Each of these reforms could “take root and have enduring consequences.”

Resolution 1483’s approach can be justified on a variety of theories. Under the traditional doctrine of debellatio, when the institutions of state have totally disintegrated, occupation transfers sovereignty. Some commentators have adapted this principle to popular sovereignty and asserted that debellatio could justify reform of institutions along the lines of self-determination and representation. Another approach is to understand Resolution 1483 as providing a “carve out” from Hague and Geneva; under this approach, the Security Council can derogate from occupation law, as least as regards non-peremptory norms. Finally, Resolution 1483 could constitute a description of the contemporary state of occupation law: affirming popular sovereignty, requiring the occupant to promote human rights and representative political institutions, and using public resources to those ends.

The conflict between conservation and the reform illustrates an important shift in occupation law, one that has significance for thinking about contemporary insurgency. Under the kill-capture model of conventional warfare, the conservationist approach to occupation law made perfect sense. The occupier’s army, having defeated the enemy’s army in battle, needed to wait until the resolution of the peace treaty before departing the territory. As such, occupation was temporary and primarily directed at protecting the army as it waited for resolution. Professor Posner’s comment that occupation law is often violated due to enforcement difficulties grounded in the absence of reciprocity between the parties makes sense in the context of a defeated power in conventional warfare.

Strikingly, the war on terror approach aligns with the traditional, conservationist approach to occupation law, inasmuch as it finds occupation law relevant at all. First, if the goal in the war on terror is to kill and capture the terrorists, then it is not obvious why occupation is relevant at all. In a globalized conflict between small bands of terrorists who are often not members of a state, occupying territory seems like a foolish strategy. It would take up considerable resources in large geographic areas, when a better approach would be to target specific groups in particular areas in many countries. Second, even if a nation following the war on terror approach were to occupy another state, the conservationist approach seems more than appropriate. Massive reforms to the political, legal, and economic structures of the state are unnecessary. At most, the occupier needs to change laws that

306 Id. at Para 5.
309 Benvenisti, supra note 271, at 37.
310 See Posner, supra note 45, at 430.
would assist in the targeting or capture of terrorists. To that extent, the Hague approach of allowing changes for purposes of ensuring security would be sufficient. If the goal is kill-capture, there is no reason to democratize the state, establish a market economy, build the rule of law, or do any of the other things associated with the reformist principle that Resolution 1483 authorizes.

In contrast to the conventional and war on terror approaches, seeing contemporary conflict as insurgency not only emphasizes the importance of occupation law but also rejects the conservationist impulse within occupation law. The counterinsurgency approach to contemporary conflict requires expanding the focus of legal debates from detention, torture, and targeting, on which the war on terror approach has led to considerable debate, to other fields such as occupation law. The win-the-population strategy requires securing the population, guaranteeing basic services, and reforming in political, economic, cultural, and legal institutions. It may therefore be more important to focus on the areas of law that touch on these broader set of concerns, and the law of occupation is one, if not the, central part of the laws of war that treats win-the-population operations. Shifting to counterinsurgency thus requires thinking more seriously and debating more vigorously the contours of occupation law.

Additionally, thinking in terms of counterinsurgency suggests rejecting the conservationist vision of occupation law. Under the kill-capture approach, the background conditions of the social structure were relatively innocuous and hence largely irrelevant, except inasmuch as they prevent the occupying army from securing its own forces or moving around the territory in search of terrorists to destroy. Unlike conventional war and the war on terror, the counterinsurgency framework assumes that part of the problem – the root cause of the insurgency – is related to the status quo in the social system. The status quo has embedded within it certain grievances that can be political, economic, cultural, or religious, among other things, and they fuel the insurgency, creating active supporters who seek to disrupt or forestall the social structure. The status quo is not a neutral position, disconnected from the causes of armed conflict or the strategy for success. Counterinsurgency’s win-the-population approach is centered on addressing the grievances head on, and that may require considerable transformation of state institutions. The reformist vision of occupation better fits the underlying causes of insurgency and the win-the-population strategy of counterinsurgency.

To some extent, the law of occupation as codified by Hague and Geneva goes far to address the strategy of win-the-population, but it does not go far enough. Counterinsurgents may also need to reform constitutional, political, economic, infrastructural, and legal institutions within the occupied state. Under Hague and Geneva, such changes will most likely result in violations of international law. One commentary, channeling the conservationist ideal, argues that the occupier has a responsibility to maintain infrastructure as it was before the conflict: “The construction of a new hospital

\[\text{For one treatment of how constitutions might change, see Note, supra note 5.}\]
or the expansion of the road system would likely fall outside the occupying power’s mandate as administrator.”

312 Assistance, under this interpretation, “should not contribute to projects that alter permanently and in a significant manner the social and physical infrastructure of Iraq before the re-establishment of legitimate competent authorities…”

313 But in counterinsurgency, operations with long-term effects are absolutely necessary. Take the example of expanding the road system. After a study of road building in Kunl province, Afghanistan, in which he identified sixteen ways in which road-building had assisted the win-the-population strategy, David Kilcullen concluded that road-building is “a tool for projecting military force, extending governance and the rule of law, enhancing political communication and bringing economic development, health and education to the population.”

314 The conservationist approach, even with the limited reforms allowed by Hague and Geneva for security and guaranteeing the population’s humanitarian rights, simply does not go far enough. In contrast, under the Resolution 1483 approach, road-building or constitutional and legal reform would be allowed or even mandated.

Embracing the reformist approach to occupation law has important consequences. First, it would provide greater legitimacy for reforms in occupation settings, a necessary element of the counterinsurgent’s need to win over the trust of the population. Under a robust reformist approach, for example, the questions surrounding the legitimacy and legality of CPA’s actions would have been mitigated if not eliminated.

315 Second, the reformist approach need not imply neocolonialism or de facto annexation. The approach to reform suggested in Resolution 1483 requires a self-determination approach to building representative institutions, a process that is a far cry from de facto annexation or colonialism and one that aligns with counterinsurgency’s principle that “the host nation doing it tolerably is normally better than us doing it well.”

316 Shifting from conservation to reform therefore not only follows the evolution of occupation law over the century from Hague to Iraq, but also better addresses the causes and strategy of counterinsurgency.

4. Non-Lethal Weapons. Since their modern origins in the 19th century, the laws of war have prohibited weapons and technologies in order to prevent unnecessary suffering. From sociological experience, the laws assumed that military strategy and technological innovation worked in tandem to create weapons of ever greater destruction.

317 As true as the strategy-technology nexus
may have seemed in the late 19th and early 20th century, the history of military technology in the late 20th century and the win-the-population strategy in counterinsurgency tell a different story. In recent years, military technology has focused less on massive destruction and more on precision in order to reduce collateral damage and casualties. And counterinsurgency’s win-the-population strategy suggests that the technologies of great destruction will be counterproductive. One of the promises of technological innovation is the creation of non-lethal weapons: weapons that incapacitate temporarily or that otherwise fall short of killing the enemy. Yet under the laws of war – inspired by the conventional kill-capture approach to war – many of these technological developments are severely limited, if not banned outright. The laws of war are thus not only disconnected from the strategy of counterinsurgency but also prevent means of warfare that are potentially humane.

In recent years, technological developments have promised the creation of non-lethal weapons (NLW). NLWs are weapons “explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.” NLWs come in many forms, including directed energy beams that can prevent people from moving forward, blunt projectiles like rubber bullets and bean bags, calmatives that make people relax or fall asleep, giant webs that trap people, tasers, malodorants that smell like excrement or rotting flesh and may cause vomiting, pepper spray, and anti-attraction spray that makes the ground more slippery than ice. They can also include glare lasers that cause disorientation, and acoustic and sonic weapons. With such broad variety of technologies, the term “non-lethal” is somewhat misleading. Some non-lethal weapons, such as tasers, can cause death. (Though, of course, even “lethal” weapons, such as rifles, may merely leave a person injured.) Non-lethal also suggests that the weapons are directed at personnel, but they could just as well be directed towards equipment and materiel. Despite these terminological problems, the defining quality

318 Dept. of Defense Directive 3000.3 at 3.1 (July 9, 1996); see also Ingrid Lombardo, Chemical Non-Lethal Weapons -- Why the Pentagon Wants Them and Why Others Don't, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Story, 8 June 2007, available at: http://cns.miis.edu/stories/070608.htm (defining NLW as “a weapon or piece of equipment whose purpose is to affect the behavior of an individual without injuring or killing the person. NLW are also intended not to cause serious damage to property, infrastructure, or the environment.”); Megret, supra note 24, at 8 (defining NLWs as weapons that “lay claim, in descending order of priority, to (i) not causing death, (ii) not causing injury, and (iii) not causing substantial pain”).


320 Lombardo, supra note 319.


of NLWs, as David Fidler has noted, is that they are “designed not to destroy or kill but to incapacitate.”\footnote{Duncan, supra note 323, at 5 – 6; see also Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Working Group on Biological Weapons, \textit{Non-Lethal Chemical and Biological Weapons} at 2 (Nov. 2002) (noting that “a categorical distinction between lethal and non-lethal agents is not scientifically feasible”), available at: http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/nonlethalCBW.pdf.} Perhaps surprisingly, the laws of war prohibit the use of many non-lethal weapons. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ Protocol II on mines and booby-traps, for example, makes no distinction between lethal and non-lethal mines.\footnote{Fidler, supra note 322, at 55.} Under a straightforward reading of the Protocol, a mine that sprung a giant web and trapped personnel would be prohibited. Likewise, the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) undertake an absolute ban on biological weapons. The Gas Protocol prohibits “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids” and bacteriological substances.\footnote{Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26.1 U.S.T. 571.} The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits nations from developing, producing, stockpiling, or retaining any “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.”\footnote{Biological Weapons Convention, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, at Art 1 [hereinafter BWC].} Notably, the BWC is not limited to dangerous or lethal biological weapons, but includes any and all biological agents. Under these prohibitions, an army could not use a sleeping gas. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is no better at supporting NLWs, as it specifically bans chemicals that cause “temporary incapacitation” unless they are used in law enforcement or for other peaceful purposes.\footnote{Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC]. There is disagreement as to whether the CWC applies to anti-materiel chemical weapons which might have the effect of death or incapacitation. Compare Fidler, supra note 322, at 72 (supporting this reading) with David A. Koplow, \textit{Tangled up in Khaki and Blue: Lethal and Non-Lethal Weapons in Recent Confrontations}, 36 Geo. J. INT’L L. 703, 738 (2005) (rejecting this reading).} Moreover, it prohibits the use of riot control agents (RCA) in military operations, even though it condones their use in domestic situations.\footnote{By prohibiting RCA in military operations, the CWC has enabled the United States to interpret the treaty as allowing the use of RCA in international operations other than war, such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, hostage rescue, and counter-terrorist operations. See Fidler, supra note 322, at 74; Koplow, supra note 329, at 739 – 40.} Finally, the prohibition in Additional Protocol I on weapons that cause “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” has prompted the Red Cross to define those terms more clearly. The SIrUS Project\footnote{SIrUS stands for Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering.} proposed to define the phrase according to whether the suffering causes “specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, specific abnormal psychological state, specific...
and permanent disability or specific disfigurement; field mortality of more than 25% or hospital mortality of more than 5%; Grade 3 wounds [large wounds] as measured by the Red Cross wound classification system; or effects for which there is no well-recognized and proven treatment.”332 Some of these criteria, in particular the “specific abnormal physiological state” and “effects for which there is no well-recognized treatment” criteria, would exclude non-lethal weapons that cause temporary effects such as disorientation or confusion.333

Taking counterinsurgency’s win-the-population strategy challenges the conventional approach to the ban of non-lethal weapons – and indeed any blanket technological ban. Under the kill-capture strategy, the strategy-technology nexus would result in ever-more-dangerous weapons that needed to be banned for humanitarian reasons. But under counterinsurgency, one would expect less-indiscriminate, more precise, and less-dangerous weaponry. As one of the paradoxes of counterinsurgency asserts: “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.”334 Indeed, the case for non-lethal weapons is that they create fewer fatalities and are particularly useful in situations when military targets are hidden within civilian populations.335 NLWs seem particularly appropriate in modern warfare, in which collateral damage is generally intolerable336 and can fuel insurgencies. As one commentator has asked, “[w]hen we really want to stabilize or neutralize something, why incur greater wrath from the community by incinerating or by blowing something up if we don't have to do that?”337 Non-lethal weapons also offer the opportunity to transform the use of air power, from dropping bombs that cause great collateral damage to spreading non-lethal substances.338 In essence, counterinsurgency and weapons innovation point to the same goal. “Over time, old stereotypes which infer that killing or destroying the enemy is the only path to victory will be modified . . . A new stereotype will emerge that recognizes that killing or destroying the enemy is not the only way to defeat him.”339 If a military seeks to win-the-population, using NLWs to prevent collateral damage seems like a no-brainer.

332 Fidler, supra note 322, at 87; see also ICRC, The SIrUS Project: Towards A Determination of Which Weapons Cause “Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering” (Robin M. Coupland ed., 1997).
333 See Donna Marie Verchio, Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned, but Unnecessary and Superfluous, 51 A.F.L. REV. 183, 204 (2001). For a critique the SIrUS project’s suggested criteria, see id. at 199 – 212.
334 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1-150 at 48.
335 Lombardo, supra note 318.
338 See generally Ryan H. Whittemore, Air-Delivered Non-Lethal Weapons in Counterinsurgency Operations, Air Univ. (April 2008) (arguing that air power is seen as counterproductive in counterinsurgency because of its collateral damage and arguing that non-lethal weapons might give air forces a greater role than merely advisory or monitoring).
339 Duncan, supra note 323, at 56.
Despite the value of NLWs to counterinsurgency operations, many believe allowing non-lethal weapons is problematic, even dangerous. The first argument against NLWs is that they can be lethal. In some cases, as when the Russians pumped fentanyl into a Moscow theatre to incapacitate hostages and hostage-takers, a NLW can be indiscriminately harmful. In Moscow, 127 hostages died. NLWs are also lethal for certain classes of people who are at higher risk – children, pregnant women, handicapped persons, persons with asthma. Such persons need to be monitored when engaged with pepper spray or anesthetics.  

Although this concern is factually accurate, the lethality critique of NLWs suffers from the fallacy of using the wrong baseline of comparison. This criticism compares two situations: the use of NLWs with inherent risks, and no military action with certain safety. In reality, however, there is a third situation to consider: the use of lethal force with certain collateral damage. The right diagnosis of the problem requires determining whether in any given case the military would use conventional lethal forces, NLWs, or no force.  

Take a case in which there are insurgents in a crowd of people. We must first ask whether a military would use a conventional lethal technology like a missile, would choose not to act against the insurgents at all, or if available, would use a NLW. This creates three scenarios with three different baselines. In scenario one, the military would choose lethal force over no action, but would prefer NLWs to lethal force. In that case, the comparison is between certain collateral damage from bombing the crowd and the risk of lethality from NLWs. The skeptic of NLWs and the counterinsurgent would likely be aligned, preferring the mere risk of lethality to the certainty of collateral damage. Scenario two arises when the military would choose no action over lethal force, and would prefer no action over NLWs. In counterinsurgency, this situation is not unlikely. As the paradox of counterinsurgency recommends, “[s]ometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.” Militaries must take into account the adverse consequences of their operations – including the risks inherent in NLWs. In these cases as well, the counterinsurgent and humanitarian are in agreement and there will be no use of NLWs. The final scenario is one in which the military would pick no action over lethal force, but would prefer NLWs to no action. The comparison is between the risk inherent in NLWs and the certain safety of no action. Here the counterinsurgent and the skeptical humanitarian are opposed.

340 In addition to the perspectives presented here, some have indicated that opposition may be rooted in a “static technological perspective fixated on lethal force,” see David P. Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons and International Law, in LEWER, supra note 321, at 35, or as another commentator put it, a “tendency to see conventional weapons as defining of war.” See Megret, supra note 24, at 11.  
341 It is worth noting that many of the deaths were due to insufficient medical attention after the hostages were rescued. See Koplow, supra note 329, at 769–81.  
342 See U.S. Department of Justice, The Effectiveness and Safety of Pepper Spray, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice No. 195739, Research for Practice, 01 April 2003.  
343 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, 1-152 at 49.
Notice that clarifying the three baseline scenarios has two important consequences. First, substantive disagreement is limited to the cases in which the military would not use lethal weapons and prefers NLWs to inaction. A substantial number of cases are likely to fall outside of this category – and in those cases, the counterinsurgent and the skeptic of NLWs are in agreement. Second, it is not clear whether scenario one or scenario three will occur more frequently. In scenario one, lives are saved in the shift from certain casualties to risk from NLWs; in scenario three, lives are put at risk in the shift from no action to risk of NLWs. It is not clear which option – allowing or preventing NLWs – will save more lives. A counterinsurgency-inspired approach would not shrink from this uncertainty, but would enable the use of NLWs. NLWs allow the saving of lives in scenario one, and scenario three has built into it the risks of NLWs – risks that a counterinsurgent must take into account as part of the proportionality analysis she undertakes.

Another criticism is that NLWs can be deliberately misused. There are many versions of this critique. Robin Coupland has noted that “the only difference between a drug and a poison is the dose.”344 Some have argued that nations might use non-lethal weapons to incapacitate soldiers easily, and then kill them anyway.345 Other believe NLWs could create a slippery slope leading to the redeployment of traditional chemical and biological weapons;346 malodorous weapons, for example, could be used to mask traditional chemical and biological weapons.347 There is much truth in these concerns, but they too suffer from a baseline problem of comparison. It is true that NLWs may be misused, but the comparison is not necessarily between the misuse of NLWs and no action on the part of the misusing army. If a military that would misuse NLWs is prevented from using them, it might instead use lethal force, misuse lethal force, misuse non-weapons,348 or ignore the ban on NLWs and still misuse them.349 Given this problem, it is not obvious whether allowing NLWs as a general matter will cause greater unnecessary suffering than the alternative. If the misusing state will misuse weaponry regardless of the legal structure, the justification for prohibiting NLWs seems weak. The appropriate use of NLWs, even if only by well-intentioned counterinsurgents, will still alleviate and prevent some death and injury.

Finally, some have argued that permitting NLWs will encourage policymakers to deploy troops more frequently.350 NLWs may lower the cost of civilian casualties and make it easier to wage war with less backlash. In this

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344 Robin Coupland, Calmatives and Incapacitants – Questions for International Humanitarian Law Brought by New Means and Methods of Warfare with New Effects, The Open Forum on Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Ban (May 1, 2003); see also FAS, supra note 324, at 3 (arguing that the potential for abuse suggests prevention of weapons in the first place).
345 See Duncan, supra note 323, at 11.
347 Lombardo, supra note 318.
348 For example, cigarettes can be used as torture devices. Alexander, supra note 336, at 4.
349 Id. at 3.
350 See id.; Fidler, supra note 322, at 65; Duncan, supra note 323, at 10.
sense, NLWs reduce the collateral costs to the kill-capture approach. However, in a win-the-population approach to warfare, reducing civilian casualties is necessary but not sufficient. Reducing casualties can prevent fueling the insurgency, but in itself, it is unlikely to win over the population. What is needed is the slow and resource-intensive work of securing the population and providing services and governance. Deciding whether to go to war, in this context, would not likely turn on reduction of civilian casualties, but rather on the ability of the state to undertake serious win-the-population operations.

Despite the problems with the criticisms of NLWs, categorical supporters of NLWs are not completely free from criticism themselves. These supporters often argue that NLWs are superior because when compared to lethal force, non-lethal force is always more humane. On this theory, blinding a person with a laser will always be superior to killing them. Indeed, they seem to believe that because death is permitted, anything less than death is permitted. Neither the laws of war nor counterinsurgency take this view. Rather, they acknowledge that unnecessary suffering and severe injuries can be so bad that they, like death itself, should be prevented. Under a win-the-population approach in counterinsurgency, non-lethal force may not be strategically desirable. In some cases, lethal force may be preferable. To take an extreme example, detaining and torturing insurgents captured in the midst of battle would be strategically problematic: torture creates backlash and fuels the insurgency by creating a grievance for local populations that are seeking protection and order, not ruthlessness and fear. Killing those insurgents in the midst of battle might, in that case, be preferable to the non-lethal option. In other cases, no action may be preferable to NLWs. When “doing nothing is the best reaction,” the risk of adverse consequences of NLWs outweigh projected tactical advantage from NLWs. Under a win-the-population approach, the idea of preventing unnecessary suffering and superfluous injuries is thus centrally important because it prevents the creation of potential grievances.

The counterinsurgency approach to non-lethal weapons would therefore support a significant restraint on unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury and support the use of non-lethal weapons. But its support for both regimes would be contextual, focused on the actual effects in a particular case rather than on blanket rules. As in the case of the principle of distinction, it would suggest the strengthening of proportionality analysis. Likewise, it would recognize that in certain contexts, otherwise properly-used NLWs might cause unnecessary suffering. The use of some gases in cities or villages might be reasonable, but in closed areas like caves or bunkers might cause terrible suffering. The right question in the debate on non-lethal weapons is thus not whether they should be permitted, but how exactly to define unnecessary

351 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 336, at 2 (criticizing the fact that incineration is allowed but blinding is not).
suffering and superfluous injuring in a manner than can accommodate the rich and varied contexts that animate counterinsurgency.

5. Detention Policy. The detention of terrorists and terrorist suspects has perhaps been the most hotly debated topic within the war on terror. The basic arguments, all stemming from the need to balance national security and civil liberties, are well known. One camp believes preventive detention is necessary. They acknowledge that criminal prosecutions and the laws regarding capture and detention on the battlefield are often sufficient, but also recognize there are cases falling between these regimes. Prosecution risks disclosing intelligence sources and operations, evidentiary rules make it impossible to prosecute some terrorists who may be captured in far-flung places, and most importantly, prosecution is based on the principle that it is better for a guilty person to go free than an innocent person to be deprived of liberty. In the context of catastrophic terrorism, where the risks to so many are so high, society cannot allow terrorists to roam free. Another camp believes that preventive detention is a threat to liberty and may even be counterproductive. Outside the battlefield context, criminal prosecution provides sufficient tools to ensure security and greater protections than any preventive detention system could provide to personal liberty. Preventive detention may also limit the ability to make future arguments from human rights, enabling dictators to justify quashing dissidents, and reducing support from others in the war on terror.

To an extraordinary degree, the debate over detention policy has been shaped by the “enemy combatant” approach made famous by the Bush Administration’s war on terror and use of Guantanamo Bay as a detention facility. Under this approach, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are enemies in an armed conflict. The laws of war, therefore, license the United States to kill or capture these enemies and detain them, as it would detain enemies of a foreign state, for the duration of the hostilities. This approach has two lasting influences: it has globalized detention and it has created a baseline status quo that has framed the debate.

Despite the flexibility the enemy combatant approach provided, the Bush Administration moved Al Qaeda members and terrorist suspects from

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353 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, NY TIMES, July 11, 2007; Wittes, supra note 95, at 151 – 182.
355 Posner, supra note 83, at 92.
356 Kenneth Roth, After Guantánamo: The Case Against Preventive Detention, 87 FOR. AFF., May/June 2008, at 2; Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. INT’L L. 499 (2004-05);
Afghanistan and other countries to Guantanamo Bay, under a theory that it was a legal black hole – free of the rules of the battlefield and free from the purview of American courts. Moving detainees to Guantanamo Bay can be interpreted as a global response to a global problem: if terrorism exists across boundaries and terrorists are independent entities, so too could detention of terrorists be a borderless, global enterprise. Guantanamo Bay thus amounted to the globalization of detention. Detentions that would otherwise have been subject to traditional geographic constraints and their associated legal regimes were now transformed, creating the assumption and practice that persons captured in one place in the global war could be moved to other places, detained, and potentially tried and convicted.

The enemy combatant approach has also shifted the baseline status from which debates on detention follow. The natural tendency, as Professor Waxman has noted, of all reform efforts is to start with the enemy combatant approach to detention and then add procedural protections. Yet doing so, as Waxman notes, does not adequately consider the purposes of detention and the role detention plays in an overall strategy. In addition to clarifying purpose and strategy, designers of a detention system must consider the scope of detention and the procedural safeguards provided after detention. The scope of activities triggering detention could be as narrow as direct participation in hostilities or as broad as providing material support to terrorists. Procedural safeguards that could be chosen include provision of counsel, access to information, limits on the fruit of interrogation, level of publicity, and institutions for review of decisions. Focusing on the enemy combatant model threatens to assume a baseline of scope and process that may not be the optimal starting point, given the well-known status quo bias that afflicts decision-making.

The globalization of detention and the “enemy combatant” approach, driven by the war on terror framework, suffer from significant problems. The nature of contemporary threats is such that it is not obvious who the enemy combatant is because insurgents and terrorists deliberately blend into civilian populations. The result is a high likelihood of detaining innocent persons, a prospect whose risks are exacerbated by the fact that the war on terror is potentially infinite in its duration. As significantly, the globalization of detention has centered the detention debate on the Guantanamo Bay detainees.

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360 Id. at 10–11.
362 Id. at 1126.
363 Id. at 1127 – 1131.
365 See Waxman, supra note 359, at 5-6.
To be sure, Guantanamo is incredibly important, but there are other situations to address: newly captured insurgents and terrorists, and prisoners held in facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, courts are faced with the decision whether detainees in Bagram prison, Afghanistan, have a constitutional right to challenge their detentions in U.S. courts.\(^\text{366}\) From the perspective of designing a detention policy, simply assuming that the globalization of detention is the appropriate approach is dangerous. The contours of detention, like other legal regimes, are driven by policy choices that integrate political, rights, and strategic concerns. If the strategic foundations of the enemy combatant model of globalized detention are unsound, debate over the particular contours of detention policy might shift significantly.

The strategic shift from the global war on terror to global counterinsurgency provides a helpful critique of detention policy. At a strategic level, global counterinsurgency differs significantly from global counterterrorism. The latter approach, derived from the kill-capture strategy for victory, prescribes finding, killing, and capturing terrorists wherever they exist around the world. It acknowledges the global, borderless nature of terrorism and responds in kind. Global counterinsurgency offers a different strategy – disaggregation. The insurgency framework envisions a global system of interconnections and linkages that provide strength and resilience to insurgent movements. Grievances, materials, and active and passive support in one location migrate across borders and can spark or fuel insurgency in other locations. A globalized counterterrorism strategy is therefore likely to be counterproductive. As David Kilcullen notes, “efforts to kill or capture insurgent leaders inject energy into the system by generating grievances and causing disparate groups to coalesce.”\(^\text{367}\) In contrast, the strategy of disaggregation suggests de-linking parts of the system, creating a series of “disparate local conflicts that are capable of being solved by nation-states and can be addressed at the regional or national level.”\(^\text{368}\) Disaggregation thus has two components: At the global level, it suggests de-linking conflict, grievances, and resources in order to contain insurgent operations to particular states or regions. Within each state or region, it suggests a robust counterinsurgency strategy of winning the population.

Disaggregation implies that the globalization of detention was and remains a misguided approach. In place of globalized detention, disaggregation suggests that detainees should be detained and tried in the state in which they are captured. The benefits of disaggregating detention are substantial. First, the capture, detention, and prosecution of insurgents is a potential grievance for insurgents to use to attract new recruits or motivate existing insurgents. Transferring insurgents is likely to spread grievances across geographic jurisdictions and make accepting states into focal points for the insurgency.

\(^{366}\) Wazir v. Rumsfeld (District Court docket 06-1697); Maqalah v. Rumsfeld, 06-1669; Al Bakri v. Gates, 08-1307, and Al-Najar v. Gates, 08-2143.

\(^{367}\) Kilcullen, supra note 103, at 43 – 44.

\(^{368}\) Id. at 37.
Guantanamo is an example. Detention policy in Afghanistan and Iraq spark little backlash or protest when compared to Guantanamo, and a global insurgency analysis would predict that Guantanamo would inspire more terrorists than it holds. A disaggregation strategy has the potential to limit the spread of the grievances sparked by detention. Detaining and prosecuting insurgents in the territory in which they were captured decentralizes the grievances from the global counterinsurgent state and limits their ability to link to the global insurgency. Shifting the emphasis to particular states allows for the insurgency to be treated at a local, rather than global, level.

In addition to preventing the spread of insurgent grievances, disaggregating detention forces nations to develop their own legal structures for detention, thereby strengthening the rule of law around the world. The best way for the U.S. to support counterinsurgency and state-building in Afghanistan is not to outsource Afghan detainees and legal problems to American prisons and courts, but instead to help Afghans develop their own detention and legal systems to confront their particular challenges. Under a disaggregation strategy, countries that develop legitimate processes and the rule of law will win the support of their local populations and effectively grapple with dangers within their borders. Those that refuse to adopt legitimate legal regimes will face increased pressure from their constituents – and from insurgents.

Finally, the disaggregation strategy allows for a diverse range of detention policies via the tailoring of detention policy to the particular conditions within a state. For example, in a state confronted with an active insurgency, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, detention policy might need to have a broad scope and limited procedural safeguards. In a peaceful state without daily attacks from insurgents, such as the United States, detention policy might take on a narrower scope and offer greater procedural safeguards. The value of this diversity of policies across jurisdiction is both principled and strategic. It is principled because it affirms the rule of law and value of liberty, rather than embracing a universal, global policy of expansive preventive detention. It is strategic because the win-the-population strategy in counterinsurgency requires developing legitimate governance structures, including legal and judicial institutions. Forcing the United States into a detention regime designed for the threats of Afghanistan does more harm than good to liberty at home. Forcing Afghanistan into American legal and constitutional structures does similar injury to their security and their development of a distinctly-Afghan government. Diversity enables both security and the rule of law.

Opponents of the disaggregation strategy will pose some important practical criticisms, though a right understanding of global counterinsurgency strategy can meet each. First, some countries may not provide an expansive enough detention scheme to prevent against catastrophic attacks. A disaggregation approach places pressure and responsibility on the government to provide heightened security to its population, rather than transferring responsibility to a single state responsible for all global detention operations. To the extent that a nation’s detention policy falls short of the threat, global
diplomatic forces and domestic political forces will pressure the under-secured state to change its approach. Second, some countries might torture individuals or engage in other human rights violations. Under the UN Convention Against Torture, states must not transfer persons to a state “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”\textsuperscript{369} The Convention poses no problem for a disaggregation strategy because it suggests keeping detainees where they are captured. And the human rights violating state will inspire backlash, pushing the state to change its policies. Third, some countries might use detention policy as a method to clamp down on political opponents. Politically oppressive states could follow such policies regardless of disaggregation, but because of the nature of grievances and feedback loops in insurgent systems, they will also likely face a backlash. In each case, disaggregation strengthens the responsibility of states towards its citizens with respect to both security and liberty. If the state is incapable of providing either, it will face a heightened insurgency. At the same time, the focus on the state’s responsibility to detain contains potential grievances at the national level, limiting their relevance and spread across geographies.

In each of these scenarios, effective detention relies both on the feedback effects inherent in counterinsurgency, and on what Abram and Antonia Chayes called a “managerial model.”\textsuperscript{370} The international community would ensure that each state has a clear understanding of what basic security and legal measures are appropriate and could assist states that have not met those measures but want to meet them. Moreover, networks of government officials, best practices, and technical assistance would help fortify national institutions.\textsuperscript{371}

Pursuing the disaggregation strategy to detention would require designing detention policy in a variety of situations – from states with full-blown or active insurgencies to states with limited threats from insurgencies. Focusing on the particular state and its conditions necessitates considering the role detention plays in the state’s overall strategy to address threats. Designing a detention system does not exist in a vacuum. Some activities could be prosecuted under criminal laws, including material support for terrorism laws, which have been adapted in recent years to preventive ends.\textsuperscript{372} The goal of the preventive detention system would be to fill the gap at times when evidence needed for criminal arrest is insufficient and in which the warfare model of targeting those who are directly participating in hostilities is insufficient. The size of this gap will differ based on the extent of the insurgency. In a full-blown insurgency, a broader preventive approach will likely be necessary because violence is pervasive in the society, because resource constraints and state capacity may be insufficient for effective criminal investigations, and because


\textsuperscript{370} ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1995)

\textsuperscript{371} See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).

\textsuperscript{372} See generally Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 361.
direct participation in hostilities is an insufficiently narrow standard in insurgencies.

A system of preventive detention, as Matthew Waxman has argued, can have four purposes at its core: incapacitating subjects who are deemed to be generally dangerous, deterring individuals from joining with radical groups, disrupting specific and ongoing plots or attacks, and enabling the gathering of helpful information. Designing a detention system to incapacitate would focus on proxies for future dangerousness because the goal is to identify individuals who are generally dangerous. Designing towards disrupting a particular plot would require a functional linkage between a person and a plot. Note that these categories are not coextensive: a financier may be generally dangerous and require incapacitation, but detaining a financier might not stop an ongoing plot. The financier could not be detained under a disruption-regime. On the other hand, a courier may not be generally dangerous but might be transmitting information that will facilitate a particular plot. The courier could not be detained under an incapacity-regime. Additionally, detention with respect to a particular plot would imply a shorter duration of detention, as the threat would subside after the plot was disrupted. Detention for purposes of information provides a broad scope, suggesting potential detention of friends and relatives of a suspected person in order to interrogate them. At the same time it poses the considerable risk of alienating the population. Finally, detention for deterrence seems like a poor design purpose, as prosecution or military action, depending on the context, would both seem to be sufficient deterrents.

Using these purposes, detention policy can be tailored to both active and inactive insurgencies. In an active insurgency, such as Iraq, detention should seek to incapacitate and disrupt. Insurgencies are driven by violence and fear in the population, and the goal of the counterinsurgent is to secure the population and win over passive supporters of the insurgency. To that end, incapacitating active supporters of the insurgency, admittedly a broad category, would be an effective way to secure the population. Likewise, disrupting particular attacks is necessary to protect the population. An information-based preventive detention policy would appear valuable, as it would provide helpful intelligence, but it would also alienate the population when mere questioning might suffice. Detention in active insurgencies sweeps in many, but procedural safeguards should not be abandoned. Indeed, to win the population, the counterinsurgent must build legitimate legal institutions and not overdetain. One answer to this dilemma is a balancing approach that provides discretion to
Another answer is to engage in the expansive detention while requiring safeguards. In Iraq, for example, many of the U.S. prisons take active supporters of the insurgency who were not the most dangerous insurgents or leaders of the insurgency and work to rehabilitate them – teaching them to read and write, providing education in moderate Islam, and then releasing them. This approach provides twin benefits – providing security to the population by removing active insurgents from society and rehabilitating those insurgents so they can reenter society in a peaceful and hopefully productive way.

In an area of inactive insurgency, such as the United States, where the threat is ongoing but not pervasive, a different approach follows. The justification for incapacitating potentially threatening persons seems weak given the resources of the state, the availability of surveillance, and prosecutions for material support of terrorism. In contrast, preventive detention for disruption seems appropriate to provide security to the population. It also requires a nexus between an actor and a plot, a higher standard than general dangerousness, and it is limited to a short-term. When the plot is disrupted, preventive detention would lapse and likely give way to a prosecution. Finally, the information and intelligence justification seems inappropriate in state with an inactive insurgency. Detention for intelligence purposes has high costs to liberty and is largely unnecessary given surveillance capacity.

To be sure, the disaggregation approach will not work in 100% of the cases. In a failed state like Somalia, a captured terrorist can’t be turned over to a functioning government or prison system. In some cases, a state’s assurances might be insufficient or diplomatic pressure might not be enough to ensure human rights or serious security. In these cases, where disaggregated detention is too risky, states should individually or cooperatively create backstops that protect against domestic failure. These backstops could follow the globalized detention model, allowing foreign courts to hear cases of prisoners captured elsewhere, or they could follow a collective security model, with the creation of an international body to deal with the limited number of cases in which domestic institutions are insufficient. But as much as possible, captured insurgents should remain where they were found.

The strategy of counterinsurgency and disaggregation cannot provide the details for how a detention policy should be designed. Policy makers will disagree as to the specifics of procedural mechanisms to be imposed, the scope of the threat and the potentially detainable population, and perhaps even the purposes of detention. But counterinsurgency’s global strategy of

381 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 361.
383 Id. at 340.
disaggregation does indicate that the globalization of detention – the transfer of insurgents across borders in search of a better forum for detention or prosecution – is a misguided approach. It further suggests that the best approach would be to encourage each state to detain its own suspects and develop its own detention policies. Placing greater responsibilities on states helps minimize linkages and weaken the focal points of a global insurgency.

B. Rethinking Compliance: From Reciprocity to Exemplarism

Reciprocity is one of the central principles of international law and the laws of war. Reciprocity holds that states should be subject to the equivalent rights and duties, and that mutuality and equivalence is what enables states to cooperate in an otherwise anarchic, self-interested world. However, the nature of counterinsurgency demonstrates a significant disconnect between the underlying conflict and the legal structure premised on reciprocity. The asymmetric nature of counterinsurgency undermines reciprocity’s equivalence assumption and with it, this theoretical foundation for compliance. But the consequence need not be shedding law altogether. Rather, counterinsurgency’s win-the-population strategy would suggest as a replacement for reciprocity the asymmetric principle of exemplarism, by which the counterinsurgent acts in accordance with law regardless of the insurgent’s actions. Exemplarism unites lawfulness and strategic self-interest, rather than placing them in opposition.

The principle of reciprocity is defined as “the relationship between two or more States according each other identical or equivalent treatment.” Some commentators have added to this definition a requirement of contingency, the rewarding or punishing of an actor based on their fulfillment of the agreement. But others argue that contingency is not required, distinguishing the practical ability to enforce from the legal requirement, which is limited to the mutuality of the norm. The essence of reciprocity can be understood through two elements: first, reciprocity manifests cooperation between parties in the context of a world system in which states are unwilling to act unilaterally. The cooperative element allows states to constrain their actions

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385 Bruno Simma, Reciprocity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 30 (2000).

386 See Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1, 5–6 (1986); see also Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161 (1960).

387 Simma, supra note 385, at 30.

and the actions of others, while at the same time channeling actions into other fields or arenas. Second, reciprocity solves the enforcement problem in international affairs. The basic idea is illustrated by a simple Prisoner’s Dilemma. Both parties in the Prisoner’s Dilemma are better off if they cooperate than if they both defect, but if one party shows cooperative behavior and the other defects, the defector gets the most benefit. If played multiple times, cooperation becomes rational. A party could defect in the short-term, gaining high payoffs, but would face considerable future costs as the other party also defects. Instead, if both parties cooperate, each benefits in the short and long term. Thus, the potential for future defection by the other party provides a check on a party’s actions – and an enforcement of cooperative action. The principle of reciprocity, then, provides international affairs with a way to enable cooperative action when defection may be more profitable in the short run.

Reciprocity manifests itself in three ways. Specific reciprocity describes “situations in which specified partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence.” Specific reciprocity is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma situation described above, and provides enforcement through retaliation. Specific reciprocity can be effective when players have common interests, when future cooperation is appealing, and when there are limited players in the game. However, specific reciprocity can also provoke bilateral feuds, restrict possibilities, and make multilateral action difficult. Diffuse reciprocity “involves conforming to generally accepted standards of behavior.” Each party cooperates in order to maintain a collective norm that it finds valuable. Diffuse reciprocity requires interactions over time to create mutual obligation, but it also can result in the exploitation of cooperative parties when others defect. Indirect reciprocity functions when the retaliatory threat comes not from the reciprocal party but from a third party. In these cases, A and B may have an agreement, but when A violates the agreement, B does nothing; instead C retaliates.

The concept of reciprocity has been central to debates on the legal status of terrorists and the application of the Geneva Conventions in the war on terror for the simple reason that terrorists do not follow the laws of war. Thus

389 Keohane, supra note 386, at 1; Parisi & Ghei, supra note 385, at 93; Simma, supra note 397, at 29. In a centralized system, the central authority can impose and enforce norms; in a decentralized system, reciprocity plays a much larger role. See RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 123 (2005).
391 Keohane, supra note 386, at 4.
392 Id. at 24.
393 Id. at 27.
394 Id. at 4. The distinction between specific and diffuse reciprocity is similar to the distinction between immediate and systemic reciprocity. In the former, a state is bound only if the agreeing state is likewise obligated; in the latter, obligation is tied to “the continued existence of the system.” See PROVOST, supra note 389, at 122.
395 Keohane, supra note 386, at 22.
396 Id. at 24.
397 Gottesman, supra note 384, at 152.
terrorists are perennial defectors, rendering the enforcement element of reciprocity meaningless. Some have argued that the absence of reciprocity means terrorists cannot claim protection. As Ruth Wedgwood has said: “To claim the protection of the law, a side must generally conduct its own military operations in accordance with the laws of war.”398 Others have argued that the United States has no duty to follow the laws of war because reciprocity is absent. John Yoo is probably the most prominent advocate for this view: “the primary enforcer of the laws of war has been reciprocal treatment. We obey the Geneva Conventions because our opponent does the same with American POWs. That is impossible with al Qaeda.”399 Eric Posner presents another view. Posner sees the laws of war as premised on self-interest through reciprocity. On his theory, the laws of war come into being when parties find a way to reduce costs and destruction while not providing significant advantage to any of the other parties.400 Posner argues that the Bush Administration’s claim that Common Article 3 did not apply to the war on terror was based on a reciprocity justification. The United States had nothing to gain from adhering to the rules because Al Qaeda would not follow them regardless of what the United States did.401 Others have been worried about the failure of reciprocity. Some argue that reciprocity requires giving combatant’s privilege to both sides,402 others that the absence of reciprocity and the resultant violation of law by both sides might lead to the degradation of the laws themselves,403 and still others think it is simply unsustainable to have law without reciprocity.404

Thus far, the responses to these arguments and concerns have pursued two tracks. One response is to argue that the laws of war are not really based on reciprocity but rather on humanitarian principles.405 The humanitarian approach concedes that there is no interest-based argument for following the laws of war in asymmetric situations. To some extent, there is evidence for this proposition. The failure of occupation law, as Eric Posner has noted, can be understood as deriving from the absence of a reciprocity-based enforcement threat, because the opponent has been vanquished.406 In cases when reciprocity fails, the needs of humanity are a backstop justification for compliance. The other response argues that reciprocity may still provide a justification for adherence to the laws of war despite the asymmetry of compliance between state and non-state actors. As a matter of specific reciprocity, it is unlikely terrorists will comply with the laws of war; however, with defection by the United States, terrorists might act even more ruthlessly than they would have otherwise. The diffuse reciprocity argument warns that violating the laws of war will undermine humanitarian

400 Posner, supra note 45; see also Belz, supra note 388, at 117 (2006) (noting that “Utilitarian laws will only be found where the reciprocity element is still present, inducing both sides to decrease aggregate costs.”).
403 Weisburd, supra note 24, at 1086.
405 Richemond, supra note 203, at 1026.
406 Posner, supra note 45, at 430.
norms. Indirect reciprocity cautions that U.S. personnel and POWs might be treated poorly in future conflicts given the actions of the U.S. in this conflict.\textsuperscript{407} Thus reciprocity still works and the U.S. should continue to follow the laws of war.

The trouble with these approaches is that they fail to account for the strategic self-interest at work in counterinsurgency. Reciprocity in the laws of war is based on two premises that are inapplicable in counterinsurgency: first, the opponents are each better off using destructive violence to destroy the enemy but each side can reduce its costs if they both limit certain tactics, and second, if one side defects, the other side is at a disadvantage. Counterinsurgency’s win-the-population strategy for victory rejects these propositions. The counterinsurgent is not better off using destructive violence to kill and capture the enemy; rather, the counterinsurgent must win the population by securing the population, ensuring essential services, establishing governance structures, developing the economy and infrastructure, and communicating with the population. These operations require limitations on destructive violence. The reason for the counterinsurgent to limit its actions is not out of reciprocity with the enemy to reduce mutual costs, but pure unilateral advantage. What is important is that the win-the-population strategy does not turn whatsoever on the operations of the insurgent enemy: whether the insurgent is ruthless and vicious or lawful and humanitarian is irrelevant to the counterinsurgent’s strategy.

The fact of asymmetry, of the insurgency’s defection from the laws of war, is therefore irrelevant to the counterinsurgent’s strategy – and might in fact be helpful to the counterinsurgent’s operations. Because the goal is to win over the population, a counterinsurgent that follows the laws of war may be at an even greater advantage in the context of an insurgency that is ruthless and vicious, than in the context of a lawful and humane insurgency. A ruthless insurgent will alienate the population, creating fear and terror. A humane and lawful counterinsurgent, in contrast, gains legitimacy and support of a population that seeks a stable, orderly society, free of violence and fear. The counterinsurgent seeks legitimacy, which is assisted by its adherence to law and humanity and by the insurgent’s disregard for law and humanity. In essence, asymmetry does not undermine an interest-based justification for adherence to law, but rather supports and deepens it.\textsuperscript{408} Instead of interest based on cooperative reciprocity, interest is driven by unilateral advantage. As a result, the counterinsurgency approach rejects the basic tension between humanity and military efficacy\textsuperscript{409} and replaces it with the idea that humanity is needed for military success. The reciprocity approach is thus grounded on strategic

\textsuperscript{407}See sources in Gottesman, supra note 384, at 169, 169 n. 97.
\textsuperscript{408}Most commentators on asymmetry and the laws of war suggest that asymmetry will lead to greater violations on both sides and to the undermining of IHL itself. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law 47, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES, eds. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping (2007); Stefan Oeter, Comment: Is the Principle of Distinction Outdated? 56 - 59, in von HEINEGG & EPPING, supra.
\textsuperscript{409}See, e.g., Provost, supra note 389, at 136.
assumptions about cooperation, compliance, and interest that are inapplicable given the strategic realities of counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency suggests a different principle -- exemplarism. Exemplarism is an inherently asymmetric approach. It holds that a party can be bound to law, regardless of the actions of other parties. In doing so, the exemplarist state gains in prestige, legitimacy, and power. Unlike indirect reciprocity, exemplarism does not premise adherence to law on the future threat of direct equivalent retaliation by a third party. And unlike diffuse reciprocity, it does not premise adherence to law based on the future threat of equivalent retaliation by the reduction of a community norm. Instead, exemplarism is based on the self-interest of the party in securing legitimacy in the eyes of the world and the target population. In essence, exemplary conduct leads to victory.

The self-interested justification for rules in armed conflict provides a non-humanitarian and non-reciprocity justification for following those rules. Military manuals and codes of conduct were some of the earliest restraints on combat and had no reciprocal element. Manuals provided greater internal discipline and war readiness and would sometimes limit damage “to facilitate the return to normality after the end of hostilities.” The impetus and success of these measures was tied to their strategic advantage, not humanity or reciprocity. Over time, it is worth noting, some of the principles established in manuals have even become customary law, such as the requirement that superior officers authorize any belligerent reprisals. Exemplarism also provides a new justification for certain norms, to date justified under humanitarian aims. For example, Article 54 of Additional Protocol I bans destroying objects needed for the population, even if destruction would also harm the enemy. The traditional justification is humanitarian, not

410 I take this term from Michael Signer, City on a Hill, DEMOCRACY (Sumner 2006). Signer applies the term to foreign policy, not law. Robert Sloane has recently argued for a unilateral or voluntarist war convention to bind states. Terrorists, he notes, do not share human rights norms and reciprocity fails because they are structured in networks not hierarchies. Sloane, supra note 102, at 477–78. However similar his conclusions, his paradigm remains fixed on the war on terror, and he roots the failure of reciprocity in different sources from this insurgency-based analysis. Sloane focuses on the networked structure of terrorists; I confront directly the strategic foundations of reciprocity: equivalence, cost-reduction, and the benefits of defection.

411 This distinct from what Professors Posner and Goldsmith call coincidence of interest, “a behavioral regularity among states occurs simply because each state obtains private advantage from a particular action (which happens to be the same action taken by the other state) irrespective of the action of the other.” See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–28 (2005). Goldsmith and Posner argue that if coincidence of interest drives state compliance regardless of the other state’s action, there would be no need for codification of international law. Agreements driven by coincidence of interest thus must have a “thin” cooperative element. Id. at 88–89. Counterinsurgency’s exemplarist groundwork offers no opportunity for even thin cooperation because insurgents will not cooperate. But that does not mean there is no reason to codify agreements in situations driven by purely unilateral self-interest. See infra TAN 424-428.

412 See NEFF, supra note 45, at 74.


414 API, Art. 54.

reciprocal, but an exemplarist approach provides a self-interested justification for these rules: harm to the population fuels insurgency and spreads the conflict.

Instituting the exemplarist principle into law ensures that the feedback effects it relies upon will apply to both well- and ill-intentioned counterinsurgents. Some states may seek to characterize freedom fighters, political opponents, or disgruntled members of the population as insurgents in order to quash them. Indeed, many nations have used the Bush Administration’s war on terror theories to clamp down on domestic opposition.\footnote{See Gottesman, supra note 384, at 181–82.} Moreover, we cannot assume that all insurgencies need to be overcome. Some may rightfully seek political freedom or independence. Under exemplarism, well-intentioned counterinsurgents will act in accordance with strategic necessity and law, thus retaining their efficacy and adding legitimacy to their operations. At the same time, ill-intentioned counterinsurgents – the dictator seeking to crush domestic political opposition by calling it an insurgency or terrorist group – will be seen as violating the law. The law therefore serves as a baseline for evaluating conduct and as a tool of warfare itself.\footnote{See Charles J. Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts, Carr Center Paper (2001) (describing “lawfare”).} Legal violations will fuel grievances, spur on insurgency, and undermine international support; legal compliance will help win the population, build international support, and undermine insurgent propaganda. This enforcement mechanism is not based on the reciprocal threat of retaliation. Rather, the exemplarist model creates a standard of conduct based on the strategic foundation of win-the-population. Because victory is tied to the counterinsurgent’s behavior, rather than its relation to the enemy, a legal structure that sets a standard for that behavior, even as it enables operations, is internally enforcing. Just as insurgencies are subject to feedback loops, so too are counterinsurgencies. Legitimacy and success build on themselves more than on the destruction of the opponent. Hence the ill-intentioned counterinsurgent will confront a downward legitimacy spiral, with exemplarist laws working against it, and the well-intentioned counterinsurgent will see an upward legitimacy spiral, with the law assisting its operations.

One example of how the exemplarist principle would manifest is in removing any thresholds for applying humanitarian norms that are conditioned on the non-state opponent. As one commentator has noted, the applicability of norms in international armed conflict is currently “conditioned on reciprocity of obligations.”\footnote{PROVOST, supra note 389, at 161.} This is not true of internal armed conflict, as Common Article 3 does not have a reciprocity-based threshold for applicability. But Additional Protocol II, which is intended to apply in conflicts between the armed forces of a contracting party and “dissident armed forces,” reintroduced this threshold. It requires that the insurgent forces are “under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of [the country’s] territory as to enable them to carry...
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.\textsuperscript{420} The Protocol tries to ensure equality of the parties – the requirement of territory and command – to act as a foundation for a reciprocity requirement, the implementation of the Protocol by the insurgents.\textsuperscript{421} An exemplarist would reject this condition as driven by the wrong strategic model. Because counterinsurgency does not rely on reciprocity but unilateral self-interest, it is unnecessary to have threshold requirements for the rough equality of the insurgents and the state or for the insurgents to follow the humanitarian norms themselves. An exemplarist approach would apply the relevant provisions to the counterinsurgent state regardless of the insurgent’s conduct or degree of organization and territorial control.

The objection to this position is familiar from the debates over Additional Protocol I: reducing the formal requirements for privileged combatants would legitimize and grant rights to terrorists,\textsuperscript{422} resulting in a perverse incentive that would encourage terrorism by reducing its costs. While it is true that the costs of insurgency would be reduced, this argument may be misplaced. First, is it not clear that Additional Protocol I’s loosening of threshold rules has resulted in more terrorism or insurgencies. Guerrilla warfare is not a new phenomenon. Second, even assuming that there has been an uptick in the incidence of terrorist attacks or insurgencies, it is not clear that the legal change drove that change. More likely, as Phillip Bobbitt has argued, the extraordinary asymmetry of power has forced those who fight against superpowers to take up unconventional means.\textsuperscript{423} Finally, changing one set of rules does not require changing all rules. It is possible to decouple the political concern of insurgency from the tactics used by insurgents. The law could recognize as insurgents those who do not meet the classical threshold tests of uniforms, territorial control, or other reciprocity-inspired provisions, and could simultaneously reject providing privilege or legitimacy to tactics such as targeting civilians.\textsuperscript{424} It does not follow, for example, that insurgents who place tanks in mosques to protect themselves from attack need to be privileged; rather, that practice can be justly condemned even as the fact of insurgency is recognized and the counterinsurgent is bound by law.

Instead of replacing reciprocity with humanity, exemplarism retains self-interest as a justification for following the laws of war. It also illustrates a self-interested, strategically sound, response to the war on terror theorists who assert that counterterrorists have no obligation to follow the laws of war.

\textsuperscript{420} AP II, Art. 1.2.
\textsuperscript{421} See PROVOST, supra note 389, at 161.
\textsuperscript{423} See BOBBITT, supra note 104, at 130.
\textsuperscript{424} Id.
Given the disconnect between counterinsurgency and the laws of war, it is only natural to wonder what course revisions to the laws of war should take. Although counterinsurgency wars are the likely wars of the future, conventional warfare is by no means extinct. Fear of conventional state on state violence is pervasive – Russia and Ukraine’s gas disputes, India and Pakistan’s border and terrorism issues, China and Taiwan’s ongoing cold war. In cases of conventional war, the traditional rules of warfare might be more suitable than ones centered on counterinsurgency. The question, simply put, is how to fashion a laws of war that can satisfy two different strategic realities – the kill-capture approach to conventional warfare and the win-the-population approach in counterinsurgency warfare?

In some cases, revising the laws of war to accord with the win-the-population strategy of counterinsurgency will have little or no negative effect in conventional wars. For example, the ban on non-lethal weapons originated in agreements that were deliberatively all-inclusive, fearing the worst of technology based on the kill-capture strategy. Technological innovation, spurred on by the strategic imperatives of counterinsurgency, now produces non-lethal weapons. Rolling back the blanket technology bans in favor of a regime that differentiates between lethal and non-lethal weapons would align with counterinsurgency and cause little trouble for conventional war. For the same reasons as in counterinsurgency, the use of non-lethal weapons in conventional warfare is unlikely to cause more humanitarian suffering and it will likely lead to less suffering. In such cases, where the legal implications of both strategic models coincide, revision is thus unproblematic.

In other cases, however, the legal implications of the two strategic models may collide, and revision becomes more difficult. Take the principle of distinction. In counterinsurgency, the principle can and must be loosened due to systemic nature of insurgency, the need to win over the population, and the feedback effects involved. However, in conventional warfare, a strict principle of distinction is necessary to prevent widespread attacking of civilians. Universalizing one rule would result in a regime that poorly fits the reality of the alternative form of warfare – conventional or counterinsurgency.

Some might suggest that in such cases one could adopt the counterinsurgency rule as policy, rather than law, because the strategic self-interest of exemplarism makes law unnecessary. However, leaving counterinsurgency-inspired rules to policy will ensure that some laws are broken. A strict principle of distinction would render illegal the counterinsurgent who attacks or captures active supporters of the insurgency who are non-combatants. Moreover, one of the goals in counterinsurgency is itself creating the rule of law within the insurgent territory. As Sir Rupert Smith has written, to “operate tactically outside the law is to attack one’s own
strategic doctrine." Finally, as discussed earlier, legalization rules enable enforcement of the exemplalist principle against ill-motivated counterinsurgents. Policy alone is thus insufficient.

The obvious solution is to devise, instead, two laws of war—a conventional law of war and a law for counterinsurgency war. Yet this solution faces its own problems. How would one decide which regime applied? In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholars debated the right of a participating or foreign state to recognize belligerency or insurgency and the duties that went with recognizing each legal regime. A dualist system for the laws of war would have to establish criteria including who recognizes and what happens in cases of conflicting interpretation. Additionally, it is not obvious that only two laws of war would be needed. In recent years some have suggested that the laws of war add to international and non-international conflict a category of extra-state or transnational armed conflict. Perhaps we must add separate legal regimes for peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, war against pirates, and other military operations. The proliferation of legal regimes would require numerous threshold determinations for applicability and result in considerable conflict over applicable regimes.

There is no simple answer to this problem, and it is not the purpose of this Article to present a comprehensive proposal for revising the laws of war. That work must be left for future scholarship in this area. Still, some might wonder whether revision is necessary at all. Is law merely another tool of the U.S. military, to be changed whenever it conflicts with or constrains strategy? The question raises the larger issue of the relationship between law and strategy—or even law and politics. A full theory is beyond the scope of this Article, but the basic contours of the approach gestured at here are worth mentioning.

The underlying premise is that law and strategy are inextricably intertwined. Law does more than constrain actors, it provides pathways for action. Because law is at once enabling and constraining, it can shape strategy. The change in laws wrought by the French Revolution allowed the levee en masse, providing Napoleon the army needed to dominate Europe. Yet, at the same time, the laws created are dependent on strategy. Czarist Russia, for example, sought bans on new technologies at the Hague Conference of 1899, because it knew it could not compete with other industrializing nations. The upstart American delegates, aware of their growing economic prowess, and

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426 See, e.g., George Grafton Wilson, Insurgency and International Maritime Law, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1907); Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition of Insurgents as Defacto Government, 3 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1939); Lester Nurick & Roger W. Barrett, Legality of Guerrilla Forces Under the Laws of War, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (1946); see also NEFF, supra note 45, at 268–73.
428 Sloane, supra note 102.
429 For a magisterial tract that takes this nexus seriously, see PHILLIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES (2002). For a practical illustration, see Kelly D. Wheaton, Strategic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of Military Lawyers at the Strategic Level, ARMY LAW. 1 (Sept 2006).
430 BOBBITT, supra note 429, at 5.
with it, military might, counseled against such bans. Their legal positions were shaped by their strategic posture. As Phillip Bobbitt writes, “[t]he legal and strategic choices a society confronts are often only recombinations of choices confronted and resolved in the past, now remade in present condition of necessity and uncertainty.”

The laws of war, in this story, are not simply a humanitarian constraint on the horrors of war, though they do serve that function. Rather, the laws of war are an expression of political values. They construct and legitimize military activities including violence, channeling them into certain avenues and condemning others. The legal construction of warfare is shaped by strategy – by the characterization of the conflict, the definition of goals, and the plans and operations that will lead to victory. In fact, the goals of a strategic doctrine are not dissimilar from many of the goals of law. Strategic doctrine seeks to influence others, to provide guidance to lower level officials, to inform the public, and to establish neutral and general principles for action across a necessarily varied and contextual set of cases.

To put it another way, the laws of war may have the function of increasing humanitarian aims, but their bounds are defined by the necessity of compliance by states in an anarchic society. Whether a state agrees to the laws of war and complies with them will depend on the nature of warfare and the strategy the state has adopted. The law, on this approach, can place duties or constraints upon states as long as those duties or constraints are in accordance with the state’s strategy. A right understanding of strategy is therefore essential to shaping the content of the laws of war. It provides the framework within which legal obligations can be crafted. A misinterpretation of strategy may result in imposing legal obligations that will be ignored, in omitting legal obligations that could create new norms and encourage humane behavior, or in failing to address entire areas of law. The law is always evolving, as scholars have noted and celebrated in other fields. Those changes do not necessarily

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432 BOBBITT, supra note 429, at 6.
433 See WALZER, supra note 204, at 24-25 (“What is war and what is not-war is in fact something people decide … . As both anthropological and historical accounts suggest, they can decide, and in a considerable variety of cultural settings they have decided, that war is limited war – that is they have built certain notions about who can fight, what tactics are acceptable, when battle has to be broken off, and what prerogatives go with victory into the idea of war itself.”).
434 BOBBITT, supra note 104, at 437 – 38.
435 See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 1-2 (2006) (“Should nothing be theoretically permissible to a belligerent engaged in war, ultimately everything will be permitted in practice – because the rules will be ignored.”); ICRC Commentary to API para. 1390 (“without these concessions, which take reality into account, it would never have been possible to arrive at such detailed texts and at provisions which were so favorable to the victims of war.”) (emphasis added).
436 As Phillip Bobbitt notes, “Without legal reform…, we are in the paradoxical position of putting ourselves at a potentially fatal disadvantage; if we adhere to law as it stands, we disable effective action against terror; if we act lawlessly, we throw away the gains of effective action.” See BOBBITT, supra note 104, at 395 -96.
mean that law is merely at the mercy of expedient politicians, but rather that law must keep up with changes in society. So too with changes in strategy.

CONCLUSION

Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a renaissance in counterinsurgency strategy has taken place. Military strategists, historians, soldiers, and policymakers have all taken counterinsurgency strategy seriously, making its principles and paradoxes second nature and transforming massive institutions in pursuit of strategic victory. Yet despite counterinsurgency’s ubiquity in military and policy debates, legal scholars have spent little time assessing how counterinsurgency and the law align. Many continue to frame debates around legal issues in the war on terror, a frame that not only misrepresents the military’s conception of contemporary challenges but also omits significant areas of law that require greater discussion. In addition, the laws of war themselves are based on conventional war’s strategy for victory – kill or capture the enemy. Counterinsurgency, however, rejects this strategy, embracing instead a win-the-population strategy.

Taking counterinsurgency seriously leads to some notable conclusions, the greatest of which is the significant disconnect between counterinsurgency’s strategy and many time-honored provisions and widespread interpretations of the laws of war. The foundational requirement of reciprocity is challenged by the asymmetry of counterinsurgency and its exemplarist approach, an approach that unites strategic self-interest and humanitarian ends. The conventional focus of contemporary national security debates – on detention, torture, interrogation and the like – are insufficient without discussion of compensation and occupation law. The ancient principle of distinction is flawed, even as proportionality looks more humane and strategically effective. The laws of war are excessively constraining, preventing occupying forces to establish the conditions and structures of sustainable self-government. The laws of war are at times insufficiently humane, entrenching the privilege to destroy, when the humanitarian policy of civilian compensation aligns better with strategic self-interest. The turn to global solutions can be counterproductive under the disaggregation strategy, as in the case of detention. And the nexus of technology and innovation creating ever-greater destruction appears to be inverted in an age of counterinsurgency, suggesting the use of non-lethal weapons should be permitted.

These are but a few areas within the laws of war. Others too may be poorly tailored to the realities of counterinsurgency. Doctrines around protected persons and places may need to be rethought. The role of humanitarian organizations, protecting parties, and transparency and accountability for counterinsurgents might require revision. The centrality of information operations, human intelligence, and surveillance merit serious attention. And questions of borders and migration, POWs, and informational interrogations await reconsideration.
To shape the legal structures that will govern and guide contemporary conflict requires understanding the nature of strategy in contemporary warfare. It is not too late for legal scholars to join the fray and understand the relationship between counterinsurgency and the law. Counterinsurgency is the warfare of the age. Lawyers and legal scholars should not ignore it.