


Challenges in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas

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Challenges in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas

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Preface

A fruitful collaboration between the Louis A. Bantle Chair in Business and Government Policy, the National Security Studies Program at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, and the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism led to the March 2006 Symposium reproduced here: *Challenges in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War on Ideas*. With the extraordinary leadership of Bantle Chair holder General Montgomery Meigs, the sponsors succeeded in attracting a distinguished international group of scholars, public servants, and policy and business experts to explore the ongoing struggle against violent extremism. The contributors and abstracts of their papers appear in the next pages.

The Louis A. Bantle Chair in Business and Government Policy was established in 1990 by Louis A. Bantle and UST, Inc., designed to support research and teaching at the intersection of business and government policy. This Symposium is emblematic of the core interests of the Bantle family and of the Chair that their generosity created. All the contributors to the Symposium share the view expressed by Bantle Professor Montgomery Meigs that successes in the struggle against violent extremism will occur only when government and the private sector combine forces. Business models and private sector leadership and management solutions will help develop the technologies and ideas that will support government in its ongoing efforts to combat extremist forces. The confluence of the Bantle family's recognition of the importance of business and government collaboration and the hard work of the academic partners at Syracuse University produced a truly enlightening Symposium. This set of Proceedings will make a lasting record of their achievements.

William C. Banks

Director, INSCT

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Abstracts

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr.**, advises against the current kinetic approach towards extremists, which involves “killing people and breaking things.” Instead, he argues, we must understand the enemy’s perspective, which includes factoring in the conflict that is going on between the radical Salafist extremists and the wider Islamic community around the world. We must understand the acceptance of the Salafist interpretation of Islam, as this is the heart of the war of ideas in which we are engaged today. Giambastiani also notes that it is crucial that we remind ourselves of who our adversary is, what his goals are, and how he intends to achieve those goals. Because the enemy flies no flag, defends no borders, keeps no standing army, and occupies no defined territory, we must identify the source of his support, and how he is able to operate.

Nasra Hassan, Director of the United Nations Information Services, identifies the factors that influence suicide bombers to carry out their objectives. Hassan notes that the adoption of suicide terrorism is preceded by discussion, and, in addition to there being a ‘cause’ that drives suicide terrorists, there must also be a charismatic figure, a sponsoring group, and a network. Another important aspect is interoperability, which allows different groups to operate together, not necessarily in unison, but in parallel, to meet short-term objectives.

Col. Lior Lotan, Managing Director of Homeland Security for Cukierman & Co. Investment House, Ltd. addresses the core issues of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and why we must win in these types of engagements. Lotan focuses on the importance of perception to warfare of the information age. A battle in the information age is really a battle about information and ideas. In this era, if an opponent controls information, he also controls the battlefield. Lotan identifies the basic features of insurgencies: the importance of the idea; the structure behind it; the leadership, the leader must be a military person who understands and has courage to enter into battle; and finally, the asymmetric nature of insurgencies must be understood. The efforts to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the adversary should not concentrate only on the soldier, but also on the surrounding society that supports the insurgents. Without understanding these aspects, we cannot win.

Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, **Raymond F. DuBois Jr.**, argues that we must reexamine the entire interagency process, notably between the State Department and the Department of Defense, to come up with something more effective than what exists today to fight radical extremists who want to harm the United States. DuBois notes Congress’ resistance to reconfigure how it deals with national security and homeland security after September 11th. He calls on former secretaries

and vice chairman of different committees to speak out and try to convince Congress that protecting their committee and subcommittee turfs and fighting turf battles will not further our aims at home or abroad. He notes further that *The Quadrennial Defense Review* (2006) process was significantly different from previous rounds and that more could have been done regarding reforms in management, governance, and decision-making in the Defense Department. Finally, he expresses the importance of recognizing that the global war on terrorism will not be won solely on military terms, but rather, it will be won by economic development, reconstruction, foreign exchange, and foreign investment. The global war on terrorism, if we do not succeed, is simply a precursor to a much larger conflict.

Gen. Montgomery Meigs (Ret.), argues that defining the current situation in Iraq as 'asymmetric warfare' is inaccurate. In operational terms, asymmetry means the absence of a comparable capability, which suggests that asymmetry involves a degree of commensurability. However, commensurability is lacking in Iraq. Instead, we are dealing with two cultures with two very different approaches to warfare that do not fit together. Meigs argues that the relationship is idiosyncratic rather than asymmetric, and a good example would be the attack on the World Trade Center. It was not directed towards the military, but rather at American political will and economic foundations. This action requires a different way of thinking about just what our opponent is thinking and what their next move may be, and how to counter it. To deal with this type of situation, we must go after not only the sniper, but we must deal with the society in which these extremists are supported. Our enemy is adaptive and has developed a variety of means to carry out an attack. We must understand these idiosyncratic aspects to warfare today and utilize this understanding to produce favorable results.

Richard Games, Ph.D, chief engineer for MITRE Corporation's Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems, focuses on the changing face of warfare from symmetric force-on-force situations, characterized by defined parameters, and today's wars, which involve tactics and technologies that are played out in an asymmetric context. Games argues that we must move from an exclusively reactive to a more offensive posture to level the asymmetric playing field. To do so, we must act as the enemy acts; our actions must be unexpected, small scale, and local. Further, we must not rely solely on information technology as our only assets. Instead, we must understand the social science behind war and mix this aspect into the technological know-how in order to succeed.

Founder and executive director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy, **K.A. Taipale** analyzes the role that information plays in fourth-generation warfare. He calls for the development of a doctrinal framework within the United States government and its allies in order to succeed in the war effort. Taipale argues that in fourth generation warfare,

legitimacy is the center of gravity and that information and ideas, along with information operations, are paramount instruments of this power struggle. We do not currently have a doctrine of rules for how to operate in this new generation of warfare.

Founding and managing partner of the Portland, Maine law firm, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios LLP, **Harold C. Pachios** examines the motivation behind extremist terrorism against the United States. He argues that violent extremists are unlikely to be affected by our ideas, and the theory that if terrorists understood us, they'd be less likely to be our enemies. Rather, terrorists do understand us, and very well at that, and it is our foreign policy along with religious fundamentalism that drives much of the terrorism towards our country. Unrestricted political support for Israel in the occupation of Palestine territories, along with the U.S. invasion of Iraq have motivated contemporary terrorism. Pachios calls for a redefinition of the image of the United States in order to affect the hearts and minds of those who view the U.S. in a negative light.

Col. F. William Smullen III (U.S. Army, ret.), Director of the National Security Studies at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, finds that public diplomacy can be used as a weapon to win over world opinion. We must shed the perception of the United States as a monolithic empire doing whatever we want to whomever we want. He argues that America can be viewed as a 'brand' because its general perception by others does not reflect necessarily what the United States says about itself. The reputation of Americans has recently declined considerably. However, public diplomacy can make a difference. We must develop a plan that has at its core sensitivity to other cultures. We must devise a message that has a relevant tone – something that many different groups will want to listen to across their differences and that allows us to represent a commonality in message. What is clear is that we cannot fight this war alone; we need the assistance of several countries and we must use public diplomacy to secure this assistance.

INTRODUCTION TO CHALLENGES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM: WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr.

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

It is a great pleasure to be here with my shipmate – General Montgomery Meigs. In fact, I am here at Monty’s behest, though Colonel Bill Smullen and Dean Mitch Wallerstein are also persuasive people. Since we stole Professor Meigs from Syracuse University and the Maxwell School to run the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force, it was only fitting that, as Monty requested, I do one thing for him: come up here and speak. It also gave me the opportunity to come back home to upstate New York and to visit with friends.

I am going to begin by telling you a little about General Meigs. It is important for me to talk about him for a minute because I have admired him for a very long time. Here, we have an armor officer who in the early 1990s wrote a book called *Slide Rules and Submarines: American Scientists and Subsurface Warfare in World War II*, while he was at the National Defense University. The book addressed how the U.S. defeated the Germans in the anti-submarine warfare realm of operations. General Meigs hails from, frankly, a big Navy family in Annapolis – but while I did not know Monty back in 1992, I had read his book, and I wrote him a letter to tell him how impressed I was with it. He was serving in Bosnia at the time, as I recall, and had just made Brigadier General. When we began looking hard for the right senior leadership to bring to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force, we thought of General Meigs. These IEDs are dastardly devices, and we needed someone to take a holistic approach, dealing with tactics, technology, and all of their complex aspects. I should also thank Dean Wallerstein for lending this talent to the U.S. to serve one more time in an active role.

To set the stage for today’s deliberations, I would like to make three brief points. My first point is related to the topic being tackled here, today, at this Maxwell symposium: winning the war of ideas, which is crucial to winning, what we call in the Defense Department, “the long war.” Second, I will review, from my perspective, our adversary, who this enemy is, and what his goals are. Third, I want to address how we fight and win a war of ideas when we might not even have a seat at the table, and when it is difficult to expose our adversary for who they are.

From our perspective, the “long war” against Islamic extremists appears to be a war between “us and them,” the U.S., our allies, and a world-wide terror network that does, in fact, exist. Such a perspective naturally lends itself to what in the military we call a kinetic approach, which might be defined crudely as

killing people or breaking things. This perspective can be misleading, however, or, at least, not wholly complete: it tends to project onto our adversary our own familiar mindset and decision-making processes. This is my first point: we should be wary of such a misleading approach.

I am reminded of the danger and of the limits of this approach given the recently released *Iraqi Perspectives Project Report* (available on the web)¹, which I commissioned when I was the commander of the United States Joint Forces Command. Some of you may have seen the summary article by the report's three main investigators on Foreign Affairs' website, which will also be a future lead article in this publication. In my view, it is worth a read: what did it do? It used interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders and reviewed captured Iraqi documents to view Operation Iraqi Freedom from – and this is what is important – the Iraqi perspective, through their eyes. The essential insight of this work, among many rich 'take-aways', is that Saddam Hussein viewed his military as an instrument to keep his regime alive and not as a means to protect Iraqis against external threats. This is a very important point: it led to military decisions on his part that were incomprehensible to us, but were perfectly rational in terms of maintaining the Baathist regime in Iraq.

I would suggest that we factor into our view of this "long war," this war of ideas, the conflict that is going on inside Islam between the radical Salafist extremists and the wider Islamic community around the world. Stated another way, this is not a clash between civilizations, but within one civilization: the Muslim world. This clash, in many senses, is a real ideological civil war between one hard-line view of what Islam means, and what such a meaning demands, and a whole variety of Islamic expressions of faith which are largely peaceful, which can and do coexist comfortably within our modern world, and which abhor the violence that certain people like bin Laden and Zawahiri profess. In my view, this war of ideas targets the real center of gravity in this "long war" – the billion plus members of this Islamic community known as the *ummah*. It is their acceptance – active or tacit – of the Salafist interpretation of Islam that is at stake. That acceptance, or rejection, is at the heart of this war of ideas in which we are engaged today.

My second point is that, as we consider this war of ideas from multiple perspectives, it is important to remind ourselves just who our adversary is, what his stated goals are, and how this adversary operates. Given this distinguished audience today, I suspect that many of you are familiar with these issues. So you must excuse me for repeating what you may already know, but it is important to reiterate certain core realizations. Just who are these folks? Let us be perfectly clear: the enemies in this global war on terrorism seek to abolish our, your, way of life and to replace it with the rules of an extremist Islamic empire. That

¹ <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf>

may sound like a broad goal, but our adversary seeks to accomplish this goal in a variety of ways: they fly no flag, defend no borders, keep no standing armies, occupy no territory. Instead, our adversary derives its strength and support in a variety of ways: by developing safe havens in the geographic, virtual, and mass media worlds, including, primarily, the Internet; by setting up front companies; by buying off politicians and financiers who move illicit money around; and, finally, by co-opting and enlisting sympathetic, civic, and charitable organizations to propagate a hateful ideology.

It is crucial that we fully understand this adversary's intent: what is their goal? Look no further than their written and spoken words. Like many totalitarian leaders in history, al Qaeda has publicly outlined its goals which are ambitious and, at the same time, simple and clear: purge the Middle East of all foreign influences; overthrow Islamic governments which are viewed as illegitimate (essentially all of them); and establish an extremist Islamist empire in their place. Similarly, their campaign against the U.S. and our allies is equally ambitious, simple, and clear: they seek to bankrupt and to exhaust us. That objective is similar, for example, to the objective previously used against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1970s. In the process of achieving this familiar goal, this enemy also works to establish and expand safe havens from which it can operate, and it aims to leverage a growing Islamist empire to gain weapons of mass destruction capabilities, or to control oil resources. These moves are both useful in driving us out of the region and effective for making their case in this war of ideas in Islam.

How do they operate? The followers of Islamic radicalism are bound together by this extreme ideology – not by any centralized command structure. This situation makes it easy for a loose network to achieve, in a sense, a unity of effort, as we would say in the military, and, in turn, this unity makes it very difficult for any single military campaign to eradicate the threat. Ideas cannot be eliminated by simply using guns. Moreover, this adversary is a master of intimidation, but not of the battlefield – they can intimidate and kill, but they cannot win an engagement against any properly employed military force. Thus, they exploit local conflicts to build a complex culture of victimization: this entails mobilizing resentful, disillusioned, and underemployed young people, men and women, and, then, employing modern technology to amplify these effects in their destructiveness. Indeed, this adversary purposely targets innocent individuals for political purposes – and not our military outright – because they are well aware that if they did confront us, they would be thrashed. Instead, they try to peck away at a superior force, using, for instance, improvised explosive devices, and, further, deploying these IEDs against innocent civilians – victims with absolutely no tactical military value, but immense strategic import. It is for this reason that a focused effort in this arena is so important.

I want to take a minute to describe why I dislike the term “IEDs” or “Improvised Explosive Devices.” Not only is the term too long, it does not help us to understand the nature of these weapons. These are weapons of indiscriminate destruction with strategic effect, and they are used to spread fear among the local populations. The enemy’s goal is to break our will with a constant drumbeat of death and destruction, which is then amplified by around-the-clock news cycles reporting their actions and adaptive, clever uses of the Internet. This enemy knows that the propaganda which goes into making news is more important than military operations, and they expertly use this virtual world for planning, recruiting, financing, indoctrination, and training.

My third and final point: how do we fight and win this war, which is a war of ideas? To use a crude, but, perhaps, helpful historical analogy – and this is just an analogy – we find ourselves in a position much like the British during the American Civil War. They were profoundly interested in who would win this conflict because they possessed moral and economic stakes in its outcome. Yet, any involvement on their part was seriously resented, especially by the Union side. If we view this conflict as an Islamic ideological civil war, in certain important ways we have no recognized role as intellectual combatants. In short, we are facing a very tough problem that very smart people, inside and outside government, are trying to solve. It is a problem at the heart of recent debates over strategic communications – which are so important in this “long war” – and which we just substantially addressed in drafting, over the last seven months, the new *Quadrennial Defense Review*. This issue has also led to some controversial operations, such as paying for the publication of articles which are truthful, so far as I can tell, in the Arabic news media in an attempt to tell positive, accurate news stories that would simply not make the local Arab networks.

But to my mind we still have not come up with a good enough strategy – or even enough good ideas – to compete in this war of ideas, in this Islamic civil war, in a way that strengthens Islamic moderates against hard-line extremists. To be honest, I do not have simple solutions to offer here today, which is one of the reasons why this topic at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University is so important. I hope, however, to have framed this problem in a coherent fashion so that we can put our heads together and make progress. In fact, that is why this symposium is so important, as are the opportunities here for national security professionals – including the group that the government has sent to Syracuse University’s National Security Studies Program to work for many weeks to take time out of their daily careers to think hard about these issues. I hope that the debates and deliberations here, including for those participants from the Defense Department, will help us identify some practical lines of operation in this war of ideas. The war of ideas is a crucial center of gravity in the “long war” against Islamic extremists and their very clear goals which are inimical to our

way of life and to the beliefs and aspirations of hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world. Figuring out how we can usefully contribute to this war of ideas is, as we say in the Pentagon, a non-trivial matter and, further, something that we simply must succeed at.

Thank you in advance for your service and for your future contributions, which I hope are substantial.

Question: How important is it to this war, this global war, that we maintain the will at home?

Adm. Giambastiani: Well, we have a lot of folks addressing this issue. What I would tell you, right now, is that this simply is a war of wills. Are people being killed and wounded and hurt, Americans, coalition forces, Iraqis, Afghans, Jordanians? Yes. This is a world-wide issue, and our ability to understand that as a nation, in my personal view, is incredibly important. Obviously, the President has been out talking about this. We have gone through a series of cycles as we have looked at, for example, how Afghanistan is developing, ridding Afghanistan of Taliban and al Qaeda, turning over operations in two theatres to Afghans and Iraqis. People who talk to me are very interested in these nations carrying more and more of the burden, as we help them as a coalition member bilaterally, as allies. So, while I do not have a simple answer for you, I will tell you that we are doing everything we can inside the Department of Defense, as you would expect, to reduce any drive towards additional casualties, while we still get these operations done to support these governments as they build politically and militarily.

As a military officer, I can also say that we, as a military, have spent a huge amount of time building up the security forces inside Afghanistan and Iraq. When you hear the issue of needing more troops discussed, we certainly agree with that: we want more Afghan troops; we want more Afghan police; we want more Iraqi military; we want more Iraqi police; and we want capable security forces that can provide for security in all of these areas. We are working hard to do that in both countries, in addition to helping partners around the world combat these types of wars. Now, IEDs, these are weapons that are going to proliferate – they have over the last 20 years, since Vietnam, in different ways. One reason why it is so important for us to steel ourselves against these weapons is to help us in this war of wills: we cannot falter in this. I will tell you that those are important lines of operation, as we say in the military.

Question: Admiral, I received a weekly newsletter from Iraq, called The Advisor. It provides me with good information about some of the positive things going on and the contributions that we are making, as well as the achievements of the Iraqi people. However, I think that in the U.S. we fail to do the public diplomacy thing: what more can we do, in a way that advances some

of these positive activities? What more can the military do in public diplomacy, in advertising the good things?

Adm. Giambastiani: There is a lot of debate and discussion about positive news, negative news, and the rest of it. Look, there is killing and dying going on, so there is no doubt about the negative aspects. But a classic example of a very positive thing is for us to talk about this pilgrimage that just occurred, for example. Though it depends on who you talk to, some will say there are a million pilgrims moving from Baghdad down to Najaf and back again – they were walking on the roads. Each year that we have seen this pilgrimage, we have had on the order of hundreds killed initially. Then we got down to, I think it was somewhere like, 30 plus last year. This year we had twelve people die and a couple, two or three wounded – that is the latest figure that I have seen. The majority of the security conducted for this operation was provided by Iraqi security forces – now, that is a very good news story.

It is important for us to talk about these instances because we want the Iraqis to continue to build their capability, not just on the military side, but on the political side, for a national unity government. People like myself, the Secretary of Defense, and others, we need to keep talking about these examples at every opportunity, to take time to have the public discussion. We also need to provide opportunities for our media so that they can talk about these types of news events. But, ultimately, whether the media decides to do this or not is their choice, not ours. For us, however, on the military, diplomatic, and governmental side, if we do not make these opportunities, then we are not doing as well as we should. We need to convey that which we are spending a huge amount of time on.

I want to offer a side comment on this issue. I do not know how many of the ROTC students are here, but I suspect they watch the television program *Stargate SG-1* – maybe you are too busy studying here at Syracuse University. The reason that I bring it up is that, while I do not watch it very often, the program is based on the concept of “the stargate,” this door that you pass through to move from one universe to another. Every time I go to Iraq and every time I return to the U.S., it is like I am passing through this stargate, because the perspectives about what is happening, the representations of Iraq, of Afghanistan, are so different when I am there from when I am in the U.S. Our troops return home and refer to this problem constantly: how can we get a different kind of information out, beyond those who are service members and their relatives, or members of the State Department? These people get this very different impression on a daily basis, because they are out building hospitals, working with young Iraqi students, the Iraqi wrestling team – whatever the case may be – to try to bring a more normal life to this outfit. We cannot downplay the fact that there are some serious security problems, but it is our job to try to publicize those in a balanced way through various forms of communication. I

am not sure how we are going to be able to do this differently. If I look at the local news, killings and murders seem to get the big news stories, and they sometimes overshadow a lot of the good stuff. That is a national problem that we have right now.

Question: Are the Iraqi people getting this good information, and if so, how are they getting it?

Adm. Giambastiani: We are reviewing a program relevant to this question now in theatre. We wanted to make sure that the Iraqis were getting good news stories, that good news was spreading to them. So, it was important, for instance, to have Iraqi television stations cover these stories – and a lot of them do. If you have never been to Iraq, you would be astounded by the difference. When I flew over Iraq for the first time in June of 2003 – two months after we started combat operations – and I looked at reconnaissance photographs of Baghdad, for example, there were no satellite dishes anywhere. Now, if you fly in a helicopter, there is an incredible explosion of media: hundreds of newspapers, thousands of satellite dishes have sprung up. They can now get all of the Middle East stations, radio stations, local television stations – there is an incredible amount of diverse opinion out there. So the answer is yes, it is getting out there, and this is part of the debate on how the military has gone about making sure that truthful, positive stories are circulating along with the rest. We are reviewing the mechanisms that we have used and are using – that is why, for instance, one might use Voice of America or Radio Free Europe. Your help at The Maxwell School in thinking about how to do this would be very helpful to us.

Question: Yes sir, I was born on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is, today, prime jihadi territory, where you can see asymmetric warfare on both sides, on the border of both Afghanistan and of Pakistan. There is jihadi terrorism, suicide terrorism by jihadi, which is, right now, the preferred method of fighting both the Pakistan armed forces and the coalition forces in Afghanistan. So in this asymmetric warfare, armed forces, whether those of the U.S., probably the premier military power in the world, or those of Pakistan, they do not fare very well because the enemy is so amorphous and has so much support. Here is where I want to come back to your war of ideas: to win this war of ideas, the majority of the Muslim ummah also needs to be on board, and I do not see that happening. That is a problem, and I want you to speak to that. Thank you.

Adm. Giambastiani: My Pakistani friend, I will speak to this – but, as you know, I am not an expert. I would begin by saying that, first, with regard to Pakistan, it is important for us to remember that President Musharraf and his government have been very strong supporters and allies. Is there an internal problem in Pakistan? You bet there is. But we need to remember that along

the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan there is an area called the FATA, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas – these are government-sanctioned tribal areas with no federal military forces. Since 9/11, actually, since after October of 2001, the Pakistanis have gone into these FATA areas with significant numbers of troops. Now, that is not the only answer. If you look at what President Musharraf is doing, he is trying to bring aid, construction projects, school projects, to these areas. He is trying to downplay their use of training schools, the madrassas, to change their fundamentalist teachings by emphasizing math and science – helpful subjects to young people in getting jobs as opposed to focusing on, if you will, the jihadist upbringing.

But you must, as always, with any insurgency or fight against an ideological enemy, work with local populations; you must win over the civilian population; they must be on your side. This is very important in Afghanistan, in Iraq – in all of these areas. Let us also not forget that Pakistan is an ally in a country we are not at war with; yet there are elements in that country that we are at war with. So having a strong ally to help us in this area – one that we can build partnership capabilities with – is very important.

Let me put this point another way by telling you about the importance of the earthquake effort, which is a good news story. When the earthquake occurred in Pakistan, the U.S. immediately responded: at one time we had up to 33 medium and heavy-lift helicopters in that country and, in addition, we sent in hospitals, naval construction engineers, a disaster assistance center in Islamabad with personnel who worked throughout Pakistan. The single most popular toy there is the U.S. Chinook helicopter, and the reason why is because of all the relief sorties and supplies that it brought to Pakistani residents. Taking the opportunity presented by the unfortunate earthquake devastation has brought a lot of good will to the U.S. Another example of this good will with many Muslim insurgents is our role in Indonesia with tsunami relief where, once again, the U.S. provided, unquestionably, the single largest disaster relief effort. Taking advantage of these instances expresses to populations what we stand for, what our moral values are, what is important to us, that they are important to their country and to the world.

When these types of unfortunate disasters do occur – and clearly, we do not ask for them – we ought to respond humanely and in a sensible fashion to help our neighbors in a way that, frankly, allows them to help themselves. In fact, now, in Pakistan, we have left all of the engineering equipment that we brought in; we have left an Army mobile hospital (all of the equipment, tents, surgery equipment); everything has been turned over to the Pakistanis. We still have under ten, I believe, CH47 Chinooks there running supply flights, and we are providing a tremendous amount of assistance to the Pakistanis. These things make a difference.

Question: Admiral, does the military shoulder the burden for winning this war on terror, this war on ideas – a burden that is an increasingly bigger and bigger task? Who takes the lead and how do you organize it? How do we balance this burden out?

Adm. Giambastiani: Well, this is not a military problem to solve, it just simply is not. Nor is it just a U.S. problem to solve. The military happens to be only one component and, clearly, if you do not bring the economic and the political side of the equation to the problem, then you will not solve it in the long term. So, it is a much broader issue. We happen to be the face of it, but in Afghanistan, for example, bringing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this large number of allies, having NATO take over this mission – with the U.S. still being the single largest contributor to what we call Operation Enduring Freedom operations, which are separate from NATO – this is a very important component.

It is also important to bring in other interagency elements: the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, I think, has it dead on when she named a Director for Foreign Assistance in an attempt to unify under one director about 80 percent of U.S. foreign aid which had been splintered among a number of different groups. It cannot happen fast enough for all of us, but Secretary Rice is working very hard in this particular area. But this is truly an interagency operation: it is the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the United Nations, NATO. There are lots of folks who we need to have working with us in these various areas around the world. I will tell you that we spend a lot of time in Washington, and, actually, out in these theatres, working the coalition, the interagency, the nongovernmental organizations to bring together as much synergy and cohesion as possible.

About eight weeks ago I visited a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in a place called Chaghchran, Afghanistan in the Ghor Provinc – the poorest of all the provinces. I have been to a number of these PRTs, and what is fascinating about them is that, for instance, the Lithuanians are the lead military force there. Even though the Icelanders, for instance, do not have a military, they have nine people there doing support, as do the Danes – both are there supporting the Lithuanians while the U.S. provides the logistics assistant. I flew in on a C130 onto a dirt strip, went and met the provincial governor, and found a tremendous, positive response from the people I met, the average citizens out there aiding in this international response. USAID is a very key component because of the aid they bring for building roads, infrastructures – all kinds of things. The PRT approach in Afghanistan is a good way for us to bring together various components of the effort and to get Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) to work with them – they have proven very successful. The U.S, frankly, came up with this idea, created a large number of them, and

turned many over to NATO – but that is a way for us to try to capture and bring a cohesive, integrated effort across organizations.

One final point, I would mention. I have been at a number of conferences and have found that NGOs do not like the military sometimes. It is amazing to me, when I first started talking with these groups at symposia around the world, I would encounter some hostility. A woman at an event would stand up, for instance, identify her NGO, and say: ‘I’m with this NGO and we don’t like you military types; you’re trying to steal our job.’ Well, I can assure you – the last thing the military wants to do is steal the job of these organizations, their ability to bring reconstruction and other related benefits to an area. So, we went back and took a look at how we deal with this issue over the last three years, and we have made stability, security, transition, and reconstruction every bit as important as the war-fighting piece. In fact, while the first three of our four main operating concepts inside our military may not be surprising – these are major combat operations, strategic deterrents, and homeland defense – the fourth concept, that we support stability, security, transition, and reconstruction may be unexpected. The reason why we made it such a long title is because, inside the department, it used to be called “Stability Ops” – a lousy name, in our view. Also, people on the outside, like NGOs, did not like the name. They wanted us to transition to them, and we wanted to transition to them. It is, over the last three years, important that we transition, not only to other elements of the government, but to these international organizations.

Question: Sir, I’m from the Newhouse School of Public Communications and I would like to get your help in figuring out a problem. Assume for a moment that, instead of being an admiral, you are the top news executive of any news organization. The President requests that the news media need to do a better job in reporting good news in Iraq, for example. We have had journalists of late go into Iraq and attempt to do this – Bob Woodruff was looking at how Iraqi troops are doing; Jill Carroll was working independently. It looks as if the only way that the military can help us to do this is where journalists are embedded, which limits the kind of journalism one can do, the kinds of stories told. As a news executive, what would you advise?

Adm. Giambastiani: Well, the good news is that I am not a news executive – that I can assure you – and I am not going to pretend to be. But here is what I think is important. For independent journalists operating in areas with insurgents, these extremists know that the truth hurts, and they do not want you to be out there telling good news stories. All of this seems to indicate that you may, in fact, want to embed. Now, some would say, if I embed, that means I am restricted – but you have to remember that when I travel into Iraq, when the Secretary of Defense or a congressional delegation like Senator Warner, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, travels there, a force protection tails along. When journalists go out with the troops, there is a force

protection with them. These military forces can help protect journalists so that they can tell the story, if you will. Now, will this story be what a journalist considers the most complete and comprehensive story? It probably will not be, in their eyes. But, we do not want to see journalists killed, wounded, captured, held hostage – because, frankly, our work load increases, because we have to rescue them. It is easier for us to try to expose you to the types of stories that you want to tell, rather than later trying to mount a rescue operation.

It is important to remember that insurgent forces are out there; they understand this issue; and they want to make it as hard as possible for journalists to do their job. So, I do not have easy answers. Donald Rumsfeld said at a press conference, I think it was yesterday: ‘look, if you want to embed and you want to go out there and spend three, four, five months, we will put you out there with the troops.’ Those who are involved, within a few days, participate in the normal rapport of their unit – they learn an awful lot about what is going on from the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and coalition folks. Most commanders want you on board and will deal with you in an honest, forthright way – it is no burden. In fact, we have tried to encourage military officers, our troops, to deal with you. Obviously, they will test you when you are first embedded – they always do, just as they test us officers, other enlisted members who are new to the unit. But I believe that you will see a lot more than if you try to do it independently – at least in a safer way.

Question: Admiral, in your remarks you made reference to the “long war.” My question is: if the military is going to be called upon over a long period of time to do missions, as it has had to do in Iraq and in Afghanistan, does the size of the active duty force need to rise if we are going to be able to sustain our tempo and not have multiple deployments of reserve forces?

Adm. Giambastiani: This is a great question and there is obviously lots of discussion about it everyday. I have been back in the Pentagon for eight months, since I was a combatant commander. My last job was supply – there were about 1.2 million people under my command, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. We were providing the bulk of the active component, as well as National Guard and Reserves, out to General John Abizaid, General Franks, all of these different commands around the world. What I would tell you, first, in a simple analogy, has to do with what I said before: are more troops in Afghanistan and Iraq important? Absolutely. We think that more Iraqi and Afghan troops are essential to provide the kind of security necessary for creating a national unity government, like we have done in Afghanistan and, as we will do, hopefully, sooner rather than later, in Iraq.

With regard to U.S. forces, we have looked at how we have operated during the Cold War, and most of our force planning was driven by major combat events that were of the “surge variety” – for very short periods of time. Those were

the force level drivers. Today, it is long term “sustainment.” So, like any family examining their budget, we take a look inside the Defense Department and see how we can put out, for example, more infantry, if that is the need. In the case of the Army, the need is more operational forces. So what we have done in the active-duty Army, for example, is to go from 33 active brigade combat teams to 42 – we are somewhere at 38-39 right now and building to the 42 total. This is very important. We have also created more operational soldiers inside the existing Army end-strength. You know, like any home, when it is time to buy a new car, at least in my family, I trade in my old car so I can afford the new one – and I do not buy another couple of cars because I want to. We do the same thing here: we look underneath the top line to figure out how we can rearrange our forces, produce more operational forces, and that is what we are doing in the active component, the National Guard and Reserve. We are doing this in the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Force – it is very, very important.

The other thing that is very important is that, in the past, we have not fully resourced all of our brigades. We have 106 brigade combat teams and support brigades, for example, inside the National Guard – that number is not changing. The difference, now, is that we are funding to properly equip and train the 106 brigades – we have never done that before. So we did not have 106 fully operational brigades, and that makes much more of a capability. Now, a year ago, we had about 39 percent of the deployed forces overseas; both combat and support were National Guard and Reserve. Today it is around 19.4 percent. We are building up these operational forces in a way that allows us to sustain a long-term rotation on the operational side. When I was in the Navy, my life consisted of either being deployed, getting ready to deploy, or coming back from deployment. Today, our forces are very different: we have been changing things over the last ten years in the Army and really accelerating it for the last five years. So that is what I would tell you – build more operational forces.

Question: Sir, to what extent do you think our friends in the Middle East, at least the governments of other Middle Eastern countries, share this view of a clash within a culture, and are any of them coming forth with ideas for a better approach for dealing with the problem in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Adm. Giambastiani: Well, first of all, I think many of these leaders do understand this is an internal clash, and they know these extremists want to replace them. In my travels, going back to October 2001, in talking with these leaders, in being in meetings where, for example, I was Secretary Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, I found that they understood this.

There are a variety of ways that you can deal with this problem – but one is a classic. We just had the Bahraini government, six or seven of their very senior people, including the Crown Prince – who, by the way, went to an American school in Bahrain, speaks just like any of you, went to an American university,

just as his entire family has attended American schools. They understand this problem, and they are doing everything to be the best allies possible, to help support us, and enable, not only us, but the coalition and allies to help combat this problem. So, I am not giving you specifics because that would be a long answer. But think about this: we have essentially moved Syracuse, New York, through Kuwait about ten times over the last three years. If the population of the city is about 175,000, we have moved maybe eight times Syracuse through there – both equipment and personnel through Kuwait alone. They are incredibly supportive of us in a whole variety of ways, and I think we will see more of the Arab League, for example, offering assistance. Much of it is in a quiet way that does not get out to the average American. Having worked with these folks constantly, I know they are incredibly supportive. The Jordanians, for example, are unbelievably supportive: in working with us, they understand the threat to them. The Saudis understand this too. At times, you have to thank the Lord for people like Zarqawi, because they say what they mean and mean what they say – and then they go and do it. They attack the Saudis and the Saudis react.

[Shift to PRESS CONFERENCE]

Question: You talked a lot about the center of gravity being the war of ideas and the war of wills. But, if you look at the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), it mentions different aspects of this long war, part of which is homeland defense.

Adm. Giambastiani: Well, I would tell you several things: first of all, back in October 2002, with, frankly, little reference to it by many folks, we created the United States Northern Command. It is the first time ever that we have assigned defense support for homeland defense and security to a single combatant commander who deals with the U.S. and our northern and southern allies, Canada and Mexico. You saw some of the value of this, for example, in our ability to respond to various natural disasters inside the U.S. by using Admiral Tim Keating in Northern Command. So, from a military perspective, this is very important. If we use what we call federal or Title 10 forces inside the U.S., we assign them to Northern Command, and if we federalize the National Guard, they, in fact, work for Admiral Keating in support of other federal agencies as directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. So we are in really a support role, and this is very important because it helps focus defense efforts. Typically, you think about air and cruise-missile defense – those types of things that make sense for Northern Command –but our ability to support and respond to contingencies inside the U.S. is equally important.

In the QDR, if you go back and check, you will find that we spent a significant amount of time talking about how we can help support the Department of Homeland Security. Obviously, we report through the Secretary of Defense to the President, but now we can be in a supporting role for natural disasters,

contingencies inside the U.S., and manmade disasters in the event of weapons of mass destruction or some other major event. Remember, I said that there are four operational concepts, the third of which is a very important pillar: homeland defense. Bringing homeland defense to the forefront has been very important over the last four years.

Question: Sir, could you explain more about how ideas cannot just be eliminated by guns – how the military is looking at gaining a little more insight into understanding cultures and ethnic groups. From a service member's perspective, can you expand on that, like the outsource members in Iraq, and whether our service members are gaining a better understanding of the Iraqis.

Adm. Giambastiani: The U.S. has great capability in our Special Forces to deal with other cultures, both in language and in understanding cultural differences – but we simply do not have an armed force filled with these more experienced Special Forces folks. So much of what we are doing is to have our conventional forces, which make up the bulk of the military, transition lots of these different types of tasks over to the conventional forces, so that we can use special operations forces in a more focused way when and where we need them. Let me provide a concrete example: foreign military training. This used to be done by Special Forces, but now, the vast bulk of the training is done by conventional forces, and a lot of the embedded trainers are conventional force operators. Now, clearly, they need to have cultural awareness in dealing with Afghans, with Iraqis, which needs to be extended across the board to Army, Marines, etc. We are also growing the size of Special Forces by 14,000, the operational Army by 40,000, the operational Marine Corps, and we are doing a lot of different tasks and functions that typically would be assigned to Special Forces. Our QDR spent a lot of time figuring out how, both in manpower and culturally, we can increase our language skills across our entire force.

Question: Are the polls of the American people suggesting that the military is failing, or being defeated?

Adm. Giambastiani: I am a military guy so I am really not into the polls and these things – that is not my lane of operations. But as a senior military officer it is important to discuss support from the home-front for what we are doing – we have learned that over a lot of years. It is of the utmost importance for us to get out and talk about the successes; that is one of the reasons why I am here. More importantly, it is good for the American people to hear what our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are doing, like the remarkable successes we are having in training Iraqi, Afghan, and other security forces.

A couple of years ago the story was that the Iraqi or the Afghan forces would not stand and fight, for example; and then after that, it was that American's were dying on the battlefield – but what about the Iraqis and the Afghans? What I would suggest is that they are, in fact, dying for Afghanistan and Iraq, and that

is an important story. Now, do we want to make sure that more Iraqi and Afghan forces are dying – absolutely not. What we want to do is to turn over security and make sure that a national unity government is formed as quickly as possible inside Iraq, so that they can take more and more of the burden and responsibility on themselves. So building up these forces is very important and we are essentially going to be done building Iraqi security forces by the end of this year – that is at the battalion, brigade, and division levels. We are working on the ministries also. That is one of the reasons why you have heard General Casey say that ‘this is the year of the police,’ because about four months ago we were given the responsibility to train police, so now we are taking the same approach as we did with the military.

Question: Can you briefly address the issue of the National Guard and their numbers? Is the concern that their numbers are thinning valid?

Adm. Giambastiani: Let me walk you through our Reserves and National Guard, which are different, but incredibly important. Remember, a very large number of our armed forces personnel out of the 2.4 million total are Reserve and National Guard. Essentially, we are funding the equipping, the full equipping, and the full training of our National Guard forces. What has gotten a lot of press lately is the fact that we had a larger number, and that we are going to turn out with a number of brigade combat teams inside the National Guard from 34 down to 28. Would you rather have 28 fully equipped, fully operational, fully trained National Guard brigades, or 34 brigade combat teams that are not fully manned, fully trained, and fully equipped? We would rather have a smaller number fully ready to do what they need to do. In addition, we have not changed the overall number of brigades inside the National Guard: we had 106 before and we have 106 now. So what have we tried to do, instead of having just a strategic reserve, is to make the reserve component of the United States Armed Forces an operational and strategic component – that is the way I would say it. Thanks very much.

PANEL 1: REDEFINING THE THREAT: A GLOBAL COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

The Gentrification of Suicide Terrorism

Nasra Hassan

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My research on suicide terrorism is focused on Muslim suicide bombers – on whom I have compiled a large database with primary field research on those who have completed the act. These profiles include suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories and Israel (210 suicide operations, excluding those thwarted), but also in Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh (307 suicide operations).² The number in this latter set has outstripped the former set and, together, with the Palestinians, totals 517 suicide operations. What I have is a rich and comprehensive – but very frustrating – set of data yields, to which I will be adding data from Iraq.

I am a Muslim from Pakistan and, on 9/11, I was living in New York City on assignment with the United Nations. It seems to me that the Islamic world has not fully comprehended the magnitude of what happened on that day, or what it still means to Americans when they whole-heartedly support the war on terror. This war, of course, is wider than the war on Muslim terrorists. However, 9/11 was carried out by Muslims. Major suicide operations prior to 9/11, such as those at the US embassies in Africa in 1998, were also committed by Muslim terrorists. The fact that the majority of those terrorists did this and that their cohorts continue to do this in the name of Islam, shows that the Muslim world still needs to come to grips with this phenomenon.

Some Muslims say: ‘well, yes, but those were fringe groups with whom we have nothing to do.’ But we do have something to do with it. Without accepting the notion of collective guilt, or the practice of collective punishment, we must recognize that our world is an increasingly global world, a shrinking world. This means that we, as citizens of this planet, whatever our nationality or citizenship, and especially as Muslims who identify ourselves as such, cannot simply say: ‘it was not me; it was a bunch of loonies.’ In fact, the one thing that is clear from my vast collection of profiles is that suicide terrorists have never been a bunch of crazies. This is why they have been – to use a gruesome word – “successful.”

2 As of the end of December 2006, I have recorded 517 suicide operations involving 573 suicide bombers and have profiles on approximately 400 of the latter; I am collecting information on suicide bombings in Iraq (on which Ayman al Zawahiri quoted the figure of 800 in July 2006). For earlier field work, see Nasra Hassan, “Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers,” *The New Yorker*, 19 November 2001, available at www.newyorker.com/fact/content.

Another aspect that I wish to address today, is how the majority of suicide and other terrorist acts in recent times – and especially in places such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, Israel, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Islamic world – carry out their operations in the name of Islam. Indeed, their sponsors are usually religion-based entities. It is not accurate to refer to this as “Islamic” terrorism, although the sponsors and the suicide bombers may use Islamic discourse to justify their actions, and encourage and recruit operatives and supporters. They also couch their objectives in terms of Islam. Despite the wide support this earns sponsoring groups, I also come across many in the Islamic world who agree that this is terrorism, Islam-based or not – though many then justify it on the basis of “equivalence.”

It is essential to look at the nuances involved because ultimately all terrorist operations – and suicide operations, in particular – are about violence and the use of violent means. Terrorism is about power, about fighting for “political” space, whether it was enacted by Marxist groups in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, or by today’s Islam-based groups (Islamist, radical, extremist groups, insurgent, and resistance groups). Not all groups using Islamic and Islamist discourse are necessarily fundamentalist or religion-based. Suicide operations are mainly military operations for political and military objectives, though they often use confessional, sectarian, doctrinal, or other ideological terminology.

Another aspect we need to examine is that suicide and other forms of terrorism are carried out because they are perceived to work. The jury is still out on whether this strategy can or will achieve sustainable “success” over the long term for its sponsors. But the fact remains that suicide terrorism often does meet immediate, short-term aims – as shown by its increase, spread, and frequency, and by its adoption and adaptation in areas of the world where the classic conditions, such as foreign occupation or severe threats to the Islamic ummah (nation), do not exist.

What factors lead to the adoption of suicide terrorism in the Islamic world, or by jihadist groups in the West? On what basis do Islamist groups escalate and de-escalate violence? These are relevant questions, whether in symmetric war between the armed forces of states, or in asymmetric warfare by insurgent groups, rebel groups, or suicide terrorist groups. I have focused on suicide terrorism carried out by Muslims generally in the name of Islam, but not exclusively, i.e. I also look at suicide operations carried out by non-Islam based groups in the Islamic world, such as the Palestinian PFLP. The largest subset in my database, until fairly recently, was the Palestinian one. However, there have been hundreds of suicide bombings in other countries – many of which fall below the radar – that have not yet been studied with the same focus as the Tamil Tigers or the Palestinian suicide bombers.

My data, based on primary research, covers only those suicide terrorist operations that specifically involve the use of explosives and self-detonation, of suicide attacks where militants or terrorists embark on an operation with the certainty that they will not return (and not, for example, the lone gunman attacking a heavily-armed military or police post where the attacker is killed by enemy fire). Some of the profiles are fairly detailed, almost book length; others are scanty, because information is not (yet) available. About 210 of these completed suicide operations were in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, by Palestinian groups (involving 223 suicide bombers). The rest took place in Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, and Bangladesh.

The world of the jihadis – whether suicide terrorists or not – is a complex and shifting, changing one; it is, in fact, a set of complex worlds. There is a dynamic, in fact, a number of dynamics in those worlds, as well as rapid adaptations – these aspects are far less studied than they should be.

It is useful to know that suicide bombings are invariably part of a package of non-suicide operations. When Bangladesh saw its first set of suicide operations in November 2005, this was preceded by years of bombings and other terrorist attacks all over the country. Of special note in terms of planning and execution was 17 August 2005 when, in a superbly-coordinated operation worthy of the national forces of any country, there were approximately 500 explosions in 63 of the country's 64 districts in one day.

I look at jihadi suicide terrorism as a subset of suicide terrorism. In the first Palestinian intifada, for instance, only Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two religion-based groups, undertook suicide bombings. In the second uprising, al Aqsa intifada, which began in October 2000, secular nationalist groups also adopted suicide terrorism. A number of suicide operations have been carried out jointly by, or in coordination with, the two broad categories of sponsoring groups. I consider jihadi suicide terrorism as a third category: for example, in the Palestinian case, they say, 'this is our land under Israeli occupation with Israeli troops and settlers.' In Afghanistan, the Taliban say something similar: 'there are foreign troops on our soil.' But in Pakistan, there is no foreign occupation, although in some provinces insurgents occasionally threaten secession, alleging that they are 'occupied' by the center. Groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army have (so far) not carried out suicide operations – they use traditional insurgency tactics.

In the north-west frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with over 80,000 Pakistani troops, suicide operations are carried out, and suicide bombers cross the border to blow themselves up in Afghanistan – and in some cases, in the other direction. The suicide terrorism of the jihadis in Pakistan started out as sectarian terrorism, with extremist Sunni Pakistani groups blowing up themselves and the enemy, which was and still is defined as Shiite Muslims.

The latter are considered a greater danger than non-Muslims because they are “inside the house” of Islam. Sectarian jihadi suicide squads in Pakistan offered their services to al-Qaeda affiliates for suicide operations against the U.S. and other Western or proxy targets in Pakistan. In Bangladesh, which is neither a frontline state nor a safe hinterland for jihad or resistance to foreign troops, the sponsoring group deliberately targeted lawyers, who are seen as a specific obstacle to the supremacy of the sharia.

I would like to make another point – nobody wakes up one fine morning and decides to adopt, as an individual or a group, suicide terrorism as a tactic or strategy. The move to suicide bombing is serious and usually preceded by an internal debate resulting in a specific decision. In the Palestinian case, it took over five years. Fathi Shiqaqi, one of the founders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, tried to introduce suicide bombings in the late 1980s, but met with resistance, especially from Sunni clerics. The first Palestinian suicide bombing took place in April 1993. In the case of Pakistan, the process was much quicker. After 9/11, the bombing of Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, and so the Taliban, Arab, and other jihadis (Pakistani jihadis who were in Afghanistan) returned or fled across the border into Pakistan. In November 2001, senior Islamist leaders, clerics and jihadi commanders (mainly Arab, Pakistani and Afghan but also a few Central Asian), met in two locations in Pakistan to discuss the use of suicide terrorism. Serious attempts began in the spring of 2002, and major suicide operations took place in May and June 2002. When the jihadis discovered that in a case of mistaken identity, they had blown up a van carrying 11 Frenchmen in Karachi in May 2002, instead of the intended U.S. targets, and that the French were actually naval engineers assisting Pakistan with its submarine program, they wept in remorse. A few weeks later they carried out a suicide bombing against the U.S. consulate.

Thus, in all cases, the adoption of suicide tactics is preceded by discussion. The two examples cited show, in one case, a lengthy debate over years, and, in the other, a quick decision to agree on the use of human bombers. In our compressed world, speed is important, not only in terms of geography, but also in terms of time. The decision to introduce suicide operations in both Pakistan and Afghanistan was taken simultaneously. Once the first one or two human bombers appear on the scene, hundreds subsequently volunteer.

In addition to a ‘cause’ which resonates and the deliberate decision to adopt suicide bombings, other necessary ingredients are: a charismatic figure, a sponsoring group, and a network. Hence, social network analysis is even more important than the psychology of the suicide bomber (on which a great deal of attention has been focused).

Another aspect that has evolved between the 1980s – when suicide terrorism erupted in Lebanon and in Sri Lanka, followed by the Palestinians in the 1990s

– and 9/11, is the mutation, the permutation, and the hybridization of suicide terrorism. These hybrid aspects of jihadism, sectarianism, and insurgency are more relevant to Iraq and to Pakistan than in the cases of the Tamil Tigers, the bombers in Lebanon, and the Palestinians – since the latter categories function within clearer, and sometimes modifying, parameters. In Pakistan, for instance, a number of jihadi organizations sponsor suicide terrorism, though deep digging reveals essentially one “mother” group as the source of the suicide bombings: Lashkar-e Jhangvi, the earliest of the operational Sunni extremist groups. I came across an interesting Palestinian case where Hamas carried out a suicide operation, but ‘sold’ the credit for it to a secular group. Money did not change hands: Hamas did it as compensation for a past or an advance on a future favor.

In the case of Pakistan, it quickly emerged that each jihadi group did not need to set up its own suicide cells. It was speedier, simpler, and more efficient to create a one-stop shopping venue, with one or two basic outfits providing suicide terrorists and explosives. The only instructions which came from clients via the “linkman” who placed the order were: timing, location, and target. Pakistani authorities say: ‘this is not in our culture; suicide bombers are outsiders; they are foreigners, Arabs or Afghans, Uzbeks or Chechens.’ Afghanistan authorities say the same: ‘suicide terrorism is not native to us; these are foreigners; they are Pakistanis or Arabs, and they come from across the border.’

My database shows that, in fact, most of the human bombers are local or home grown. The majority of the suicide bombings in Afghanistan are by Pashtuns from Afghanistan, who may hold dual nationality or residency. Many Pashtun tribes, clans, and even families are at home on both sides of the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They identify themselves as Pashtun and, upon filling out a form, may put down Afghanistan or Pakistan as their country of citizenship, but maintain an ethnic identity and nationality as Pashtun. So, whether it is a Pashtun from the Pakistani side or the Afghan side of the Durand Line is less relevant than the jihadi cause.

Another important aspect is interoperability, a concept used in peacekeeping or in other multinational joint operations – especially where troops and civilians from different countries and entities function under an umbrella mandate. Interoperability is relevant to rules of engagement and allows different groups to operate together, not necessarily as one, but in parallel with each other for (at the very least, short-term) common objectives. Jihadi groups are efficient at interoperability, not just in Pakistan and in Iraq, but elsewhere too, because they are connected in a loose series of networks. Again, it is not one network; there are many networks. There is no monolithic jihadi group and no single, narrowly-defined jihadist philosophy – not even among those who support an Islamic state governed by the sharia in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and eventually

in the rest of the world. Jihadis do not restrict their vision or action within time constraints. Even among these groups and their adherents there is a range of views – strategic, tactical, operational, and ideological. Some hope can be placed on the pragmatists in the jihadi, insurgent, or fundamentalist groups. They may never officially unsubscribe to jihad – called the sixth pillar of Islam – but many are capable of feasible, realist, practical approaches – in their own interest, if for no other reason. Unfortunately, pragmatists are often liquidated, leaving implacable hardliners in place.

The jihadi agenda is not always comprehensible to non-jihadis. In 1998, I visited a rural village in the heartland of the Punjab to interview the head of a militant group who would agree to meet me only in that remote place. It was a seven-hour drive, with five hours on a dirt road. In large letters in Urdu on all the mud walls was inscribed: “liberate Sanjak.” I had not previously heard of this place which needed “liberating.” Two years later, when I was Chief of Staff at the UN Mission in Kosovo, I came across a reference to Sanjak – a province in south Serbia inhabited by Muslim Slavs. In that hamlet in the middle of nowhere in Pakistan, the jihadis wanted to liberate this south Serb town – never mind that the Muslim population was content where it was and that there was no insurgent activity in that area!

This is one of the faces of contemporary jihad and of the over-arching concept of the sharia, of Islamic law, of a return to the Caliphate ruling the Islamic ummah, and of the concept of jihad to achieve those ends. Extremist jihadis tell me that such “conquest” or “return” must be effected solely by combat – it is not adequate for this to be achieved peacefully. The element of jihad would ensure and safeguard the supremacy of the sharia in a way no other modus operandi could. Even within the concept of jihad, there are layers and layers of philosophical, ideological, and contextual nuances, of pragmatism, and of realism. Labels are reductive and misleading, but I will use one here to briefly refer to a typology – that of the takfiri jihadis. The original simplistic concept (from kufr, unbelief) was that anyone who is not Muslim is kafir, but takfir, as the creed of apostasy, refers to Muslims who are considered to have abandoned and betrayed Islam, as rulers and as individuals, thus hindering the application of the sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state. Modern-day takfiris arose out of two jihadi groups in Egypt: the Gamaa Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. After a crackdown following the assassination in 1981 of President Sadat, the ultra-militant members of the splinter cells belonging to these two parent groups were imprisoned, went underground, or fled overseas. Militant takfiris target those whom they suspect of violating the sharia; however, the takfiris among the jihadis are even more uncompromising. Their view is that even within the fold of Islam, even inside Sunni Islam, even among jihadi Sunni Islamist groups, a jihadi is constantly engaged in the ultimate battle or in a series of related battles.

If sharia and jihad are opposed, the concept of wajib ul qatal, a Muslim's duty to kill the apostate, comes into force. I would say that the takfiri jihadis are probably the most dangerous of all jihadis, whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan, and certainly in Iraq. There is no evidence of takfiris in the Palestinian territories, not even as an idea, not to speak of operations. An older takfiri trend in north Africa has re-surfaced. After some activity in the early 1990s by returnee jihadis, there are again signs of an emerging takfiri concept in Lebanon and in Jordan – but so far its manifestation in these countries is more in the isolationist structure and lifestyle of its adherents than in jihadi operations.

When the term “al-Qaeda” is used, it does not signify a formal headquarters, forms filled out in triplicate, and identification as due-paying, card-carrying members. That is not and has not been the case, though forms were filled out for jihad training camps, which I have researched in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, which means “the base,” was the name first used in the 1980s in the border town of Peshawar, Pakistan to refer to a services office where arriving jihadis received help and guidance. Here again, nuances are important to further accuracy and understanding. Not everybody who talks like al-Qaeda is al-Qaeda, but for purposes of a brief discussion such as this, we can refer to al-Qaeda philosophies, al-Qaeda affiliates, or al-Qaeda-inspired groups.

I referred earlier to the Palestinian case (and to the Tamil Tigers) having clear parameters as to motive and motivation: ‘this is our homeland; it is occupied; we want independence; we do not have armed forces, so we make weapons and missiles of our bodies.’ However, sponsoring groups sometimes use suicide bombings as a weapon of choice in preference over remote-control explosives, and not all such operations are conducted in the cause of jihad. In Lebanon, the earliest suicide operations were sponsored by groups affiliated with the Iraqi underground Shiite Dawa group, later adopted by different Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian resistance groups, and subsequently, by Amal and Hizbullah. All those suicide operations were titled ‘resistance operations’ against foreign and occupation troops (e.g., Israeli, U.S., French, Italian), not operations in the cause of Islam.

In Pakistan, suicide terrorism began as a jihad against the Shiite Muslims whom the Sunnis considered to be getting out of hand, as Imam Khomeini's 1979 revolution across the border suddenly energized and empowered the Shiites in Pakistan. After 9/11, suicide terrorists began to hit proxy targets. If Western diplomats, especially U.S. officials, were too well protected, the suicide squads blew up other Westerners or Pakistani Christians. In Afghanistan, groups which sponsor suicide operations are made up of locals, Pakistani Pashtuns, Arab jihadis, or al-Qaeda affiliates of Arab or Central Asian ethnic origin and nationality. The majority of the Arab and Central Asian militants have married local women on both sides of the Durand Line – the sisters and daughters of the Taliban and Afghan and Pakistani jihadis. Many foreign jihadis

have made their homes in these areas and have become “members” of the tribes into which they have married. They have no other place to go. Many jihadis in the first wave of the “Afghan Arabs” who fought Soviet troops returned in the early 1990s to their homelands (in the Arab world, in Asia, or elsewhere, especially to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan), or went on to fight in Bosnia and Chechnya. After 9/11, returnee jihadis brought back a new generation of recruits who joined the jihadis from Central Asia – fresh crops came from the immediate region. At present, few jihadis are returning in numbers to their own countries where they face imprisonment. Some of those who could return in safety prefer to remain in the jihadi battlefield.

In Afghanistan, there are parallel Taliban and al-Qaeda jihadi structures: the Arabs appoint their own regional and local commanders for southwest and southeast Afghanistan – the two major areas of jihadi activity. Suicide operations are carried out against foreign troops, aid officials, NGOs, and Afghan officials who are considered to have sold out to the coalition. Operations are also used to settle tribal, personal, and ideological scores.

In Kashmir, suicide operations were introduced after the Kargil fiasco in 1999 (when Pakistani and Indian troops faced off over the Siachen heights and came close to all-out war) by jihadi groups that had for decades engaged in other types of militant and insurgent activity. These included “final” suicide attacks in which survival was a priori ruled out, but in which the suicide attacker did not press the detonator or ram an explosives-filled vehicle into the target.

Other than the dozens of suicide operations in Kashmir, there have been three human bombings in India with three suicide bombers sponsored by jihadi groups linked to Pakistan. On the subcontinent, the modus operandi is usually a suicide team, one or two of whom strap explosives to the body, while the rest carry arms. When the team goes in, sometimes using a suicide driver to blast an entry, the gunmen start shooting to kill as many of the targets and collaterals as they can and are killed in return fire. The suicide bombers detonate at the end to cause maximum damage to the first responders. Usually one blows up first and, when rescuers and onlookers rush to the scene, the one waiting in the wings detonates. These wait-and-blow-up-later tactics have also been used by Palestinians in double and triple suicide operations, as well as in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Bangladesh has a clear parameter for its suicide operations – though one different from the foreign troops or occupation model. The sponsoring group, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), has announced that its operations, whether bombing or suicide terrorism operations, have only one objective: to bring about sharia rule. Let me share an interesting anecdote. JMB’s ruling council originally had seven members; however, the one-day series of bombings

in August 2005, referred to earlier, was considered such a success that the council was expanded to include the commanders as a reward.³

Since space is limited, let me briefly refer to other aspects of Islamist suicide terrorism. There is a robust martyrdom “industry” which springs into action right after a suicide operation. Products, such as a video of the potential suicide bomber reading the last will and testament, posters, eulogies, even hagiographies, are prepared in advance. Martyrdom glorification enterprises are most pronounced in the Palestinian case and far less developed in Pakistan, where suicide bombers are commemorated quietly within jihadi circles, or by the sponsoring group, and rarely in the community at large – mainly because of official crackdowns and penalties. In Afghanistan, in contrast to the early days when names were not known or revealed, videos and online announcements are available shortly after the operation. In a few cases, the same name and photo, or a different name but the same (old) photo, points to a breakdown in real-time communications – the error is usually corrected within a few hours.

There is another category I would like to refer to: that of a traveling, touring, or professional suicide jihadi who focuses on proxy targets and proxy locations. These are “proxy” suicide bombers. For example, in the Middle East, I am told by Palestinian refugees whose family members have detonated in Iraq: ‘before leaving for Iraq, my son (my brother) said that since he cannot enter the land of Palestine to fight the occupier, he is going to confront his enemy’s supporter – the U.S. – in Iraq.’ Groups in Afghanistan and in Iraq are jubilant at being able to confront the enemy on their own territory: ‘we do not have to go to the West, the Westerners come to us to be killed.’

What about home-grown suicide bombers, as in London in July 2005, or western converts who adopt Islam and terrorism? Another anecdote: a Palestinian suicide bomber (on whom I have a fairly detailed profile) with fair skin and hazel eyes was always assigned to the role of the Western-looking IDF or Shin Beth officer in skits staged by Hamas for special anniversaries such as the founding of the group!

Suicide terrorists do not necessarily have to fly, sail, or drive in from elsewhere. Terrorist-proof measures at borders can be imposed, real-time intelligence exchanged, global databases created. But what is often called the “swamp” cannot be drained. I do not have simple answers, and I do not mean to be alarmist. This is a bigger problem than the nineteen suicide hijackers of 9/11, without denigrating or reducing the enormity of what took place that day. But home grown terrorism is more complex, not only in the U.S., but also in Europe, with its many communities of immigrants and its second- and third-generation citizens. People who subscribe to crime and to terrorism in general

3 A Taliban commander announced in January 2007 that the only aim of their jihad was to re-establish an Islamic sharia state.

are the tiniest minority, as are those Muslims who do so. Political, social, legal, and integration issues are layered over or conflated with distant causes that resonate. The sympathetic identification of second- and third-generation French of North African origin with the Palestinian cause is stronger than it was among the first generation of migrants, for instance. The riots in the banlieus outside Paris in the summer of 2005 and in other towns had nothing to do with jihad or jihadism. It is important to deconstruct and analyze data, and construct, re-construct, and reconfigure the issues, rather than to lump them all into the simplistic formula: Muslims = jihad = terrorism. In the U.S. and in Europe, the major problem in terms of terrorism and suicide terrorism is less what happens on the ground along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, or in the Middle East (with its complex local and/or regional conflicts, insurgencies and suicide terrorism), than in how asymmetric warfare may play itself out over here. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of “causes” and supporters.

I am carrying out research in the original or “home” communities of those Muslim migrant groups in the West which have produced suicide terrorists. These suicide bombers are first- or second-generation nationals/residents in European countries; some, but not all, are from countries embroiled in conflict; some have gone “home” to blow themselves up; others (such as North African origin jihadis from Belgium) have detonated in a favorite “Islamic cause” country such as Iraq. A major series of questions relates to such home-grown terrorists, but also to educated, employed, middle-class professionals who are not immune to terrorist activity. For example, in Pakistan as well as among some migrant Muslim communities in the West, why are such persons choosing terrorism as a profession?

I carried out a small survey in Pakistan in an attempt to identify factors that could help to turn extreme militants into moderates, and vice versa. In 2003, jihadi groups held a recruitment drive and opened registers for martyrdom volunteers: in one location about 200 signed on for suicide operations. Two years later, twenty-five of those were interviewed: they were educated, mainly middle-class; all had jobs; all had as young boys visited or fought in Afghanistan in the anti-Soviet jihad or, later, on the side of the Taliban. The majority belonged to well-off families, some to very wealthy homes; only a few were poor; and only a few had studied at madrassas; the rest had been to government or private schools; and not all practiced a fundamentalist Islam, although all espoused extremist views. Of the twenty-five, only four had given up a commitment to suicide martyrdom – the majority maintained their hard-line militancy. This was not encouraging. So it is not simply the poor: even the rich and privileged donate their bodies and detonate. One of the twenty-five stated that he was ready to blow himself up that very day, but only against a really important target. Normally, though, suicide bombers have a short shelf-

life, though I have a profile of a Palestinian bomber who waited six years before his operation.

Fugitives of all kinds – criminals, smugglers, car thieves, kidnappers, terrorists, insurgents, those on private hit-lists or wanted by the authorities, anyone who needs to drop out of sight – retreat to safe-haven “camps” in remote locations, where they hang out until it is safe to return to their usual underground or above-ground haunts. The camps offer safety, food, and arms, and some also stock hepatitis A and B vaccines and vitamin tablets; only a few store jihadi or hate literature. Participating members are practical and intelligent; they would much rather die in a suicide operation than get sick and die of hepatitis. That is the changing nature of modern suicide terrorism: it is hybrid, and amorphous.

I will end with an anecdote from my recent assignment in Lebanon. Three young Lebanese – two Christian boys, one whom I know well, and a Shiite girl, who wore a hijab – had been students at an exclusive school in east Beirut. In the summer of 2005, some years after leaving school, they ran into each other at the Eiffel Tower in Paris. The woman spotted her old schoolmate and called out his name, which was Jihad. Envision this: a young woman, with her head covered, loudly calling out “Jihad, Jihad,” to a group of young Middle Eastern-looking men. There was total panic, people dropped to the ground, and the gendarmerie came running. It took a while to convince the police that the young Christian man’s name was indeed Jihad, as entered on his passport; he pulled out his cross as further proof. This example illustrates how complex and little understood remains the problem which I have been trying to explain today – not to speak of solutions.

Countering Insurgent Strategy in the Global Jihad

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There are a few things I want to mention before I begin today. The first is a physiological fact which may not be entirely relevant – it is an hour before midnight in my country, which I left yesterday. For some reason I feel the need to share this information with you. Second, concerning the question asked by the soldier at the end of the last session, I will address these core issues of insurgency and counter-insurgency today and further discuss why, in engagements of this nature, we must win.

A lot of what I will talk about today concerns perception; for instance, the perception that the suicide attacker is a civilian, as was raised in earlier discussions. There is, indeed, something extremely important about how differently two sides can view the same issue. I am reminded of a story in Islam of two men walking in a desert on a dark night who come upon a vague form as they approach a farm: one is convinced it is a goat, the other, an eagle. So profound are their different views that one believes that he can make out the eagle's bald head, its wings unfolding as it stands on a stone, while the other man notices the goat's body and head, its jerky movements. Suddenly, as they grow closer, this form's wings expand as it takes off into the sky. Yet, despite the fact that it has just flown away, the other man insists still that he had seen a goat. The point here, especially in this war, is that it is all about perception. In fact, one very good reason why this is so, why perception has become so important, has to do with the very nature of warfare in the information age. In the example of what we in Israel call "suiciders," many dispute the motives of this phenomenon: some find the suicider to be an innocent, albeit desperate, civilian drawn into battle against their will, while others argue – my colleague here, today, for instance – that these are willing participants, soldiers in an epic battle, whose children, even unborn children, are already enlisted in this war. Are they pawns, misled, or deliberate warriors making choices? I will provide a framework to approach this and similar stubborn questions.

First, I want to speak about insurgency in the way that I know it best, as a soldier fighting against it. But, over the last two years, I have also become a director of a research institute, which means that I have had the opportunity to critically reflect upon these issues from a different and more academic angle. Additionally – and this is, perhaps, a third angle – this research institute is located in Israel, the front line of radical Islamism, and, thus, a kind of laboratory for developing research-based solutions for this and other urgent security issues. While established only in 1996, this institute attempts to be both apolitical and

relevant, and to make a serious contribution to understanding our new security environment through the collaborative, interdisciplinary work of our research fellows and associates – many with twenty years plus of direct experience in the field. So, I will situate insurgency and counter-insurgency in these multiple perspectives and in the information age, since warfare before and after this period was not the same. I will show how, at the most basic level, a battle in the information age is, ultimately, a battle about information, about ideas. Lastly, I will speak of some “lessons learned” about counter-insurgency in our present age with its specific challenges from the context of Israel.

First, when dealing with the issue of insurgency, it is important to remember that it involves, at some very elementary level, the prospect of assassination. This is the perspective of direct experience, perhaps, but also of history. In 1983, I began to serve with a joint army force – it was one year after the Israeli army had invaded Lebanon in an attempt to hold the border and to stop missiles launched into Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After that, I spent many years in Lebanon in a counter-guerilla unit in which we were seeing the emergence of strong Shi’a elements in Southern Lebanon, though many were operating in an environment that offered them only ambivalent support. I am also directly familiar with the patterns of insurgency that Israel has faced in the last six years, what we call the intifada, the Arabic word for uprising, which has been instrumental in formulating military and political strategy against Israel in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in general.

In analyzing the history of warfare in terms of waves (whether economic or sociological), there is an enormous difference between agricultural tools and industrial weapons of warfare, innovations such as factories, for instance, but also the mass production of tanks and aircraft, which have sparked a paradigm shift in winning wars. We now, however, occupy a third wave or stage, the information age, where the rich are no longer the industrialists, but the owners of information technologies (i.e., Microsoft). And, so, the battle is about information – not industrial age weapons – where if an opponent controls information, he also controls the battlefield.

This historical analogy helps us see some of the basic features of insurgencies: first and foremost, the centrality of the “hot button” idea. The importance of the idea, of warfare organized by an idea, is, perhaps, evident over the last hundred years, whether in Malaysia, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, or elsewhere. Not only is warfare defined by the power of ideas, but such ideas are in no way isolated to the soldiers of the insurgency: the society must provide public, often ideological support to those undertaking the real fighting. What is, therefore, also evident in insurgencies is a second feature, a structure or organization, some organizational capability, including the position of the leader, so that fighting can proceed and the public can be persuaded. Third, this leader must not only be intelligent

enough to have ideas, some political proclivities, a cause, and also organizational capabilities, but, most critically, he must be a military person who understands and possesses the courage to enter into battle – because this is what insurgency is all about. With this premise comes the most basic principle of insurgency at the military level: namely, asymmetric warfare, or deliberately avoiding a frontal engagement with an opponent. The asymmetric nature of insurgency, its fourth feature, reminds us of how the insurgent spends his strategic and tactical energy, an enormous amount of energy, on postponing the battlefield, and how he does this by bleeding the other side. In fact, if an insurgent group were to use all of its resources, energy, and intelligence on the battlefield it would, invariably, lose because it cannot beat its opponent frontally, physically. Hence, insurgents develop asymmetric strategies and tactics. Many of you here today – those of you who are part of the various security communities – understand this problem, that today's conflicts are not about physical capabilities anymore; nor are they about how to end an engagement by winning in the physical arena. This is one of the greatest challenges of the present moment: that warfare of this kind is about the impact, creating an effect, such that an adversary will abandon or change his perception. We have entered the information age of warfare.

Consider Carl von Clausewitz's famous contention that winning, that a gain in warfare, requires destroying an opponent's army or military capability, eliminating the majority of its manpower, its tanks or aircraft.⁴ In World War II, after the U.S. started to produce more tanks and aircraft, the Germans began to show signs of faltering, for instance. Additionally, on this issue of winning in warfare, there is also the common wisdom that conquering an opponent's land is required to really eliminate them as a threat. The last and most important factor for winning in warfare – though the most nebulous of all – is the act of prompting an adversary to lose their will to fight. In Israel, while we have fought very few wars since the 1948 War of Independence, we were never really able to finish the war by either destroying the opponent's army, their military capabilities, or by conquering their land, because Israel, as a small nation, depended upon the support of the international community, especially America. In fact, on the contrary, what we have seen – and one of the few things that we can count on – is the opponent's willingness to keep on fighting. So, for us in Israel we have grown used to this level of ongoing, constant combat. We are familiar with the insurgent dimension, the realization that it is not all about the physical conclusion of the battle, but about 'battle impact' or 'battle effect.'

4 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, rev.1984).

For the rest of the world, however, this is a new lesson of warfare and one that is essential to begin to understand: insurgencies, asymmetric battles, will end only after the adversary has decided that they are no longer willing to fight anymore. It is in this respect that I could, in fact, conclude this lecture with one simple claim: counter-insurgency measures, those efforts to win “hearts and mind,” should not concentrate on the soldier, the warrior, but on the surrounding society that gives some level of support to the insurgency. Once this community believes that the insurgency is counter-productive, that ‘we are not willing to suffer anymore,’ that ‘we are more willing to try something different, a next phase, than to support the insurgents as we have,’ this is when things will change.

To take the example of the insurgency in Iraq, without going into too much detail, some estimates, on the part of European intelligence agencies, for instance, find approximately 20,000 hard-core warriors with about 180,000 of those among the general population willing to support them. In fact, of this larger number, some participate in selective forms of support, even violent activity, at various times. These are the patterns, the tricks of the trade, so to speak, of the global insurgency, the global jihad. In fact, after this war in Iraq ends, insurgents will continue to do what they did in Afghanistan in the 1970s – they will go elsewhere to exploit their organizational capabilities in another venue, in another conflict.

There is, moreover, a complex spectrum of participation in this asymmetric process at this time. In Iran, for instance, there are those Islamic fundamentalists who will not in any way compromise on the U.S. invasion, the stability of Iraq, or the issue of Israel, for that matter. Likewise, as one of my colleagues noted, there are those in Iraq who are fighting this insurgency as a battle against modernity, secularism, native regimes, progress – they will, therefore, under no conditions end their stake in this war. But there are others, those nationalists from the Ba’ath or former Ba’ath Party, for instance, who are joining the insurgency for the liberation of Iraq from the intervention of other national entities; and there are also those minority political organizations that join the insurgency for local political aspirations, to have a voice in a future political infrastructure. Lastly, there are volunteers who take part in this insurgency to share in some of its religious dimensions, the arguments and ideologies of the Islamic radicals. In a recent study, for instance, we spoke with about 2,000 to 3,000 volunteers: approximately half or 55 percent of them had traveled to Iraq from Saudi Arabia; 20 percent had traveled from Jordan or Palestine; only three percent came from Europe, though these were often the most qualified and experienced of the volunteer forces; and about 9 percent were from North Africa and Algiers. To this day, there are viable training camps for volunteers going to Iraq.

Let us probe more deeply, momentarily, the role of this phenomenon of radical Islamism, the framework of the radical Islamist movement, in this new era of warfare. As most of you know, in 1928 in Egypt, Hasan al-Banna established the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, one of the oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organizations with offshoots across the Middle East, Africa, even Europe. Initially developed as a resistance movement against Western representatives in Egypt, mainly the British, and against modernity and the extravagant life of King Farouk I, it gained widespread popular support. After several attempts at assassinating Egypt's prime ministers in 1948 (by al-Banna who was, in turn, killed by an Egyptian Secret Service agent) and in 1954, Nasser abolished the Brotherhood and jailed thousands of its members; one of its most influential thinkers and leaders, Sayyid Qutb executed in 1966, emerged from this period. Essentially, Sayyid Qutb argued that the true and virtuous Islamic society must be restored by overthrowing existing corrupt governments, that Islam was not a personal, but a political commitment, and that jihad was not a private mission to improve the individual's life, but a political mission to reform the world on Islamic terms to be conducted by those devoted to jihad for the benefit of the group. When Sadat replaced Nasser in 1970, he allowed the radicals to emerge from jail and to return from exile again – many came home, not only richer and more experienced, but with established links and networks throughout the Arab arena. After the peace agreement with Israel in 1978 these radicals succeeded in assassinating President Sadat in 1981 – Hosni Mubarak, his successor, has once again begun to fight this movement. But no matter which regime outlaws or arrests Brotherhood members and its supporters, the years spent in jail, the ideologies shared, the hatred for the regime – all of these factors have fomented a regional movement, a rise in extremism, and the development of organizational networks to operationalize this cause.

By the way, inside the prisons in the 1980s, there were two now infamous radicals: Ayman al-Zawahri, who later became Osama bin Laden's second in command, and the so-called blind sheik, Omar Abdel-Rahman, who later received asylum in the U.S. and participated in the first attack against the World Trade Center. These men represent this process of political radicalization occurring in prisons at this time. But there was also the Shi'a Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 which succeeded, for the first time, as an Islamic war, as an example of how to launch an Islamic revolution and to build a national regime based on Islamic ideals, the ummah – thus ensuring Sayyid Qutb's dream of making Islam important in the modern world as a force and reality. There was also the war in Afghanistan, the evacuation of the powerful Soviet army and the mujahadeen's victory against all expectations – this was considered not only a military, but an ideological and religious

victory which anticipated that Islam could prevail in a wider arena. It was after this point that Osama bin Laden met al-Zawahiri, this highly organized, logistical figure, who was enlisted for, among other things, his organizational capabilities.

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam is the Palestinian contribution, our contribution, to this equation. A Ph.D. and mentor of bin Laden, he went from Palestine to Egypt to teach, met bin Laden in Saudi Arabia, arrived in Afghanistan to meet likeminded mujahadeen, and, ultimately, once again, changed the nature of jihad. He argued that one should not focus on national regimes, but on global Islam, reorienting the main priority of the radical movement to promoting revolution among the Islamic national regimes. His philosophical rationale for transforming jihad from the national to the global level, in turn, paved the way for broader, transnational participation: he enjoined every Muslim as a Muslim to adopt this jihadi approach, to see Muslims everywhere as victims of aggression against their religion and their land, and to make common revolutionary cause to resist these violations. Essentially, in the debate over modernity and progress, he advocated the preservation of tradition, and he questioned the cause, the reason, Islam had declined from its early 14th and 15th century heights to its present status: his answer was that Muslims had attempted to become modern, to seek advanced technology and that, in certain ways, the Muslim worldview had failed insofar as it had become a comfortable part of modern society. He thus drew the battle lines over restoring a traditional Muslim identity and preserving a Muslim way of life – this was his big idea.

Initially, I spoke about the Afghan alumni, where volunteers descended upon Afghanistan to participate in the war against the USSR, and in the process, established organizational means to support the jihad warrior. But Abdullah Azzam's influence began to change the way that the resistance was fought, its ideological equation, in four ways. In addition to fighting a global jihad, one that included fighting "the big Satan," the West, the U.S., the old crusader, and "the small Satan," Israel and the Jews, the true Muslim needed to adopt four steps to participate in the new global jihad: immigrate from your home, your family, and go volunteer wherever Islam is being threatened or suppressed; be able and willing to spend time within enemy lines and prepare yourself for it, physically and mentally; be prepared to do battle well and efficiently; and be ready to die on the battlefield and to look at this act as the highest form of achievement. This second step, for instance, is why many Guantanamo detainees appear to be prepared for interrogation, for the moment of capture, for life behind enemy lines. Likewise, the third and fourth steps explain why bin Laden has spent so much money in building training camps and in establishing a system of training based on the core belief of dying well for the cause. In fact, this

commitment is not passive, but active: warriors should not go to battle ready to lose their lives; they must only give their lives during battle after taking the life of their enemies. This ideal of jihad, its prescription from such third-generation leaders as Abdullah Azzam, al-Zawahri, bin Laden, among others, helped to initiate the organizational structure underlying al Qaeda and other groups, the kind of groups and style of warfare that we are fighting today. Indeed, this commitment in 1998 was put forth as a key fatwa: that every Muslim who is capable of doing so bears the personal duty to kill Americans and their allies, whether civilian or military personnel, in every country.

This was 1998, two years after the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia; the year of the U.S. embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, which killed 225 people and injured more than 4,000; two years before the attack against the USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden; and three years before the coordinated attacks of 9/11. In short, this was the beginning, the declaration of war. Yet, to understand how and why this is a war, one must connect the dots, link one attack to another, seek out the goals of each action in what is a global jihad. The ideological goal is, of course, the rule of Islam, the subjection of the world to the religion of Allah, without distinguishing East from West. After this big idea come strategic and tactical considerations, which are described best in terms of three circles of influence and conquest: the first circle is the divine world of Islam on earth, upheld by faithful believers; the second circle is the corrupt and secular Arab world embodied in present governmental regimes across the Middle East; and the third circle is the rest of the world, including non-Arabs and non-Muslims. So what began in Egypt before World War II and was cultivated in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the 1970s, in large part through the volunteerism associated with the Afghan campaign, was a set of core ideas that have been further developed by Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden, al Qaeda, and others, as well as in other developments. There is also, for instance, the important Wahhabist dimension to this story in Saudi Arabia, which others have explored, and the revolutionaries in Iran. All three paths have crossed, come together, encountered friction and cross fertilization, and, thus, constitute what is known today as the radical phenomenon of Islamist extremism, especially in its militant, its warrior aspects.

The second aspect of global jihad which is much more complicated and no less dangerous is so-called da'wa – variously translated as an invitation to the community of Islam, preaching or proselytizing the mission of Islam in order to strengthen the community, and moral and political reform through good deeds. For the purposes of critical reflection on insurgency and counter-insurgency, understanding the role of da'wa is, perhaps, the

second important lesson from Israel, from my culture, because it offers a sense of perspective on the social and public support for these causes, these big ideas, and how they are mobilized. I would also like to introduce the idea of counter-da'wa, a mode of counter-insurgency suited for this era of warfare and the information age in general – a way to turn the enemies' terms against it. Remember, counter-insurgency is not equivalent with fighting the enemy, since fighting the enemy is a tactical and operational mission that should end with victory. Once, for instance, during a posting in South Lebanon, insurgents penetrated a room where Israeli soldiers slept, killing some of them. One soldier began to fight the intruders, however, but they still managed to escape and to run away. The chief of staff, upon hearing of these events, consigned this soldier to a very tough sentence because, as he said, there is no way that any of our soldiers should begin an engagement with the enemy without finishing it with a victory. This is a classical example of fighting the enemy. A good example of counter-insurgency, which is different from fighting the enemy, however, is this idea of counter-da'wa, which has two aspects that I will describe. Since one sense of da'wa is the idea of community, the traditional community, often associated with the rule of Islam in the past, the first obligation of counter-da'wa, given today's unstable regimes throughout the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, must be to stabilize these regimes and, in this sense, genuinely protect and support the community, as da'wa implies.

The second priority, if one wants to counter an insurgency, is to gain the support of the population: but how does one do this? –by insuring loyalty and displaying capabilities. To counter the insurgency, thus, requires a second area of efforts, revealing to the community the true nature of the insurgency, how they are counterproductive, how they are far less capable than they pretend to be, and thus, exposing their lack of respect for the community, for the da'wa of Islam. There are plenty of examples that could be used to do this. Consider the three recent coordinated bombings in hotels in Amman, Jordan in 2005 which killed 60 and wounded 120 – one occurred in a ballroom where a local wedding was taking place. The Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, held responsible as commander of this operation, purportedly used this event to convey a message to the heretical (in his opinion) government of Jordan. He essentially claimed that this government was declaring war on Allah and his messengers in supporting U.S.-coalition efforts in Iraq and that this regime had replaced the authority of the Sharia for their own man-made rules. In this case, the al Qaeda target was the regime, the government, hence, they delivered the message that this government will suffer, but further, the public of Jordan was made to suffer too because of the secular policies of its government. Is this action and its message a good deed? Does it support a strengthening of the community? Does it invite others to join Islam? Or does it hold civilians hostage to a confused cause?

A second example is the attack that occurred against a disco nightclub in Bali, Indonesia in 2001, which killed a total of 202, mostly Western tourists, many Australian, but also many local Balinese hospitality staff. A local group, related to al Qaeda, was held responsible. Their message, this time to the public, was similar: 'you must remain in the Islamic world and eschew modernity, tourism, progress, technology, etc., because if you go after these charades, you too will suffer.' Essentially, the first attack attempted to influence the second circle, corrupt governmental regimes, and the second attack targeted the first and third circles, the community of Islam and the rest of the non-Muslim world. These examples may be used as instances of counter-da'wa, moments when radical extremists can be exposed for what they are – enemies to the values of da'wa.

In order to fight the insurgent's appropriation of da'wa, it is therefore important to understand their strategy, their targets, concerning da'wa, including those areas of the world where they intend to do battle and to go to war. The most critical venue of war against the secular crusader, for instance, is the world economy. Why? Because, if powerful nations fear economic overreach or bankruptcy, they cannot afford, politically or economically, to send troops to Arab countries in support of secular regimes. This, however, is political – not tactical – deterrence. Indeed, from the enemy's perspective, the West, America, decries the death of one American soldier in Iraq, even while this death makes no difference from a tactical perspective. But if the insurgent creates the sense that they are more brutal, more determined than their opponent, then they have created a political deterrent. They are not foolish: they know that America is too big and strong to change its policy – it is not Spain – after a single beheading. In fact, their target audience is not exclusively America at all, but their own societies, their own populations, because: 'if I behead an American soldier, I show that I am more brutal and more determined than the American officers, so you should support me and not follow coalition ambitions and try to reshape Iraq.'

Furthermore, they use indirect means to accomplish their goal which is, in this case, to erode a Western presence in the Middle East, the U.S. presence – that is why the choice was made to launch an attack in Madrid, March 11, 2004. Remember what the insurgents said after ten coordinated explosives rocked four commuter trains: 'we reserve the right to retaliate at the appropriate time and place against all countries involved.' No doubt, the U.S. represents the leader of the coalition on Iraq, especially as compared with Spain, but the insurgents are essentially demonstrating that 'we will go to the general public, the third circle to exert our influence – this is the most politically expedient means of influencing their own populations, the international community, and the U.S. Likewise, the bankruptcy strategy was successfully tried in Afghanistan in the

1970s: bin Laden has, indeed, conveyed to his followers that they will bleed today's crusaders like they bled Russia, using the same policy until America falters. In this way, they use the powerful tool of oil, the source and symbol of the vulnerability of Western economies, the lifeline of the crusader. This kind of thinking, this mode of approach, is all one structure.

We have spoken about the three paths that, eventually, created the radical Islamic movement. We have also discussed the two dimensions of the radical Islamic movement: the most dramatic one, jihad, the warrior dimension, but also the more silent, secret partner, da'wa, which is equally, if not more, powerful. Da'wa also implies, insofar as it represents the community of Islam, its social and economic infrastructure, the support and future supporters of radical Islam. These supporters are everywhere across the Islamic arena. One main aspect of da'wa used by the insurgency in relation to governments in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc., is thus a kind of threat: these nations have established militaries, intelligence agencies, which are very powerful and important to the stability of their regimes. In doing this, if they violate the social aspects of society, the insurgents are suggesting that 'we will defeat them by cultivating those aspects.' Hence, they establish schools for children, medical treatment supplies and facilities, various charities, and other supportive mechanisms necessary for civil functioning. But these efforts also go to the core of the economic condition of a given society and help to create the next generation of loyal supporters. Indeed, these generations of loyal supporters now reside in many places, such as Europe and across the Arab arena, and they are ready to act by exploiting democratic values. Many radically-minded individuals and groups have passports or are third- and second-generation immigrants in Europe, for instance, having relocated there during the cheap labor needs of the 1970s and the 1980s. Many, while brought into European economies, do not have a place, a position, in European societies.

To take one example, Arab migrants in Berlin last year celebrated "Jerusalem Day" at the suggestion of Iran's revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, designated for the last day of the holy month of Ramadan – this day is devoted to 're-liberating Jerusalem from the Jews,' a call for Israel's eradication. Traditionally, Hezbollah has celebrated this day to demonstrate its military might in public rallies. Here we have in Berlin, Germany the flag of Hezbollah flying in celebration of shared radicalisms, as well as an organization designated by the U.S. and the U.K. as a terrorist organization comfortably calling for supporters inside Europe. These elements and symbols – whether in a flag, certain colors (green, for Muslim), an ideology, a terminology, a message – with the help of a radicalized interpretation of da'wa promote a fundamentally extremist version of the Qur'an, of Islam.

I have mentioned the nature of the battlefield in the information age, how the purpose of warfare in this era is to gather information and to block an adversary from garnering that information, and further, that if one controls information, one controls the battlefield. This approach describes too what we have been trying to do in fighting this radical movement: gather information from various sources (visual, communication, informants, surveillance, etc.), process it, and fuse it with information from other sources to create a single product. This product is then analyzed and distributed to a given platform which is engaged in the fight, that is involved in targeting. But a target has a very short shelf life – you may have only a very small window of opportunity to target a terrorist who is outside his neighborhood, driving his car. After that, he may go into another neighborhood where you may not be able to launch a missile. These are the challenges of warfare in the information age: on the one hand, we know how to gather information, which is mainly strategies of counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, but, on the other hand, we are limited in doing “data mining.” Law enforcement agencies do this only after having evidence, a judge, a sentence, whereas intelligence agencies tap into other communication forms, informants, for instance, to establish patterns. This challenge, further, goes to the heart of democratic and civil protection laws, finding the right balance, the right equation, between democratic values and the need for intelligence agencies to prepare an investigation in many cases before a crime has been committed. This is a serious tension, a serious concern.

I want to raise the issue of technology and organizational capacity as an additional challenge without going too deeply into the theories of American technological-revolution in warfare, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the idea of the precise attack. During the first Gulf War, for instance, eight percent of targets were hit by precise attack, whereas this number rose to 35 percent in Afghanistan recently; presently it is 58 percent in Iraq. In Iraq, there is now a growing number of secular participants in this information gathering, the intelligence gathering, process, those who are helping to identify and to intercept targets. This is important because a nation or coalition may have all of the maneuvering power, the firepower, in the world, but it is timely and often insider information that provides the real power, as we have discussed. One implication is that in information warfare there is a much larger role for technology and technique: as Kofi Annan said today, the strong feel almost as vulnerable as the weak, and the weak, of course, are still vulnerable to the strong because of their advanced technology. These are the dynamics of insurgency in the information age. The insurgents thus compensate in ways that are now familiar to us. What we know about insurgency at this time, for instance, is that, first, it can be much more fluid and less

hierarchical because it fuses likeminded forces together that then operate independently. There is no one post command, for instance, in control of all orders, that provides training, or that sends intelligence to guide targets. Every cell can work by itself – in Lebanon, Jordan, even Israel – which is why this scattered warfare is difficult to fight and why it can so easily reproduce itself and grow on a daily basis.

This familiar logic of guerilla warfare is aided and made more efficient by technology, by the internet, the fact that fellow cell members may share intelligence, ideology, training, military perception, and tactics. By the way, isolated cells influence each other in numerous and far-flung ways. There are posters, for instance, that show a lineup of Sheikh Yassin, cofounder and leader of Hamas, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Yahya Ayyash, the infamous Palestinian terrorist killed known as “the engineer,” among others. There is a correlation being made here in this image among these men, Palestinian, Egyptian, terrorists: they are all to be revered by those who view this poster across nations, towns, neighborhoods, those who know little of the local events in which they are involved. They represent “resistance” to complex social forces, instead of the acts of violence, often against innocent civilians, that these men have committed. In fact in the Iraq insurgency today, the structure is such that members of a given cell do not even know their own leaders – their information and ideology come from afar.

A second example of the role of technology in increasing the challenge of warfare in this era comes from a fishing boat that we intercepted in 2003 where what was being smuggled was not a weapon, but an expert. This expert from Hezbollah to Gaza carried with him 35 computer disks intended for distribution into the field to teach people how to build explosive devises, belts, IEDs, from local materials. The information was far more important than the weapon itself. In certain respects, then, this example highlights the most serious aspect of our challenge today, a challenge which is a kind of fishing venture, where catching the big fish, the information flows, is more important than capturing any single agent. We all know, for instance, that improvised explosive devises are causing one third, maybe more, of American casualties in Iraq. This is also where da’wa plays its role too in the ideologically spread of core ideas over the internet and across unlike cells. In this case, the Gaza Hamas cell was taking expert advice from Hezbollah and sharing tactics used predominantly by al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq. Indeed, it is no surprise that the go-between, the expert, was from Hezbollah since al Qaeda has itself begun to fall out of favor. A cell associated with the al Qaeda platform in Tanzania, for instance, changed its name after searching the internet for a different organizational affiliation, and another group operating in Uzbekistan likewise changed its identity, one learning that it was more convenient to do so in dealing with local authorities.

These developments, fostered by the use of technology to spread information and ideology, the nature of warfare in the information age, are increasingly evident in three patterns that we have begun to notice over the last two years in using the internet to spread extremist ideology: first, radical Islamic websites are being written more and more, not in Arabic, but in English; second, there are many translations available on these websites, including those in additional European languages, especially Italian and Spanish, where websites are posting translations of U.S. military documents for instance, or manuals for conducting training, weapon building, or calling for a ceremony to celebrate 9/11; and third, extremists are using the internet, chat rooms, blogs, etc., to recruit new supporters in very personalized ways. These moves are extremely important because this technologically-sophisticated use of ideology forms the basic groundwork for recruiting the new supporter, the new volunteer.

Extremists have learned to position themselves in highly sophisticated ways at the technological level. For instance, they circulate mythologies, reproduced in videos, to appeal to the immature development of potential recruits: ‘you will gain 72 dark-eyed virgins in heaven;’ ‘you will be respected by all the 70 families of your region;’ ‘a crown with a precious gem will adorn your head in death.’ The would-be martyr is himself recorded speaking profoundly and with sober conviction as a pilgrim before his mission on this most serious of matters, the fate of Islam, their resistance to modernity and westernization, etc. These personalized videos are then spread from website to website to drum up support, commitment, to collect money. Indeed, this matter of collecting money, and the use of the internet in this process, is not insignificant. Since in America you must be politically correct, I will only say that there is an Arab country that directs a charity, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), with branch offices in 20 countries, that receives donations from all over the world according to the principle of zakat – one of the five pillars of Islam in which Muslims of a certain wealth donate to social charities and the underprivileged. In this case, the Central Zakat Committee donated 10,000 dollars to the IIRO – we have the receipt, of course – and, as it turns out, the man who was paid this sum of money was subsequently tied to operating a suicide attack which caused 14 casualties in Israel. So in this way, extremists are using the internet, mass media, first, to create a deterrent, and, second, to gather support, often deceptively with contributors quite unaware of these motives. Without the internet, without information and ideology sharing, this spread would be more limited.

I want to end with two examples that illustrate the importance and the complexity of the cultural dimension in terms of counter-insurgency in this war, in asymmetric warfare in the information age, and how Israel offers pivotal experiences in this context. The first example is a married man

with children who by no means looks the part of the terrorist. His suicide mission failed due to a technological malfunction, which does occur, and so we were able to interview him repeatedly in prison. Intelligent, sincere, soft-spoken, no irrational fanatic, he bought deeply into the ideology, the economic and social payoff that said: 'if you get involved, your family will advance to a higher level in society;' 'you will gain respect among the most important families;' 'you will get economic rewards that will change your family's lives forever;' and 'you will finally be able to do something meaningful in your life.' This is a man who under other conditions might be a poet, an intellectual. The second example is a woman who was badly burned and received medical treatment in an Israeli hospital every week over several months. When she therefore crossed the border carrying an explosive device, intelligence agents knew her and, after she was isolated into a secure area, she was asked to abandon her mission and to take off her outer clothing – she refused. Actually, she insisted that she had medical authorization, a letter from a doctor at the hospital, and when she began to fully realize that she would not fulfill her mission that day, commit the suicide attack at the hospital, she grew inconsolable – she was seen in a security video to desperately pull the faulty trigger again and again. I know her well from prison, and I really believe that she is a victim, but I would say, that even among those who have clearly been thwarted from achieving what they see as political gains – to kill Israelis, to be part of the Palestinian war – they feel this loss at a deeply personal level, as a loss of achievement. This woman was not being coerced in any conventional sense, but still she was deeply committed to this cause. I know that these examples can only serve as a brief introduction to issues that we must explore at the same time that we address more traditional issues of security.

But from this context, the importance and power of culture, I want to give the last word to five 'lessons learned' about counter-insurgency from the Israeli experience. I remember Major General Moshe Kaplinsky, now the Deputy Chief of Staff, comparing counter-insurgency tactics to a billiard game. In planning an operation, he noted, we are like billiard players, but with only a moderate amount of skill: you aim for one billiard ball, but instead, it hits many balls without your ability to control where they all are going. Whether you are engaged in some tactical encounter, conducting an arrest, going into a neighborhood, putting a tank into a neighborhood, you may achieve only one physical dimension of the tactical operation, and meanwhile, you unleash a lot of moving balls that influence other threats. One should think about those unexpected movements and impacts whenever engaging in a tactical encounter with the insurgency. The second lesson is that, in countering insurgency, there are very few positions from which to engage: there is the offensive and the defensive

position, and then there are the operations conducted within civil society, the civil population. Since options are limited, it is thus important to weigh these factors, to equalize them, when considering your overall goals, what you really want to achieve. In effect, one must recognize that there is a political agreement or negotiation going on in this process, both with the adversary and the public at large. If you lower the use of offensive tactics, for instance, and heighten the use of defensive tactics, you are keeping up a certain relationship with the populations, which is very important.

In fact, the population – and this is the most important lesson learned – is the most critical target of counter-insurgency efforts. A connection with the population, the third lesson, should be preserved at all times, even if the population participates in the battle, even if you lose troops because of your support for the population. The most critical achievement in counter-insurgency is thus to recognize the impact of your tactics, your operations, your choices, on the supportive population. They too are tired; they too may be interested in changing the equation; they too may be reforming their perceptions and not supporting the insurgency anymore. A fourth lesson learned arises from the example of the siege at the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem during Israel's Operation Defensive Shield operation in 2002. There were 220 Palestinians inside – 36 were known terrorists with blood on their hands – who seized the church for 38 days. At the beginning of the siege, the public image was of the Jewish army surrounding the second holiest place for Christians in the world, while defenseless Muslims sought asylum inside. It was essential to understand that, this was the Basilica, the Church of the Nativity where Jesus was born, and that perceptions would play a crucial role in this conflict and its resolution. One Armenian priest, however, turned the tides when, after he allowed one of the Palestinians into his compound, he found that he had stolen money and jewelry. He raised a flag outside and asked for our help which we immediately showed to the press – and thus the representational equation began to change. President Arafat could not maintain the usual narrative when Palestinian freedom fighters began looking like common criminals disrespectful of one of the holiest places in the world, one of the few places that was willing to shelter them.

In this way it is important to recognize and to take advantage of opportunities to change the narrative – the fourth lesson – and, indeed, to realize that the narrative that each side brings to the table is a very important component of counter-insurgency. Of course, you have to cultivate the press; they are your means to get some of your ideas, your counter-narrative, out to the population. One fifth and final lesson learned: continue the pressure on the insurgent, a move that requires a greater realization, that no operation is exclusively tactical in nature. With this view, one can also establish

deterrence and balance, separating out the insurgents from the society. This is not to say that the tactic approach is unimportant in insurgencies – we should win at this level at every engagement. But it is this other dimension of the battle, the battle of “hearts and minds,” which is far more difficult to counter. I remember during Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield, we were posted close by Jerusalem. Since we were in the field for 45 days, I would choose which one of my team to send home to their apartments, to their families, every Friday for a 24 hour vacation. One night, I wanted to send an attorney who lived in Jerusalem and had five kids; I told him ‘go home, go see your wife,’ and he responded with a sentiment that I think we all increasingly feel – that he was fighting for his home, in his backyard. He told me that even while he was only a 20 minutes drive from his home that he would stay so that he could help ensure that this battle went well since if it did not, it would ultimately impact his home, his family. I think that we all feel this today, even if the battle is 3,000 miles away from our homes, that we must do well in countering this threat because, in the process, we are defending a way of life.

Keynote Lecture: Developing a Global Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism

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I will begin by taking off the table that question that some of you may have on your minds: why did I leave the Pentagon? I am the only person to have served twice for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, or, as my children refer to him, 'the Don.' He was at the Pentagon, as many of you know, in 1975-1977, when I was a young staff assistant who was enticed to come to Washington by his predecessor, Dr. Jim Schlesinger. I had been working on Wall Street when Mr. Schlesinger convinced me, or made me the proverbial offer that I could not refuse. I came down to Washington in the summer of 1973, at the tender age of 24. When Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense, I continued to work at the Pentagon for him and then for Secretary of the Army, Martin Hoffman. When Gerry Ford lost the election, Mr. Rumsfeld and I and a number of other folks resigned, although my resignation was not accepted. The incoming Secretary of Defense Harold Brown asked me to stay on to help with his transition.

Fast forward to 2000, to the presidential campaign, where I was involved with those the newspapers refer to as 'the Vulcans:' Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Schem, Steve Hadley, Connie Rice, and others. Rumors began to circulate that Rumsfeld would be offered the Director of Central Intelligence, so several of us who had worked for him began to prepare for that eventuality. The day after Christmas 2000, I was in a little town in Texas, Pierce, which some of you may know – it is a very little town – but I had my laptop, was able to plug in, and I received an email from a mutual friend of mine and Secretary Rumsfeld: he warned me to 'get ready for tomorrow' because Rumsfeld would be Secretary of Defense again. I took a leave of absence from my company and prepared for his confirmation and his transition. So, I transitioned him out in 1976-1977, and back in again in 2001. Of course, it is an interesting place to be after 24 years in the private sector to be asked to come back to government. I confess that I did not hesitate for one minute.

I was married late in life, and I have a twelve-year old and an eleven-year old boy and girl – they have not seen much of me over the last five years. Rumsfeld is, as you may have read, a demanding individual. That is an understatement – 80-hour weeks, Saturday and Sunday meetings – are not uncommon. I was driven to Syracuse University this morning by a graduate student, who indicated to me that he is doing a research project on Donald Rumsfeld, a psychological profile of him as a leader, how he would make judgments and decisions under varying circumstances. If I have misstated the thesis, I apologize. So I began to talk with this student who had done some research and who recognized that I

might have some insight into this gentleman, the Secretary of Defense. I told him that he must read the Esquire magazine profile of him, “An Old Man in a Hurry,” from last summer (2005).⁵ When the author asked Rumsfeld who he could interview for the article, he was supplied with only five names – I was one of them. The author came to my office and we spent two and a half, almost three, hours talking, and then, another hour during a second interview. The title, “An Old Man in a Hurry,” comes from a comment I made. Actually, it was when I first met Donald Rumsfeld when he was a Congressman from Cook County, Illinois in 1967, and I was a young summer intern for Senator Charles Percy of Illinois. I remember going out for drinks with a couple of fellow interns who asked me: ‘we understand that you met Congressman Rumsfeld from Illinois – what do you think of him?’ Rumsfeld and I shared the same undergraduate institution, so I spoke frankly: ‘you know,’ I said, ‘I met a young man in a hurry.’ Years later, as I was interviewed, I was asked the same question, and he still seems to me to be in a hurry, though obviously, he was much older. Sure enough, Rumsfeld curled up his nose at the title but did not chastise me too much: after all, he is 73 years old, the class of 1954 at Princeton. As I told the student: ‘You have got to understand that Donald Rumsfeld is the iconic male of the 1950s, compounded by the fact that he grew up in the Midwest – that means this man is duty, honor, country to his core.’

I will share with you a personal observation. After the Abu Ghraib prison abuses were reported in the press, I have never seen – and I have known this man a long time – someone so crushed, so hurt, so angry. He could not believe that young Americans, especially young Americans in uniform, could have done what they did at Abu Ghraib. We are still living with those actions, and we will live with them for an awfully long time – they will infect this country, this world, this insurgency that we will face for many, many years to come.

This brings me to the kind of issues that I want to discuss with you tonight. I have to warn you, I am not going to give you the classic keynote address, since you already got that today from Admiral “G.” – Ed Giambastiani, a naval officer whom I have known for many years. Actually, my father and my grandfather were both career naval officers, but I broke the mold: I was drafted, served in the Army in Vietnam as an enlisted man, got out, and went back to college. But I know submarine officers and Adm. G. is one of the best. I am going to critique, very briefly, some of the points that he made with you, with us, this morning. But please do not hold me to General Meigs’s expectations, or to those of Dean Wallerstein and Professor Banks, for that matter, because I will talk in general terms about some precepts that I see as key to building a strategy to deal with this insurgency, this global insurgency. I encourage you, if you are so moved, to ask questions. I see a lot of generations and genders represented here: who are the students – undergraduate, graduate? Please raise your hands – now I know where the questions are going to come from.

I want to do four things: One, I want to critique, as I said, Admiral G's remarks briefly. Two, I want to review some of the key points made last year at this very conference, those by David Kay, former U.S. chief weapons inspector in Iraq, whom I saw the other day, and General Wayne Downing, who came out of retirement after 9/11 to be the Deputy National Security Adviser. Three, I want to take you into The Quadrennial Defense Review ("QDR") (2006) process, how it was significantly different from the prior round and, yes, how it does have Secretary Rumsfeld's signature on it. Specifically, I will address the execution roadmaps: for those of you who have studied the QDR, out of that effort came eight execution roadmaps, three of which I was intimately involved with as a member of the QDR task force: Defense Department (DOD) Institutional Reform in Governance is one roadmap; Strategic Communication, which Admiral Giambastiani talked about today, is the second roadmap; Building Partnership Capacity, which really has three pieces, is the third roadmap. These three pieces amount to what the Department of Defense needs to do, internally, to better position itself to fight this global insurgency. I will also address what the interagency requirements are, in my judgment, and what we should do with our allies and the alliances around the world. I will stick to these three execution roadmaps which came out of the integrated product team that I chaired – the other ones are more narrowly focused on legal and legislative authorities, regular warfare, joint command of control, etc. Last, I want to return to a comment that Adm. Giambastiani made about the long war, what it will take to defeat this global ideology, and how long it will take to build partnership capacity – since we, neither the U.S. military, nor the U.S. government, are going to be able to win this war by ourselves.

I got a call one Sunday afternoon from Secretary Rumsfeld asking me to give him historical examples in which the President had brought someone out of retirement to take a four-star job. Since I am close to the Secretary, I knew where he was going with this. I contacted the Chief Historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and we worked on it that afternoon: these figures included Gen. Maxwell Davenport Taylor in 1955, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in 1861, among others. There is a historical set of antecedents for bringing someone out of retirement, which of course, was not necessarily known or appreciated when President George W. Bush brought General Pete Schoonmaker out of retirement to become Chief of Staff for the Army. But the point I want to make is a question that he raised: what was the most important bullet fired in the war on terrorism against the Islamist fascist enemy in the past year? What, when, and where was this bullet fired? It was not in Iraq or in Afghanistan. It was, as Adm. G. mentioned today, in the Army MASH hospital in Pakistan after the Kashmir earthquake. I want to begin with this context – what kind of efforts matter to winning the war of ideas – as a framework for my remarks this afternoon.

Adm. G. addressed the fact that winning the war of ideas is going to be crucial to success in, as he referred to it, the long war. This phrase comes from U.S. Central Command commander General John Abizaid's presentation to Congress eight or nine months ago, entitled, "The Long War." I recommend this unclassified version to the Maxwell School, to have someone come up and make the presentation – it is lengthy, complicated, but extremely revealing in my view. Adm. G. also asked who the adversary is, and what are his goals? I think he outlined these fairly well. His third point was how do we fight and win a war of ideas "when it is not clear that we even have a seat at the table." Quite frankly, when he said that, I did not quite understand it, and I am not sure that I understand it now. The beauty of no longer being Under Secretary of the Army (2005-2006) is that I am a private citizen with the luxury of taking issue with some of my former colleagues, hopefully not without reason. I disagree with saying that we do not have a seat at the table, that 'we have no recognized role as an intellectual combatant.' We do have a recognized role; we do have a recognized obligation, it seems to me, in terms of intellectual warfare, to put it in those terms.

You will also note in Adm. G.'s remarks that he spoke of the limits of the kinetic approach: killing people, destroying things. On the one hand, we will never peacefully dissuade those dedicated to violence against us, so we must be prepared to capture and/or kill them. But, on the other hand, the fact of the matter remains, as Adm. G. said, the kinetic approach is one piece of the equation and cannot be viewed as the only one. He spoke of The Iraqi Perspective Project Report and what drove Saddam Hussein to do what he did prior to the war. You may know the book, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (2006), coauthored by retired Marine Corps lieutenant general Bernard Trainor and The New York Times chief military correspondent Michael Gordon. This extremely revealing, well-researched book examines the motivations of Saddam Hussein who viewed his military, not to defend the borders of Iraq, but to sustain his power, as well as the power of his two sons and their henchmen in Baghdad – all of which led to what we think of as his irrational leadership decisions. But I also want to suggest to you that the failure of American intelligence, which has been discussed so much, was also in not truly understanding what was rational in the mind of Saddam Hussein. His was not a course that you would take at the National Defense University, but I hope that we have learned from our mistakes, both in intelligence collection and analysis, as well as what actions we may or may not take in future situations like that.

The Admiral also addressed the Salafist interpretation of Islam. It is very important to recognize – and the President, the Secretary of Defense, and others have said this repeatedly – that we are not at war with Islam. However, if you took one half of one percent of all the folks in this world who subscribe

to Islam and who would be willing to take up arms against innocent civilians, that one half of one percent amounts to approximately six million people. We cannot forget this situation which alone, on the European continent, today, comprises an estimated 20 to 30 percent Arab population. The global war on terrorism – and I think that we need to come up with a better phrase because it is not our war alone – ought to be viewed as a war against a terrorist subculture that truly wishes to abolish, not just our way of life, but the way of life of all representational societies around the world. Adm. G. also mentioned that ideas cannot be eliminated by guns alone – very true. IEDs, he said, and I wrote a note here, are not weapons of mass destruction, but weapons of individual destruction. But this weapon is also one of mass psychological destruction; it has psychological impacts that we cannot forget. He ended up, in my view, in the right place, by arguing that the war of ideas is a crucial center of gravity in the long war against Islamic extremists.

From this recognition, where we are now, I want to go back, briefly, to one year ago. My reference point is last year's Bantle Symposium summarized in a book produced by The Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) here at the Maxwell School and the Law School – I was very impressed with it, by the way. One of the most important aspects from David Kay's lecture, "Major Obstacles to Creating a New National Security Policy," addressed the so-called interagency process. The interagency process is just what it says: it includes the National Security Council, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the President and Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of Central Intelligence, now the Director of National Intelligence, and, sometimes the Attorney General. But even when these cabinet officers and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. are in total agreement, why is it that the departments underneath them, including the National Security Council (NSC) staff, cannot seem to pull it together? David Kay points out the enormous cultural differences between the State and the Defense Departments.

I watched Admiral Crowe when he was Chairman of Joint Chiefs and Caspar Weinberger when he was Secretary of Defense – he just died yesterday – deal with Secretary of State George Shultz. Adm. Crowe once told me that he had never seen such palpable dislike between two men who held such important jobs in a single administration. Did that friction, the institutional friction, which exists between the State and the Defense Departments, help? It will always be there, but one must work at multiple levels to overcome it. One key difference between the State Department and the Defense Department is discipline planning. As David Kay said last year, planning is something that the DOD trains for and does very well. I was in a meeting not too long ago where we were talking about planning: we had State Department members, DOD folks, some 'think tankers,' and NSC staff. One person who shall remain unnamed said

in a somewhat jesting way – but, like all humor, it had a serious element – that planning at the State Department is like improvisational jazz, whereas planning at the Defense Department is like martial music. There is a difference, which does not mean that the two institutions cannot work together. But the fact of the matter remains, whether it is the Coalition Provisional Authority under Jerry Bremer, or working out a treaty negotiation, the interagency process must be driven by the National Security Council staff.

We have had strong NSC advisors in the past, those who, quite frankly, thought of themselves as equal to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The last, current, and prior NSC advisors did not subscribe to that notion. Given the global war against an insurgency the likes of which we face, we must have all of U.S. government talent and disciplines focused on the issue. When they for some reason do not – and you have to look at outcomes – the NSC staff must step in. Now that I am a private citizen, I intend to make this case in writing, in speaking with groups, and before Congress. We must reexamine the entire interagency process and come up with something more effective than exists today.

David Kay notes – and I love this line – that “the complexity of the task has gotten beyond the interagency process itself in a way that makes 3-D chess look simple.” That is very true. Wayne Downing talked, as well, about impediments to the interagency or intergovernmental process. In one of his recommendations, he insisted that it is an absolute imperative to harness and focus on all elements of national power – diplomatic, information/intelligence, military, economic. As Gen. Downing noted, the challenge is to get the diverse elements of the federal government to work in concert to achieve national goals. Secretary Rumsfeld, in the first four years of the Bush administration, would get together with Connie Rice and Colin Powell once a week, though they talked every single morning and in some cases multiple times during the day. I have been a student of national security management since I wandered on to the scene in 1973, and I have to tell you, at their level, it is working better than I have ever seen it work. The problem is with the levels below that: it is imperative that the NSC staff sees to it that what the secretaries and the cabinet officers agree to gets implemented.

Congress is also a problem. Post 9/11, Congress had a marvelous opportunity to reconfigure how it dealt with national security and homeland security. Did it? No. It protected committee turfs. It still does. The executive branch is, obviously, in a difficult position to dictate to the legislative branch how they ought to be organized. Independent groups, academe, think tanks, that vast population of “formers,” as we used to say – former secretaries of this, a vice chairman of that – have an obligation to speak out and to try to convince Congress that protecting their committee and subcommittee turfs, fighting those turf battles, will not further our aims at home or abroad.

I want to turn now to the QDR process, how it was different this time around, as opposed to four years ago during the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative. I was intimately involved in a particularly difficult part of that process that had the direct involvement of the Secretary of Defense. In fact, Rumsfeld had put the Deputy Secretary, then Paul Wolfowitz, but subsequently Gordon England, and the Vice Chairman, Pete Paisley and, now, Ed Giambastiani, in charge of it. We had a group of disciples made up of the Under Secretaries of the Services, the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Services, and the Under Secretaries of Defense to grapple with some of the problems. What I can say now, like with the prior BRAC-QDR, we did not do all that we should have done. In fact, the internal Defense Department's special interests stymied some of what I would consider necessary reforms in management, governance, and decision making in the Defense Department.

But I will never forget Rumsfeld's response when I went to see him after he made his recommendations on the last QDR. I said to him, 'boss, I've failed you,' and he asked me 'why, what did you do?' I told him that we could have done so much more, that we left so much money on the table, taxpayers' money, and that we did not further military value as well or as far as we could have. The Secretary smiled and said: 'everything you say may be true, so are you suggesting that I failed?' I said that, 'we failed.' He responded with, 'perhaps,' but 'we never would have gotten as far as we did,' and that this 'BRAC was the equivalent of all four prior BRACs.' The reality is that without his intimate and individual involvement, including lobbying the heads of special interests, we would not have come as far as we did. Similarly, this most recent QDR cannot be approached literally as a roadmap, as the architecture, by which all things shall be solved. In general, the Defense Department's 450-439.6 billion dollar submitted budget in fiscal year 2007, plus the supplementals in excess of 500 billion dollars, makes it the largest and most complex organization in the world. It would be an enormous achievement just to get the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines to agree on Aerial Common Sensor, for those of you who have been watching that particular program and procurement.

Yet, the QDR did beget some very important outcomes: it recognized, first and foremost, that building partnership capacity, internally, in the Department of Defense and, externally, with respect to the interagency process and our allies and alliances around the world, was absolutely crucial to battling this insurgency. As I also mentioned, none of the QDR execution roadmaps stands alone: building partnership capacity must include strategic communications and some reform of how we govern, both internally in the Department of Defense and externally with our sister agencies and departments and our alliances, like NATO. The issues that follow from building these partnerships, the capacity to deal with terrorism all the time, anywhere in the world, will take time. I have referred to Gen. John Abizaid's, "The Long War," this student of the

Middle East, who has just now had his command of CENTCOM extended into his fourth year. How long do you think he thinks is 'long?' Multiple generations: we had better be resolute and patient and committed to that timeline.

Remember that defeating an ideology takes time. How long did it take to defeat Communism? We gained prominence in this endeavor, as we know, in 1919, and we began active opposition to it globally through the Kennan Containment Policy in 1946. Forty-three years of 'cold' and 'hot' war later, it was essentially defeated – it ultimately collapsed from within. The Islamic-based violent extremism, an ideology with roots that go back thousands of years, is different from Communism. The Islamic terrorism, the Islamic insurgency, is purportedly legitimated by its religious underpinnings. This we have to recognize. In fact, this is one of the ways that they recruit – we are going to have to deal with the madrassas of the world. Another difference is that of a group-based ideology as opposed to a state-based ideology. We must learn a crucial lesson: marginalizing an ideology requires patience; it requires promoting reform from within. Building partnership capacity to that end will take time too.

We have long-term examples of success by virtue of what General George Marshall put into play when he announced the so-called Marshall Plan (it was not called that then) at a commencement address in June 1947 at Harvard University. Germany and Japan and South Korea are also examples of success. There are commonalities there that we have to think about today, and whether they apply. There were decades of support from the U.S., sustained American presence, significant American investment. And, yes, democratic societies in the making with free-market economies were aided. But what was the pay off for our society and our beliefs and our values? Partner nations standing up to Communist threats; significant allies and trading partners; each a stabilizing force within its own region.

Now, I think it is very important to talk about – and one of the things that Adm. Giambastiani did not mention – the implications of quitting. What if we fail, given what history has taught us? I think the immediate implication is that you will see a violent, extremist overthrow of the emerging participatory government in Iraq. You will also see an immediate 'hot' war against Israel. The U.S. image around the world will be severely damaged, and it will embolden the enemy. Resource-rich havens will come under the control of terrorists. Failure to stop these people today, while they are in many ways relatively weak, portends a much larger conflict later at enormous costs. World War II, just to provide a little historic context, cost the U.S. over 300,000 lives; 70 million lives were lost worldwide between 1937 and 1945. In World War II, the U.S. spent 3.114 trillion (in 2005) dollars: it ate up 38 percent of our gross domestic product per year. Subsequent to the war, U.S. reconstruction expenditures, the Marshall Plan and various variations on that theme between 1948 and 1952,

were 90 billion dollars in 2005 dollars, which was approximately one percent of the GDP.

This is why it is so very important that we recognize that the global war against these terrorists will not be won solely on military terms – although we have to be militarily capable of targeting our kinetic efforts – it will be won by economic development, by reconstruction, foreign exchange, and foreign investment, including our own in these countries. The global war on terrorism, if we do not succeed, in my view, is only a precursor to a much larger and more expensive conflict.

I want to end with an interesting piece that I read yesterday in *The Boston Globe*, a newspaper not known for its conservative principles. As we all know, whether you are in Iraq, Boston, or Baghdad, the press is a crucial part of a representative democracy, of a free society. An article co-authored by Jonathan Morgenstein, a program officer at the United States Institute of Peace, and Eric Vickland, a lecturer at the Joint Special Operations University, made several telling comments. I will just read you a couple of quick passages that offer a coda for my remarks this afternoon: “Iraq is now a microcosm of the global struggle we face, it is a comprehensive insurgency inadequately described as the global war on terrorism.” This point about “inadequately described as the global war on terrorism,” – I agree with that. U.S. forces in Iraq, our military, are coming to terms with “essential lessons” in dealing with insurgency: “overwhelming fire power is often counterproductive,” and we will also “never peacefully dissuade those dedicated to violence against us.” Instead, “comprehensive reconstruction and information efforts win hearts and minds,” and the “best sources of actionable intelligence are local populations.” Lastly, “indigenous law enforcement facilitates smaller U.S. footprints, multiplying the effectiveness of all other efforts.”

Donald Rumsfeld has been accused and criticized by a number of different, well-intentioned, and very intelligent and experienced men and women in the public arena. With respect to not enough troops in Iraq, I will make one quick point about analogies between Vietnam and Iraq: they are not the same places; they are not the same wars; they are not the same conflicts. However, in my view, and I was a soldier there in the Central Highlands in 1967 and 1968, when William Westmoreland – and this is somewhat simplistic, but still instructive – took on a larger and larger role of combating the VC and the NVA regulars. When we did this, the South Vietnamese stepped back. I also worked with the South Vietnamese Army in the southern four provinces of the Highlands which represented a turning point in that conflict. Donald Rumsfeld and the current leadership at the Pentagon understand that, while we need more troops, we really need more Iraqi troops, more Iraqi security forces, more Iraqi policemen – it is, after all, their country.

Lastly, and this gets back to what I call Pete Schoonmaker's bullet theory and a succinct comment made in the Morgenstein and Vickland article, "we must recognize" and "we must promote America's charity." We are one of the most gracious, generous countries in the world, but we must promote this charity "while exposing the enemy's hypocrisies." This takes sophistication; it takes information operations; it takes intelligence, especially human intelligence; it takes the ability to communicate effectively. Economic development, property law, judicial systems, land titling – these are the underpinnings of an emerging representational government at all levels of society. We must work hard on aggressively providing economic and political development as we help – help, assist, not force – the development of a civil society, institutions, human rights, the judicial system, and property. As Morgenstein and Vickland note, "Only when populations in the developing world obtain genuine economic opportunity, social dignity, and political empowerment will they no longer incubate the global insurgency."

So I want to stop where I began, with that Army MASH hospital in Pakistan, those little toy helicopters that Pakistani kids love to carry around – it really will make a difference. It will turn the tide, but it will not be quick – it will take a long time. These young men and women, here, in uniform, they will probably be retired before this is all over. But, again, building partnership capacity is reforming the way that we do things in the Department of Defense, reforming the way the interagency operation works, and working very closely with our alliances and our allies. This President has been accused of many things and one of them has been not working effectively – or as hard as he should – with NATO, for instance. But as you heard from Adm. Giambastiani, NATO was fully engaged in Afghanistan. The United States Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic International Studies, the Center for the Study for the American Presidency have gotten together to do a review of the Iraq situation with former Secretary of State Jim Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. I wrote a memo to Secretary Baker saying that one of the things that you must focus on is, how will the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, establish an investment fund for Iraq, their neighborhood and its stability – it has got to be done. The only way, in my view, that the Iraqi situation will eventually stabilize is through economic development.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. I am very glad to take your questions.

Question: Given the preemption strategy of a few years ago and where we are today in the war on ideas, what caused the shift, and what did not go right with the preemption strategy?

Dubois: We have some folks who I hope will come up here, get invited to come here from the Pentagon, who have tried to educate me on the difference

between preemption and prevention. Some have said that the Iraqi situation is not preemption, but rather prevention. There is, so I am told, and from what I have read, a history to America and other countries, for that matter, making preemptive moves, when a situation of extremists is facing them. A senior person at the Pentagon said that we should never do another Iraq again. I was in the room, and I turned to him and said, 'I disagree with you.' It was one of the QDR meetings and, as the Undersecretary to the Army, I laid out what I thought were situations that we will certainly face sometime in the next five to ten years. I used failed or failing states as an example, and it was clear – it was strictly a non-factual example – that I had been studying some issues in South America. I said that what concerns me most is a South American country that is already vulnerable, economically and politically, and on the verge of bankruptcy; to al Qaeda cells and narco-traffickers, it is the perfect storm. What if something like that occurred; how long would it be before the U.S. took action? How would we take action to remove what would quickly become a spreading instability in South America? When you combine al Qaeda narco-traffickers in an unstable democracy in one place in one country at one time, I think the U.S. is going to have to act. It would be nice if the Organization of American States (OAS) would come to the same conclusion, if those circumstances were to arise. But the U.S. would take action. The theory of prevention or the theory of preemption is sort of like the delicacy of nuclear power: it has a civilian aspect, a non-civilian aspect, a military aspect. I do not want to comment any more about it, but it is troubling to me that this country has sometimes considered it and sometimes rejected it and, in the case, most recently, taken action. But remember, as we are seeing, and as General Meigs reminded me, how many documents do we have from the Saddam Hussein government that we have not translated yet?

General Meigs interjects: 50,000.

Dubois: Ok, 50,000, and those that we have translated, we have seen that Saddam Hussein and his two sons and a handful of people were communicating frequently with al Qaeda and figuring out a way to, on the one hand, prevent al Qaeda from being in his back yard and, on the other hand, being perfectly willing to support it and some of its most nefarious designs. So preemption and prevention are going to be an interesting debate going forward.

Question: As I listened to your talk, it sounded almost exactly like what every war college seminar was putting together as a national strategy during the 2000-2001 academic year that I spent in war college. What are the reasons that it takes us four years of bloody war to get back to these points? Is it because of the interagency friction that you talked about which everybody that spent 20 years tromping around in the places that we are talking about has highlighted, the fact that we cannot work together with anybody outside of our own military when we go places? Is it because of the way we change administrations every eight years,

and we do not want to learn from the previous eight because we were not there? Or is there anything else that you can put your finger on?

Dubois: Institutions – the larger the institution, the slower it reacts. Not that this is all that pertinent, but I went to the Army Intelligence school in November of 1967, and I was the first class to be taught the Southeast Asia order of battle. This was 1967 – how long had we been in Vietnam? I do not think the Army is quite so slow today, but the notion of cultural and language proficiency, knowing what goes on in these societies and cultures, is absolutely critical. The Army has had a very strong Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program – but we are going to expand it. Special Operations Forces maintain proficiency in sixty languages, but we do not have enough of them in the critical languages when we need them. One of the QDR recommendations is to take the National Defense University – it ought to be called, perhaps, the National Security University – and increase the student body using and connecting with schools like Maxwell to build up a cadre of individuals who have these skills. This has to do with a program that I propose which is having a special military occupational specialty, if you will, within the Guard and Reserve dealing with post-conflict reconstruction. Where are the skills that we continue to need in terms of advising the Iraqi government, in terms of waste-water treatment, sewage, roads, bridges, civil government, and judicial systems? They are in every single state of the union – they are not just in the State Department, USAID, the Treasury, Justice, Energy, Education, and Labor. We ought to have a core set of individuals in each of those federal departments and agencies; but we also ought to have a reserve corps of folks who are deployable when we face another failing or failed state. Notice that I did not say ‘regime change’ – I do not know why it takes so long. I do know, and I will say this as a private citizen, that we should be spending more money in that area and less money on some Cold War weapons systems that we still have in the pipeline. But that is a subject for another discussion.

Question: Sir, from an insider’s perspective, can you talk about the two things that I perceived as the biggest challenges when I was in Iraq in both tours: first, dissolving the Ba’ath party, and, second, standing down their Army?

Dubois: I was involved, but not directly, in helping to set up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) when I was Director of Administration Management. I knew the people that we sent over there; I knew their ideas. I was not involved with the decision, with Jerry Bremer’s recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately to the President, to dissolve the Ba’ath Party and not to reconstitute, at any level or formation, the Iraqi Army. I think in hindsight that we have learned that this did not work. We had a number of Iraqis who had a vehement distaste for the Ba’ath Party and for that small group of folks under Saddam Hussein who tortured and killed and buried alive so many people. It was understandable, their anger and insistence that we wipe the slate clean. But I think that we have learned that, perhaps, not all

Germans were Nazis, even though they may have registered in the party. Not all Iraqi Sunnis were Ba'athists; not all the Iraqi Army sergeants were bad guys. In hindsight, I do not think we should have done it.

Question: Sir, I spent 14 months in Iraq working with the State Department and some other folks who helped build some of this reconstruction that you talked about. The concern I have, and what I saw there, was unwillingness on the part of – well, maybe this is a bit strong – but, an inability on the part of many of our interagency partners to shoulder their responsibilities. You alluded to this as one of the things that you wanted to tackle, and I guess the question I would have for you is: how do you propose, short of a Goldwaters –Nichols type of approach, to get our partners to shoulder those responsibilities?

Dubois: This is, perhaps, one of the cornerstones of Secretary Rumsfeld's philosophy – and a little-known cornerstone, I might add. I was in the room four years ago – I will never forget it – and there were ten or twelve of us, prior to the war, discussing what would happen if we went to war. Rumsfeld said, 'what if we have catastrophic success,' and there was silence in the room. Now, unlike some of the press reports and some of my former colleagues in the State Department and USAID, who said we did not listen to them at all, that one conversation prompted a tremendous amount of work with USAID, with the State Department. What would happen if we had catastrophic success? As it turned out, we did in the sense of toppling Saddam Hussein. I set up the Office of Reconstruction Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) under Lieutenant General J. Garner, put them on an airplane, and sent them to Iraq. There was immediate offering up of some key people from Rich Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, whom I dealt with on this issue. We brought Ambassador Hume Horan out of retirement, who, unfortunately, died a year ago – he was one of our former ambassadors to Saudi Arabia who spoke the language, understood the culture and the religion. I sent them all out there, Horan with significant personal courage – I did not know at the time that he was dying – but he did this, nonetheless.

The State Department, however, frustrated me. I will be perfectly blunt about this. I had a list of people whom I knew in the State Department. You see, I ran intelligence operations in the four southern provinces in the Army, and I was summoned to the State Department in 1975 for the President's Indochinese Refugee Task Force. I met, grew up with, and worked with a lot of guys who then became ambassadors and undersecretaries – Frank Wiesner, Reggie Bartholomew, Larry Angleberger – they are just an amazing, enormously talented group of people. I asked Rich Armitage for the next generation, the Foreign Service Officers (FSO) 'in the middle' – I did not want a bunch of '20 somethings,' and I could understand if you were close to retiring, you may not want to get on the next flight to Baghdad. I said that I knew some of them who had been recommended to me. But I was told, 'Ray, we cannot deploy; we cannot tell them to go.' When I said that I did not understand, that I thought in

the FSO contract it said you can be deployed, I was told, 'well, that is true, but we have never done that; we would not do that' and that 'you guys in Defense can do that, but we have to take volunteers.' I told them that this was too important, the single most important U.S. Mission, with a capital 'M.' Now, the Secretary of State, Connie Rice, as you may have read, made the comment, maybe two or three months ago, that promotions would be determined by whether or not you served in posts that are not pretty, in places that you do not necessarily want to go to – and they are not called Paris. Your promotions will be your jacket, your personnel file, and it had better have those deployments, to use a military term, in them. We will see if she enforces this. That is why I say that we need, whether we pay them extra or whether we give them some kind of special status, in Transportation, Justice, Treasury, State, prepared to deploy when situations like this arise, as well as people from State and local government.

There is a tremendous wellspring of patriotism in this country. A 53-year old doctor in Houston, Texas, whom I have known for 20 years, called me up recently to say I want to volunteer; I want to get into uniform and go. His nickname is Tripp, and so I said, 'Tripp, have you talked to anybody? He told me that the Army had turned him down, not once, not twice, but three times. Why? 'Well,' he said, because I am over fifty, and I am a prostate cancer survivor.' This is one of the world's leading cardiologists, who also happens to be an expert on Avian Bird Flu, and was the medical school roommate of Bill Frist, the majority leader of the Senate. Well, as Undersecretary of the Army, by the powers vested in me, I made it happen – the guy went into uniform. They pinned lieutenant colonel on him, and he was immediately flying around the world talking to all the combat commanders and command surgeons on Avian Bird Flu. I also work for the World Bank right now, and it is fascinating how they are dealing with the Avian Bird flu potential in various places. Nonetheless, my wife was not happy with me; his wife was not happy with me; he has young children, as I do. But I knew what he wanted to do. This is a personal story, an anecdote, but I cannot tell you how many times I received emails, telephone calls, etc., that so and so wants to volunteer. That is all well and good, but we also need to have a core of experts in the federal government who, by virtue of their agreement, are prepared to deploy under the circumstances that we have had in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Question: Sir, you made a strong case for the importance of strategic planning. So if we were going to invade a country, and we knew that we would probably be able to overwhelm them in a short time, why did we not have a corps already established; why were we not prepared to take this on?

Dubois: I think you have raised a very interesting public policy issue. Some would say, if we had a corps like that, if we had a reserve group like that, then, it must mean that you are going to invade some country sometime, somewhere. It must mean that regime change is a cornerstone of the new 21st

century American foreign and defense policy. I would turn that around, and I would put on my advisor hat to the Commission of the Guard and Reserve and say, the National Guard of the U.S., 500,000 men and women strong, 54 states, territories, the District of Colombia, is in the business of being in operational reserve. It used to be a strategic reserve but, now, it is an operational reserve – it is in the business of providing military support to civil authority; it is in the business of disaster relief, locally, regionally; it is in the business of homeland security. A lot of the disciplines and skill sets that are needed, in my view, to have a fully operational, fully capable, fully organized, trained, and equipped National Guard in the U.S. will be useful for our own domestic needs – this may be the way to access this talent. The National Guard, the Army Reserve, only has one combat unit – it is almost entirely, except for one combat unit in Hawaii, combat support and combat service support. I was involved with the debate on reducing the number of armored brigades in the National Guard. I sat and listened to Governors who told me, ‘I insist upon having that tank battalion in my state.’ I would ask, ‘Governor, wouldn’t you prefer to have an engineer battalion, or a civil affairs battalion, or a transportation battalion, or a quarter master battalion – what do you want Abram’s tanks for? Are you protecting Cleveland?’ It is going to take a little time, but I think that the National Guard, this crucial part of American history, older than the country itself, older than the Army, could be molded in such a way as to become a dual purpose force, operational, deployed overseas and domestically – but the operational deployment overseas would not just be infantry, armor, and their defense. It would be, also, I think, a lot of these – let us call them civil or governmental skill sets that we can put there.

PANEL 2: COUNTERMEASURES & COUNTER- COUNTERMEASURES IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Twenty-First Century Challenges in Warfare: Operational Asymmetry & Idiosyncratic Tactics

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We commonly refer to the situation in which we now find ourselves in Iraq as asymmetric warfare, but I do not believe this term applies here. Asymmetry, in its colloquial sense, is a term from geometry – it is when two shapes, two triangles, for instance, do not correspond in size, shape, or relative position. Hence, they lack a common basis of comparison. In operational terms, asymmetry means the absence of a comparable capability, which is to suggest that, at some level, asymmetry involves a degree of commensurability. It is that commensurability which is precisely what we are lacking in Iraq – what we are dealing with, instead, is two cultures, two entirely different approaches to warfare, that do not at all mesh.

Since there are no like capabilities or qualities, this relationship is better described as idiosyncratic.⁶ Now, many of us remember taking a foreign language course and encountering those disruptive verbs, phrases, or expressions that your teacher defined as idiosyncratic – they did not follow any of the rules of grammar. Hence, they were idiosyncratic, and you were simply told to “just memorize them.” This is what idiosyncratic means in the context of warfare, too: something is simply outside of the norm, outside of predictable parameters, in a totally, unexplainably, different way. That is the nature of the warfare that we are confronting today in Iraq.

I want to return to Admiral Giambastiani's comment yesterday about indiscriminate weapons with strategic impact. Most of us are familiar with the American military's rules of engagement and our very strong restrictions on using lethal force against those whom are not a threat to a unit. Our opponents in this war, by contrast, injure civilians out of political and military purpose. U.S. military men and women are not allowed to attack religious and cultural sites unless the enemy is using them to create a threat to U.S. forces, for instance. But the organization that brought down the Samarra Golden Dome, by contrast,

⁶ See Montgomery C. Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare,” *Parameters*, Vol. 33 (2003): 4-18 (for a more detailed description of this distinction between asymmetric and idiosyncratic approaches to warfare).

intentionally attacked a religious symbol of tremendous power for Shiites to instigate a violent reaction. Likewise, the attack on the World Trade Center was directed at civilians and designed to make Americans recoil in horror and shock – it was not directed at the military, but at American political will and its economic foundations. These moves describe this idiosyncratic approach to inflicting strategic influence on your opponent. This approach requires, in turn, a very different mode of thinking in trying to understand what our opponent is doing, what their next response or move may be, and how to counter it – while at the same time protecting our base of political support in our own country and among our network of coalitions.

Calling this situation “asymmetric” is, thus, too easy: it does not capture, as the term “idiosyncratic” does, how we are challenged in this much tougher relationship with our opponent – a relationship that is likely to be prolonged, a relationship that consists of strange, unpredictable, truly weird dynamics and qualities, and a relationship designed to undermine political will. This is the game that we are in.

We must remember that this enemy is one who has decided to use routine and low-tech means of inflicting mass casualties (as well as continual casualties on our military forces) to affect national will. That is their objective, their weapon. In Iraq and in Afghanistan, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Iraqi insurgent forces on both sides realized that they could not face down American and coalition forces in a straight-forward, stand-up fight. So they rely upon explosive devices, for instance, as a means to employ chemical and kinetic energy against civilians and our forces. It is, of course, just another kind of fire, only it is weird and strange – there is an idiosyncratic quality to it. Imagine driving by a dead animal on the road and having it, suddenly, blow up. Other ways of hiding improvised explosive devices are in inner tubes, garbage; or, you find yourself driving down a road that you have driven down a thousand times before, but now there is a 250-pound bomb placed under it by insurgents who have tunneled below what was a safe area. This enemy is still using fires, certainly, but employing it in different, strange – idiosyncratic – ways.

So the question becomes: how do you deal with that situation, how do you protect yourself, and how do you go after this opponent? Consider how you would deal with an analogous situation: if the majority of our casualties were being inflicted by snipers – let us say the enemy had a very successful sniper program and 60 percent of our wounded and killed were caused by snipers – how would you defend against that? Would you defend against the bullet or the sniper? The right answer is “both.” You simply cannot deal with this situation without going after the sniper, but the great majority of the money that I am spending in this campaign is fighting against the bullet. The reality is that if you want to solve this problem long term, you must go after the sniper and that, itself,

requires going on the offense – with the understanding that this campaign is much different than any normal military operation. As Admiral Giambastiani pointed out yesterday, it does not just involve a kinetic component: you must deal with the society, the sea within which the fish swims.

Let us, momentarily, return to the issue of fires – in its technical aspect – to give some shape to the nature of this challenge. Since late in 2003 we have seen a number of phases in this operation. Here is an all-too-typical example: I have in my hands automatic locking car keys to a Dodge, equipped with a familiar, little black button to unlock the door. This mundane device can be transformed into a low-power initiator for an explosive device: all that is needed to set it off is to generate enough current to open or close a switch. So if I take the receiver out of a car, which accepts this message to lock or unlock doors, I have created a low-power device that is good for approximately 30 feet – the obvious disadvantage is that I have to stand fairly close to the explosion for it to work, which does not bode well for me. In the early days of the campaign, these low-power devices dominated the scene because the Iraqi economy had been shattered, so other available mechanisms were no longer easily available. But there are other ways to initiate a charge, such as via the familiar Motorola walkie-talkie. While conventionally these medium-powered communication devices are often used for hunting and fishing, they allow, in this case, the shooter to move farther away from the receiver that initiates or arms the charge. We often see crude and simplistic means for closing a circuit – a pressure plate, for instance – which has been around for a long time. But high-power cordless phones are also becoming increasingly common. Once a phone is connected to a charge which is hooked to a blasting cap, the shooter has devised an elemental base station: make a call to the phone and the result is a high-powered device.

From late 2003 until today we have seen a complete waning of low-power devices and a movement toward high-power devices. Why? Technically, they are more reliable, there is more juice, so to speak, and the shooter can establish a good deal of distance from the charge. To put this point another way: we have here a thinking, adaptive enemy.

We have also seen, all along, explosively-formed projectiles. An explosively-formed projectile is a means to make an explosive charge (usually made out of cylindrical metal pipe) squeeze a metal plate so that it shoots either a stream of metal formed into a kind of plasma, or a segmented stream followed by a slug or a plate. When an ounce of copper travels in a stream at 10,000 meters per second – which is over ten times the speed of a 30-60 bullet – it can push its way through a lot of armor. One of these segmented streams with a slug traveling at 7,000 meters per second will punch its way through rolled homogenous steel, let alone a humvee door. These types of devices, originally seen in Lebanon and

used by Hezbollah, are very effective, but they are in no way new technology. Based on the so-called “Monroe Effect,” these types of weapons were discovered in the late 19th century when chemist Charles E. Monroe noticed how carved initials remained in the metal of the charge. If you have a 45-degree angle on the face of the charge and you put a metal cone there, when a shock wave from a base initiation hits it, it squeezes the metal and basically spurts it out. This shaped-charge technology, which was behind the warhead on the bazooka used in World War II, is still very effective.

Another type of device that we are seeing, which is very lethal, is similar to something used in the Vietnam era: several artillery rounds, or a 250-500-pound bomb, placed under the road. The weakest part of an armored vehicle is its belly or back, since we simply cannot armor a tank or an infantry carrier at 360-degrees. Generally, the armor is placed in the front 60-degree arc of the vehicle and then, operators try to keep the enemy to their front. Of course, it does not always work that way, so we try to move around to the side or to the back of our opponents – we can target enemies from the front, if necessary, but it is more difficult, and it requires the vehicle to get closer. In any case, over time, as low-power devices diminished and high-power devices became a much larger proportion of the means of initiation for most IEDs, artillery rounds on the side of the road became more prevalent. Pressure plates, for instance, are often used for the belly attack, and the device that sets off an explosively-formed projectile for the most part is an infrared or IR sensor – the type found in a residential burglar alarm that seeks out an IR beam. When the IR beam is broken it initiates a switch that sets off the device: we are now seeing the use of cell phones in this capacity. While they may look innocent, the circuit that provides the ringing can initiate a charge. In fact, there are a lot of things a cell phone can do to make it a very interesting way of traversing large distances to initiate a charge. As low-powered devices wane, high-powered devices become more prevalent.

At the same time, there is an increase in the variety of means and ways of conducting an attack. Today, we are seeing a much larger number of types of devices and an increase in sophistication. By the way, this development is not confined to Iraq and Afghanistan – there was a recent day in Bangladesh in which 150 of these things went off. If you read the foreign press, you will find that IEDs are proliferating to other areas as a means of firing an attack.

The other interesting aspect of the idiosyncratic mode of warfare is the number of ways in which our opponents are using the Internet. Recently, there was an article in the L.A. Times that alleged certain capabilities for a piece of gear that we were testing. The profile reported was not accurate, but five days later on those Internet sites which insurgents use to distribute information out to foot soldiers and to bomb networks, there was a list of countermeasures to

these alleged capabilities. I would have given these countermeasures about a C+. But consider all of the links and actions that needed to be forged for this series of communications to occur: the top level actors had to get the information, assess it, go to their technical experts, come up with simple, easy, and crude countermeasures which people on the street can use in a very poor country, and, then, blast these instructions over the Internet. Remember, too, that the communications which they are using are compartmented, so you just cannot simply pick up the phone and call Jud Gostin and say: “Hey, Jud, Americans are working on this device; tell me about three things that I can give to the troops that will block it.”⁷ Compartmented cellular structures do not work that way. But they got the word out in five days: that is pretty quick. You know you are dealing with an adaptive, thinking enemy when an insurgent in Iraq pays this close attention to media channels, takes down information, and immediately starts applying simple, crude countermeasures – even if those countermeasures amount to average quality.

This reality is the reason that restraint is the most powerful tool that people like me have in our toolbox. Defensively speaking, I do not want the enemy to know what I am thinking about, or what I know about him. Nor do I want him to know what I think my weaknesses are, or what remedies I might have in store for those weaknesses. The physics of this game are well-known – and we are not talking about particle physics here – but simple Newtonian physics for the most part, with some high-speed electronics thrown in (though nothing particularly obscure). A good electrician can do most of what we have discussed today, and, if he has electronic engineering help, he could do some sophisticated things. A ten-year old with a cell phone, if you put him or her up to it, could come up with interesting ways of using cell-phone technology. Today, our opponents can go to the Japanese version of Radio Shack to buy their gear and to devise simple, rudimentary, tricky ways of doing business. I have to go to corporations like Sensis, Syracuse Research Corporation, and Lockheed Martin to get state-of-the-art engineering talent to develop countermeasures because, remember, the enemy cannot know what we are thinking when we field a capability. My advantage, our advantage, is for our enemy to only see an effect – for him to lose soldiers, lose equipment, find his communications not working, and not be able to figure out how that is happening.

In World War II during the Battle of the Atlantic, German Admiral Durnitz could not figure out why he was losing submarines at an inexcusable rate. He and his lieutenants simply could not imagine that their codes were being broken; they could not fathom the power of microwave radar; and they did not know about our use of the acoustic torpedo. All they knew was that

7 Mr. Gostin, moderator for Panel II of this conference, is Chief Executive Officer of the Sensis Corporation, a leader in sensors and information technology development for militaries, civil aviation authorities, airports, and airlines.

fewer and fewer submarines were returning from patrol. When fighting in high-tech warfare, this is the position of advantage. In speaking in the public domain, there are lots of innovations that I cannot talk about, because, if I do, it could cost us literally millions of dollars and many months to gain back the advantage, if we ever can. That is why I am speaking in general terms today about our responses, though I can assure you that we are making progress. I will provide some hints in that direction.

I recently returned from visiting the United Kingdom and Israel, where I found it interesting to compare notes with those nations that have been dealing with this idiosyncratic problem for much longer than we have. The British have an interesting mantra about making progress in this game: it comes down to 60 percent men in training, 30 percent equipment, and ten percent luck. That breakdown makes sense because, the fact is, a very large proportion of the IEDs that we find in Iraq and Afghanistan are discovered by the most well-known, old-fashioned, and often-used sensor: our soldiers' eyes. Soldiers have become adept at noticing the telltale indicators of IEDs in their particular backyard. I would therefore amend the British rule to suggest that it is 20 percent intelligence, 40 percent tactics, techniques, and procedures, and 30 percent equipment (some of which is intelligence gear) and, most importantly, that you make your own luck.

How do we make our own luck? Let us walk together through some premises. Obviously, I will not go into the details of our intelligence efforts, but I will give some sense of its unique characteristics. In today's environment there is a much greater connection between the strategic realm and the tactical realm than ever before. Given the kinds of connectivity that we can mobilize through the modern communication systems of our military, if we have information in any one part of the system, we can make that information available to the platoon leader on the ground in almost real time. Think about that for a minute – what is analogous to that? Visiting a website and seeing individual trades on the stock exchange with a fifteen-second delay, from anywhere in the world. That agility of information is available to us and to our soldiers' leaders every day, every minute. That level of connectivity was unavailable in the past. I can tell you that as an old Vietnam veteran how extremely powerful it is.

We are also now good at attaining human intelligence. We are not as good at it as some countries are, and we have some disadvantages that they do not: there are more people who speak Arabic per capita in Israel, for instance, than in the U.S. Geography and culture influence these things: the U.S. obviously has more Spanish speakers per capita than does Israel, for instance. The soldier sent from San Antonio, Texas, to Iraq – where Arabic is necessary for human intelligence, or Dari and Pashto in Afghanistan – is probably not going to speak the native language fluently. Yet, our receipt of human intelligence from Iraqis

over a six-month period in 2005 went from 400 contacts per month to 4,000 contacts per month, a ten fold increase. This is a powerful indicator, since every Iraqi who came to us by phone, a direct source, or some other means was risking his or her life. All networks have physical qualities, and, so, the trick is to find them: whether a spy operation, a guerilla or terrorist organization, all of these and more manners of techniques are used to hide those physical characteristics.

I want to address one last area in which we are countering this idiosyncratic environment. My organization possesses a powerful training effort with experienced operators in the field, units that help with training in combat, and those who feed back these techniques to our Marine Corps training base in California at Twentynine Palms and the Army's National Training Center. Not only do we send to the field the best-trained soldiers in the world, but our soldiers deploy to places as diverse as Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq – this is a serious challenge at the level of training. The challenge of the idiosyncratic arena is striking a balance between protecting forces and conducting offensive operations as we, all the while, go after the sniper, not just the bullet. We are now pretty good at armoring things. However, there is that point when you can run the risk of making ineffectual the man or woman whom you have over-armored, especially when you ask this solder to run around in 130 degree heat all day. What kind of results have we seen in trying to strike this balance? We have reduced the rate of casualties per explosion by 50 percent over the last two years – despite the fact that the complexity and sophistication of the enemy's techniques have increased significantly. This is an extremely powerful result.

In addition, over the last three months, the enemy's attacks have begun to drop off. They had peaked during the period of the constitution's ratification (October 2005) and the elections, for obvious reasons. But they have started to tail off again. I cannot explain why: we need more data, more time. But I can tell you, having recently visited our soldiers on the ground, that they are doing amazing things in terms of their operational skills. Watch the televised news carefully and you can see hostages being rescued, or the types of operations being run, for instance, in Tal Afar. These are interesting hints that ought to reassure you.

Updating the Countermeasures & Counter-Countermeasures Games for Asymmetric Warfare: The Role of Technological Innovation and ‘Social Physics’

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You may not be familiar with the MITRE Corporation, a not-for-profit company based in the Boston and the Washington D.C. areas. We work only for the government, where we often act as an advisor or intermediary between government and the industrial base, especially when government needs to acquire very complicated electronic and information systems. We started back in 1958 with the first integrated air-defense system that put together sensors, communications, and computers – it was called the Semi Automated Ground Environment, or SAGE system. Designed for the nature of the threat at the time, the Cold War, bombers over the poll, as many of you remember. Today, the SAGE system is a relic: you can see it at the Smithsonian Museum of Technology down in the computer display – that dusty old case showing the multi-story building containing these enormous computers. This is our legacy, both in technology and in threats, the old days when things were simple.

Today, we are dealing with something entirely different. But first, I am simply going to tell you a story, a World War II story. This will be a story about conventional measures, countermeasures, and the counter-counter measure situation – a descriptive analysis that I will use to help us update and address the challenges of our contemporary world.

In the 1930s, radio navigation, the application of radio frequencies to determining a position on the Earth, became popular. You could fly a plane, for instance, listen carefully, and when you were “on the beam,” you would hear this nice tone; as you diverted from it, information in your headset told you to “steer back.” This was the era of German-developed Radio Direction Finding (RDF), where by simply tuning into a radio station with a directional antenna to find the direction to the broadcasting antenna, you could plot your location in all sorts of weather and in all times of day.

But German radio engineers also developed another communication aspect of this system, called *Leitstrahl*, or “guiding beam,” translated outside of Germany as *Lorenz* – the name of the company manufacturing the equipment. Two signals were broadcast on the same frequency from directional antennas with a small angle in the middle where sound was continuous: planes would fly into the beams by listening to the signal to identify which side they were on and then correct until they were in the center. Originally developed as a night and bad-weather landing system, in the late 1930s

the Germans adapted the system for night bombing. They had this idea that if they set up these two beams and crossed them where they wanted their planes to drop bombs, the pilot could fly along one beam until he heard the second beam – then he knew exactly where to drop the bombs. As it turned out, this system was deadly accurate until the so-called “battle of the beams” where the U.K.’s intelligence services succeeded in rendering the system useless.

As is usually the case, the British got wind of these German innovations. R. V. Jones, the British physicist, sometimes referred to as the father of scientific and technical intelligence analysis,⁸ was put on the case: he understood the physics and, more to the point, how to defeat it. His approach was to interject energy just in the right way to bend the beam and so, as the German pilots came upon the second beam, it had been bent, unbeknownst to them: they would drop their bombs all over the countryside. This is a particularly good example of a countermeasure because the Germans, as far as they were concerned, were not being countered at all. Eventually they figured it out, through their own non-technical means. But throughout the war, there was this back and forth, the Germans devising new and improved radio navigation techniques, and the allies countering them.

This is, perhaps, the classic example of the measure, countermeasure, counter-counter measure, counter-counter-counter measure game that we all know so well. It is also an instance of the symmetric force-on-force situation, characterized by very defined and bounded parameters: the Germans wanted to use radio navigation tactically, and the British were hell-bent on preventing it. What is surprising and instructive about this instance of symmetry, however, is the comparable length of time it took both sides to figure out each others’ respective technologies, that they even existed, and then, to defeat them – as well as the comparable costs that went into these achievements, among other things.

Today, by contrast, we are wrestling with how tactics and technologies play out in the asymmetric or idiosyncratic context. I would postulate here – and all of you can fill in the details since, as General Meigs suggests, it may be unwise to explain too much – that we have entered into a new world with new rules. Let us take an example of something common, an airplane, for instance, but consider when this familiar measure is used as a missile – this is unexpected, idiosyncratic. So our countermeasure, which we are still working on, is the enormous effort to secure aviation. We are currently spending billions of dollars to do just that. One issue is when, when do we know what

8 Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analysis, Robert M. Clark, Center for the Study of Intelligence, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v19i1a06p_0001.htm.

the adversary knows, because at that time the advantage shifts from them to us, from measure to countermeasure, where we, in turn, gain the advantage.

Some ask – and this is a debate – when, in this kind of conflict, will we ever have the advantage? I can guarantee that this is a difficult question, and that this enemy is thinking of something different all the time. We will secure aviation, for instance, and they will then mount an attack in an entirely different arena, in an entirely different way, next time. In certain respects, we must recognize that if we do ever gain the advantage, it will be brief and costly. It is thus important to understand the nature of idiosyncratic or asymmetric warfare that, in fact, this reactive-defensive, measure-countermeasure game, is just not going to get us where we need to be.

So the main substance of my remarks, here, today, echoes that which General Meigs observed earlier: we must move from an exclusively reactive to a more offensive posture. We need to level the asymmetric playing field: we have to act like they act; it has to be unexpected; it has to be small scale; and it has to be local. There are a lot of efforts underway to do these things. I want to concentrate, in a more general sense, on some of the information technologies that can help in this effort. We have, in fact, been talking a lot about the internet during this conference, thus far. Some of these emerging technologies, if handled with an awareness of the asymmetric, idiosyncratic context, give us the potential to move into this more agile mode. I also want to make it very clear, however, that new technologies and tactics are not our only assets and resources: there is an important social-cultural dimension that is part of this challenge and a key issue on which I will end my comments today. We must understand what I call “the social physics” – as well as innovative technologies – so that we choose the right beam to bend. I will continue using this analogy throughout my remarks.

I want to, first, address the institutional context – there is an institutional response to these problems, a department that is well-under way – and then, I will discuss new technologies in relation to the social dimension, which I mentioned. Much of how I am framing these challenges comes from the Quadrennial Defense Review Report chart (QDR: 19) that describes how traditional force-on-force challenges have morphed into three different quadrants: the challenges of disruptive warfare, catastrophic warfare, and irregular warfare.⁹ The challenge of irregular warfare, as General Meigs discussed, describes the Iraqi situation, whereas the catastrophic challenge, for instance, describes tactics that go beyond simply blowing up bombs in the middle of roads for something more catastrophic – weapons of mass destruction, for instance. Indeed, for many of us, the biological situation

9 The Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (6 February 2006), 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC, 20301-1000, available online at <http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf>.

in instances of CBRN is the most challenging, the most frightening, since it encompasses a threat deck that may range from a tactic deployed by a terrorist group to the wayward schemes of Mother Nature. These scenarios, in their range and complexity, are obviously extremely challenging to develop technological countermeasures against. In my group, for instance, we are focused on the avian flu pandemic. The Department of Homeland Security, as we heard last night, has to gear up to be ready to confront those sorts of homeland defense missions, if and when something of this complexity occurs.

In certain respects, the new challenges of irregular warfare call for different kinds of forces. The use of Special Forces, for instance, has been successful in these situations. In fact, the QDR points out that there are several effective institutional responses for moving from large to more agile force structures in these asymmetric situations: in addition to special operation forces which have proven very effective, especially over the last three years. For example, there is the whole area of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), which is being plussed up, as are civil affairs (i.e., what you do after the war ends). The question is how much can you scale up the Special Forces model to the larger units in the Army and in the Marines to help them deal more effectively with these irregular challenges?

General Meigs discussed his organization, what they are doing, and, for instance, if the enemy uses make-shift bombs, then his vehicles had better be armored – and so, we have a classic countermeasure to a measure. In fact, it is impressive that we have been able to make such progress on the humvees, which has involved no small amount of money. Likewise, our opponent's innovations in the use of triggering devices, achieving further distances from its targets, as General Meigs also mentioned, are, likewise, a pretty straightforward instance of a counter-counter measure.

This is all familiar ground. But what about our responses and our technological innovations as part of our responses? I have chosen to focus on four challenges and four innovations – the use of intranets and internets, the commoditization of geographic information systems and their combination or “mash up” with other web services, the use of small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for local surveillance, and data mining.

First, let us begin by considering our use of closed intranets, the networks used by the national security community, for instance, which are presumably closed to public access, but open to specific users. Tremendous amounts of information are being posted to these websites on a given network, signaling an entirely new age: in the past, if you remember, we built complicated military systems that hid data that users could only access by coming through the system's front door. Today, you will see our troops posting all kinds of things

on these national security intranets, and that can really increase the speed and agility to counter the asymmetric threat.

This network technology, however, is also being used by our adversaries – there are insurgent websites on the open Internet that post training and other information such as bragging videos of attacks. Most of this information is in Arabic or other languages most of us don't speak. And there are not enough linguists to translate this material. To gain access to these sources the community is applying machine translation technology. At MITRE, for instance, we have built systems that allow people to browse foreign language websites using translation technology – it is still a little rough, but you can get a sense of what is going on. This is important, as a countermeasure, because, as Marc Sageman argued at this conference last year, the internet has impacted the very structure of the insurgency: there is no single hierarchy, but, instead, multiple cells which use websites in a pickup game fashion.¹⁰ By accessing these websites, members do not have to communicate directly or explicitly with one another.

The second technology area that I want to discuss is the commoditization of geospatial information systems (GIS). We have had commercial satellites for the last six to eight years that have pretty good resolution, now, about less than one meter. But this data has traditionally been controlled by government or by companies, where users had to buy access and thus faced lots of impediments to actually using this data. With the appearance of Google Maps and Google Earth, as well as Microsoft and Yahoo's analogous services, this information has become ubiquitous and is now available worldwide over the internet – at a meter or less resolution. You can literally count the number of cars in front of a building, for instance, whether it is in Fallujah, Iraq, or Syracuse, NY. This high-resolution internet-available imagery is also more detailed for places of public, indeed, worldwide, interest: like the White House versus a cornfield in Kansas, where the land-set data is very coarse grained. There are, now, policy debates going on over the global transparency and global security issues raised by this technology's commercialization – but these are areas that I do not have the time to delve very deeply into today.

It is important to observe that by, combining these technologies, such as GIS with other webservices, since this is where the payoff for many different users arises today: by combining technologies, users can have an easier time putting together unexpected capabilities. The technical term for this phenomenon is “mash-ups,” and what has become increasingly obvious today, given the open and global nature of our commercial base, is how so-called

¹⁰ See Marc Sageman, “The Global Salafi Jihad,” *The Global War on Terrorism: Round II: A Publication of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006) 49-66, and *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

“mash-ups,” putting together new technologies in unexpected combinations and ways, are made possible because companies like Google, eBay, Amazon, etc., are making their data available over the internet. Furthermore, there has been a technological leap in integration technologies, webservices, that make it easy to pull together various capabilities so that users can create their own task-specific services and, in turn, post them on the internet.

I will be driving to Boston later today, and if I wanted to fill up with gas before I get on the thruway, I could go to several websites designed to track and reveal the cheapest gas in my target area. This service is zip-code driven, which I can set within three to 300 miles, and, bingo, Google Maps displays a field of pushpins annotating, not only cheap gas, but decent food, affordable lodging, airports, museums, etc. Services of this kind did not exist a year ago, probably, but now they proliferate – there are literally hundreds just like this one, a million with variations on different themes. If I wanted to buy a car on eBay, for instance, but do not want to ship it from, say, Chicago, I can go to another website that displays all the cars currently being auctioned off on eBay within a 50-mile radius of where I live. If I wanted to know how much my neighbor’s house is worth, I can go to a website that integrates geographical information with tax-assessment data, again using Google Maps and other publicly-available web services. Thousands of these mash-ups are occurring on the open web, and what we are going to need to do to be agile and responsive against this new threat, is to consider how they are happening and how they are going to happen in the security space, as well.

What if we were to compare data over time: a snapshot from Google Maps on 26 January, 2006 and 30 August, 2005? This is the issue of old data, one of the biggest challenges that we face, if and when we adopt this data-centric strategy as a means to counter this new threat. We will be forced to live or die by the quality of our data, including its presumed timeliness: what happens if you receive eBay or stock transactions that are fifteen seconds old? This is a problem, a defining problem in our community. There are also issues of security and propriety. Consider the organizational friction with which many of you are familiar: will people make their data available across government agencies? Because, when they do, they will most certainly lose control of it. If another group picks up data and uses it, especially for different purposes, will the original sources receive credit, blame? These are, in fact, rich policy issues at the intersection of security studies, government, our commercial markets, and new technologies – complex issues that I think a school like Maxwell can really sink their teeth into.

The third technology area I want to touch on is the collection and organization of local surveillance data. Remember the famous adage that everything, most especially politics, is local, and certainly, the people on the

ground know the most about what is going on around them. In addition to the timeliness of data, there is the issue of its locality and specificity. If an operation on the ground were to receive their information from afar, there may be problems with its quality, or it can simply take too long to acquire. So in a new trend, the Army has begun to launch what appear to be model airplanes, though they are actually UAVs designed to conduct local surveillance and reconnaissance. So, if you are in the middle of a city, and it is really important for you to know what is around the corner, there is a technology available that can allow you to access that.

So, we have all of this available information on the internet, sensors are producing more of it, and we have innovative ways to combine it. What is the payoff? This raises the fourth technology area of data-mining, a subject that causes a lot of confusion. I define data-mining as the ability to collect and sort this massive amount of data with a computer to find useful patterns, fields of interest, or even undiscovered relationships lurking in large and even unrelated datasets. Perhaps, the best, most familiar example of data-mining is illustrated in the case of credit card fraud, where credit card companies have, in fact, been compiling, as well as sorting out patterns in, massive amounts of data for fifteen or twenty years now – and they really have it down. Of course, after 9/11, there was a sense that if we can find the person committing credit card fraud, why can't we find the terrorist in the same way, or the people that we do not want to allow on airplanes, for instance.

To decide whether data-mining is a useful tool for this or another application, consider these three questions: how often does an activity occur; how easy is it to recognize that it has occurred; and how bad is it, if you say it has occurred and it has not? Who has been called by a credit card company asking them if a given charge was valid? Perhaps, at least fifty percent of our audience has had this experience. Once, I drove straight from Cincinnati to Boston overnight, stopping for gas three times, only to receive a call the next morning: my transactions, my behavior, tripped a rule, a pattern, that the credit card company had, in fact, associated with fraudulent credit card use. Here is a case where the patterns in credit card fraud are identified and obvious. What about the cost? Was I offended when they called me? On the contrary, I actually thought, 'great, the credit card company is really watching out for me.' Obviously this sentiment would turn quickly into its opposite if I found myself, en route to Dallas on a business trip, on the "no fly" list. If this happened to you, you might think that some computer has mistakenly determined that you are a terrorist; that no one has looked into this issue very carefully; and that every time that you visit an airport, here on out, you will be searched, hassled, scrutinized. This represents a big difference in terms of the cost of being wrong.

You can actually plot these questions and the problems that they may raise and compare them on a graph: the credit card fraud example, I would argue, occurs a lot; credit card companies have thus been able to hone their rules for its identification; and if they are wrong, they still receive good feedback from people like us. By contrast, terrorism does not occur very often, thankfully; when it does occur, it is recognizable, but are the patterns leading up to it equally recognizable? After the fact, patterns may be visible, four men taking a plane to Los Angeles, for instance, but that represents a low signal – there are always four people flying to Los Angeles. It is very difficult to discern patterns in this case. What about the Iraqi insurgency? If IEDs are the event of interest, they happen a lot – certainly more than Al Qaeda-style terrorism – but probably less than credit card fraud. How easy are they, the patterns leading up to them, to recognize? Again, is it a situation where one can recognize the bomb going off, but not any stable patterns leading up to it? One thing is working against us here in this case: the people planting IEDs are not dumb; they are smart and adaptive. If there were a pattern, it may not be stationary long enough for these techniques to identify it. There is therefore, right now, a boundary between when and where data-mining works well and when it does not.

What does work well, regardless, is giving an analyst these tools and techniques, the facility to explore all relevant data, to confirm hypotheses, to explore linkages, etc. That is what is happening in the national security space today. We are not, in a mindless way, allowing computers to do the thinking – these techniques are enabled and optimized only by a smart analyst. Most people, when they understand this, are willing to make the privacy/data analysis tradeoff, just like we all were willing to do with the credit card company – it makes you feel safer. It is, of course, a lot better when you know that it is not just some mindless computer plowing through data, including yours. In fact, there is a dedicated core of folks who spend 18-hours a day doing this kind of thing.

I want to end by discussing the growing importance of social and cultural understanding. Remember the SAGE system, the air-defense system that I mentioned, which was an early example of the integration of computers with communications? It was built by electrical engineers, physicists, and mathematicians. Today, however, MITRE is hiring sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists: why? Because we know, in fact, that the ‘physics’ that we need to understand is occurring in the social sciences – in this way, being here at the Maxwell School is helpful, given its emphasis on the social sciences.

The importance of this kind of social and cultural knowledge has also been observed by the QDR, especially in what has happened over the last few years. It used to be that an “intelligence prep” of the battlefield involved going

out there and counting tanks, airfields, airplanes, for instance. Today, we have a notion of a “cultural prep” of the environment, going out and understanding the local conditions, who is in charge, the tribal infrastructure, customs, etc. We also understand that if we go into a situation and do not understand these things, that we may, easily, do more harm than good. What about the graffiti that a soldier may encounter, for instance, the meaning of its symbols? Why does some graffiti get consistently overwritten by others? These elements are all very important for us to understand better. We have to adapt technology to non-textual culture too, to be able to search out images, as well: we have, for instance, an effort in which we are applying technology to this challenge originally developed to search the internet for trademark violations, for pirated Nike or Coca Cola imagery.

I mentioned previously the problems of not speaking the languages of our adversary. The same language issue can arise between the members of the many coalitions that we get involved in. Military folks here today know how important instant messaging or chat has been in the last four years in terms of doing operations, in taking away the middleman, and in greatly reducing the latency of information. We have developed a translingual instant messaging system, called TrIM, to address this issue. Consider this actual transcript where Rod Holland, a J-6 in a multi-national division, is talking to a Polish counterpart: he is saying, basically, that he can give them more bandwidth to help get them connected to the network. His interlocutor says, “thanks, that is really good news,” and then, the J-6 tells him that “it will take about a month.” There is some written garble when the machine translation fails, but what is interesting about chat is that, because it is an active interaction, you can actually negotiate meaning when the message is unclear. Eventually what happens is that you ask your interlocutor to state his message in another way, hoping that the machine can understand a different phrasing better. Eventually, the J-6 writes back, rather wittily, “If I said I could do this for you next week, you would call me a liar,” which is being fairly subtle and using humor – the thing perhaps not to do on translingual chat. I cannot imagine what happened next.

We also have developed a tool that integrates this computer-assisted translation technique into another kind of environment, the kind of environment that analysts use all of the time, called “Clipper.” So, for instance, an analyst can browse foreign language websites using Clipper: the first one we did was for China, but now Clipper has about ten languages, including Farsi. What is crucial here is discovery, the browsing process: if you place a linguist in-between an analyst and some foreign language source material, the analyst cannot browse or be agile. There is, however, a tradeoff: the level and quality of translation.

I hope these examples give some perspective on where we are in terms of intervening in and countering this asymmetric, idiosyncratic threat, and how we are developing technologies to change our posture from a reactive to a more active and agile mode, which this situation requires. Where we need more research today, is in understanding the social physics – getting back to my metaphor of knowing where to bend the beam. A place like the Maxwell School could help us here enormously. Simply consider the whole notion of the war of ideas, how it propagates, the cultural channels, the social networks. Today, social network analysis, putting together the large linked diagrams of entities and how they relate, is well-worn territory, whether tracking behavior of a group online, or following the players and relationships from a piece of intelligence. The organizational chart, however, does not really tell you how members relate, or how the organization operates. It certainly does not explain why. What if there are no links? We are in a place where the technology allows groups to sort of congeal relationships without explicit communication linkages. We need new ideas.

Consider another analogy to epidemics in how ideas spread: when does an idea catch on, what are their patterns or indications; how does it move from a bunch of disconnected parts to a powerful, galvanizing force? What accounts for this phase change? These questions are examples from the field of computational social science, which takes social science into a more quantitative dimension, into model building. We build models initially to make sure that we have captured the things that we have seen – we validate them that way. The challenge, really, is to move from description to prescription, from describing things that we are seeing to explaining them. How might I use these techniques and which ideas should I tune into to bend that beam in such a way that makes it not at all obvious that I am bending it?

I have tried to argue that, whether we call it idiosyncratic or asymmetric warfare, today, the nature of our challenge means that we cannot win using reactive means or postures. Indeed, to try to do so would take a long time and a lot of money and, more than this, our opponent will not remain “in bounds” – they are interested in tweaking us in some way that we do not expect. If we must move to the offensive and if that offensive posture must be local, small, agile, then which technologies will help us in this endeavor? In fact, since both sides will likely use similar technologies, the question will be: who is better at using them and for what ends? The key ingredient for our success on this front, in my opinion, is mixing a bit of ‘social physics’ into our equations, in conducting interdisciplinary work in developing and utilizing these technologies, in mobilizing our scientists, engineers, and internet-types with social scientists, sociologists, cultural analysts and anthropologists – this is where the answers will lie.

Seeking Symmetry in Fourth Generation Warfare: Information Operations in the War of Ideas

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Introduction & Overview

The United States is engaged in a protracted global counter-insurgency – a fourth generation war in which loosely allied irregular forces and terrorists threaten U.S. interests abroad and at home. In this conflict information operations are important – maybe the most important – instruments of power.

The general thesis of my talk is that there is a greater need to understand the role of information in this conflict, as well as a need to develop an overarching strategy and doctrinal framework to integrate information operations writ broadly, not just within DOD, nor at the interagency levels, but across the U.S. government and all its allies and partners to succeed in this conflict.

Counter-insurgency is political warfare and can only be successful where counter-force strategies, actions and effects are perceived to have legitimacy; and where they succeed in isolating insurgents, separating them from the general population, and eliminating any external or popular support.

This talk discusses how the emergence and characteristics of fourth-generation warfare lead to a convergence of the previously separate domains of national security and traditional law enforcement resulting in the need for new strategies, doctrine and law. My central claim is that in fourth generation warfare, *legitimacy* – that is, the perceived legitimacy of actions and effects among relevant populations – is the true center of gravity and that information, ideas, and information operations are the paramount instruments of power in this struggle.

I will discuss characteristics of fourth-generation warfare, aspects of symmetry and asymmetry, how information and information operations interact and have relevance, and I will try to reconcile the claim made earlier that the problem is idiosyncratic rather than asymmetric. I will also discuss some of the ways that al-Qa'ida is using information operations and the Internet to further its own aims, and how counter-force information operations might be directed against them.

Links to download the presentation slides, references, and other related material are available at <http://information-warfare.info/>.

Background

The point of view from which I approach these issues is as an information theorist, a communication theorist – someone who has spent a lot of time looking at and thinking about information and communication as the fundamental units of human activity and at how these impact on other social issues, activities and arenas, in this case, how they relate to modern warfare. One of the overall claims that I will make is that our enemy is in the end not that different than we are in terms of human communication. Accepting that they function under some of the same psychological, social and other constraints that all human beings do – while understanding that this does not excuse any particular behavior – allows you to use information more effectively for combat in fourth-generation warfare.

But a caveat, here: I am also making some actual claims about equivalency, theoretical equivalency, between how al-Qa'ida and our enemies view what they are doing and how we perceive our own actions and doctrine. Obviously, I am not suggesting any moral equivalency between our enemies and ourselves, but I think it is important for us to understand how the other side looks at the same things, at how they view their own actions. If we can understand how they use information to support or justify their own actions perhaps we can be more effective in our own counter-efforts.

But, let us first consider some background definitions and documents so that we are starting from the same base. Some of the relevant reference material

11 U.S. Department of Defense, Information Operations Roadmap, 30 October 2003; U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations (GPO 2006); U.S. Air Force, Policy Doc. 10-7, Information Operations (2006); U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13.4, Military Deception (GPO 2006); U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (GPO 2003); U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-61, Public Affairs (GPO 2005); U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs (GPO 2003); U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-51.1, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare (GPO 2000); U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review ("QDR") Report, 6 February 2006; U.S. Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005; National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006).

See also Winn Schwartau, *Information Warfare* (TMP 1996); Dorothy Denning, *Information Warfare and Security* (Addison-Wesley 1998); Robert Leonhard, *Principles of War for the Information Age* (Presidio 2000); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Rand 2001); Bruce Berkowitz, *The New Face of War: How War Will be Fought in the 21st Century* (Free Press 2003); Leigh Armistead, *Information Operations* (Jt. Forces Staff College and NSA 2004); Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds* (Belknap/Harvard 2004).

12 U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (1940), U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War* (GPO 1995); U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense* (GPO 1996); U.S. Army Field Manual, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (FMI 3-07.22) (GPO 2004); National Security Council, *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006).

See also Ian Becket, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies* (Routledge 2001); Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea* (Brassey's 2002); Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (Putnam 2004); John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago 2002, 2005); Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary War* (Potomac 2005); Robert Bunker, ed., *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency* (Routledge 2005).

for my talk includes information operation doctrine and strategy,¹¹ counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy,¹² and understanding the insurgency and terrorism.¹³

A word of caution on my use in this talk of the term information operations. When I refer to information operations here, I am generally not using the more narrow definition that is limited to things like computer network operations, cyberwar, etc., but to the use of information more broadly in this new kind of conflict – including things like public diplomacy, propaganda, PSYOPS, etc. – hopefully, I will make those distinctions more clear shortly.

Finally, on understanding the insurgency itself, on understanding the enemy, I think it is absolutely vital for anyone engaged in this conflict to be familiar with this background material. Anyone who is not familiar with this work is missing a big part of the picture – particularly with those documents describing the Iraqi and al-Qa’ida insurgency – their thoughts, justifications, and strategies – through the insurgent’s own words – in particular *In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, Harmony and Disharmony*, and *Stealing Al-Qa’ida’s Playbook*.¹⁴ There is an absolute need to get a sense of who the enemy is – I believe this was the first point made by the Vice-Chairman Adm. Edmund Giambastiani yesterday – to “know your enemy” as Sun Tzu would say.

Convergence

So why do we need an overarching doctrine? It is because there is this issue of convergence in the context of a new paradigm of warfare. Traditionally, we have had two defined domains – a national security power domain and a law enforcement power domain – and now we are talking about moving into a new arena where we do not really know how to act – we have not yet formulated an effective doctrine, there are no rules.

In this conflict, the purpose of using military power has shifted from destruction to disruption; and for law enforcement has shifted from prosecution

13 Amena Consulting Group for NCCI, *Electronic Propaganda of the Iraqi Insurgency* (2005); Bruce Hoffman, *Does Our CT Strategy Match the Threat?* (RAND 2005); International Crisis Group, *In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency* (ICG 2006); Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities* (2006); Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, *Stealing Al-Qa’ida’s Playbook* (2006).

See also Walter Reich, *Origins of Terrorism* (Woodrow Wilson 1998); Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia 1999); Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God* (Harper 2003); Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (UPenn 2004); Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Potomac 2002); Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet* (USIP 2006).

14 See references in note 13 supra.

15 Jane Harman, *The Fog of Law: The Need for a Legal Framework for Twenty-First Century Security Policy*, transcript with Richard M. Cohen, Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2006, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10133/fog_of_law.html. (“We have in recent years reorganized our intelligence structure ... [b]ut four years [after] 9/11, we still don’t have a legal framework for how to gather intelligence and what specifically we expect our intelligence operatives to do – the rules within which they must live.”)

to preemption. We are in what Congresswoman Jane Harman called at the Council on Foreign Relations recently, ‘the fog of law.’¹⁵ And I do not mean here law in its narrowest sense – I mean that we really do not have a doctrine or rules for how to operate. We are very comfortable operating in the other two traditional areas, but not in this new field. We simply don’t know what to do – but that must, and is, changing.

Fourth Generation Warfare

What is fourth-generation warfare, and why are we talking about it? Here is how the Russians view the lessons learned from the war in Iraq:

We are approaching a stage of development where everyone is a soldier or everyone is involved in combat actions. The task now is to demoralize the enemy and destroy its intrinsic values.¹⁶

And, the Chinese view of modern warfare:

The new principles of war are no longer ‘using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,’ but rather are ‘using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.’¹⁷

And, that of our own military thinkers:

[The] goal [is] collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture. the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point ... the distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear.¹⁸

16 Maj. Gen. G.A. Berezkin, Deputy Head of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Center of Military-Technical Information Studies, *Lessons from the War in Iraq*, Military Thought (May 1, 2003).

17 Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: Peoples Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999).

18 Col. William S. Lind, et al., *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*, Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989).

19 Although I speak of “generations”, these are neither exclusive paradigms nor necessarily sequenced linearly in history – that is, the principles of each generation have co-existed and elements of later generations have been exhibited in earlier times. Indeed, the point is that elements of later generations can be used to defeat forces organized on earlier principles. For example, the American Revolutionists combined aspects of third (maneuver) and fourth (irregular combatants) generation warfare against the British; and, the allied forces of Britain, Portugal and Spain used maneuver and psychological/political warfare to defeat a larger, better trained, better equipped and better funded French Napoleonic army in the Peninsular War (1808–1814). Further, there are many other examples and references to information and information operations that can be found throughout military history – and strategies and tactics like those discussed in this talk aimed at disrupting organizational networks are not new. Machiavelli, among others, wrote about disrupting organization by planting seeds of dissension or by eliminating necessary support elements. See Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (W. K. Marriot, tr., 1916, c. 1505), *The Art Of War* (Ellis Farnsworth, tr., revised edition, 1965, 1520), and *The Discourses* (Leslie J. Walker and Bernard Crick, trs. 1985, 1531) and manipulating information to create discontent and unrest within enemy forces has been a staple of military theorists since the earliest known western technical warfare writer, Aeneas Tacticus, *On the Defense of Fortified Positions* (Loeb Classics 1923, 360 B.C.). See also Sun Tzu, *The Art Of War* 41 (S. B. Griffith, tr., 1963, c. 500 BC) (“All warfare is based on deception”).

I will not spend a lot of time discussing the evolution of warfare, but I do want to make one small distinction with how it was laid out yesterday. In my view the key is to recognize that each generation of warfare is essentially a response to the technology and doctrine that entrenched the order of the previous generation battle space.¹⁹ So, first-generation warfare brought linear order to the battle space by organizing operations into a line, a column. Previously, warfare had little order, it was based either on individual combat or a disorganized scrum. Linear organization allowed commanders control of the battle space. In a way, it is part of our problem today that we are so used to an ordered battle space, thus, an enemy action not conforming to the old rules is seen as “idiosyncratic” or “asymmetric.”

Second-generation warfare was a reaction to the disorder brought to first generation warfare by technology – once machine guns and tanks were able to disrupt the column, for instance – this moved us to a concept of second-generation warfare – massed firepower, steel on target. Tanks against tanks, artillery duels, battles like that.

I would argue that the U.S. Army is still basically organized to some extent on these second-generation warfare principles – a reliance on massed firepower – and is still organized to fight a similarly organized enemy.

Third-generation warfare was a response to overcome the inertia of second-generation warfare – the kind of inertia evidenced by trench warfare in the First World War. Third-generation warfare is characterized by dynamic maneuver – like the German blitzkrieg of World War II that simply went around or over the defense. The U.S. Marine Corps is essentially organized on third generation principles – speed, surprise, and dislocation.

We are, today, into fourth-generation warfare, and the key in my mind – and we will talk about insurgency, shortly – is that in fourth-generation warfare the state has lost its traditional monopoly on war and violence.²⁰ This raises what was referred to earlier as the idiosyncratic problem: when the state had a monopoly, we knew how to play by the rules, the nation-state’s rules, i.e., the laws of armed conflict. Within that context we knew the rules; but now, we are being forced to move outside of that box.²¹ We have lost control of the battle space. And, we must adopt a new framework for dealing with this perception of disorder and chaos.

As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted at the National Press Club:

Compelled by a militant ideology that celebrates murder and suicide, with no territory to defend, with little to lose, they will either succeed

²⁰ See references in note 16 supra.

²¹ Note that this evolution has been recognized in the QDR, supra note 11, and also that U.S. Special Operation Forces are essentially organized along fourth-generation principles.

²² Speech delivered at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 2, 2006).

in changing our way of life or we will succeed in changing theirs. ... Because they cannot defeat our forces on the battlefield, they challenge us through nontraditional, asymmetric or irregular means.²²

Since our enemies cannot challenge us on the traditional battlefield, these non-traditional, asymmetric, or irregular means are employed – hence, we have arrived at fourth-generation warfare – and the fight against a global insurgency.

So we really are in a political war, and in a political war superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. This is obvious – we have talked about it over the last couple of days.

Again, conventional warfare generally only works against established powers, in symmetrical conflicts, which our enemies know, just as they know that fourth-generation warfare – insurgency – is the only approach against which the U.S. has ever lost (for example, Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia).

However, counter-insurgencies also can be waged successfully: we have examples in Malaya, Oman, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But, these small wars, these insurgencies, are long wars, political wars, special operations wars, all of which we have recognized in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review.

If first – through third-generation warfare between nation states could be thought of as ‘diplomacy by other means,’ today, in fourth-generation warfare, where we are dealing with non-state actors, fourth-generation war is really ‘politics by other means’ – which is different from ‘diplomacy by other means’ – with different characteristics and different implications. Insurgency and counter-insurgency is political warfare aimed not at persuading other governments or nation states through force to bend to your will, but to convince populations to support your cause, your desired outcome – to accept, if you will, a common set of rules.

In this context, the center of gravity that we have heard much about over the last couple of days has become popular support, the hearts and minds, the belief of the people.

So – and I am going to get to one of my main points here – information and information operations are the key to fourth-generation warfare.

Information in Fourth-Generation Warfare

We might consider four arenas or levels in which information plays an important role in fourth-generation warfare – the strategic level, the theatre level, the tactical level, and the operational level.

At the strategic level, public diplomacy and perception management, aimed at reducing the appeal of extremists, encouraging alternative views

and values, and discouraging “terrorism” as an acceptable tactic, are important. Ultimately, it is about providing acceptable alternatives.

At the “theater” level, in civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS), it is important to separate terrorists from their support structures, the rest of society, to make their actions not an acceptable alternative to an ordered society that people are prepared to support, and to stabilize moderate forces.

At the tactical level, information operations must discredit the insurgency, discredit al-Qa’ida, create discord, provoke distrust among its operatives, demoralize its volunteers, discourage its recruits, and thereby destroy group cohesion and eliminate their capacity to act. Actually, this is where information operations are the informational equivalent to kinetics, where they can be used to break group cohesion.


At the operational level, especially combined with the use of intelligence, the goal is to disrupt enemy operations, to preempt terrorist actions.

I want to make a few observations about information as an instrument of power in relation to traditional firepower. In fourth-generation conflicts, non-military instruments of power – in this case, information operations – can trump military solutions. Indeed, although information can constrain the exercise of kinetic power, kinetic power cannot constrain information power.

Most obviously, information has more affect on popular support – the center of gravity in fourth-generation war – than kinetic power. I will talk a bit more about what I mean by this later, but the key point here is understanding the “bullet versus information” question.

What is the role of information in conflict resolution? When we are talking about war being at the other extreme of politics on a continuum, consider this spectrum: on one end, it is totally kinetic, violent, while at the other end,

Role of Information in Conflict Resolution



it is nearly a completely information-based activity: So, what is the power of information? Information is not powerful on its own terms – it is only powerful in context. It derives its usefulness (or uselessness) in relation to decision-making, in support of a worldview or paradigm that enables decision-making and action taking.


Thus, the utility of information is actually more important than its truth-value. This is not to say that false information is power, but for instance, if we are talking about Abu Ghraib, one can explain that situation in many terms, argue that the particular actions were an aberration, but in the end, a single image defines and wins the debate. So the fact that you can explain things, explain your position, and even that you may be “right” in some intellectual sense is not necessarily important in information warfare, in the battle of information, or in the war of ideas.

It is the power of information to shape perceptions, its utility to influence decision-making leading to physical world consequences – its capacity for self realization – that trumps its truth value.

Information as Warfare

Information operations – and, here I am using the more narrow sense of the term – refers to the protection, monitoring, disruption, or manipulation of information, channels, or actors in order to improve one’s own decision-making and/or to degrade that of the enemy. In order to improve one’s own capacity, you want to reorient the usefulness of information or information flows to support your mission at the expense of your opponents. You want to focus on the cognitive and physical data that supports decision-making or that influences the perceptions of groups and individuals. That is where manipulation comes in, as well as disruption.

Here is a simple information flow model to illustrate the relationship between information and decision-making:



Essentially, data plus context plus knowledge equals information on which one can make decisions, or on which one can form a worldview. You can break that model – or change its outcome – by disrupting one of these elements – you can change the information that is going into the system – in negative or positive ways – by feeding in new information, what you think your truth values are, etc., for instance, or you can feed in false information, or you can distort existing information. But the idea is to alter some of the inputs or contexts in order to make the decision-making process change – hopefully, to change to your advantage.

So, information is warfare, the “war of ideas” is war – and conflict itself is a complex adaptive system – particularly now – in which information informs actions and actions are constrained by feedback in an infinite loop. Information determines the terms of battle. The objective in information operations is to deny, oppose, or to destroy the opponent’s worldview, or to change the paradigm in which he operates so as to degrade his decision-making or to undermine his external support. To do this we need to find out how to apply these principles – to fight in this new context.

Elements of Advantage

We have been talking about power and effects in relation to information. One of my claims is that in modern warfare information itself is actually more powerful than traditional elements of power: that the information environment that you are acting in and the feedback from the effects of your action constrains your ability to use power – whether kinetic power or any other power.

Crucially, the perception of legitimacy can increase power – when people perceive that you are acting legitimately, you can use power to a greater degree, to greater effect. But to the extent that they perceive that you are acting illegitimately – or if your actions are perceived to have unjust effects – it constrains your ability to actually exercise that power in the first place – or undermines its desired effects. So power is information-environment dependent.

I am not sure if you are familiar with the article “Kill Faster!” by a reporter – a former Army officer – who was embedded at Fallujah. The point of the article was that, given the role of the global media as a strategic factor today, “we must direct our doctrine, training, equipment, organization and plans toward winning low-level fights much faster” before “the global media can do what enemy forces cannot do and stop us short.”²³ In the rich media environment in which we live, the mistake in Fallujah was to not finish the kill within one news cycle. The images that were emerging – regardless of whether Fallujah was actually filled with insurgents or not – made it appear as if the U.S. Marines

23 Ralph Peters, Kill Faster! N.Y. POST, May 20, 2004.

were destroying residential neighborhoods, which resulted in political pressure that required the Marines to pull back – this was why, essentially, that battle was lost. Information constrains kinetic power.

One of the problems in recognizing legitimacy – legitimacy as the lynchpin of the center of gravity, of the popular will – is that it is founded on the cultural perceptions of a given audience. We tend to talk about this from our point of view, from the western, the Westphalian model based on nation states, the laws of war, etc., and we tend to say that anything that is outside of our perception of that is somehow different – idiosyncratic or even illegitimate.

Taking the example of idiosyncratic used this morning, of coming across a dead animal in the road that blows up, I am not sure if that is any different from a British soldier marching along in formation in 1776 and an American colonialist jumping out from behind a tree and shooting him. In each case, the paradigm that you are functioning within is somehow challenged by unexpected or non-conforming behavior. The problem is that legitimacy – and especially the perception of legitimacy – is not universal, but is perceived through cultural relativity. One man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, as they say.

The opportunity, however, is that the enemy also requires legitimacy to win, or even to continue the fight. This is an important recognition, and where I think that there is actually symmetry and not asymmetry in information operations. The enemy requires legitimacy as much as we do. His legitimacy must be attacked – he must be seen among his own supporters as a terrorist, not a freedom fighter – but his legitimacy must be attacked on its own terms – in terms of how he and his supporters perceive it.

Obviously, I am not an expert on Salafism, but after 9/11 there was a wide outpouring across the Muslim world condemning that action as an attack against innocent civilians, as un-Islamic. In response, al-Qa'ida – very defensively – had to put forth their case for why they felt it was legitimate to do this – it was a debate – the beginning of a debate – in the Muslim world. And, it was a debate that took place in Qur'anic terms – but in terms that have equivalence to those we use in the west – in our laws of war, for example – using concepts analogous to those of collateral damage, necessity, dual use, etc.²⁴

And, it was not clear how this debate was going to turn out – it was not clear until after we invaded Iraq – at which point, all of those leaders, those scholars, those clerics that had condemned 9/11 said, “well, I'm not sure about 9/11, but I will say that it is a Muslim's duty to fight invaders on Muslim land.” And, that statement, while not necessarily encouraging violence directly, made them – and much of the Muslim world – at best, neutral in the conflict, if not

24 See Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11, Middle East Policy Council Journal, Vol. X No. 2 (Summer 2003).

actually supporters of the insurgency. Worse, as a practical matter, it ended the debate.

Now we may think that their justifications for their acts may be completely off base from how we perceive things, but the issue and the theoretical framework by which they approach the issue, I would argue, is exactly the same – it is a human-decision making and communication process, a political process, intended to maintain support, to maintain legitimacy.

The Audience & the Debate

In a sense, the bigger battle – the war – will be won or lost with the *ummah*, the worldwide Muslim population. If a lesson of Vietnam was that we cannot win a war without the support of the American people, the lesson we are learning in this struggle – this struggle against these fundamentalists – is that we cannot win without the support of the *ummah*.

So what are the sources of legitimacy in this conflict? For us and our supporters, authoritative legitimacy comes from certain well-known examples – the secular canon, the rule of law, the nation state, the Westphalian system, the United Nations, whatever you want to use here – for them, it is the Qur'an and other sources. This is an interesting battle, a perception battle, a battle where information operations as a tactic can potentially have significant effects.

But, it was asked yesterday, is there a role for us in their intellectual debate? This depends upon how you define the intellectual debate: if the intellectual debate is about what the Qur'an actually says or authorizes, we can have a lot of views on that, westerners and others. But, in the end, I am not sure that those views are particularly relevant. It is not that we cannot have a view, cannot be "right," or cannot point out particular sayings in, or interpretations of, the Qur'an, but again, it is not really about the truth-value of what you say, but the authority – the perceived legitimacy – with which you say it and how it is received. Therefore, a Muslim leader, even a "terrorist" leader, even if he says something incorrect about the Qur'an, can have more authority with our enemy and his supporters than a very learned western Islamist at Harvard University could.

But I think that we do have a role in the intellectual debate because if we actually think that our canon, the Enlightenment ideals embedded in our Constitution, etc., the whole basis for freedom, democracy, etc., are the right ideas, the right human values – and if we believe that those values are universal – or potentially universal – and should triumph in the end, then what we have to do is make sure that Muslims in conflict have access to these ideas. But these values cannot be imposed – we need to find ways to make them part of the Muslim debate, ways for these values to grow Muslim roots if you will, to take hold among Muslim intellectuals, to become relevant to Muslim audiences on their terms, etc.

Unfortunately, we have not done a good job in making these ideas available. I'm not going to talk about the language problem here today, but as a simple example, investing in language skills, in translation, is a big deal. You cannot understand a man – much less change his mind – unless you can talk to him.

In the entire last millennium, do you know how many books were translated from English into Arabic? About ten thousand – in a thousand years we have translated the same number of books into Arabic that are translated into Spanish every year. There have been more books translated from English to Greek – a language spoken by maybe 10-15 million people – than into Arabic – a language spoken by, perhaps, 200-250 million people – so there is a problem, here, a basic communication problem, which I do not have time to address in more detail.

Information Symmetry & Asymmetry

I have just said that there is a kind of symmetry in information operations because of the need for legitimacy on both sides. But there is also a basic asymmetry in the relationship of violence and information that must be recognized as well: insurgencies use violence to prep the information battle space – that is, they use violence to highlight the political case – while we tend to use information as a way to prep the physical battle space, that is, we make the political case to justify the use of violence.

This is an enormous difference, an asymmetric problem that we need to address. For the insurgents, the use of violence is itself a success – this is their physics. For them, violence is tactically insignificant, but it has a huge strategic effect. Not only does it have a psychological effect on us and our supporters but it gives credence and credibility to them – highlights their ability to act against the U.S., against power. These acts make us spend immense sums of treasure on defenses, to protect against future acts, to reassure our own population of their safety.

Meanwhile, for us, for counter-insurgency, the use of violence is itself a failure – it means that the political process has failed, that we have failed under our own rules of law and other standards that we say are the right way to do things. When we have to resort to violence, it may be tactically successful, but it is a failure, strategically counterproductive, with negative political effects.²⁵

So, it seems obvious that counter-force information strategies must undermine the insurgency's legitimacy, but in a credible way. It does no good, as I said before, for us to be right about the argument: the question is what is the perceived legitimacy and authority of that argument? The Muslim world thinks, for instance, that the United Nations is a rubber stamp for U.S. policy and

²⁵ This is true also when we are perceived to resort to overt tactics – torture, for example – at odds with our own espoused values.

interests – thus, U.N. approval may help with getting Europe on our side, but it does not help with the Muslim world. And, the insurgent's sense of legitimacy, and that of their supporters, comes from a completely different place, which is, again, religious and theocratic, so it is difficult to counter directly, but it is still an issue that we need to deal with directly.

Counterinsurgency Strategy

So, how do you undermine insurgents' legitimacy? There are the classic counter-insurgency strategies: isolate the insurgents, separate them from the population, target organizational fault-lines, eliminate external support, and exhibit consistent flexibility in doing all of that.

Most importantly, in my view, is that you must maintain integrity and, thus legitimacy, in the process while exposing an opponent's hypocrisy. It is not an accident that bin Laden calls moderate Muslim leaders hypocrites – he understands the need to de-legitimize his opponents.

By the way, you should know that everything that I have said today about the use of information – about insurgency and counter-insurgency – is outlined in al-Qa'ida's own documents.²⁶ These documents indicate that our opponents are further along in this analysis – in this new way of strategic thinking – than we are. They understand the need to argue for the legitimacy of their actions, which is why they put out their statements on websites, and why they claim that the Qur'an approves a given action.

They understand the power of information at both the tactical and strategic level. For example, bin Laden has recognized information operations as a tactic: “all that we have to do is to send two Mujahedin to the farthest point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qa'ida in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human economic and political losses without their achieving for it anything of note”²⁷ and has acknowledged its strategic value: “it is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.”²⁸

And, they understand insurgency and counter-insurgency strategy. In their training documents, for instance, they teach that as a foreign fighter when you go to a foreign location you will not have the support of the population at first

26 See Combating Terrorism Center, U. S. Military Academy, *Stealing Al-Qa'ida's Playbook and Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities*, supra note 13.

27 Translated transcript, provided by the U.S. government, of Osama bin Laden's videotaped message released and aired on the al-Jazeera satellite television network during the weekend before the U.S. presidential elections, as reported in the Washington Post (Nov. 1, 2004) at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16990-2004Nov1.html>. The release of this statement is itself an example of the “perception management” genre of information operations and the actions described in the quote are an example of the use of the “misdirection” genre.


28 Letter from Osama bin Laden to Emir Al-Momineed, AFGP-2002-600321, in Combating Terrorism Center, *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities*, supra note 13.

and so you must earn it – they have, in their documents, detailed processes about how you should go about doing that, how the jihadist fighter on the ground must personally exhibit certain ethical behaviors to prove to the population that he is worthy of being their soldier.

We need to learn how to do this better ourselves, to project our own values, positive values – and we need to learn how to counter their efforts directly– but how? One problem that we have relates to this question of legitimacy – how to do this at least in part with a hidden hand, in places where overt U.S. presence or action is counter-productive. If you are a moderate in the Middle East, for instance, overt U.S. support may be a detriment – you are perceived as a puppet or you end up dead. We must work through legitimate authoritative sources, with overt legitimacy where possible, but with covert action where necessary.

Let us return to symmetry. To put everything that I have just said on a graph, we are faced with our own heavy, physical infrastructure designed to fight a conventional war at this intensive, violent level and to manage perceptions only slightly. Our opponents are in the opposite situation: they use small amounts of violence to have large, even global, effects – to in effect prep the battle space for the war of ideas.

We cannot win unless we act against their asymmetric advantage directly.



[A]symmetric “balance”

Operational Objectives & Opportunities

I want to spend a minute on operational objectives. These objectives are to disrupt operational capabilities and to prevent actions on the part of the enemy – to preempt acts of terror, to reduce or eliminate the future threat. Information operations can help meet these goals by attacking or destroying their motivations and capabilities to act.

To prevent action requires breaking up the groups themselves – undermining the group dynamics and disabling the networks – you have to attack the cohesive elements of the group. This requires thinking about what keeps the group together. There is a lot of interesting recent behavioral science – including social network theory – that is useful to this dimension.

The bad news, as we heard earlier, is that al-Qa’ida is a net-centric group, a segmented tribal sort of organization, which means that there is no head, so to speak, to cut off. Information technology is a big enabling factor for them in this: the Internet allows them to communicate and actually affect command and control from anywhere in the world. In fact, the web is very interesting from a command-control perspective because it provides an unbelievable infrastructure. If we had to build the kind of command infrastructure that al-Qa’ida has access to for free by virtue of the Internet we could not afford it.

Secondly, the web enables a whole different way of functioning, as others have suggested earlier, defined by this network relationship – allowing power to migrate to non-state actors, lowering transaction costs, lowering risk, etc., eliminating the need for hierarchical organization, allowing for loosely affiliated or unconnected groups to act in concert.

So tactics that were adequate against traditional, hierarchically organized enemies – nation states, drug cartels, organized crime – are inadequate here. In this new context, as I said earlier, you have to break the network itself, destroy its capacity to function.

It is important to understand that I am talking about “net-war” not “cyberwar” here. Cyberwar – in which you are attacking the other’s information networks qua information systems – is itself like traditional military conflict or high-intensity conflict – you are essentially trying to break things, even if they are virtual things. Cyberwar may be useful in net-war, but net-war itself is more like low intensity conflict, the use of military operations other than warfare, and much more concerned with containment and prevention, rather than destruction. It is about the disruption of social organization – about eliminating the capacity for disparate hostile elements to act against your interests in concert.

The QDR recognizes the concept of ‘fighting the net.’ The premise in ‘fighting the net’ is that this fight itself – that is, fighting the network – requires a counter-network and all of the things that we have been talking about earlier: flexibility, speed, taking advantage of the ability to have real-time information, etc. But most fundamentally, it simply means understanding that the target is the network. The terror network itself is the force-multiplier for the enemy, it is what allows him to project his power – and it is that network that must be attacked.

Now there is a lot of research modeling and charting social networks, exercises on how to attack these kinds of organization, modeling destabilization strategies. You must look at the particular characteristics of networks and how

they break – particularly how communication links bind networks – and it is not always clear that the node which has the most connections or control (like in an hierarchical organization) is the thing that you want to take out – it may be the node with only a single connection between two otherwise unrelated groups that has the most destabilizing effect. Identifying the effects of destabilizing strategies is an area that requires much more research and thought.

Also, we have to think more about the kinds of things that facilitate group or network formation in the first place, what are their organizing principles, their preconditions – and we need to look for ways to undermine or eliminate conditions conducive to formation – to stop hostile networks from forming, to create inefficiencies and increased costs for the enemy.

Anyway, if the bad news is that al-Qa'ida is net-centric, the good news, if it can be called good news, is that to engage in terrorist acts that can have potentially catastrophic outcomes – that is, that can truly endanger the national security – still requires some kind of organization. To conduct nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks still requires, at least for now, enough organization to have some coordinating command – even if it is non-hierarchical – it requires some network to provide funding, communications, logistics, coordination, etc.

And, if there is a network, there is the potential for identification or discovery, and hopefully, disruption or preemption.

Disrupting Information Flows

We have done a reasonable job in developing counterterrorism strategies for disrupting terrorist financing, strategies aimed at limiting or undermining financial efficiency, and cutting off the flow of funds [Slides 48-49]. There is an international structure – an agreed structure – of lawful authorizing and controlling mechanisms that provides a general political consensus and legitimacy within the financial system to act, to interdict these channels, to cut off these flows. However, we have not developed the same kind of strategies against communications or other information flows.

To disrupt communications, information operations can be mounted against the data, the channels, or the actors. Going after the data can simply mean getting our point of view across – something that we have talked about already and that I think we will hear more about this afternoon in terms of public diplomacy, presenting different ideas and alternatives. But it also includes the more direct things, direct information operations, where you are actually manipulating data, changing data, disrupting the flow of data in some way, such that the utility of the information flow changes to your advantage.

Both of these levels, the strategic level of changing the popular will and the tactical level of intervening into data and information channels, requires some

form of legitimacy – truthfulness and awareness of how you will be perceived – or must be accomplished through covert action.

One complex problem that we face given the current global media environment is that operations at the tactical level often have a ‘blowback’ effect at the strategic level (and vice versa). You see this across the board: for example, in the Fallujah action, a Marine first lieutenant on his own initiative told an embedded CNN reporter that they were going to begin the assault that night even though the assault was actually scheduled for several days later. He did this in order to evoke a response from the enemy who would see the report on CNN that night. This was a great tactical military move to elicit battlefield information, to find out in advance how the enemy was going to respond to the attack – but when CNN reported that we were attacking Fallujah and it turned out that we were not attacking for another five days, the media spent the next week reporting how the Pentagon was lying to the press about what it was doing, rather than focusing on the real problems confronting our forces, or on who and where the enemy is.

Information operations can also produce unintended consequences. Before the invasion of Iraq, for instance, it was reported that we spammed the Iraqi generals’ cell phones with messages to surrender, to put down your arms and you will not be hurt, etc. What happened, as I understand it, was that all the generals went out and changed their cell phone numbers because they did not want Saddam Hussein to know that they were getting these messages from the Americans. By the time that we invaded and we needed to make contact, we could no longer call any of the generals because they had different cell phone numbers.

We also have some interesting statutory restrictions – and not just those that constrain the Pentagon from directly trying to influence U.S. opinion. We have privacy laws that prevent us from uncovering the identity behind enemy communications nodes, and cybercrime laws that prevent us from hacking into these communication or information channels. It may be one thing to mount operations in a military theater, in Iraq, for instance, and fit them under the existing laws of armed conflict, but it is different – and generally prohibited by law – when you are trying to do this to a server in London, or against a website hosted in the U.S. – even if that server is directly supporting enemy activity – even if the information is benefiting the enemy directly in theater.

It has been reported, for example, that the U.S. restrained from attacking the Iraqi banking system – that is, specifically from attacking Saddam’s and his sons’ accounts electronically – because those systems were so entwined with the French banks that built them that planners feared collateral damage in France or to French interests.

Essentially, the point I want to make on this issue of law is that we have a lot of laws on the books that differentiate rules for foreign or domestic operations, for war and peace – or that are based on historically justified geographic bounds – and that are there for very important reasons – but these rules can create huge problems in the global information operations space, in globalized media and communications. Lack of international consensus makes it difficult for us to pursue our enemy's use of the Internet, while at the same time various – and often conflicting – national cyberlaws put real constraints on our abilities to fight back.

Recognizing that information is an instrument of war in this battle raises some interesting questions – both regarding what we can do to wield it, but also what can we do to deny it to our enemies. Remember that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) are rules – internationally accepted rules – that essentially protect military forces engaged in what otherwise would be illegal acts – murder, theft, destruction of property, etc. – we need to develop the rules, the doctrine, to govern information operations. What otherwise illegal acts are to be allowed in information war? Allowed in a global counter-insurgency? We just don't know.

Assume a hypothetical case in which there was a properly authorized Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant permitting the monitoring of a certain communication channel in the U.S. – assume that it was a transit communication known to be used by al-Qa'ida – a situation where we are intercepting the communication, but either don't know or cannot reach the participants. Now we intercept a message that is going to have a real-world physical effect, to trigger an action, say – what do we do when we see that message?

It is one thing to monitor it for intelligence purposes, the FISA warrant allows that; but, it is another thing to interfere with that message, that channel. Let's assume that it is not the easy case – for example, 'hey, go pull the trigger on the nuke' – but more ambiguous or indirect – how would we go about stopping or intervening in the communication flow?

Suppose that they were involved in a long-term conspiracy, could we bring an action against the communication itself – the way we bring a legal action against instrumentalities of crimes? Like against cars or boats used in drug smuggling, for example? Could we shut down the communication node or the channel itself? What if it affects others using the same channel? How do you deal with collateral damage when the infrastructure is civilian? Or, when your own citizens or your allies are also using it?

Could we come up with a legal structure, for instance, that would allow you to go to court or another body and get a FISA-like "information operation warrant" that said: 'we do not know who these two guys are, but they are communicating

in this space, and we want to go into that space and intervene in that communication? How might we do that; what rules would we do it under?

It is not an impossible problem, but something that we have not thought enough about yet, including, how to do it in a way that has legitimacy when it shows up on the front page of *The New York Times*, which it inevitably will. This is what I mean when I say we need a doctrine, we need rules. And, it is not just so that things are “legal” – not just so that our own forces know what they can do, when they can act – but, also so that they know what they *should* do. Rules and doctrine permit action.

Al-Qa’ida, the Media, & the Internet

I want to talk briefly, before I end, about al-Qa’ida’s uses of the Internet. Both the kinds of organizing uses that we discussed earlier – the use of the Internet to enable a net-centric organizational structure, to support a metastasized movement that is somewhat self-organizing from the bottom up, that doesn’t need a hierarchical organization – and the instrumental uses – that is, uses to directly support actions and capabilities.

al-Qa’ida uses the Internet to spread its message. They target very specific audiences: supporters, who they aim to inspire and guide; potential supporters, who they aim to recruit and guide; international public opinion; enemy publics, which they attempt to segment and attack their fault lines; and enemy governments, to which they supply disinformation.

They are very sophisticated about this. They use the Internet to disseminate ideological messages calling for violent global Jihad, as well as to publicize operational “successes” by disseminating, for example, videos of terrorist attacks and beheadings. al-Qa’ida has its own media production unit, *as-Sahab*, which produces relatively sophisticated and multidimensional videos and other content. A formal propaganda organization of the global Jihad movement, the *Global Islamic Media Front*, serves as a distribution mechanism for these and other materials.

I will go back to something I said earlier: language is an important tool in information operations, and they use language very effectively, for example, to segment their messages to these various audiences. Take *al-Jazeera*: I read the English website, but when I talk to my friends who speak Arabic, I find that there is a whole different message conveyed from the same story in the Arabic version. Furthermore, I do not realize this because I am reading *al-Jazeera* only in English – I think this is how everybody is reading the story, but it isn’t. And, this is *al-Jazeera*, this is the mainstream Arab media.

In the case of al-Qa’ida and the jihadist websites, the reality is that your browser says “EN” when you go to their web sites, so they know the language you speak is English, and so they serve up something different to you, something

targeted to you. It is not just a different view or message for Americans versus the people that they are trying to recruit, but they have a different message for France, for Spain, and elsewhere. They use language effectively to segment their message and to get it across – something that we do not do very well. Unfortunately, we don't even have enough language skills to understand what others are saying, much less to try to speak to them or their supporters. This is really a public diplomacy point, which I am sure that Harold Pachios will be talking about later.

One of the ways we are trying to deal with this on the strategic level is to set up our own broadcasting company to compete with *al-Jazeera*. I have a friend on the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, with whom I have this debate all the time, where I say, 'how ridiculous is that, who is going to watch it?' He argues that their listening audience is huge, but what are the demographics? Are these the people that we have already convinced, that already support us – the government bureaucrats, the elites?

Even if the street is listening, are we getting our point of view across? If you look at any of the Arab polling on who listens to it, even our enemies will say, 'of course we listen to it, it has got the best music, and so we listen to the music and then we turn off the news.' This is not the way to get your viewpoint across.

I'm not arguing that we shouldn't do these things, shouldn't provide alternative media, our own channels, for example. But I'm skeptical about how successful it can be. This is not like Radio Free Europe, or Radio Liberty, where the target audience doesn't have access to any alternatives, or where the alternatives are known to be Iron Curtain propaganda. Today there are hundreds of legitimate sources, independent sources. A U.S. government outlet is going to be the one perceived as propaganda, no one is going to turn to it to get the "real story" as they might have with Radio Free Europe.

In my view, what you have to do is go on *al-Jazeera*, you have to get your viewpoint into their media. The Vice Chairman referred yesterday to paying to get truthful stories planted in the media that the locals are reading – but it is increasingly difficult to do that covertly; I wonder whether you can actually do that convincingly in the end, because it undermines your legitimacy and authority when it becomes known. If you are going to do this it must remain covert.²⁹

I think, in addition to covert actions, we have to have legitimate acknowledged spokespeople for the U.S. point of view who are willing to talk on *al-Jazeera*, and on *al-Arabia*. Getting our message out into their media is the only way that we will win this battle – you can't win the war of ideas in the Arab street unless you

29 See David S. Cloud and Jeff Gerth, Muslim Scholars Were Paid to Aid U.S. Propaganda, N.Y. Times (Jan. 2, 2006) in which U.S. efforts in Iraq are exposed. But, compare Reuel Marc Gerech, 'Hearts and Minds' in Iraq: As History Shows, Ideas Matter More Than Who Pays to Promote Them, Washington Post (January 10, 2006) arguing that it may not matter who pays, as long as the ideas get out.

get your viewpoint into the information flows informing the Arab street, into the flows trusted by the Arab street.

I could talk at length about al-Qa'ida's other instrumental uses of the Internet. How they use the Internet for recruitment and mobilization, to raise funds, for training, for reconnaissance, for surveillance and target selection, for psychological and propaganda operations and for planning, for command and control of actual operations, and how we might counter these.³⁰

Conclusion

But, I am out of time and the point, in any case, is not to enumerate each use but to understand that they are using the Internet – and sophisticated information operations – like any other adaptive organization to further their mission.

They are using technology – communications technology – as a force multiplier to achieve greater and wider effect than any previous insurgency was able. This allows them to essentially disregard geographical borders, to further a global insurgency, to project their power.

Unfortunately, they seem to be adapting to this new information environment faster and more effectively than counter-forces can respond. We need to understand these developments and to develop more effective doctrine based on legitimating our actions and de-legitimizing theirs, and we have to do so on their terms.

Finally, we need to develop a joint doctrine – joint across all instruments and organs of national and allied power – to put forward a consistent ideological response, including a coordinated information campaign plan.

Thank you.

Panel Discussion

Question: The panelists all wrestled somewhat with well-known catchphrases. But I think that we hamstring ourselves by searching for terms like asymmetric or idiosyncratic warfare, in affect, compartmentalizing types of warfare. Only Saddam Hussein was stupid enough to engage us in traditional warfare. Iran and China, if they become opponents, will confront us with all means, traditional and otherwise. Are we really in a fourth-generation of warfare, or does contemporary warfare include state and non-state opponents using all means against us, and should we be preparing for that?

Meigs: I do not see a conflict here. You deal with the crisis you are in, and right now the approximate crisis is a different kind of warfare. I think

30 See K. A. Taipale, *Seeking Symmetry on the Information Front: Confronting Global Jihad on the Internet*, 16 Nat'l Strategy F. Rev. 14 (Summer 2007) available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=987040>.

that if you look at the training and the equipping of the forces that we have in the Department of Defense, they are very capable of fighting a conventional campaign on air, sea, and land. It is just that they also must adapt themselves in the short term to this particular problem and be prepared to deal with it over the long term, if it persists.

Games: I say it is a continuum. In reality, a lot of these technologies have only appeared recently. These activities that we are involved in, now, are giving us the opportunity to test them out and to see how they work – we are learning a tremendous amount. So it is a test case really for a lot of things that might be very important, including traditional force-on-force activity, in the future.

Taipale: I do not have much to add. I will just say that the information component is not going to go away. If you read Chinese strategic documents – those that the CIA translates and puts on the web – you will see that their planning includes network operations. We have a fairly structured way of going after financing – we have laws, cooperation, including the private sector, information sharing. In fact, we have done a lot of things against terrorist funding that we have not done anywhere else. It should be a model, I think, of how we deal with other areas.

Question: If I may, I would like to ask a simple question: you gentlemen all mentioned a variety of challenges, military, strategic, tactical, cultural, information challenges, etc. I really would like a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to this. While you all suggested various ways to make some progress, in your view, are we gaining? Are we falling behind? Are we going to win this?

Meigs: We are making progress in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not as fast as anyone would like, but that is the nature of the beast. The war on, the so-called, war on terror, the war between cultures, civilizations, we have cycles and waves of violence, sponsored violence, across the Muslim world. I do not think that the American people have come to grips with that yet – I do not think that they understand how much of a problem this can be in our future. If they, if we and our allies, if the moderate Islamic community can understand this better, I think we can win it, and, I think, quite honestly, the major perimeter is legitimacy. I am very taken with that argument today.

Taipale: I am going to take a little bit of issue with what you said. Although I might be a ‘maybe’ also, I think we actually know what the threat to success is – weapons of mass destruction. If the capabilities increase with this current enemy at a rate that exceeds our ability to transform, to deal with it, we will lose in a sense – our way of life will change significantly in a way that we will not recognize it and that will be a loss, whether they win or not. That is the real issue that I do not think that people have addressed. So it is the unknown in the rate of capabilities. We face an enemy who has put a thought out there that says it is OK to use weapons of mass destruction against civilians – that is part

of their doctrine. So I think that you cannot look at whether we are moving fast enough against any particular threat in isolation, because WMDs are the great unknown.

Question: There is not just one debate going on within the Islamic world. There are many, many debates, and I think that only one of those debates made it into the consciousness of Western authorities and the Western public, which is we, the Muslims, are going to get you, the non-Muslims. All of the other debates are equally relevant, for you but also for us. And one of those debates is even more frightening for someone like me and that debate is: 'we do not really have to go in there and attack them because Western societies will collapse from within.'

Meigs: That is an old argument and it did not work the last time.

Taipale: The interesting issue is where are those debates occurring, and why are we not clued into them?

Question: Regarding the comments made about cybercrime laws and so forth, we have a history of, when necessary, changing or suspending at least domestic laws, dating back to the Civil War, and the imprisonment of people without due process, etc. Today, we currently authorize government to do things that we do not let average citizens do, certainly with weapons – we do not let private citizens own certain types of weapons and so forth. Is it time for us to consider changing certain laws authorizing our government to do things with respect to the internet so that we can get a little bit further ahead in this information war?

Taipale: Well, yeah, I think a sub-thesis of my presentation was that we need some overarching framework in which to do these things, and we need it for two reasons. One, we need it for legitimacy and authority purposes, and, two, we also need it to have rules so that our people know what to do, which is the part that always gets forgotten in these things. In *The New York Times*, last week, there was this op-ed piece by an Army interrogator from Abu Ghraib who said, 'look, in all of my training, they told me about the Geneva Conventions, how to treat prisoners, and how to do interrogations – but when I got to Abu Ghraib they said these are not prisoners of war, the Convention doesn't apply – and I did not know what to do; I had no rules.' Even the worst rules give guidelines for action. Further, without rules, people often do not do anything. Without a set of rules, without doctrine, we do not know how to function. So, yes, we need rules to address this new battlefield, for coming up with analogous ways that we have dealt with these kinds of problems in the real world for online problems. We need to ask: what is the process? Is there a process, like a FISA process, for information operation warrants, where you would go and prove to somebody that you need to do the following things?

Question: I would just add that for people who are in charge of security and privacy programs, there is a misunderstanding of what the technology can actually do. So you get into situations where you are embarrassed because the technology is not effective, or the cost benefit is just so out of balance in terms of what everybody expects. They do not see the benefits, and so the programs get cancelled. There are certainly people in government that understand the technology, so it is a question of bringing the two together in small scale or large-scale programs.

Taipale: Can I follow up on that? I think a very vital thing that is also missing in this debate is that technology development, R&D technology development, requires failure. When we set up impossible standards, which I think we have done in many cases in the privacy field and other places, it implies that these technologies have to work, and at 100 percent, before we are allowed to use them. We have a real chicken and egg problem with research and development in technology. Now, I am not arguing that R&D ought to be free of any rules, but I am saying that we need to address R&D rules and experimentation differently than the rules that we are going to live with long term. We cannot use the procedures that, as said earlier, were sort of the extraordinary procedures used in wartime in the past, because this is a 'long war.' We need rules that work and that we can live with over a long period of time.

Question: In the QDR, there was a discussion about basically grinding them into the ground through cost, much like we did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This dovetails with what you were talking about, when you take a look at the potential, within the discussion, of pursuing that as a strategy. But how can we do that, given the rising cost of technology, research and development, and with the low cost of counter measures? Is that really a viable alternative that can we pursue across the information and the technology domain?

Meigs: If you look at cost in terms of this issue of center of gravity, which is truly an issue of the enemy's legitimacy, and you make each of the enemy's actions cost him in terms of his support base, then, the concept has a certain amount of efficacy because it forces you to look at the world from his perspective and what he cannot afford to lose.

Taipale: I think that is right. The pure cost thing is a losing battle. Again, I think, any measure that we take is going to be in excess of their counter-measures. On the intelligence side, this is the reason for secrecy, why you cannot reveal certain things. This is the classic NSA problem, why information is more powerful than kinetics. Disclosing one spy satellite obliterates a five hundred million-dollar investment, for instance. You cannot recall it after the fact; you cannot use force or do anything else to get that information back – it becomes a complete write off. That is the problem, particularly in asymmetric

or idiosyncratic warfare: it is the investment. In my view, the only investment that has payoff no matter who our enemy is, is understanding information and how to use information. Now, we still need heavy metal to oppose traditional force; we still need to kill and capture people and all those other things, but our thinking about cost has to change. As Gen. Meigs said, we need to impose costs on the enemy that he cannot bear – undermine his legitimacy, for example.

PANEL 3: WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS

Public Diplomacy & Winning the War of Ideas: The Battle for World Opinion

Col. F. William Smullen, III (Ret.)

Director of the National Security Studies Program (NSS), The Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, and Member of the U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy.

Winning the war of ideas, to me, suggests that there is a battle going on. In my view, this battle is the battle for world opinion, and we are struggling with it. One weapon, I will argue, that we should use in this battle is public diplomacy – a complex activity that I am going to briefly describe and reflect upon this afternoon.

Before I begin my formal remarks, however, I want to take this audience, momentarily, out of the present world by referring them to an ancient astrological theory that emanates from the Roman scholar Ptolemy. In the first millennium, he convinced the world that the planet Earth was the fixed center of the universe. It was not until the 16th millennium, that the Polish astronomer Nicolas Copernicus shattered conventional wisdom by arguing that the earth was merely one of many planets revolving around a centralized sun. At the time, this was a significant blow to the idea that God had set earth at the center of his creation. Why, you are probably asking, am I telling you this story?

My purpose is comparative, to encourage us to imagine how we as Americans often see the U.S. as the fixed center of a universe while other nations revolve around us. On the one hand, this idea is one of our endearing qualities: we as a nation and as a people, have grown comfortable with the premise that this republic was destined to hold a very unique place in human history – and, luckily, history has been for over two centuries on our side. President Reagan best described this phenomenon when he referred to America as ‘a shining city on a hill.’ On the other hand, regrettably, and perhaps more so recently, other nations around the world are no longer so willing to see us or deal with us in this way: in fact, many, and not only because of our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, see a monolithic empire doing whatever we want against whomever we want.

Such a view has resulted in the decline of what I call “brand America.” A “brand” is a term from marketing, as you know, and it means – not what you say about yourself, your organization, your company, your product, or your service – but the general perception of you by others. Whether we like to think of our country as a brand or not, its reputation, good or bad, exists in the minds of hundreds of millions, actually billions, of people around the world. So what America does, how it does it, and why it does it, directly shapes world opinion of our country brand.

I would submit to you that the reputation of brand America has been on a recent and steep decline. Consider this example. Recently, in 23 countries, when people of our age were asked what country they would recommend to their own young people for economic opportunities and the possibility of living a good life, we scored behind the likes of Australia, Canada, Britain, and Germany. These perceptions are influenced by two simple words that appear twice in *The 9-11 Commission Report*: diplomacy and public diplomacy.³¹ What people around the world generally think of America comes, in part, from what they think about Americans – usually a positive feeling toward us as people. But there is another side: what they think of us as a nation. Despite many positives, people tend to see Americans as: arrogant, ignorant, insensitive, disrespectful, exploitive, and self-centered.

The decline in America's reputation is to be found particularly in the Muslim and European worlds, where favorability ratings of the U.S. have shown a decline over the last four years (though this decline is also true in other parts of the world). It is also, here, where public diplomacy can make a difference.³²

In November 2004, for instance, a coordinated survey was taken in 10 countries of our friends and allies – those nations with which we have strong relationships. In these countries, the majority indicated an unfavorable view of America. Another recent example comes from a South Korean newspaper poll where 65.9 percent of young people in the country said if war were to break out between the U.S. and North Korea, they would side with their neighbor to




Source: RoperASW

the north – so much for a half century of force protection. The cool reception that President Bush receives when he travels abroad, particularly in Europe, is

yet another example of these frail and fraught relations that we are currently seeing with our friends, especially those in NATO countries. The average European, the average non-U.S. citizen around the world for that matter, does not care about many of the defenses that we are trying to resurrect. They are not impressed with U.S. foreign policy or the ties that bind us to them.

Another part of this trend is that many Americans have decided that they simply do not care that foreigners have come to believe that the U.S. is no longer “cool.” But we should care, not only for the sake of pride, but for many reasons, one of which is economic: the attitudes that people have about us, at this particular point in history, may have a lasting impact on our pocketbooks, our financial portfolios. In fact, the U.S. is so unpopular in parts of the world that there are boycotts of U.S. products occurring. I have taken the top ten U.S. “power brands,” Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Nike, Microsoft, Disney, Levi’s, Ford, Discovery, MTV, American Express, Estee Lauder, and AOL, for instance: all but one of these brands has witnessed their fortunes drop since 2002 – Ford is the exception.

Meanwhile, of the top non-U.S., overseas brands, nine of the 13 have improved their ratings during the same period. For a more specific example,



31 The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004): 363; 364.

32 All slides are from F. William Smullen’s “Public Diplomacy and Winning the War of Ideas” (paper presented at the 2006 Bantle-INSCT Symposium, Challenges in the Struggle against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas, March 29 – 30, 2006, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY).

consider that ten restaurants in Hamburg, Germany joined together to ban Coca Cola, Marlboro cigarettes, and the use of the American Express credit card. From a broader view, consider that one in five European consumers will avoid purchasing U.S. products and services offered by American-based companies. These choices are the direct result of U.S. foreign policies – and non-U.S. consumers are making no bones about it. This trend is also not confined to Europe: almost one out of four people in the Asia Pacific region say that they avoid buying American brands for the same reason.

We can, of course, think that these people are simply wrong and choose to ignore them, but unfortunately that will not change how they feel or act. Some of you may know this, but I was a member of a Congressionally-mandated committee that traveled to the Middle East and to Europe in 2004: our mandate was to observe the attitudes and the opinions in these countries. We also had the opportunity to talk to politicians, to Ambassadors, and to common people in many places. At the end of the trip, the seven of us committee members were unanimous in our view that there was a deep and abiding anger at America. We submitted recommendations as to how to address this problem in a report to the State Department.³³ Yet, what stayed with me was the urgency of this issue, the need to act quickly. During our trip, I requested that we visit Egypt because the Ambassador at the time, David Welch, is one of the brightest minds in the Foreign Service. When sitting in his office in Cairo, listening to his views, not just on what was happening in the country, but across the Middle East, he said something that I still find staggering: ‘we are making enemies faster than we are gaining friends,’ he noticed. This caused me to conclude that we must develop a plan that has at its core sensitivity to other cultures and to other peoples. What I came away with as we gathered impressions of negativity towards America is that, as a government, we must apply some expedient and insightful strategic thinking to a public diplomacy problem, the likes and proportions we have not previously known.


There must be several dimensions in this plan in order to make a difference. The first, I concluded upon ending this visit, is simply the recognition that we are not always as sensitive as we ought to be to others from different cultures, and further, that this sensitivity must be expressed toward people throughout the spectrum of a society – from elites to youths in a given country. Second, not only must we reach across demographic audiences with our message, we must devise a message that has a relevant and resonating tone – something that many different groups will want to listen to across their differences and that allows us to represent a commonality in message and intention.

There are many things that this message could project with sensitivity while preserving the dignity of different groups and cultures. Three elements, integral to the U.S. and to virtually all peoples of the world, are the issues of faith and education. We have a lot that we could say, from our own history and

experiences, that would be compelling to other areas of the world. If we do not do this now, we will suffer the consequences – and not only those impacting our economy. In fact, I am mainly concerned with the bigger consequences, those things that have been the subject of this conference over the past few days. Perhaps, they could be boiled down to that contested expression: the global war on terror. One thing is clear, we cannot fight this war alone – it must be done at the international level and with various communities in several countries fighting together to stop what is a mountain of challenges.

Likewise, if we choose to be proactive about getting across our message, we do not have an endless amount of time. The Taliban have an expression to taunt the Americans in Afghanistan, which may be instructive: ‘you’ve got the watches,’ they say, ‘but we’ve got the time.’ In effect, time is not on our side anymore – though it is on theirs – and, given that, this is not the time for complacency. It is the time for a government, ours, and a people, us, to get busy, to get actively involved in public diplomacy so that we may influence world opinion in positive ways, and so we may begin to win this battle for world opinion in which we are locked.

It is also important to remember that the more powerful an individual or entity, the more suspicions they provoke. Hence, to keep our sense of balance as the only superpower in the world, and to maintain faith in us as a people who are more invested in peace than in war, we need to keep our moral compass azimuth. We need to show the world that we do not intend to impose our will arbitrarily, and, quite frankly, as I tell my students, we need to be cognizant of the fact that, whatever we do, someone is always watching. This is a difficult time for U.S. diplomacy, the challenges and the consequences are enormous, and so we must set our course correctly and navigate it carefully – with the recognition of urgency, responsibility, and oversight. In my view, what would help us to pass these tests, these tests of public diplomacy, would be to



33 U.S. Department of State, Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Patricia de Stacy Harrison et al., Cultural Diplomacy: The Lynchpin of Public Diplomacy, Sept 2005. Available online: <http://www.nss.edu/Readings/Misc/CulturalDiplomacyReport.pdf>.

strengthen the bonds of international cooperation. That will help our economy grow. We need relationships to be successful in fighting the global war on terror, and we need relationships to live openly and securely – something that we have agonized over since September 2001.



One aspect of this problem is the barrier of language, not only that people talk past one another in this global conflict, but that we do not spend a lot of time and effort studying other languages – even while others take advantage of learning our language. Global market advertisers, for instance, know this lesson all too well and now adapt advertisements to a given cultural context and language. Remember the old advertisement campaign “come alive as the Pepsi generation?” In Chinese, this translated into a promise to bring ancestors back from the dead. “Body by Fisher” in Flemish came out “Corpse by Fisher.” Frank Perdue’s marketing claim that “it takes a strong man to make a tender chicken” meant, in Spanish, “it takes an aroused man to make a chicken affectionate.” Other cultures are also translating their own language into ‘global English,’ especially for tourists, which may produce some equally interesting mistranslations. But my point is that, just as marketers are making this shift by understanding that their messages – like their products – are global, so too must U.S. government agencies become actively involved in tailoring our message, our “brand America,” to culturally different audiences. This is an important component of U.S. diplomacy, known as public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy, the diplomacy of the U.S. State Department, is more than just public relations, however. It is finding – and expressing well, with sensitivity – a position on a particular issue, especially sensitive issues where different groups are inclined to disagree. At its core, public diplomacy has a lot to do with explaining – explaining who you are, what you are about, why you have done what you have done, or what you are going to do, indeed, what you hope to do. All of this influences public and, today, world opinion. The ambassadors in the 182 countries of the 192 countries of the world where we have embassies are busy today. They also have smart staffs doing public diplomacy

– but they cannot do it all and they cannot do it alone. So we have people around the world doing a variety of different things, including government-to-government programs and scholarships programs, such as the Fulbright and the Humphrey and Muskie exchange programs. The International Visitors Program is a particularly effective example of these public diplomacy programs, in my opinion, and one that we are fortunate to have here. The International Center of Syracuse works with the State Department to host international visitors to the Central New York area each year. I have met with a professor from Hungary who wanted to study our educational system, for instance, a high-ranking Chinese government official who wanted to learn about our form of local government, journalists interested in public culture from Taiwan and South Korea. All of these programs provide opportunities for us to interact with professionals from places that do not necessarily understand us. Anwar Sadat, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, Margaret Thatcher, Hamid Karzai and many others, have come to the U.S. under the auspices of these programs and learned, during their time, lessons that subsequently benefited us by virtue of these early relationships.



Additionally, Syracuse University is particularly fortunate to be one of seven universities in the U.S. to host a group of international journalists next month – many from the Middle East. We will take them into classrooms, to chat with students, to businesses downtown, to meetings with journalists. The idea is not only to expose them to Syracuse, NY, but to America as reflected in this local city and its university. At the end of the day, we will gain new friends. But the importance of this State Department initiative is in choosing those professionals from all over the world who will come here to see “America” for themselves and to report back their impressions to millions of people. Consider this: last year, 35,000 students were involved in exchange programs; many current world leaders have been educated

in America, including Mexican President Vicente Fox, who met with President Bush in Cancun today, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. They, among many of the world's leaders, have degrees from U.S. colleges and universities and, thus, experienced in their time here greater understanding and appreciation of this country. Syracuse University alone has 2,000 international students making up its 18,000 graduate and undergraduate student population.



There are, of course, more traditional ways that governments can work on the cultural side of public diplomacy, many of which were mentioned yesterday – Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and a new station in the Middle East. These are all important. There are also American libraries and cultural centers associated with our embassies all over the world. But, in addition to these government-to-government programs, I like to advocate what I call “people-to-people” programs where ordinary Americans take up this cause: host international visitors in your own town or an international student in your home, for instance, or sensitize your family and friends to the fact and the mechanics of anti-Americanism across the world; help change the attitudes among ordinary Americans and those non-Americans that you encounter on trips, vacations, holidays, excursions. Embrace the issue.

We also need to be clear eyed as a nation about our foreign policy in a moment that is about so much more than, simply, how Iraq turns out. This moment, especially after 9/11, is about making decisions that are right for the country – with implications for all times. In all of the years that I have been witnessing the relationships that we have built with other countries around the world, there has never been a more delicate, and in my view, a more desperate time – and I am not a pessimistic guy. I want to close with a challenge that I would ask of all of you, individually and collectively: I think we can all make a difference, but we all need to invest in this challenge, in some specific way, because it is an enormous one.

Change & the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas

Harold C. Pachios

Founding and Managing Partner of the Portland, Maine law firm of Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios; member of the U.S. Department of State Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

The U.S. Department of State Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy has been around since 1948. I have been in the Commission longer than anybody, not since 1948, but for 13 years now. It is risky to talk about war – and part of what I want to discuss, today, is the global war on terror – especially when you are not trained in the art of warfare. I do not want to play down my military background, since I did get promoted some 45 years ago from ensign to lieutenant J.G., the pinnacle of my Navy career. I have enormous respect for those who are serving our country in the military, their talent, intelligence, discipline, and willpower – the greatest armed forces in the history of this planet.

My title, *Change and the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas*, generates a series of questions that I want to address to establish a context for talking about the war of ideas and winning it. The first question: are we talking about winning the war of ideas against those engaged in violent extremist attacks, like those that occurred on 9/11? I do not think so, since they are unlikely to be influenced by our ideas, no matter what kind of information campaign we conduct. We often hear that these people just do not understand us, and thus, we need to have a better public diplomacy program so that they can. But, in my view, they understand us all too well. The violence that those terrorists have unleashed does not result from their failure to understand us, or our failure to communicate. They lived among us.

Last week, incidentally, I met with a friend, a real-estate developer in Delray, Florida. We went to Linton Boulevard, to an apartment complex that he had developed, where some of the 9/11 bombers had lived. This was their home – imagine that. Today, exchange programs are the foundation of the U.S. State Department's public diplomacy programs. We believe, correctly, that if foreigners come to our country, even for a few weeks, that they will learn what we are all about: that we are a diverse country, that conflicting ideas and customs are tolerated, that individual rights are supreme, and that people are free to practice any religion they choose. If visitors understand this, so the theory goes, they are less likely to be our enemy. But this is not so with this group of terrorists. They understood our culture, our democratic process, our neighborhoods, our diversity, and our tolerance for ideas. They understood us, perhaps, better than those who participate in three-week or six-month exchanges, better than those who listen to Voice of America everyday. They

lived among us; they did not lack information. Instead, they consider us the enemy because of what we do and who they are.

Some argue that it is our foreign policy that motivates terrorism, that generates violent opposition to the U.S. Nearly three years ago, Secretary of State Colin Powell appointed a panel of a dozen experts to go to the Middle East to determine the cause of anti-Americanism. We organized our observation in the report, *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World*, much like dozens of other public diplomacy reports.³⁴ I was on the Council on Foreign Relations task force, which, like the other task forces that I was on, all say the same thing – which is not a lot. We recommended, like the others, more exchanges, more English teaching programs, more money for Embassy Public Affairs Programs, more private corporate support and involvement, and more cultural programming.

I want to make sure that I am on the record, here, saying that these are good things, and that we should do more of them. But in all the meetings that we had in the Middle East, with journalists, academics, government officials, and citizens during our two weeks there, no one said that the cause of anti-Americanism is that we do not understand you. After all, these are elites. For the most part, they did and do understand us. Like a broken record, they all said the problem was U.S. foreign policy – unrestricted political support for Israel and the occupation of the Palestinian territories and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for which they said, there was no credible explanation. This is the single most important factor for the spectacular growth of anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

The point was made, here, at this symposium this morning, that polling in Arab countries soon after the American bombing attacks in Afghanistan showed relatively positive results. That has changed: they think we have a different agenda, now, than simply going after the people who attacked our country. Yet, our report never even mentioned policy. Almost all of my colleagues wanted to avoid any suggestion that the administration's policies, regardless of whether they were right or wrong, might be the cause of some of this anti-Americanism in the Middle East. How can you write a report and leave that out? I hasten to point out that the chairman of the task force, Ambassador Edward Djerejian, a former Assistant Secretary of State, Ambassador to Syria, Ambassador to Israel, and a Middle East expert, made a valiant, but unsuccessful, effort to get the group to acknowledge the obvious impact of American policies on public opinion in the Middle East. Since that time he has actually spoken frequently about it.

34 Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Edward P. Djerejian et al., *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World*, Oct 2003, available online at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf>.

There is an important distinction to be made, of course, between the hardcore al-Qaeda terrorists who are in a shooting war with the U.S. because of its policies, and the millions of people in the Middle East who do not have a positive view of the U.S. because of its policies, but are not at war with us. The war of ideas is very much relevant to them and, shortly, I will discuss the importance of public diplomacy as it affects this category of people.

My second question relates to who is a terrorist? The Bush Administration finds it politically convenient to use 'terrorist' in reference to a wide range of opponents. In a war where only one side has both the latest weapons technology and large numbers of professional soldiers, and the other side fights with whatever is available, including stealth, deceit, roadside bombs, and disguise, can we use the term terrorist? Were American revolutionaries, the French or the Yugoslav resistance in World War II terrorists, or were they engaged in a resistance movement? Were the Vietcong terrorists or national liberation fighters? These are important distinctions because it seems to me, in these situations, the party with the high-tech weaponry, trained army, and capacity for shock and awe has a hard time selling ideas – fear, yes, but not ideas.

Usually, physical opponents do not succumb to ideas. Real war, with a lot of destruction, has a way of eroding attempts to win with ideas. One of the most significant reading experiences I have had was Neil Sheehan's, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*, the Pulitzer Prize-winning book about Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann and a historical perspective on the Vietnam War. Vietnam is not Iraq, but the lessons are important. I worked in the White House during the critical years of the Westmoreland buildup in Vietnam, and I was, as you might expect, a true believer. I was a purveyor in those days, as Deputy White House Press Secretary of Statistics: Vietcong body counts, bomb tonnage dropped by American planes, numbers of strategic hamlets established. I could tell you, reporters, our allies, and I did, about the efforts of our own small 'coalition of the willing.' I worked on the message that it was not good to publicly disagree with the U.S. position because that would encourage the enemy and sabotage our country's fighting men. 'Stay the course,' we would say, 'be patient!' The idea was that the South Vietnamese army would improve and take over the fighting; American boys will come home; and the people of South Vietnam will preserve their precious freedom. Another currently familiar theme that we were selling at the time was the power of democracy. There had been three military coups in South Vietnam, and in 1966 Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van Thieu were in power. Lyndon B. Johnson believed that if they were actually elected, it would demonstrate that they were like us, they shared our values. Like most patriotic Americans, particularly successful politicians, he figured, if it works here, it will work there.

In February 1966, a year before the South Vietnamese election took place, President Johnson held a summit conference in Honolulu with Premier Ky and General Thieu. I was there as Bill Moyer's deputy in the White House Press Office. After returning to Washington, a staff photographer for *The New York Times* asked me if the President's personal photographer had taken any pictures in Honolulu of Johnson and the two colonels, who were now aspiring politicians – at least in Johnson's mind. *The New York Times* needed the photograph for a magazine piece on the conference, so I gave him a lovely photo of the three men standing in President Johnson's hotel suite: the 6'4" Johnson standing in the middle and the diminutive colonels standing to each side of him. I thought nothing of it. Nearly two weeks later on a Sunday morning at 6:30 a.m., the phone rang at my Washington bachelor pad, and an operator said, "Mr. Pachios, please hold for the President." A few seconds later a loud Texas drawl interrupted my revelry: 'are you happy?' Completely confused and not knowing if I was supposed to be happy or not, I hesitated, whereupon I was asked, again, the same question. I mustered enough courage to say, 'Sir, I do not understand.'

President Johnson asked me if I had seen *The New York Times* that morning and whether I realized I 'had brought down the government of Vietnam' – a stunner for a 29-year-old guy from Cape Elizabeth, Maine. After several hours that Sunday of living with the burden of having destroyed the government in Saigon and, perhaps, lost the war for the U.S., I called a colleague who explained it all. Johnson, the veteran campaigner, believed that voters had a poor impression of a candidate who appeared small. In his view, it was politically devastating for a 5'5" candidate to be pictured next to a 6'4" guy. This was my first lesson in public diplomacy, the art of image building and its effect on foreign public opinion.

In those days, we talked a lot about the battle for the hearts and minds of Vietnam, especially the rural population. The U.S. military, USAID, and the CIA engaged in a joint effort to win hearts and minds through the old idea of interagency cooperation. Years later, through the actual field experiences of Colonel John Paul Vann, Douglas Ramsey (a civilian assigned to USAID), and other Americans dedicated to this cause, concluded that, no matter what our message, no matter what devices and programs we used to deliver it, it had little effect on people. The people whose villages were being bombed and whose families were being killed were not influenced by it.

'Shock and awe' is not effective, in my view, in winning hearts and minds. It may be effective for other reasons, but not as a way to win hearts and minds. To the extent that the definition of terrorists includes, as the administration will have it, all warrior insurgents everywhere, including Sunnis in Iraq, Palestinians in the West Bank, they are not candidates for the hearts and minds initiative.

By contrast, with respect to people who have not yet made a commitment to violence, they are our target audience.

While the Vietnam War is not analogous to the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, and even less analogous to the global war on terrorism – where our opponent does not have geographical boundaries – there is much to be learned from the Vietnam experience. One keeps hearing in Iraq that native forces will take over. But what happens when the proxy does not do as good of a job, does not fight as well as we do, or if the proxy does not have as strong a cause as the opponent? These are serious problems. Ultimately, in Vietnam, the proxy business did not work, and we had to fight that war with nearly half a million Americans. Applying military might and carrying out occupation is the surest way to lose hearts and minds. Occupations require rules that are enforced by the end of a bayonet; they require detention centers for military and civilian detainees, like Abu Ghraib, or the so-called black room in Iraq, which *The New York Times* reported on last week. Occupations require martial law and loss of freedom of movement, and they produce mass resentment.

Those are simply the facts – there are no value judgments here. Did Japan win the hearts and minds of the Philippines between 1942 and 1944? Did Germany win the hearts and minds in a single country that they occupied in World War II? Did the Soviet Union succeed in Eastern Europe or in Afghanistan, the British in Northern Ireland, or the Israelis in the occupations of the pre-1967 Palestinian territories? Even Syria lost the hearts and minds of many Lebanese as a result of its occupation. On the one hand, our engagement in the war of ideas is not likely, in my judgment, to influence those with whom we are at war – the people who are on record saying that they want to destroy America and kill Americans, here and in Iraq. But, on the other hand, we are talking about a few thousand people, not hundreds of thousands, even though those few thousand have had considerable success in renewing themselves and in the ability to raise the numbers of violent extremists to the level of hundreds of thousands. My point is that this will depend, in large measure, on our success in waging the war of ideas.

This is the war that the U.S. must carry out, though it cannot successfully do it alone. It will require the voices of our pre-Iraq allies, the voices of Arab and Muslim leaders, the voices of spiritual advisors throughout the world, and a role for the media and even for celebrities, who are so influential. Most of all, it will require the U.S., the world's only superpower, to have a credible voice. So much depends on who is doing the talking. During the Cold War, the U.S. encouraged peoples' democratic aspirations with legitimacy. This, of course, was not difficult to do: it was a bipolar world and the other side was not selling personal freedom. It should also be emphasized that we were encouraging these aspirations through the use of soft power and public diplomacy. In those days, there was not even a notion in America that we could help people achieve these

goals through preemptive invasion and occupation – and I say that despite what the former Acting Under Secretary of the Army said last night, because I do not know where those preempted wars were that he mentioned.

We talked in those days – when the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) became very effective – with a strong sense of legitimacy. But it does depend on who is doing the talking since the message does not have much effect without a credible voice. We worry so much in Washington about what are we doing, what are we saying, what information we are giving out, that we are not doing a good enough job of getting our message across – it is the voice that is saying it.

America is no longer a universally credible voice. It is a matter of who we are perceived to be, as Bill Smullen just mentioned, which can be much different than what we perceive ourselves to be. Many Americans see our country – accurately, I personally believe, as the world's beacon of personal freedom and democracy, of social and economic opportunity, of diversity, and as a place in which the oppressed and downtrodden can find relief and a better life. We were once perceived as a nation that sought alliances and multilateral approaches in dealing with the rest of the world. Likewise, the American people see themselves as tolerant, caring, compassionate, and idealistic. Until the end of the 20th century, that self-perception was approximately how America was perceived in the world – several polls represent that past. Most presidents in the second half of the 20th century reinforced that perception: Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton were treated to many enthusiastic public receptions everywhere in the world; and Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton were international stars. These chiefs of state could positively influence foreign publics, and despite its enormous economic and military power, America's image was more soft than hard. In fact, this image of American power was so soft that, in fact, much internal political debate centered on whether its leaders were 'soft on communism' (i.e., the Democrats), or naïvely idealistic (i.e., President Carter).

But since the year 2000, our leaders have projected a new image of America, which has been achieved rather easily and very effectively because of the global information revolution. This voice is different: it talks about preemptive war wherever and whenever America wants, of unlimited military power which produces shock and awe. It announces that we will 'go it alone' because we can, and further, that the point of view of 'old Europe' is neither particularly relevant nor important. This new voice announces that America can and ought to change the world through its use of unparalleled military power because, again, 'we can.' It thereby reinforces with public pronouncements around the world that which the world already knows: 'we can.' This voice, it must be noted, has great domestic political appeal to many Americans, but it, predictably, causes non-Americans to fear us. By the way, I do not discount the utility of fear in keeping order, but we should not expect the fearful to be our friends. As editors

Robert Kagan and William Kristol in *Present Dangers, Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* suggest, “It is precisely because American foreign policy is infused with an unusually high degree of morality that other nations find they have less to fear from its otherwise daunting power.”³⁵

So, the problem is that there are millions of people around the world who do not believe us. The message conveyed since 2001 is not consistent with our traditional public diplomacy message and, so, we have a credibility problem. I might add that it is self-delusional to think that foreign publics believe that American foreign policy is “infused with a high degree of morality.” The first American predicate for the invasion of Iraq was, for instance, the existence of weapons of mass destruction. Only when that was discredited did the U.S. use alternative explanations, connecting Iraq to international terrorism, for instance, which worked to convince an astounding percentage of Americans that Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attack. When that explanation did not take with many Americans and almost all of the rest of the world, the attack was rationalized by the need to get rid of Saddam Hussein – because he is a thug, as we all know, a murderer, and a thief. Slowly we have seen a fourth, and, perhaps, final explanation emerge: we invaded Iraq in order to bring democracy to the Iraqi people. I will tell you, personally, if this happens, that will be a very good reason – who could argue with it?

But this mode of providing serial explanations did further damage to our international credibility. Again, there was a dangerous disconnect between the perception of large numbers of Americans and the perceptions of foreign publics. Why is there a disconnect? I do not know for sure, but I read a piece recently by Chester A. Crocker, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under the Reagan administration, who offered this simple explanation: political support has been sustained with the help of a toxic mixture of nationalism and gullibility on the part of the American electorate. Here is where I am going with this – and I know that I am being too critical here and that nobody has walked out on me yet because you are all too polite – but in discussing the war of ideas, I do not think we can get very far unless we create legitimacy and credibility.

How do you do it, if these are our policies? I think we have got to redefine the United States, and it does not have to be a dramatic redefinition. I have been, as I mentioned, a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for 11 years, four of them as chairman. Since 2001, President Bush’s first year in office, there has been an enormous increase in our government’s attention to public diplomacy and the allocation of resources to public diplomacy. In fact, public diplomacy has captured the attention of both former Secretary of State

35 Robert Kagan and William Kristol eds. *Present Dangers, Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000): 22.

Colin Powell and present Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Their predecessor, Madeline Albright, frankly paid no attention to it, which I know from personal experience. This administration has attempted to reform our public diplomacy apparatus, give it more bureaucratic power and importance in the State Department, develop ideas to accommodate the new global communications platform and reality, and best of all, it has viewed the public diplomacy mission as sufficiently important enough to assign the President's closest confidant to lead it. What more could we ask for? Aside from the fact that the gifted Bill Clinton was a public diplomacy triumph – not a domestic political triumph, but an international political triumph – the contrast is stark between these two administrations: the previous Clinton administration killed USIA and various public diplomacy efforts, while this administration has worked overtime on public diplomacy from the start. Yet, despite these very different efforts, anti-Americanism has grown exponentially today, and that is my point: we have worked so much harder, so what exactly is the problem?

Anti-Americanism has grown exponentially, not just in the Middle East, but everywhere, in Western Europe, South America, even Canada. Anti-Americanism has grown dramatically in countries like Korea and Turkey, where we have long and traditional alliances – indeed, anti-Americanism is impeding our foreign policy goals with respect to the former case of North Korea and it has disabled us from launching a northern attack in Iraq in the latter case of Turkey. So how do we redefine ourselves? First, before other countries will accept U.S. leadership, they must be convinced, not just that America is good, but that it is wise in its application of power. Would not the use of America's overwhelming military might to protect the women and children of the Sudan, for instance, be a positive redefinition of the U.S.? If the U.S. were to say that it is reengaging on the issue of climate control because it is a problem – not just for some people in the world, but for all who reside on this planet – would that be a positive step in the redefining process?

Second, in this re-definitional effort, words count a lot, so we must be careful about what we say. The President should make it clear to his cabinet and, indeed, to all government spokespeople, that he will not tolerate chest-beating machismo, or that we do not care about what the rest of the world thinks – these are public pronouncements favored by the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense. Pollster John Zogby notes that public opinion polls in Arab and Muslim countries show strong negative reactions to any statement by a U.S. government official about the 'clash of religions.'³⁶ President Bush has done a good job of publicly playing

36 James Zogby, *Attitudes of Arabs: An In-depth Look at Social and Political Concerns of Arabs* (Washington DC: Arab American Institute and Zogby International, 2005) available online http://aai.3cdn.net/6e38e45846c8ce7df5_k0m6be9di.pdf; John Zogby, James Zogby, *Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America; How Arabs Learn about America, A Six-Nation Survey Commissioned by The Arab American Institute* (Zogby International, 2004) available online http://aai.3cdn.net/229fc3112466dc002f_wvm6bhed9.pdf; Dafna Linzer, "Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor at U.S.," *Washington Post*, 23 July 2004, p. 26.

down religious conflict. But then – and I do not want to offend anyone’s friend here – Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence General William G. Jerry Boykin inflamed public opinion once again by stating that Muslim fighters are satanic and that an Islamic God is an idol.³⁷ Maybe one percent of people here in Syracuse and the rest of America know about this example, but I can tell you that about 99 percent of the people in the Middle East knew about it – it was all over their newspapers and on television.

This was a public diplomacy disaster in the Middle East which the Secretary of Defense called “a private affair.” If U.S. government officials, including high-ranking military officers, are free to make any statement that they wish and have it carried by the media throughout the world, and if this is simply a private issue, no matter how it might undermine our diplomatic efforts, one wonders why we bother spending all this money on public diplomacy programs. I suspect, incidentally – and you folks in the military can correct me – that if a three-star general makes a public announcement wearing his uniform, as this fellow did, suggesting, for instance, that the administration’s decision to invade Iraq was a terrible mistake, that this would not be viewed by the Secretary of Defense as “a private matter.” More likely, the Secretary of Defense would fire the general for undermining U.S. foreign policy. Why did the administration not think that General Boykin was undermining U.S. foreign policy? This is an important question which may help us understand why America’s image is in tatters.

The statements from representatives of our government do, in fact, define us, but we can also redefine ourselves by refraining from publicly bashing the UN and other international organizations. I realize that there is a strong domestic political constituency for this bashing. Many American voters give ‘points’ to politicians, national as well as regional, who employ a little demagoguery on this matter. But there is a price to this issue, and it is a public diplomacy price. I believe the UN can be reformed without U.S. public pronouncements that damage its legitimacy. In a 23-country BBC World Series poll, two thirds of the 23,000 people polled were in favor of the UN becoming significantly more powerful in world affairs.³⁸ If this were an American domestic poll, the administration would already be promising to deliver.

In short, the redefinition of America’s image will require an infusion of more traditional American idealism in our policies. Last year in a piece entitled, “Smart Power” in *Foreign Affairs*, Suzanne Nossel argued that we need

37 Robert Burns, “General Faulted For Satan Speeches: Boykin’s Remarks on Terrorism and Religion Violated Pentagon Rules”, The Associated Press, 19 August 2004.

38 BBC World Service Poll, “23-Country Poll Finds Strong Support for Dramatic Changes at UN, and for Increased UN Power” (Globespan/Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), 22 March 2005, available online http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/UnitedNations/UNReform_May05/UNReform_Mar05_rpt.pdf).

to inject “liberal internationalism” into what we say about foreign policy.³⁹ Unfortunately, those two words could easily give rise to an angry two-hour monologue by Bill O’Reilly on *Fox News Channel*, so maybe we ought to find another phrase. I believe that liberal internationalism means emphasizing things like humanitarianism, American philosophy and idealism, and focusing, as Bill Smullen suggested, on education, healthcare and the environment. John F. Kennedy, for instance, took us to the brink of nuclear war in the Cuban missile crisis. This was a man who glorified the American military and was devoted to it – particularly the Green Berets of the U.S. Army Special Forces. But he also projected American idealism: the world associated him and, consequently, our country, with the Peace Corps as much as with the 23,000 forces that he sent to Vietnam.

Today, we are trying to influence world-wide opinion in an age of global communication, networks, and satellite television – a world in which those who are illiterate and living in the most remote villages still watch televised news. Today, foreign public opinion matters more than ever, and it is ludicrous to think that American foreign policy objectives can be achieved without the support of foreign publics. The support that we are looking for cannot be found at the end of a bayonet – that is, I believe, self-evident. We have been, essentially, discussing what Joe Nye has labeled ‘soft power.’⁴⁰ Nye has, however, not won over the current administration with his views, and the Secretary of Defense has even said of soft power that “he does not know what it means.” Some of my friends, too, cringe at the term; in fact, realists, neoconservatives, readers of Machiavelli, think that soft power is the problem. But since the subject at this symposium is ‘hearts and minds,’ we need to think about how to adjust our tone, our message, if we want to achieve some influence on the world’s hearts and minds.

America’s politicians – and I will end shortly – are experts at reaching out to the hearts and minds of our own citizens, their constituencies. This is how they improve their favorability ratings, and it is number one on their agenda. There are tried and true rules to do this: first, do not insult the voters, the people who you want to influence – or at least the majority of them. Second, try and understand what they want. Third, tell them you agree with them, and that you are going to try to help them. And fourth, try within reason to deliver on some of these promises. Now, I am not suggesting that U.S. foreign policy should be developed in accord with the wishes of foreign publics or their governments. But if we really want to influence others, it is really not difficult to craft messages. About three years ago there was a Pew Survey of many Arab and some non-Arab countries that attempted to measure, in descending order, what was important to them: education, good healthcare, a job, and family financial security consistently

39 Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, 83(2) (March/April 2004): 131-142.

40 Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Cambridge: Perseus, 2004)

ranked in the top four or five of the rankings.⁴¹ Religion for the great majority – and this shocked me – was around fifth or sixth down on the list, probably lower than it would be in many areas of the U.S. So, the results were similar to what you might expect to find in Wichita, Fresno, Indianapolis, and Syracuse.

The 2004 Zogby poll of Arab attitudes toward the U.S., which I mentioned, featured in the *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, found similar results.⁴² In my opinion, this is the very best public diplomacy study ever done, and it was undertaken at the request of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz – let us give credit where credit is due to Paul Wolfowitz and to my good friend Bruce Gregory, one of the principal authors. But this is a government document that said everything that I have said today, but in stronger language; frankly, I have never seen anything like it. So, to return to my point, the message has to be delivered by a legitimate voice with credibility. Most people, no matter where they live, focus on the future well-being of their children. Thus, the messages about American technological advances that improve disease control and wellness, and how these can be shared with people in other countries, will influence the thinking of foreign publics, particularly in non-Western nations. Our messages, therefore, should focus on how the U.S. can help educate young people in other countries through computerized distance learning programs, for instance, which bypass the bureaucracy of country-to-country programs, and by the establishment of regional American universities similar to those in Beirut and Cairo, as well as those in Greece, Eastern Europe, and Turkey. Our message should also focus on indiscriminate terrorist bombing, particularly on the killing and wounding of innocent children – we need to do more about putting that problem out before the world. I will end with the most encompassing shared value of all, the one that ties all human beings together, security and the well being of our children. These shared values, shared views, and shared experiences ought to be prioritized. Thank you.

41 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “A Year After the Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Even Higher, Muslim Anger Persists” (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2004) available online <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=831>, and “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity,” 6 July 2006 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press)..

42 See note 3. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, (Washington, D.C., September 2004), available online http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.

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Admiral Giambastiani served as the 7th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2005 to 2007. As the nation's second highest ranking military officer, Admiral Giambastiani co-led the development of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review with Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. Admiral Giambastiani's previous assignments have included several in which he was responsible for developing new technologies and experimental processes, as well as operational command at every level, from experimental submarine to Combatant Commander. He was assigned as NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and as Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, where he led the transformation of NATO and U.S. military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines. Admiral Giambastiani has been awarded numerous decorations but is most proud of his 19 unit awards because they recognize the participation and accomplishments of the entire team.

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Ms. Hassan serves as the Director of the United Nations Information Service (UNIS) and Spokesperson for the Vienna-based United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) since 2004. Ms. Hassan has over 25 years of experience with the United Nations (UN) and has held senior positions in other branches of UNDOC, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. Ms. Hassan has served in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia; her last mission assignment was as Spokesperson of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC) where she looked into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Prior to joining the UN in 1981, Ms. Hassan was awarded a scholarship as a Research Fellow at the Third World Institute for Economic and Social Studies in Mexico City. Ms. Hassan's research on suicide terrorism has been published in academic journals and news magazines.

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